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Foreword
Forecasting is one of the oldest of demographic activities, and yet it
has never been fully integrated with the main body of demographic
theory and data. The fact that the public regards it as our most im-
portant task finds no reflection in our research agenda; the amount
of it done is out of all proportion to the fraction of space devoted to
it in professional journals. The best demographers do it, but none
would stake their reputation on the agreement of their forecasts
with the subsequent realization - in fact some of the most eminent
demographers have been the authors of the widest departures.
Demographers do not use the departures as data for learning
how to improve their skills; in fact they rarely even look back at
forecasts made 10 or 20 years earlier to note what the errors have
been. Anyone who expects that after a census is taken there will be
a flurry of articles recalling previous forecasts and congratulating or
condemning will be disappointed. Writers merely go on to forecast
the next following census, usually without even a glance at their
past errors.
The present volume is designed to correct this unsatisfactory
condition. Its writers include some of the best-known names in the
profession, as well as younger people who in due course will succeed
them as leaders. They systematically go through the components of
future population - births, deaths, migration - that for any individ-
ual include all the possible ways of entering or leaving the world or
any country in it. The chapters systemically explore the possibili-
ties of bringing the best demographic methods to the improvement
of our knowledge of future population. Few show any defensiveness
in regard to their own earlier forecasts; the approach throughout is
fresh and original.
xiii
By bringing to bear the best of demographic knowledge on an
application whose importance has recently been accentuated by con-
cern with environment, this book will provide a valuable contribu-
tion in its own right, and at the same time be a stimulus to further
needed research.
Nathan Keyfitz
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
November 1993
Introduction
Public and academic interest in population seems to follow a cycli-
cal pattern of ups and downs that is much more pronounced than
waves in demographic rates. Whereas the 1960s and early 1970s was
a period of international upsurge in public population concern and
demographic research, during the 1980s population hardly made it
into the headlines. Presently, we are experiencing the onset of a new
wave of public interest in world population growth which is largely
fueled by ecological concerns. Population growth is mentioned re-
peatedly in international fora as one of the driving forces, if not the
single most important factor, in global environmental change. But
this time it is natural scientists rather than demographers who point
at the importance of the issue.
Demographers remain conspicuously silent in the face of the at-
tention suddenly given to an issue they have carefully studied for
decades, while researchers in other disciplines attempt to occupy
this territory. Demographers, who should have better knowledge
of population dynamics and the determinants of fertility, mortality,
and migration, tend to be embarrassed over frequent oversimplifica-
tions in the present debate, and also tend to be puzzled over how
to approach the highly complex issue of population-environment in-
teraction. Scientists from other disciplines are often less cautious in
making statements about the role of population and do not always
apply the same rules of scientific scrutiny that they are expected to
apply in their own discipline. It is also problematic when scientific
paradigms from the natural sciences and animal ecology are directly
applied to complex social systems.
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Without a doubt this new interest in population issues presents
a positive challenge and opportunity for demographers and social
scientists in general. Instead of retreating from this territory of
increasingly interdisciplinary population analysis, the demographic
community could show flexibility and directly address some of the
well-justified questions asked by the outside world. These ques-
tions are discussed extensively in Chapter 2 of this volume. One
central question in this context regards possible future population
trends in the face of ecological constraints and new threats to hu-
man life. An increasing number of people want to know more about
possible alternative population trends than the standard population
projections provide. Such people include scholars in energy analysis
who want long-range population scenarios as input to their mod-
els; regional planners, politicians, and business leaders who want to
develop robust strategies that hold under different possible future
population patterns; and an increasing number of individuals who
are simply interested in the issue. These nondemographers often
want to know more about the assumptions made, their justifica-
tions, and the range of uncertainty than has been given to them up
to now by demographers.
This volume has been produced because of the belief that the
demographic community can do more in terms of summarizing its
knowledge about future population trends than has been done in
the past. In this, the book attempts to serve a dual purpose: to
respond to the challenge of increased outside interest in alternative
future population trends; and to advance within the demographic
community the discussion on the approaches and assumptions to be
chosen for population projections.
In its approach the volume follows that of an earlier book, Fu-
ture Demographic Trends in Europe and North America: What Can
We Assume Today? (Lutz, ed., 1991, Academic Press, London,
UK). The basic idea is to devote the bulk of space to substantive
deliberations of experts with partly differing views about possible
future trends in the three components of population change: fertil-
ity, mortality, and migration. In a final part the alternative views
on future trends of each component are translated into a set of alter-
native scenarios. In this book the scenario approach is applied in a
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more systematic and elaborate way than in the 1991 book. Different
sets of projections are presented until 2030 and 2100.
Part I of the volume addresses the question of what justifies
another set of global population projections. It starts with a com-
prehensive survey of past long-range global population projections
in Chapter 1 written by Tomas Frejka, who in the early 1970s pro-
duced the most influential set of long-range projections following
Notestein's work of 1945 and introduced the concept of convergence
toward replacement-level fertility. In his contribution, Frejka em-
phasizes the lessons learned from past projections and points at
desirable features of new world population projections. In Chap-
ter 2, Wolfgang Lutz, Joshua Goldstein, and Christopher Prinz dis-
cuss some basic questions in population projections which are rarely
addressed in an explicit way. The chapter, entitled "Alternative Ap-
proaches to Population Projection," deals with such issues as who is
interested in projections, what output parameters are desired, what
should be the time horizon, and how can the issue of uncertainty
be handled. Chapter 2 also presents and justifies the specific sce-
nario approach chosen for this study and compares its features with
previous population projections.
Part II is dedicated to future fertility in today's developing coun-
tries. It consists of four chapters dealing with different aspects of
this issue which will dominate the extent of future world population
growth. In Chapter 3, John Cleland gives a comprehensive survey
of regional fertility trends between 1960 and 1990 and the factors
behind these changes. This chapter serves as an important basis for
our fertility assumptions. Chapter 4, by Charles Westoff, is more
explicitly oriented toward the future; it summarizes the extensive
empirical evidence on reproductive preferences and discusses their
implications for the future course of fertility decline. From this
analysis, powerful arguments can be derived for assuming fertility
declines, at least in the near future. In Chapter 5, Mercedes Concep-
cion looks at another important factor in determining future fertility
levels, namely, the role of population policies and family-planning
programs. Based on the experience from Southeast Asia, she shows
that such programs can make a big difference if certain precondi-
tions are met. In Chapter 6, Griffith Feeney gives an account of the
amazing fertility changes in China. Based on the analysis of parity
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progression ratios, he also derives some alternative scenarios for fu-
ture fertility in that country, which currently is home to one-fifth of
the world's population.
Part III of the volume looks at future mortality in developing
countries. It also consists of four chapters. An introductory chapter
by Birgitta Bucht (Chapter 7) provides a comprehensive analysis of
recent mortality trends in the different developing regions. Michel
Garenne in Chapter 8 focuses on mortality in sub-Saharan Africa,
the world region with the greatest uncertainties. One of the un-
certainties, the mortality impact of AIDS, is explicitly addressed in
Chapter 9 by John Bongaarts. Although both chapters focus on
Africa, many of the considerations also apply to other developing
regions. Finally, Gerhard Heilig in Chapter 10 addresses a cru-
cial question which is usually excluded from population projections,
namely, whether there will be enough food to feed all the people
projected or whether famine-related mortality is likely to increase
at some point. His conclusion is that at least for the next decades,
global food supplies should be sufficient under favorable political
conditions.
Part IV considers fertility and mortality in today's industrial-
ized countries. It has two chapters but, in the discussion, reference is
also made to the 14 chapters on that topic included in Lutz (1991).
Lutz in Chapter 11 considers various arguments that would suggest
further fertility declines in today's low fertility countries opposed to
some arguments implying higher fertility. James Vaupel and Hans
Lundstrom in Chapter 12 focus on the controversial issue of future
old-age mortality in developed societies. For making future mortal-
ity assumptions over many decades in countries that already have
female life expectancies of around 80 years, the question of an upper
limit to the human life span becomes decisive.
Part V of the volume considers migration between the world
regions. International migration is a weak point in most popula-
tion projections because of deficient data and the assumed volatility
of future migration trends. For this reason it has sometimes been
omitted altogether, which in fact means the assumption of zero mi-
gration. This volume makes an effort to deal with migration more
explicitly. In Chapter 13, Hania Zlotnik presents a systematic analy-
sis of past interregional migration flows with the best data available.
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This is complemented by a very broad consideration of possible fu-
ture migration patterns by Sture Oberg in Chapter 14. Taken to-
gether, these two chapters provide a basis for making alternative
assumptions on future interregional migration flows which will have
a status that is equal to fertility and mortality assumptions in the
following scenario calculations.
Part VI presents the actual population projections for 12 world
regions with assumptions based on the substantive considerations
given in all previous chapters. Lutz, Prinz, and Jeannette Lang-
gassner present two quite different sets of alternative population
projections. The first, described in Chapter 15, is a set of systematic
permutation scenarios defined until 2030. These are eight scenarios
that result from all possible combinations of high and low values
in fertility, mortality, and migration, plus a ninth central scenario
combining the averages of these values. The second set, described
in Chapter 16, gives long-range extensions for illustrative purposes
to the year 2100. It presents extensions of the central scenario and
high-fertilityfhigh-mortality and low-fertilityflow-mortality exten-
sions, plus special scenarios that assume interdependence between
the components and possible feedbacks from population size and age
structures on the components. Extensive appendix tables document
the results. These two chapters also contain sections comparing the
IIASA scenarios to the UN and World Bank projections.
An epilogue by Lutz puts the results of the scenario calcula-
tions back into the broader perspective of global change and the
contribution demographers can make to this important new field
of studies. It also considers the necessary trade-off between curbing
population growth and rapid population aging and discusses the im-
portance of sensitivity analysis of alternative population trends for
robust policies. The epilogue concludes by distinguishing between
future population trends that are inevitable and those that can be
influenced to a certain degree by human activities and changes in
behavior. By 2030 the world population will almost certainly grow
by between 50 percent and 100 percent. Where it will be within this
range will crucially depend on choices made during the next decade.
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Chapter 1
Long-range Global
Population Projections:
Lessons Learned
Tomas Frejka
Gregory King (1648-1712), the first known creator of long-range
global population projections, wrote that "if the World should con-
tinue to AO Mundi [anno mundi] 20,000 [A.D. 16,052] it might then
have 6,500 million" (King, 1696). In reality, the world's population
will reach the number projected by King early in the next century,
most likely in about 10 years from the writing of this chapter. In
hindsight his projection left much to be desired. But did he pro-
vide knowledge and insights that were interesting and valuable to
his conternporaries?
This chapter provides an overview of the leading long-term pop-
ulation projections that have been developed to date: their basic
characteristics and an examination of this experience to extract the
lessons learned and to attempt to formulate some general princi-
ples on what makes long-range projections interesting and useful
and what kinds of circumstances justify the creation of a new set
of projections. As a rule, to which there will be some exceptions,
This chapter uses a significant part of the work done in Frejka (1981a).
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this chapter deals only with long-range population projections - i.e.,
those that span over a century or more.
Frejka (1981a) introduces a classification of global population
projections which distinguishes between extrapolations of total num-
bers and global component projections. The latter are component
projections in two senses: demographic components (fertility, mor-
tality, and age structure) and country and region components that
are aggregated into global projections. Progress from the former to
the latter was historically the basic methodological innovation. In
this chapter we briefly review other new ideas and methods as they
are being applied in the preparation of long-range global population
projections.
1.1 Early Global Projections:
Extrapolations
The few global population projections made up to the mid-20th
century tended to be long range and were based on extrapolations
of total numbers (Table 1.1). The authors (King, 1696; Knibbs,
1928; Pearl, 1924; Pearl and Gould, 1936) based these projections
on their respective observations of population growth rates and of
mechanisms of population growth that were believed to regulate
human population change. The reason for concern about future
population growth was anxiety with regard to the world's carrying
capacity. The method used by King and Knibbs was very simple.
They applied the current estimated population growth rates to the
estimated size of the population.
Pearl undertook extensive research which led him to believe that
there is a law according to which growth of populations (not only
human) takes place, that this law is in principle shaped by biolog-
ical and environmental forces, and that the resulting trend can be
expressed mathematically in various forms of the stretched out S-
shaped logistic curve. In 1924 Pearl calculated the curve for the
world population and subsequently, in 1936, together with Gould
he revised the curve for the world population upward arguing that
there is a "necessity for frequent revision of human population lo-
gistics as new data become available."
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Table 1.1. Long-term global population projections.
Population (in millions)
Author Year Alternative To 1950 1950 1970 2000 2050 2100
King 1696 630 780
(B==1695) (2052)
Pearl 1924 1649 1832 1901 1963 2007 2020
(B==1914)
Knibbs 1928 1950 3900 15600
(B==1928) (2008) (2169)
Pearl & 1936 2073 2153 2305 2459 2582 2625
Gould (B==1931)
Notestein 1945 3300
Frejka 1973 NRR==l.O
2040 6670 13025 15102
2020 6422 10473 11169
2000 3645(B) 5923 8172 8389
1980 5116 6286 6417
1970 4746 5592 5691
UN 1974 Medium 3621(B) 6406 11163 12257
Littman & 1977 3968 5882 8188
Keyfitz (B==1975)
UN 1978 High 6509 12076 14180
Medium 4033 6199 9775 10525
Low (B==1975) 5856 8004 8029
Bogue & 1979 High 5972
Tsui Medium B==1975 5883 8107
Low 5756 7816
World Bank 1980 4416 6015 9868
(B==1980) (stat. )
Frejka 1980 NRR==l.O
plausible high 6353 11015 12348
2040 6357 11648 13427
2020 4412 6234 9902 10639
2000 (B==1980) 5930 8214 8539
1980 5333 6743 6986
plausible low 6046 8762 9208
UN 1982 Growth 4441 6337 11690 14927
High 4441 6337 11629 14199
Medium 4432 6119 9513 10185
Low 4420 5837 7687 7524
Decline 4420 5837 7667 7247
(B==1980)
World Bank 1985 4442 6147 9496 10681
(B==1980) (stat.)
UN 1992 High 5327 6420 12506 19156
Medium/High 5327 6420 12495 17592
Medium 5292 6261 10019 11186
Medium/Low 5262 6093 7817 6415
Low 5262 6093 7813 6009
(B==1990)
B stands for base year of projection; NRR stands for net reproduction rate.
Sources: See references.
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1.2 Modern Global Component Projections
The evolution of population theory and methods, as well as the
continuously greater availability of demographic data, has provided
the base for developing more sophisticated population projections.
The leading scholar who transformed the potentiality into reality
was Frank Notestein. The methodology of component population
projections was first applied in a study of Europe and the Soviet
Union commissioned by the League of Nations in the early 1940s
(Notestein et al., 1944). This study was perceived as the first vol-
ume of a series of studies on world population trends and problems.
Soon thereafter, Notestein (1945) presented the first modern global
population projections. He reviewed past population trends of coun-
tries and continents; he discussed his understanding of the mecha-
nisms of population change, distinguishing three main demographic
types of populations corresponding to different stages of the "demo-
graphic evolution" ("incipient decline," "transitional growth," and
"high growth potential"); and finally, he discussed prospects for
growth and provided projections separately by continent on the ba-
sis of which he concluded that "summing the hypothetical figures
for the year 2000, we have a world total of 3.3 billion people. On the
assumption of general order and the spread of modern techniques
of production the figure is probably conservative." Even though it
spanned only over a period of half a century, Notestein's projec-
tion of the world population is discussed in this chapter because of
its pioneering nature and because the applied ideas, approach, and
methods provided the base for a generation of world, regional, and
national projections to follow.
Notestein's projections permit the formulation of general char-
acteristics and procedures that constitute the basis of long-range
population projections:
• An explicit or implicit theoretical fmmework of the mechanisms
of population change, which guides the formulation of assump-
tions about future changes in demographic trends.
• A wealth of accumulated demogmphic data which serves as the
empirical base for the framework, provides the input data for the
benchmark year/period of the projections, and makes possible
a disaggregated approach.
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• A methodology which usually consists of (a) a separate assess-
ment of an initial age structure and separate projection of the
two motor forces of demographic dynamics in a closed popula-
tion - mortality and fertility (the combination of these elements
yields the so-called component projection of a population) - and
(b) a separate assessment and projection of national and/or re-
gional populations, which, when aggregated, yield global projec-
tions or which provide a check on separately computed global
projections.
• Advances in any of these characteristics and procedures depend
on advances of demographic and social science research as well
as on advances in data collection.
Notestein's contribution was important not only because he ap-
plied and combined all of the above elements but critical also from a
substantive perspective. His theoretical framework is based on the
demographic transition theory labeled the "demographic evolution"
in Notestein's 1945 piece. It is the demographic transition theory
which - for the most part implicitly - is the theoretical base for
the majority of the global long-range population projections that
followed.
The sets of the United Nations population projections of the
1950s and 1960s followed Notestein's model, with refinements being
introduced as methods of demographic analysis developed and new
data became available. The time span of these projections was from
30 to 45 years. A particularly innovative set was prepared in 1957
(UN, 1958) which made considerable use of sophisticated methods in
estimating demographic parameters and in the projection computa-
tions. For these projections the UN (1955) prepared a set of model
life tables, as well as models of fertility trends. This was the first
UN projection extended to the year 2000, for which time a global
population ranging between 4.9 and 6.9 billion was projected. As we
approach the year 2000 it now appears that the UN's 1957 medium
projection will come remarkably close to what the actual figure for
the year 2000 is likely to be, 6.3 billion. The central objective of the
UN sets was defined as "an attempt to project population changes
into the future as accurately as possible with available information
to provide basic data on population size and characteristics for fu-
ture planning" (UN, 1973). The focus of population projections up
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to this point in time was on providing the best possible, "as accurate
as possible," projection, forecast, or even prediction.
1.3 Contemporary Long-range Projections
The first set of long-range projections to follow Notestein's work
of 1945 was developed by Frejka (1973a) in the early 1970s (the
ideas and methods applied were originally developed in a study of
the US population in Frejka, 1968). These projections were meant
to demonstrate the strength of the population growth momentum
inherent in current demographic characteristics - age structure and
levels as well as age-specific structures of fertility and mortality -
and the strength of behavioral continuities. The principal innovation
was to prepare scenario projections in contrast to projections that
were aimed at projecting future demographic trends as accurately
as possible. More specifically, these projections were designed:
• To map alternative scenarios of how the demographic transition
could proceed toward an assumed low mortality-low fertility
equilibrium expressed by a net reproduction rate of unity being
reached at defined alternative future dates.
• To illustrate the long-range implications for population growth
of specific demographic, mainly fertility, trends.
• To demonstrate the more likely alternatives of future popula-
tion growth in the context of unrealistic/unlikely projections
based on implausibly rapid or implausibly slow assumed trends
of fertility decline.
The emphasis was on generating illustrative scenario projec-
tions, not on generating projections that would aim at depicting
future trends as accurately as possible. At the same time, however,
there was a clear intention to supply a good idea of likely future
trends by providing the possibility of comparing more realistic al-
ternatives with what appeared to be clearly unrealistic options. The
projections were computed for a period of almost 200 years rather
than the customary period of between 30 and 50 years (for instance,
the UN projections).
The assumption that a low fertility-low mortality stationary
population could be achieved and possibly maintained in the long
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run appeared quite plausible in light of the trends in the demograph-
ically mature countries through the late 1960s. There seemed to be
a reasonable (tacit) consensus at the time that post-demographic
transition societies would stabilize, with fertility and mortality be-
ing such that the long-term net reproduction rate average would be
around unity. In hindsight, the experience of Western countries, par-
ticularly since the early 1970s, has not confirmed this assumption.
These projections provided a vivid illustration of the long-term
consequences for population growth of demographic trends, mainly
of fertility, of the foreseeable future, say of the 1970s and 1980s,
which presumably could be modified by public policies. While the
calculations of the global population for the year 2050, for example,
ranged between 5.6 and 13.0 billion (see Table 1.1), it was argued
that the alternative results yielding figures below 8 billion could
be dismissed as unrealistic because the calculations were based on
assumptions of unrealistically rapid fertility decline. With consid-
erably less certainty the numbers at the upper limits of the range
were cast in doubt, as historical experience seemed to indicate that
fertility would be likely to decline faster than the defined assump-
tions for the high projection. Consequently, it was argued that the
global population in the middle of the next century would probably
be between 8 and 12 billion and that whether the actual population
would be closer to the upper or lower limit would depend on how
vigorously major factors shaping fertility decline, including public
policies, would exert their impact.
During the 1970s and 1980s various institutions, in particular
the UN (1975,1981,1982,1992) but also the World Bank (Zachariah
and Vu, 1978, 1980; Vu, 1985), the US Bureau of the Census (1979),
and individuals (Littman and Keyfitz, 1977; Bogue and Tsui, 1979)
prepared long-range projections. To a significant extent, these pro-
jections used a principle analogous to Frejka's projections, namely,
t hat they were scenario projections aiming, sooner or later, for an
eventual low mortality-low fertility equilibrium. Many did intro-
duce additional ideas/arguments or methodological refinements.
In their projections of the early 1970s, the UN adjusted the
models for the future course of fertility in both the developed
and developing countries, and introduced the reverse logistic curve
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(a stretched-out reverse S) with specified time points at which
replacement-level fertility will be reached and, beyond it, sustained.
A notable departure from the principle of aiming at eventual
replacement-level fertility is contained in the UN 1992 projections
where the experience of below replacement-level fertility in the West-
ern countries is reflected. The idea of reaching and maintaining
replacement-level fertility is assumed only for the medium variant
and for an instant replacement-level fertility projection. Two vari-
ants assume reaching and maintaining below replacement-level fer-
tility, two other projections assume a fertility decline that is above
replacement-level fertility which when the defined level is reached
it is maintained, and a fifth projection assumes constant fertility
and mortality. Among the conclusions of these recent projections,
the UN stresses that according to the medium projection the world
population would be 11.2 billion in the year 2100 which is 1 bil-
lion, or 10 percent, larger than the UN 1982 projections. According
to the UN, "upwardly revised estimated and projected average life
expectancies at birth probably play the key role." Also, there is a
much wider range between the lowest and highest results in the 1992
compared with the 1982 projections for the year 2100, namely, 6.0-
19.2 compared with 7.2-14.9 billion. The authors emphasize "that
there is a wide range of uncertainty regarding the future size of the
world population."
Bogue and Tsui (1979) reached a very different conclusion, al-
beit over a decade earlier: "the magnitude and pace of the (1965~
1975 fertility) decline is greater than many demographers had ex-
pected" and therefore
this development makes it necessary for demographers to review
and re-examine their projections for the future. We predict that
by the year 2025 the world will have nearly achieved zero pop-
ulation growth. It is estimated that this equilibrium will be
achieved with a world population of about 7.4 billion (8.1 in
2050) ... primarily because of the worldwide drive by Third World
countries to introduce family planning as part of their national
social-development services.
In the early 1970s studies associated with the Club of Rome
introduced ambitious methodological innovations. An attempt was
made to link population projections more tightly to social, economic,
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environmental, resource consumption, and political trends. Mead-
ows et at. (1972) and Mesarovic and Pestel (1974) defined global dy-
namic systems analysis models that contained population as one of
several basic components. Projections of these systems were carried
into the 21st century to demonstrate possible disastrous or harmo-
nious long- term consequences inherent in global societal trends. Ac-
cording to these projections, the likely trends in population growth
as well as in other societal trends will lead to a collapse of the world
system. This will include an increase in mortality and a consequent
rapid population decline. The studies conclude that if such a col-
lapse is to be avoided, a rapid fertility decline, significantly faster
than that of the low UN projection of that era, would have to be
generated. These projections were indeed innovative in their com-
prehensive approach, but numerous critics doubted the validity of
employed assumptions and relationships (Ridker, 1973).
1.4 A Recent Critical Review of
Long-run Global Projections
A critical review of long-run population projections has recently
been undertaken by Lee (1991). He takes a substantive rather than a
historic approach. Lee comprehensively analyzes important aspects
of population projections: demography's contribution to forecasting,
theories underlying projections, the degree of uncertainty of long-
run population projections, and recent long-run projections of the
global population. Among the numerous insightful observations and
findings, many can be applied to future work.
One observation which appears to be a central concern to Lee
and which deserves particular attention in the context of this chap-
ter is that in a number of the above-discussed global projections a
sufficiently explicit and systematic theoretical framework is lacking.
Two views expressed in Lee's paper warrant a brief discussion at
this point.
Lee eloquently challenges a central premise applied in the long-
range global projections of the 1970s and the 1980s, namely, that
the end point of most of these projections are stationary populations
with a net reproduction rate of unity. He claims that he could not
find any explanation of this in Frejka's 1973 book (see Frejka, 1973a,
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which according to Lee provides the origin of this idea; actually the
origin of the idea is in Frejka, 1968) and criticizes the justification
given in Frejka (1981b). Admittedly, the theoretical justification of
using replacement-level fertility as an end point might not have been
thorough enough, however, it was clear that Frejka's work in the
late 1960s and early 1970s was conducted within the demographic
transition theory framework as it was understood at that time. If
nowhere else this was succinctly expressed in Frejka (1973b): "The
experience of history suggests that the population of the world may
eventually reach a state close to non-growth, that is, all countries
will be in the third stage of the demographic transition."
The second issue relates to the content and purpose of the con-
cept of projections. A basic premise of Lee's, which he states with-
out providing arguments or justification, is that "almost all demo-
graphic projections are in fact forecasts, in that they present the
author's best guess about the future." Therefore he uses forecasts
throughout his piece. As has been discussed at length above, the
distinction between forecasts - Le., projections that attempt to de-
pict future trends as accurately as possible at any given moment
in time - and scenario projections - i.e., projections which intro-
duce elements that aim to illustrate certain developments some of
which might actually be intentionally unrealistic in order to demon-
strate a particular outcome - is justified. That does not exclude
the purpose of also attempting to provide a reasonable perception
of realistic future population trends through scenario projections.
1.5 Conclusions
Contemporary long-range global population projections of the past
25 years are all constructed along the lines of the Notestein model.
They are based on an explicit or implicit theoretical framework,
using the best available data, and they are component projections.
They are usually straightforward demographic projections where the
possible impacts of changes in behavioral, social, economic, or po-
litical trends are introduced via the theoretical framework. A basic
innovation was added by devising and using scenario projections in
contrast to projections aiming at prediction. However, even when
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using scenario-type projections the intention of more or less approx-
imating likely future demographic trends is almost always present.
The various projections briefly discussed above provide exam-
ples of justifications for new projections. At the most general level,
whenever a significant innovation can be introduced in anyone of
the elements a new projection is justified. Thus, formulating a new
or different theoretical framework, the application of new data, or
the development of a new or different methodology provides such a
justification.
Each of the subsequent UN sets of projections used newly
collected or estimated base data. Some of these sets introduced
methodological advances, and in some the formulation of assump-
tions about demographic trends was modified based on the devel-
opments of actual trends. Bogue and Tsui (1979) based their pro-
jections on their interpretation of fertility trends between 1965 and
1975 and on their belief that policy measures in the form of strong
family-planning programs could and would modify fertility trends
more than experience to date indicated. Meadows et al. (1972) at-
tempted to expand the theoretical framework by direct linkage to
social, economic, environmental, resource consumption, and politi-
cal trends and applied a large number of assumptions about trends
and linkages. In addition to using new fertility and mortality data,
the most recent United Nations long-range global projections (1992)
assumed a variety of fertility trends: reaching and maintaining
replacement-level fertility, reaching and maintaining fertility levels
below and above replacement.
The purpose of long-range global population projections can be
more than attempting to predict total population numbers 50, 100,
or 150 years into the future. In addition, their purpose can be:
• To demonstrate shorter- and long-run implications of alternative
fertility and mortality trends of the foreseeable future.
• To demonstrate what type of trends need to occur to achieve
a population of a desirable size and with specific structural
characteristics.
• To demonstrate various structural implications of certain fertil-
ity and mortality trends for major regions and functional age
groups, for example.
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• To demonstrate the consequences of intended policy interven-
tions if they were to succeed.
Whatever the purpose of a single projection or a set of projec-
tions may be, for them to be meaningful and to provide new insights,
a significant and well-justified new or innovative element has to be
embedded in the projections.
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Chapter 2
Alternative Approaches
to Population Projection
Wolfgang Lutz, Joshua R. Goldstein, and Christopher Prinz
Future demographic trends are inherently uncertain, and the further
one goes into the future, the greater the uncertainty. On the other
hand, few social and economic trends are as stable as population
trends. No social scientist would challenge the statement that the
percentage increase of the world population over the next five years
can be more accurately projected than changes in unemployment
rates, trade balances, or stock markets. Because of the great iner-
tia of population trends, long term and short term mean different
things for demographic and economic forecasts, but in all forecasts
uncertainty is assumed to increase with the time horizon because of
the greater probability of structural changes.
Summarizing the limits of population forecasting, Nathan Key-
fitz (1981:583) states: "The practical conclusion, then, is that rel-
atively short-term forecasts, say up to ten or 20 years, do tell us
something, but that beyond a quarter-century or so we simply do
not know what the population will be." Such a statement still seems
to reflect the consensus of most demographers today, including the
group of experts invited to contribute to this book, which defines
assumptions only up to the year 2030. But the question of what we
17
18 Wolfgang Lutz, Joshua R. Goldstein, Christopher Prinz
can know today about the future goes beyond the issue of the time
horizon which is discussed later in this chapter.
First we need to ask what kind of knowledge of the future do
we want to have? Do we want to have one single number, a cer-
tain range, or a probability distribution? Do we want total pop-
ulation size alone or for age-structural information as well? Who
is interested in these numbers and for what reason? And what is
the motivation of those who prepare population projections? These
questions all affect the approach taken to population forecasting and
the methods and assumptions chosen.
This chapter on alternative approaches to population projec-
tion gives a broad and nontechnical exposition of some fundamental
questions involved in population projection. These kinds of ques-
tions are usually not addressed in more technical scientific papers or
in the publication of projection results because certain choices are
taken for granted. This broader perspective is necessary, however,
to answer the question which forms the title of Part I: Why another
set of global population projections? Several fundamental issues in
population projection are addressed in the following eight sections.
The approach chosen in this book is described and justified against
the background of the possible approaches. The concluding section
gives a concise summary of our choice.
2.1 Who Wants Population Projections?
What motivates demographers to prepare population projections,
and for whom are they preparing them? There seem to be three
major groups of people that have interest in population projections
and are willing to pay demographers to do this job: other scientists,
politicians, and the general public, including business.
There is increasing demand from a large number of natural and
social scientists for information about future population size and
structure. The recent upsurge of environmental and global change
research has only heightened this demand. A major reason for this
demand lies in the fact that a large number of the indicators used
in such studies are on a per capita basis, i.e., by definition require
a population figure in the denominator. Most explicitly this is the
case in studies on CO 2 emissions such as Bongaarts (1992), Birdsall
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(1992), and Bartiaux and van Ypersele (1993). All these studies
combine future population trends with assumed future per capita
CO 2 emissions. Lutz (1993) has also demonstrated that the level of
regional aggregation is decisive for the results obtained. The time
horizon of these studies is typically long (at least to 2030-2050)
because global-warming is a long-term phenomenon.
Related to global warming issues is the large group of energy
demand models which is probably the greatest scientific consumer
of population projection data. A minority of forecasters (e.g., Odell
and Rosing, 1980) omits the explicit consideration of population,
and instead projects total energy demand. Most, however, combine
scenarios about the evolution of energy demand with population
forecasts (Gouse et at., 1992; Leontief and Sohn, 1984; WECCC,
1983). The time horizons of these studies range from 2020 to 2100.
Another field of studies which routinely includes population
projections is the analysis of world food consumption. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1988) has produced forecasts
of demand to 2000 and will include projections through 2010 in
a forthcoming volume. The approach taken by Mellor and Paulino
(1986), for example, is to produce two scenarios: the first is based on
present per capita calorie consumption and the second includes in-
creased calorie consumption arising from assumed economic growth.
Many more fields, such as economic forecasting, epidemiological
studies, and insurance mathematics, demand population projections
as input.
In the past non-demographic scientific studies requiring popu-
lation forecasts tended to consider only one variant of future pop-
ulation trends. Increasingly, however, the further sophistication of
scenario approaches in many of these disciplines suggests also the
consideration of alternative population scenarios. There clearly is
a demand not only for one best guess of the future population but
also for information concerning the degree of uncertainty and more
extreme scenarios for sensitivity analysis. So far demographers have
not done much to satisfy this demand.
Politicians, including public administrators, need population
projections largely for planning purposes. Especially in the health,
education, and social-security sectors, medium- and long-term
planning includes demographic variables as crucial components.
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Typically, politicians and administrators would like to receive one
likely variant of future population size and structure that they can
input into their own models of where new hospitals and schools
should be constructed and how the legal system of pension payments
should be organized to accommodate changes in the age composition
of the population.
Unlike the scientific community, public administrators and po-
litical planners hardly ever ask for alternative variants, and generally
have little appreciation of methods dealing with uncertainty in pop-
ulation projections, despite the fact that policies should be robust
and hold under varying conditions. They typically want to be given
one most likely figure.
Despite the tradition of government planners to use only a single
central forecast, the design of policies that hold under uncertain
future conditions should be a main concern of good politics. For
instance, a restructuring of the pension scheme as currently being
done by many European countries should by no means consider
only one assumed future mortality trend. Since national population
projections tend to assume very low future mortality improvements,
even a continuation of past increases in life expectancy results in a
much faster increase of the old age dependency ratio, and might
bring about painful if not disastrous surprises to the new system.
In this situation demographers have a responsibility to communicate
their knowledge about uncertainty.
The third group of users of population projections is by far the
largest and most heterogeneous. Many individuals, organizations,
and enterprises in the general public have specific interests in pop-
ulation projections. Aside from individual curiosity, this interest is
related to the planning of future activities and the estimation of
the expected returns from such activities, ranging from the individ-
ual decision of buying real estate in an area with future increase in
population density to marketing strategies for certain commercial
products, such as baby food or special products for the elderly.
Generally the expectations of this group toward population pro-
jections can be assumed to be similar to that of the group of politi-
cians and administrators. The interest tends to focus on one most
likely variant. Considerations of uncertainty may playa role in cor-
porate planning, but generally the planning horizon of companies is
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too short for alternative population trends to make a difference. An
exception may be companies in the field of energy supply that tend
to have very long time horizons.
In addition to these three major groups interested in population
projections there is one very specific group that explicitly wants to
use population projections for educational and illustrative purposes.
The most vocal of these are advocacy groups in the field of environ-
ment or family planning that want to illustrate to the public and
political circles what would happen in the more distant future if
policies aiming at a reduction of population growth were not im-
plemented. Such people are not as much interested in one medium
population projection as they are in the calculation of extreme alter-
natives to demonstrate the longer-term impacts of today's choices.
Another special group are students in the social sciences who
should understand the basic functioning of population dynamics.
For them phenomena such as the momentum of population growth
could best be illustrated through comparisons of alternative long-
term population projections.
In summary the different groups interested in population pro-
jections seem to expect two different things from the demographers
preparing such projections: one most likely variant that can be used
without further thinking about the problem of uncertainty and in-
formation about less likely but still possible trends that can be used
for sensitivity analysis, i.e., for understanding how the systems stud-
ied or any planned policy or individual action would perform under
different possible demographic futures. Although most of the users
of projections are satisfied with a 30- to 40-year time horizon, some
clearly want a longer time horizon.
2.2 Time Horizon
Technically, it is a simple matter to continue a population projec-
tion one hundred, or even one million years into the future. The
choice of a projection horizon therefore represents a compromise
between the advantages of providing more information and the dan-
gers of making false forecasts. Beyond a certain point in time, we
feel too unsure about the state of the family, health, and the world
to specify rates of fertility, mortality, and migration. In this section
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we explore the possible reasons demographers could have for see-
ing 30 to 40 years as a threshold beyond which projections become
less reliable. We also address the question of whether uncertainty
increases monotonically with time or whether there are thresholds
and discontinuities suggesting a certain cutoff point.
The time scale of population projections is of distinctly human
dimensions. This is because not only do the human life span and the
gap between generations have important demographic consequences,
but also because forecasters' judgments about the speed of social
change depend on their own personal experience.
From a psychological perspective, there may be reasons for dis-
comfort involving forecasts of longer than 40 or 50 years, a little less
than two generations into the future.[l] During our lifetimes, most
of us get to know our grandparents, but not our great-grandparents.
Consequently, we have first-hand experience of the amount of social
change that can occur over two generations of time. When we spec-
ify demographic rates beyond this, not only must we forecast the
behavior of individuals whom we will probably never meet, but we
are dealing with individuals that are more distant, in generational
terms, than anyone we have met in our own lives. In addition to this
subjective reason for setting a threshold of increased uncertainty, we
can point to other, less personal, justifications for a particular time
horizon.
Forty years is roughly the average age in developed countries.
As such, it marks the period of time beyond which a population will
consist of a majority of people not yet born. The wholly individual
psychological perspective just mentioned thus corresponds also to
the experience of the entire population, the timing of which might
mark a rupture in social change.
In addition to uncertainty in the inputs of population projection,
the demographic rates that reflect individual behavior, we must also
consider the size of the population at risk. The number of births in
the future is a function not only of birth rates but also of the number
of potential mothers and fathers in the population, itself a function
of past demographic rates. This feedback property is well known in
the case of the echoes of a baby boom (or bust). The time it takes
for a boom to echo is approximately the mean age of childbearing,
which ranges between 25 and 30 in almost all populations. Beyond
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this time horizon, therefore, we add to our uncertainty about birth
rates the uncertainty of how many potential mothers will be in the
population.
The number of deaths in a population is also a function of the
number of past births and deaths, but since the mean age at death
(in a stationary population, equal to life expectancy) is about three-
quarters of a century, the lagged mortality effect will be of relatively
minor importance in developed countries. In developing countries,
however, a rapid improvement in infant mortality might increase the
number of potential mothers in as little as 15 to 20 years.
Migration levels, while not subject to uncertainties about cohort
size, are subject to perhaps a more arbitrary type of change - the
change in government policy. Annual migration trends are largely
determined by government policy. If we asked, for instance, how
many immigrants will Western Europe admit, most analysts would
feel reluctant to predict more than a few years into the future. And
indeed we have seen tremendous ups and downs in migration flows
over the past few years. When migration plays a major role in
determining the demography of a region, it would seem that 5 to
10 years might mark the point beyond which any projection would
become quite speculative.
If we ask why, for example, 10,000 years is too long to perform
a projection, we discover a further constraint on forecast horizons.
In addition to the fact that we are in no position to specify de-
mographic rates for such a long period, the meaningfulness of the
projection models used applies only to certain time scales. With
an ageless population growing at a constant exponential rate, the
only possible average growth rate in the very long term that would
avoid extinction or inconceivable explosion is zero. The dynamics of
an age-structured population are of interest only for as long as one
century. After this time, no traces of the starting age structure of
the starting population remain visible in the age pyramid. A pro-
jection that continues far into the future first loses its connection
to its starting age structure and eventually bears little relation even
to its initial size as zero growth rates become the only possibility in
the very long run.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the possible thresholds of increasing un-
certainty. The times shown are of an extremely stylized form and are
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Figure 2.1. Different components of uncertainty entering the pop-
ulation projection over time.
meant to summarize the arguments given above. The second-wave
of fertility cohort size uncertainty is added to indicate that the baby
boom (bust) resulting from the cohort size uncertainty after about
25 years will have echoes in the following generation also, although
of lesser amplitude. Cohort size is also determined by migration, so
we might want to add additional uncertainty 25, 50, and 75 years
after the migration uncertainty begins.
Despite its speculative nature, we can draw several lessons from
Figure 2.1. First, no single clear threshold of uncertainty emerges.
Instead, there are arguments for stopping the forecast at many dif-
ferent times. Second, the commonly accepted threshold of a little
less than half a century emerges not so much as a clear demographic
threshold (which might dictate a choice closer to the mean age of
childbearing), but rather from the timing of the increased subjec-
tive uncertainty in demographic rates. Last, the timing of the de-
mographic thresholds, particularly the delayed effect of births on
the future number of deaths, may vary according to the population
under consideration. The average age at death in a population with
high infant mortality might be considerably less than 75 years.
Equally important is perhaps what this schematic figure leaves
out, namely, the relative size of the different sources of uncertainty.
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For some countries, like Canada, migration levels may be the largest
source of uncertainty, while for others, like many African countries,
structural change in birth or death rates might play the largest role.
The risk of projecting too far into the future is the loss of le-
gitimacy ("believability") either because assumptions seem to lack
foundation or because the projected populations violate constraints,
such as an assumed carrying capacity of the globe. On the other
hand, the fact that several features of population dynamics, such as
growth momentum and echoes, do persist strongly for at least one or
two generations means that projections of less than 50 years proba-
bly do not reveal all the information already present in even today's
age structure. This offers an argument for a minimum length of
projection.
The reluctance of demographers to go beyond a certain time
horizon is in conflict with some of the expectations of potential users
as described in Section 2.1. Some users clearly want population fig-
ures for the year 2100 and beyond. Should the demographer disap-
point such expectations and leave it to others with less expertise to
produce them? The answer we found for this study is no. But as
discussed below, we make a clear distinction between what we call
projections up to 2030 and everything beyond that time, which we
term extensions for illustrative purposes.
2.3 Spatial Resolution and Heterogeneity
Because of the great heterogeneity of the world population it clearly
does not make sense to treat the whole world as one region in a
population projection. Users of projections mostly want to have
information by countries or at least major world regions that are
different not only in demographic but also in socioeconomic and
cultural terms. If the output parameters are to be regional, clearly
the projection needs to be done on a regional basis. But even if
one is only interested in aggregate global results, assumptions on
future fertility and mortality cannot meaningfully be made for all
the different regions together for two reasons.
First, different parts of the world are at very different stages of
the process of demographic transition, which in most projections is
the basic underlying paradigm on which assumptions about future
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fertility are founded. Aggregating these different parts obscures the
picture and makes the reasoning behind assumptions more difficult.
Second, because of much higher rates of population growth in
the South than in the North, the weights of the two hemispheres
will change significantly in the future, which by itself leads to a
change in aggregate rates even if the rates per hemisphere remain
constant. This can be quantitatively illustrated by a simple cal-
culation, recently done by Lutz and Prinz (1991). In the purely
hypothetical case that all vital rates stay constant at their present
levels, the projection carried out on the basis of six world regions
yields a 50 percent higher total population than the projection treat-
ing the world as one region. These results are based on the identical
assumption of constant rates, and the amazing difference is simply
due to that today the low fertility regions are still a larger propor-
tion of the world population than they will be in the future. With
this change in weights constant fertility in the main world regions
results in increasing fertility of the world total and hence in a larger
total population than in the case of constant global fertility.
While the above example makes it clear that heterogeneity of
the population can have a strong effect, it is not clear how much one
must disaggregate to avoid this problem. Even within nations there
may be subpopulations with very different demographic regimes. In
some of the South American countries, such as Bolivia, national
fertility rates have been stagnant at a rather high level which can
be explained by the bifurcation of society into a group that is well
advanced in its demographic transition and by the Indian population
which has not yet fully entered the fertility decline and is gaining
weight through more rapid growth. In addition to the observable
heterogeneity in the population, Vaupel and Yashin (1983) have
demonstrated the significance of unobserved heterogeneity.
For our global population projections a basic question was, how
far should one go in disaggregating the world population? The-
oretically, disaggregations need not follow territorial or national
boundaries but should follow the most strongly discriminating vari-
ables. In practice, however, data are most readily available by coun-
tries and groups of countries. The United Nations and the World
Bank produce their population projections at the level of individ-
ual countries. Under this approach the 1.2 billion Chinese get as
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much attention as the 72,000 inhabitants of the Seychelles. This is
due to the national constituencies of these organizations and con-
venience of data availability rather than questions of demographic
heterogeneity.
With 150 or more countries, however, simultaneous projections
become awkward especially with respect to the migration matrix to
be assumed among all these states. It is perhaps for this reason
that migration is not a major emphasis of the UN and World Bank
projections. An alternative, which has been chosen for the present
study, is to limit the number of populations projected simultane-
ously to subcontinental regions. As discussed extensively in Part V
on migration and in the concluding chapter of this book, 12 world
regions have been defined according to criteria of geographic proxim-
ity and socioeconomic, as well as demographic, similarity. These 12
regions are projected simultaneously by a multistate model assum-
ing region-specific future paths of age-specific fertility and mortality
rates and full matrices of interregional migratory streams.
These regional assumptions have to be considered aggregate fu-
ture paths of fertility, mortality, and migration that reflect not only
changing behavior within the subpopulations of the region but also
the compositional effect of changing weights. This is the only way
to deal with the bothersome issue of population heterogeneity.
2.4 Expected Output Parameters
The methodology to be chosen for population projection crucially
depends on the choice of population characteristics. If one is only
interested in total population size, methods such as simple exponen-
tial growth models may be used that are not sufficient if one is also
interested in the future age and sex composition of the population.
But many other population characteristics, such as urban/rural res-
idence, marital status composition, and educational or labor force
composition, may be of considerable interest for the user of projec-
tions and require specific methodologies.
The questions of desired output parameters together with the
above-discussed issues of time horizon and of the desirability of a
range of projections need to be discussed before the question of ap-
propriate methodologies. Introductions to population forecasting
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usually do not address these issues explicitly, but rather group pro-
jection methods by the statistical models on which they are based
(e.g., time-series models, structural equation models) as is done in
the introduction to a recent comprehensive volume on population
forecasting (Ahlburg and Land, 1992). Because the proper evalu-
ation of different methods requires the systematic consideration of
objectives, in this section we distinguish between forecasts aiming
only at total population size, projections on the age and sex com-
positions of the population and projections on characteristics other
than age and sex.
2.4.1 Projections of total population size
For projections of total population size alone a basic choice is be-
tween methods that consider the age structure of the population
and those that do not. When advocates of the projections of pop-
ulation totals through various time-series models (e.g., Pflaumer,
1992) stress that such models may be more reliable than cohort-
component models, which project the population by age groups, it is
important to keep in mind that this debate only concerns the aggre-
gate totals - figures that from a substantive point of view have rather
limited value. Most of the economic and social issues for which the
population variable is considered important heavily depend on the
age profile of the population, ranging from social-security consider-
ations to marketing, from health expenditures to education, from
the size of the labor force to internal migration. Even in the recent
discussion on population-environment and carrying capacity, the
population composition seems to make a big difference (see Lutz,
1994) because of varying age-specific impacts.
But let us assume, for the time being, that the number of total
population size in a territory at some point in the future has a
meaning and value in itself. To derive such a figure we have the
choice between simple and sophisticated guesses. The most simple
would be a guess of a number of future population size without any
formal model. If some sort of a formal model is desired, we might
consider basing the method on past experience or just consider the
population in the starting year together with assumptions on the
future.
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Probably the simplest model of population growth over time is
that of an exponential growth model with a constant rate of growth.
In practice, however, growth rates have never been constant over
long periods. Through the millennia of early human history, birth
and death rates fluctuated widely due to weather, war, food short-
ages, and diseases. Typically birth rates were high when death rates
were low and vice versa, resulting in even wider fluctuations in the
growth rates of the population. Although during the 20th century
the curve of world population growth has resembled the typical ex-
ponential growth curve, growth rates have been far from constant.
The growth rate was about 0.5 percent during the first half of this
century, increased to a peak of 2.06 percent in 1965-1970, and slowly
declined thereafter. The appealing feature of an exponential growth
model as opposed to more sophisticated ones is that one has to make
assumptions only for one parameter - the growth rate.
Several important deficiencies of the exponential growth model
result from the fact that it does not consider the age structure of
the population. The most important is that it cannot capture the
momentum of population growth, a phenomenon caused by the fact
that only women aged 15-49 have children and in the case of a very
young age distribution more and more women enter this age group
and hence the population would grow significantly even with a con-
stant fertility at replacement level. Another aspect of this deficiency
relates to countries with very irregular age pyramids, such as some
European countries where irregularities in births due to world wars,
the baby boom, and the baby bust resulted in great fluctuations in
cohort size. Here some changes in the population growth rate are
pre-programmed by the population age structures that do not re-
flect any change in fertility, mortality, and migration. For instance,
a phenomenon such as the echo of the baby boom - the larger num-
ber of babies borne by the large baby boom cohorts- could never be
captured by a model that considers only total population size.
For these reasons it is generally advisable to use projection mod-
els such as the cohort-component method which explicitly consider
age and sex, even if one is only interested in total population size.
However, in these models one has to make assumptions on a much
larger number of parameters, which raises the danger of losing sight
of the behavior of the total system while giving great attention to
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specific issues such as period-cohort translation in fertility. In this
respect the suggestion made by Pilaumer (1992), that time-series
methods applied to population totals should be used as a baseline
against which the results of more complex models should be as-
sessed, seems to be worth considering. Ideally the analyst could
then identify the sources of difference between the two approaches.
2.4.2 Projecting the age and sex composition
As mentioned above people are interested in population projections
because they want to understand population changes that go beyond
projecting total population size. This knowledge is used in a variety
of ways, ranging from aging and social-security considerations to
labor market questions, educational issues, and even marketing in
private business. For all these considerations one needs to have es-
timates of future population structure at least in broad age groups.
Few users would demand projections in single-year age groups. Pro-
jection of five-year age groups in five-year steps of historical time has
become popular, mostly for convenience.
A projection of the population by age and sex requires first the
age and sex composition of the population in the starting year. Next
one must assume age-specific fertility, mortality, and migration rates
for each five-year period to be projected. For this age-group projec-
tion of the population, the so-called cohort-component method has
become standard. This method was introduced by Whelpton in 1936
and formalized by Leslie (1945). Notestein (1945) first applied it to
project the world population. The basic method has not changed
since that time. In short, cohorts are groups of men and women
born in the same time interval and representing a specific age group
at any later point in time. Their sizes can only change through
mortality and migration. The size of the youngest age group is de-
termined by age-specific fertility levels applied to the corresponding
female age groups. Hence the projected size and age structure of the
population at any point in the future depends exclusively on the size
and age structure in the starting year and on assumed age-specific
fertility, mortality, and migration over the projection period.
The cohort-component method tells us what to do with the
assumptions on future fertility, mortality, and migration, but not
how to derive them. And it is in this all-deciding question of the
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choice of assumptions and structuring of sets of alternative assump-
tions where controversy exists and continuous improvement of pop-
ulation projection methodologies is possible and indeed necessary.
Alternative approaches to deriving assumptions on future fertility,
mortality, and migration are discussed in the following sections of
this chapter.
In the context of the cohort-component method, one unresolved
question is whether assumptions should be made in terms of pe-
riod or cohort fertility. Technically, the Leslie matrix requires age-
specific period rates. But these period rates could be either assumed
directly or derived from assumptions on future cohort fertility be-
havior. This decision goes essentially back to the rather philosophi-
cal controversy of whether the cohort approach is more appropriate
in fertility analysis. In practical terms the cohort fertility approach
requires assumptions on both the level of cohort fertility and the
timing of births over the reproductive life span. If the age pattern is
assumed to be constant and the level assumed to approach a certain
constant value, cohort and period fertility assumptions turn out to
be very similar. Theoretically the same cohort-period arguments
could be made for mortality and migration, but they are rarely ever
discussed.
2.4.3 Multistate models for additional characteristics
Usually populations are defined in terms of a territory in which
they live. But as mentioned earlier, populations may also be de-
fined as subgroups of the population in a given territory, such as
ethnic groups, marital status groups, or educational groups. These
groups can be treated as independent populations that may interact
with each other, Le., people leave one group and join another. The
traditional cohort-component method can only consider one popu-
lation and needs to be expanded to simultaneously project several
populations which are interacting with one another. Such expan-
sions are called multistate models as developed by Rogers (1975)
and others during the 1970s. The original applications of multistate
models were in the field of multiregional demography and migration.
No global population projection has gone beyond projecting the
age and sex distribution by regions or countries. But on a smaller
scale many multistate projections have been produced, mostly with
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respect to marital status or household characteristics (for example,
Gonnot et al., 1994). Assumptions on fertility, mortality, and tran-
sitions between the states have to be state specific in addition to
age and sex specific, e.g., in case of a marital status projection the
age-specific mortality of married men must be assumed indepen-
dently of that of divorced men. This multistate approach can be
applied to any other breakdown of the population (socioeconomic,
ethnic, etc.) as long as the categories are clearly defined and suffi-
cient empirical information on transition intensities is given. Such
population projections that also provide estimates of future distri-
butions of socioeconomic variables other than age and sex may be
more interesting for many users, and may become more popular as
methodologies and computer programs disseminate further.
At the global level, however, a difficulty to applying multistate
models, including additional not strictly demographic variables, is
the availability of relevant empirical data. Hence the projections
presented in this book are based on alternative projections of only
the age and sex distribution for the 12 world regions specified.
2.5 Different Uses of Past Experience to
Derive Assumptions for the Future
The real challenge in population projection is not the method it-
self but the generation of one set or several sets of assumptions
on age-specific fertility and age- and sex-specific mortality and mi-
gration. In this context there are two basic questions. The first
question relates to the way in which past experience is used to de-
rive assumptions on the future. The second concerns the strategy
one takes to deal with uncertainty, whether a range of possible as-
sumptions based on some distribution or individual point scenarios
will be considered. We can distinguish between three levels drawing
from past experience.
The Future as a Continuation of the Past Trend
This is the strongest possible way in which the past can enter. A
simple trend extrapolation can be performed without any additional
input about likely future conditions. It can be blind and mechanical
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after one has chosen the indicator to be extrapolated, the length of
the period to be considered, and the information to be derived from
the time series. It can take the form of simple linear trend extrap-
olation, other functional forms of extrapolation, or, if periodicity is
assumed, a combined trend with superimposed cycles.
The blind continuation of past trends seems appropriate only
when absolutely no information is available about likely future
trends. In the context of fertility assumptions it would mean com-
pletely disregarding considerations derived from demographic tran-
sition theories, information about desired family size, and surveys
on family-planning demands. But even this simple method does not
save the forecaster from making choices. The indicator, the length of
the past period, and the structure of the process need to be defined.
Variance from History
If one is willing to incorporate into one's assumptions external sub-
stantive information about likely future trends, one possibility of
combining this with information from the past is to determine the
average level externally and to derive only the likely variance from
the past. In the context of a probabilistic model this would mean,
for instance, setting future upper and lower bounds to the level of
fertility but deriving from history the percentage by which fertility
rates change from one period to another (see Goldstein et aI., 1994).
Also into this category falls the work by Keyfitz (1981) and Stoto
(1983) who estimate future errors in population projections from
past errors.
Structure and Understanding from History
Under this approach it is not the past time series itself which is used
to derive assumptions on the future evolution, but the substantive
knowledge about the process and its structure. Taking mortality as
an example, this approach goes beyond the analysis of past trends
in integrating knowledge from medicine and biology and addressing
questions such as that of a genetically determined limits to human
life. Naturally this understanding is also informed by the analysis
of past trends but goes further, integrating outside knowledge de-
rived from other sources. Under this approach historical information
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enters only indirectly into the formulation of assumptions about the
future. This third approach is the one chosen for our study. It is the
reason why large parts of this volume consist of substantive papers
about our understanding of the processes of fertility, mortality, and
migration in the different world regions. A group of experts was
asked to write about alternative possible future paths of fertility,
mortality, and migration and produce assumptions of a most likely
central value as well as high and low extreme values for the various
indicators by the year 2030, based on their substantive understand-
ing of the processes. The strategy of the chosen scenario approach
is described in more detail in Section 2.7.
2.6 Different Probabilistic Approaches
to Deal with Uncertainty
The future evolution of the world's population will almost surely
differ from the central scenario as described in this volume. This is
unavoidable, for there is inherent uncertainty in the future. Wars
will break out; some societies will modernize more quickly than
we expect while others will develop more slowly; new diseases may
break out, old ones may be cured; childbearing might become more
fashionable in the developed world, or, quite the contrary, less so;
the industrialized countries may close themselves to immigration,
or might even become more open. All these factors are of crucial
importance to the demographic future, but are uncertain.
What does a forecaster do in the face of such uncertainty? A
first approach is to freeze all demographic rates at their current
level. Rates will almost certainly not remain unchanged as the fu-
ture unfolds, but this approach enables the forecaster to avoid mak-
ing statements about the direction of demographic trends, and at
the same time makes absolutely clear the hypothetical nature of the
projection. This was the approach followed by early demographic
projectionists/forecasters of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.
A second approach, the one used by this volume's projections,
is to create extreme case scenarios. This enables one to make state-
ments about how far off the future population could be from the
expected evolution. The effectiveness of this approach, of course,
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depends on the thoroughness of the scenarios. On the one hand,
there is a danger that the interval between the high and low scenar-
ios might be so large that it is uninformative. On the other hand,
when the scenarios become more plausible, and thus more likely, one
begins to ask what the probability of a given scenario in fact is.
The third approach, explicit quantification of uncertainty, is de-
signed to incorporate information about vital rate variability and
the success of past forecasts into statements about the certainty
with which present forecasts are made. It is evident that both fore-
casters and users would like to know what confidence to place in
projections, but as yet no single technique to do this unambiguously
has gained currency. As the most recent US Bureau of the Census
(1989) forecast notes: "Many problems remain before a method can
be developed for placing reliable confidence intervals around popula-
tion projections." This lack of success is not for want of trying, but
rather because of the inherent difficulties in modeling uncertainty.
How can the future population differ from that which is pro-
jected? The compendium of possible mistakes is long (Keilman,
1990), but we can schematize the sources of error into three types:
1. Measurement and calculation errors. These can take the form of
mistaken input data (for example, starting the projection with
a population based on an incorrect census count) or a simple
calculation mistake.
2. Incorrect specification of vital rates. One can predict that life
expectancy will continue to rise at the same rate as the past 20
years, but instead it might well increase at twice that rate. A
second baby boom could occur. Or, less spectacularly, the seem-
ingly random "natural" variation (see Brillinger 1986) might
cause fertility, mortality, and migration rates to vary from year
to year.
3. Unexpected events. The unexpected could cause large struc-
tural changes: the outbreak of war, a sudden cure for AIDS, an
economic boom in Africa. Any number of ruptures with current
trends is imaginable, any of which might render extrapolated
visions of the future irrelevant. To these structural changes we
could also add errors resulting from aggregation of heteroge-
neous groups.
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We can call these, respectively, measurement error, parameter
specification error, and model specification error. The sum of all
forms of error is called total error.
On first glance, only the second source of error - the varia-
tion in vital rates - seems a likely candidate for the application of
probabilistic thinking, and, indeed, most attempts to incorporate
randomness into population forecasting have chosen this as their fo-
cus. Before examining these techniques, however, one technique for
quantifying the total error deserves mention. The empirical eval-
uation of the success and failures of past forecasts, developed by
Keyfitz and Stoto in the early 1980s, consists simply of gathering a
large number of past forecasts and evaluating what the average error
has been. The most noteworthy conclusion of these studies, both of
which focused only on error in total population size, was that the
traditional high and low variants offered by population projections
corresponded to approximately a two-thirds confidence interval. In
other words, the population grew at rates outside of those predicted
by the high and low variants about one-third of the time (Keyfitz,
1981; Stoto, 1983).
This empirical method of estimating uncertainty clearly takes
into account all three types of error. [2] In order to apply it to cur-
rent forecasts, however, a very strong assumption needs to be made:
that the errors in future forecasts are of the same magnitude as in
the past. This assumption is of particular concern since the most
recent forecasts are least represented in the sample of empirical fore-
casts because their accuracy has yet to be seen. This is problematic
because not only do methods of choosing high, low, and medium
variants change, but so also does the potential variability of vital
rates. Unless both the variability of vital rates and the methodol-
ogy of projection together with the degree of care used in making
the assumptions stay the same, it is unclear how good an indicator
past errors are of future uncertainty.
While an application of the results from Keyfitz and Stoto to
future population projections extrapolates in forecasting, the direct
analysis of population trends themselves offers a distinct alternative.
It is here that time-series analysts have plied their trade. Starting
with the Lee (1974) analysis of US fertility rates until today, time-
series methods aim to assign a structure to the process of changing
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rates, for example, a random walk with drift, or an ARIMA. Time-
series methods produce not only a central forecast, but also the
entire probability distribution, showing where fertility and mortality
rates are likely to be at any future specified date contingent on a
normal distribution of errors.
The principal drawback of time-series methods has been the
dependence of the results on the choice of a model structure - par-
ticularly for fertility, the demographic component which not only
has the largest effect on the evolution of populations but also is the
most variable (Lee, 1974; Ahlburg and Land, 1992). Mortality, on
the other hand, appears to offer much better hopes of forecasting, at
least in the most developed countries. In particular, both the Lee-
Carter (1992) and McNown-Rogers (1989) methods offer means of
producing trends based on large matrices of age-specific mortality
rates. These techniques have large data requirements and have been
criticized for producing overly narrow confidence intervals. They are
clear in their aim, however, only to provide estimates of parameter
variation, providing minimum error ranges.
An alternative method for obtaining probability distributions is
to simulate the evolution of demographic rates using Monte Carlo
simulation methods. Random draws of past levels (Keyfitz, 1989)
or of past variation (Goldstein et ai., 1994) are made and applied
to the evolving population. A large number, say 10,000, of sample
populations are projected forward, and the resulting empirical dis-
tribution of population size and age structure is used to estimate the
theoretical probability range. These simulations allow one to ana-
lyze the combined effect of uncertainty in mortality, fertility, and
migration; this last component has not been included in time-series
models.
Both the simulation and the time-series techniques are means to
address only the second type of parameter uncertainty. They answer
the question of how much uncertainty would there be if past levels
of variation continue into the future. They explicitly do not include
the possibility of structural change. Questions such as will their
be another baby boom in Western Europe, when will sub-Saharan
Africa experience a fertility transition, what the chances are of an
AIDS cure or of a war or revolution cannot be addressed without
probability models of the likelihood for each of these unexpected
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events. The scenario approach, focusing as it does on the hypo-
thetical effect rather than on likelihood, offers the chance to see the
hypothesized impact of unpredictable events, and seems the best
means for analyzing structural change.
While much work is being devoted to probabilistic models of
population projection, no method has emerged. For the moment,
large data requirements combine with a tremendous sensitivity of
techniques to assumptions about the form of the probability model.
One clear advantage of scenarios is that although it may be difficult
for users to assess the likelihood of the scenario, it is quite easy for
them to understand what is being assumed. Probabilistic forecasts,
thus far, do not seem to offer this advantage, for it is difficult for
most users to understand the assumptions of the different probabil-
ity models, let alone to say which set of assumptions is the most
sensible.
There is no need for an either/or approach to scenario and prob-
abilistic projections. Ideally, projections would include both an es-
timate of "natural variability" as well as the implications of possible
structural changes.
2.7 Non-probabilistic Approaches:
Single Projections, Variants, Scenarios
In practice, both national statistics departments and international
agencies have taken non-probabilistic approaches to forecasting. Un-
til recently, it was still the practice for some agencies to offer only
one set of rate trajectories. Thus, it was possible to speak of "the"
future population. Today, however, the uncertainties of future pop-
ulation growth are better recognized, and it is quite rare to find a
projection without at least one alternative set of assumptions.
Both variants and scenarios offer alternative sets of assumptions.
The difference between the two is to some extent only a difference
in detail, but this is also reflected in the intended use. The variant
approach usually offers three alternatives: high, medium, and low.
The high and low scenarios are typically defined in terms of the
resulting population size, and not in terms of their components.
Therefore, the larger population can come from increased migration,
lower mortality, higher fertility, or a combination of any of these.
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The World Population Prospects produced by the United Na-
tions Population Division (UN, 1993), the most commonly used set
of world projections, currently offers four variants to 2025: high,
medium, low, and constant fertility, the last being for illustrative
purposes. Fertility is allowed to vary, but only one set of mortality
and migration assumptions are used throughout.
In their recently published long-range world population projec-
tions, the UN (1992) gives projections until 2150 for nine world
regions. Seven different fertility extensions are considered, but mor-
tality and migration assumptions also remain invariant.
The World Bank (1992) offers only one central set of projections.
Birdsall (1992), however, offers a set of alternative projections re-
sulting from faster than expected fertility decline in the developing
world.
Sometimes the selection of inputs for high and low variants is
directly influenced by the interests of the agency producing the fore-
casts. For example, the US Social Security Administration, whose
principal interest lies in the age structure of the population, com-
bines high fertility and high mortality for its high variant, and low
fertility with low mortality for its low variant, giving the two most
extreme values for the old age dependency ratio. The US Bureau
of the Census, on the other hand, combines low fertility with high
mortality and vice versa in order to get the most extreme values for
the total population size.
Recently an increasing number of authors (Lutz, 1991; Ahlburg
and Vaupel, 1990; Cliquet, 1993) and agencies (EUROSTAT, UN)
have chosen to speak of population scenarios instead of the more
traditional variants. Substantively, a scenario approach to popula-
tion projection may be defined through several characteristics: more
emphasis is put on the if-then nature of the calculation as opposed
to a likely prediction; a scenario approach is expected to make all
assumptions very explicit and to offer a sensitivity analysis over the
assumptions chosen; all three components of change are addressed
separately, and if one is chosen to remain invariant (such as mortal-
ity and migration in the 1992 UN long-term projections) this needs
to be justified; finally, a scenario approach has the connotation of a
somewhat larger number of different outputs - for instance, the de-
cision of EUROSTAT (1991) to present just two scenarios including
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different fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions does not al-
low the analysis of the effects of individual components.
The disadvantage of the scenario approach is that it calls upon
users to exercise judgment in the choice of scenarios they wish to
consider and the relative likelihood of the different scenarios. The
advantage is that a user can get a comprehensive sense of how
changeable different population output variables are and what con-
ditions would have to arise for large changes to take place. For those
unconcerned with variation, less may be better, and the middle vari-
ant or central scenario may be the only relevant set of projections.
2.8 Interactions among Components and
Possible Feedbacks from Results
In Chapter 15, two extreme scenarios (rather than probabilistic dis-
tributions) are defined for each component based on the substantive
analysis described in Chapters 3 to 14. Combining two extremes
each in fertility, mortality, and migration results in eight different
combinations. This systematic permutation of alternative scenario
assumptions is a prerequisite for careful sensitivity analysis. In addi-
tion, a central scenario is defined by combining the arithmetic means
of the fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions. This central
scenario attempts to satisfy the demand for one main projection for
orientation.
The systematic permutation scenario approach is based on
the assumption of independence between demographic components.
The level of one demographic rate is unaffected by the level of the
others. Thus, for example, high mortality from AIDS in Africa has
no effect on fertility levels. Similarly, high migration rates from high
fertility regions to low fertility regions do not affect fertility of the
receiving region. However unrealistic this assumption may be, it
best serves the purpose of a thorough sensitivity analysis: how ro-
bust are certain policies under alternative population futures? For
testing robustness, extremes have to be considered. Also, systematic
permutations help to explain the relative impacts of the individual
components under given age structures.
But the basic assumption of independence is very strong. In par-
ticular in the long run it can lead to unreasonable results. In a world
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of dependencies, independence is rarely observed. The problem is
to capture and specify the nature of these dependencies. Because
of this lack of solid empirical information about the structure and
degree of such interdependencies, most forecasters choose to remain
on safer grounds by not specifying any. But at least for illustra-
tive purposes population projections should also explicitly focus on
possible dependencies. The development of fertility, mortality, and
migration rates is influenced by a number of determinants. At least
three different levels of interactions can be distinguished:
• Interaction between demographic components.
• Feedbacks from other demographic variables, in particular pop-
ulation size or age structure.
• Feedbacks from non-demographic variables, such as economIC
development, education, or environmental factors.
Interaction between demographic components is incorporated
relatively easily. For example, high migration to low fertility coun-
tries may have an impact on fertility rates in the receiving countries.
Such dependencies can be taken into account by adjusting some of
the systematic permutation scenarios from above, e.g., increase the
fertility level in Western Europe in the case of high immigration.
Feedbacks from other demographic variables, such as population
size or age structure, are more debatable and hence more difficult
to be included. There is full consensus that the world population
cannot grow indefinitely, but no agreement exists on the levels at
which some sort of collapse might happen. The (land) carrying ca-
pacity concept is accepted in the natural sciences, but less so among
social scientists. Collapses, if they happen at all, will probably oc-
cur suddenly and with large regional differences. As to possible
reactions of fertility, mortality, or migration to negative effects of
population aging, little consensus is found. Very rapid aging will
certainly create problems, in particular when countries are not well
prepared, e.g., with regard to social security. But, as is shown by
the example of today's industrialized world, populations can adapt
to gradual changes in the age structure. Because of the possible dis-
crepancy between individual desired family sizes and societal goals,
it is unclear whether, for example, extreme aging will result in higher
fertility.
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For any type of dependence, feedbacks for the most part work
indirectly via such complex matters as levels of education, status
of health care, economic development, or environmental pollution.
Only a comprehensive multiseetor system would be able to track
such feedbacks. However, the strength - and sometimes even the
direction - of such multifarious feedbacks is largely unknown, or
at least highly uncertain. As a consequence, multisector systems
models tend to create dependencies and future paths far different
from reality, a world in itself driven by rather vague feedback loops.
While conceptually such multiseetor models are desirable, they are
usually not suited for the purpose of population projections. By in-
clusion of multiple feedbacks from non-population variables in such
models, a great potential exists of introducing more errors than one
resolves.
A well-known example of such a multisector system is the
World3 model developed by the Forrester-Meadows group during
the 1970s - an economic, demographic, and environmental model of
the world taken as a whole (Forrester, 1971; Meadows et al., 1972,
1974,1992; Meadows and Meadows, 1973). The population segment
of World3 includes 48 equations, and keeps track of the population in
four broad age groups, 0-14, 15-44,45-64, and 65 and above. Pop-
ulation growth is determined by the difference between the crude
birth rate and the crude death rate. These two crude rates are
changed internally through a number of feedbacks. In particular,
the crude birth rate declines with increases in food intake, increases
in pollution, improvements in material standard of living, and pop-
ulation crowding (which results from industrialization). The crude
death rate decreases with increasing food intake and improvements
in the material standard of living, and increases with increasing pol-
lution and (to a much lesser extent) population crowding. Some of
the effects are ambiguous - for example, an increase in agricultural
production increases pollution and at the same time increases food
availability per capita, making its effect on death rates and hence
on the population growth rate unclear. A major shortcoming of
World3 is that education is not included.
During the 1970s, motivated by the World3 model, a number of
global models were developed. Among those, the Bariloche model
(Bariloche Group, 1976; Herrera et al., 1976) is worthy of mention
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as it has a relatively large number of feedbacks to the population
submodel. For example, among other things, the crude birth rate is
influenced by school enrollment, calorie intake, housing availability,
and the life expectancy at birth. The modelers circumspectly em-
phasized that their interrelations are based on descriptive statistical
analysis and "should not be confused with causal relationships."
However, in their judgment, "the results are very satisfactory, from
the point of view of the precision achieved, and make it possible to
predict population changes resulting from the socioeconomic vari-
ables considered in the model" (Herrera et at., 1976:51).
A different approach was used 20 years later by researchers
working at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(Lutz, 1994). They studied population-development-environment
interactions in a specific setting on the island of Mauritius.[3] The
Mauritius modeling team avoided the ambiguous relationships found
in other multisector systems, put substantial emphasis on common
property problems (in particular water and land), and chose a de-
centralized modular approach. This helped to avoid black box rela-
tionships in which the effects of certain parameter changes cannot
be understood by the user. A strength of the Mauritius model is its
population module, which - using a multistate cohort-component
model - produces projections of the population by age, sex, labor
force status, and educational attainment. Education is explicitly
incorporated. Education increases the productivity of labor, but
costs money. A main feature of the model is that it is extraordinar-
ily open. Since the nature and the strength of most of the feedbacks
included in previous models are subject to much debate among sci-
entists, most of those feedbacks are not hard-wired in the model.
The feedbacks need to be defined by the scenario maker. The dis-
advantage of this is that the use of the model can be daunting at
first. On the other hand, experienced users have at their disposal a
flexible tool for the study of population-development-environment
interactions in a specific setting.
Feedbacks from non-demographic variables cannot be captured
by the multiregional cohort-component approach chosen in Chap-
ter 15. Such feedbacks go beyond the scope of this volume. But
both feedbacks from population size and age structure on demo-
graphic components and dependencies on demographic components
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themselves are explicitly dealt with in a separate chapter on special
long-term scenarios (Chapter 16).
2.9 Summary: The Approach We Chose
In this chapter we have addressed the question "Why another set of
global population projections?" We have considered who wants pro-
jections and for what reasons, what should be the time horizon and
spatial resolution, what output parameters are expected, and what
are the alternative approaches to address the issue of uncertainty
in population projections. Throughout the chapter we contrasted
our choice of approach to that of others. Issues have been listed
in which progress is possible and desirable, and where alternative
new strategies promise new insights. Table 2.1 summarizes some
of the key issues in population projection on the left-hand side and
specifies the approach we have chosen on the right-hand side.
There seems to be little disagreement on the projection method-
ology to be used for (global) population projections. Our projections
are carried out using a multiregional cohort-component model, with
five-year age groups. In contrast to global projections produced by
the UN and the World Bank, which are based on individual coun-
try estimates, we have disaggregated the globe into 12 major world
regions. By doing so, much of the world's heterogeneity is taken
into account, and one need not bother with national particularities,
especially with respect to migration.
The crucial difference with respect to existing global population
projections lies in the specification, justification, and combination
of alternative scenario assumptions. The approach chosen involves a
number of steps. First, selected experts with different backgrounds
in the fields of fertility, mortality, and migration analysis are asked
to think about the future of the three demographic components. If
necessary, different experts are invited for different regions. The
experts are asked to suggest possible high and low assumptions for
future fertility, mortality, and migration levels up to the year 2030.
The experts have to substantively argue for their points and justify
their views. These elements are documented in Chapters 3 to 14.
Next, those alternative views expressed on future levels of fertility,
mortality, and migration, which are sometimes only of a qualitative
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Table 2.1. Major characteristics of our projection approach.
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Issue
Projection
methodology
Uncertainty
Variability of
components
Basis of
assumptions
Justification of
assumptions
Scenario
combinations
Time horizon
Interactions
Feedbacks
Our choice
Multiregional cohort-component model with 5-year
projection intervals; based on 12 major world
regiOns
Alternative scenarios combining extreme fertility,
mortality, and migration assumptions (uncertainty
ranges)
Fertility, mortality, and migration are given equal
importance; high and low values and their
arithmetic mean for each component are specified
Expert judgment on low and high values in fertility,
mortality, and migration based on understanding of
underlying processes plus outside knowledge
Scientific chapters by experts in the fields of
fertility, mortality, and migration; for developed
and developing areas separately
Systematic permutation of high and low scenario
assumptions (8 alternative combinations) as a basis
for sensitivity analysis; plus 1 central scenario for
orientation resulting from combination of means
Both medium-term projections until 2030 and
long-term extensions for illustrative purpose until
2100
Special scenarios assuming dependence of levels of
fertility and mortality in the long run and increases
in fertility in industrialized countries as a
consequence of immigration
Special scenarios assuming a food crisis in certain
high fertility regions (feedback from population size
on mortality) and a social crisis in certain low
fertility regions (feedback from population aging on
fertility)
nature, are transformed into alternative quantitative assumptions on
different future paths in each region considered. These future demo-
graphic trends are thought to be extreme, but certainly not impos-
sible. The high and low assumptions should somehow correspond
to a 80-90 percent confidence interval of an intuitive probability
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distribution. In other words, on each side only about 5-10 percent
of all possible cases, depending on the region considered, should lie
outside the values considered. Assuming a symmetric distribution,
the assumed central value should be both the most likely case and
the mean of the high and low values. Finally, a systematic permu-
tation of the high and low scenario assumptions in each of the three
components resulted in eight scenario combinations. This provides
the basis for sensitivity analysis. Systematic permutations also help
to explain the relative impacts of changes in individual components
under given age structures. Fertility, mortality, and migration are
explicitly assumed to be independent. In addition to the eight com-
binations, a central scenario obtained by combining the arithmetic
means of the low and high fertility, mortality, and migration as-
sumptions are defined for orientation.
This expert opinion-based scenario approach with systematic
permutations of high and low values for each component together
with a central scenario in each of the 12 world regions is, in our view,
the most appropriate for meeting the expectations of the users of
projections while giving maximum justice to scientific criteria and
minimizing computational efforts and input data requirements. This
was our choice for alternative projections up to 2030 (see Chap-
ter 15).
Beyond 2030, as described above, expert judgments are consid-
ered less reliable, and many experts indeed refuse to specify assump-
tions for longer-term demographic trends. Also, in the long run
independence of components is implausible. Therefore, a slightly
different approach is taken for the long-term extensions until 2100
which serve as purely illustrative purposes in this book (see Chap-
ter 16). Beyond 2030 scenarios are defined which demonstrate the
effects of various forms of dependency between demographic com-
ponents and possible feedbacks from population size/density and
population aging on demographic rates. Those exercises are quite
speculative and serve to illustrate certain features of population dy-
namics rather than giving likely long-term projections.
Notes
[lJ The word projection, of course, carries psychological connotations. As
Webster's defines the word: "projection. 6b: the attribution of one's
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own ideas, feelings, or attitudes to other people or to objects ... 8: an
estimate of future possibilities based on a current trend" (Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary, 1974, Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam
Company). These two meanings are not wholly separable, for, in imag-
ining individual behavior in the future, we cannot but include our own
perspectives.
[2] There does exist the possibility of mistaken counts of the achieved
population that would give false estimates of empirical error. These
could result in either overestimates or underestimates of error size.
[3] The last two decades produced a lively and rapidly growing literature
on the interrelationships between economic, demographic, and envi-
ronmental variables, but the development of simulation models that
included these three factors almost came to a complete halt after the
burst of activity in the early 1970s.
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Editor's Note for Part I
The two contributions in Part I provide a framework for the projec-
tions carried out in Part VI. They clearly indicate that new, world
population projections are useful if they (a) consider a broader range
of possible future trends in all three components (fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration), (b) leave room for substantive considerations
on the state' of knowledge about the determinants of possible future
trends in these three components, and (c) explicitly include analy-
ses beyond the field of demography on factors (such as food supply
and AIDS) that may impact future fertility, mortality, and migra-
tion rates. For this reason, Parts II through V of this volume are
devoted to substantive considerations in demography and related
disciplines.
Users of world population projections seem to expect two dif-
ferent aspects: (a) one most likely projection that can be used as
a guideline and (b) information about a plausible range of uncer-
tainty and sensitivity analyses for testing the robustness of certain
strategies or policies. The most appropriate and practically feasi-
ble response to these expectations is that of systematic permutation
scenarios where high, central, and low future values are assumed
separately for fertility, mortality, and migration, which are then
combined in a systematic manner. With respect to the time horizon
of projections, experts feel that defendable assumptions can only be
made up to 2025-2030. For this reason the scenarios presented in
Chapter 15 have been defined up to this threshold. But several users
- especially environmental modelers - demand projections until the
end of the 21st century. Therefore, some clearly more speculative
scenario calculations up to 2100 are presented in Chapter 16.
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Chapter 3
A Regional Review of
Fertility Trends in
Developing Countries:
1960 to 1990
John Cleland
This chapter contains a review of fertility trends in developing coun-
tries over the period 1960 to 1990. The choice of starting date is
simple to justify. Before 1960, fertility decline was very rare in devel-
oping countries. Indeed, there is evidence that levels of childbearing
in many countries increased in the 15 years following World War
II. In this period, substantial improvements in life expectancy were
achieved and thus rates of growth of Third World populations accel-
erated. Concerns about the effects of rapid population growth arose,
and the 1960s saw the first examples of a unique and new form of so-
cial engineering: state-sponsored family-planning programs. These
programs originated in Asia before spreading to other regions. As
we shall see, any account of fertility trends has to address the cen-
trally important issue of the contribution made to fertility decline
by government interventions.
A broad-ranging review such as -that contained in this chapter
has to make explicit choices about the framework within which to
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present the demographic data. The goal is to choose a framework
that will clarify the underlying forces of change. In this instance, a
regional grouping of data has been chosen, rather than one based on
development indicators. There are several reasons for this choice.
First, one clear lesson from the past 30 years is that simple mono-
causal explanations of fertility decline totally fail to capture the
complex interplay offactors that influence the onset and speed of fer-
tility decline. Thus fertility trends cannot be illuminated adequately
by a straightforward ordering of nations in terms of their stage of
socioeconomic development. This is not to deny that development,
particularly in the social sector, has an influence on childbearing.
Rather it is to assert that this influence is strongly conditioned by
cultural factors and government policies.
A second reason for choosing a regional framework is the exis-
tence of a pronounced regional imprint on fertility transition. The
clearest example is the European fertility transition that was distinct
in its timing from that in other regions. As will be demonstrated
later in this chapter, there is also an undeniable element of syn-
chronicity in the onset of fertility transition in other major regions,
such as Latin America and East Asia.
The importance of a region lies less in the implied geographical
contiguity of constituent states than in the fact that it represents a
surrogate for shared cultural values and features of social organiza-
tion. A major advance in our understanding of fertility transition
has been the realization that cultural factors, as denoted by reli-
gious, ethnic, or linguistic markers, may have a decisive impact on
fertility, independently of economic and other types of influence.
The statistical underpinning for this review is the fertility rates
collated and published by the United Nations Population Division.
Specifically, the 1992 edition of World Population Prospects is the
source of information on trends since the quinquennium 1960 to
1965. For some countries, UN fertility estimates are little more than
guesswork; in other cases, they are based on poor data and may be
incorrect. Nevertheless they represent the most carefully compiled
and adjusted set of figures in existence and carry a corresponding
authority. In the account that follows, major uncertainties about
the rates for specific important countries are noted, but no attempt
is made to amend UN estimates.
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Throughout the chapter, levels offertility are represented in the
form of period total fertility rates (TFRs): the single most useful
and widely used indicator. As is well known, period fertility rates
are sensitive to variations in the tempo of childbearing as well as to
the numbers of births that any cohort will achieve. Thus a period
TFR can provide misleading impressions of the underlying level of
cohort fertility. With the main exception of China, however, there is
little evidence that TFRs in developing countries have been heavily
influenced by large, reversible changes in the speed of childbearing.
Insofar as this assertion is correct, period TFRs provide a valid
indication of what age-specific fertility rates in a particular calendar
period imply in terms of ultimate family size.
With these introductory remarks, the groundwork has been laid
for the main part of the chapter: an essentially descriptive review
of the course of fertility in the main regions of the developing world.
Following this, an attempt is made to distill the main lessons that
have been learned and what may lie ahead.
3.1 The Course of Fertility in
Major Regions
3.1.1 East and Southeast Asia
East and Southeast Asia, excluding Japan, accounts for nearly one-
third of the world's population, with China alone comprising about
one-fifth of the total. Global population trends are thus largely
determined by the course of events in this region. In contrast to
South Asia, economic growth has been rapid: China, Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore have all achieved annual rates of growth in GDP per
head between 1965 and 1988 of 4 percent or more. (The equivalent
figure for India is 2.5 percent.) As a consequence, an increasing
number of states in the region are now classified as upper-middle or
high income countries; they are included in this review only because
incomes per head were low at the start of the 3D-year period.
As shown in Table 3.1, several countries (Taiwan, Republic of
Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) now have period fertility that
is below replacement level. In all cases, decline started in the late
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Table 3.1. Fertility trends in East and Southeast Asia.
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
Laos 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.69 6.69 6.69
Cambodia 6.29 6.22 5.53 4.10 4.80 4.60
Myanmar 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.30 4.90 4.50
Philippines 6.61 6.04 5.50 4.96 4.74 4.30
Vietnam 6.05 5.94 5.85 5.59 4.69 4.22
Malaysia 6.72 5.94 5.15 4.16 4.24 4.00
Indonesia 5.42 5.57 5.10 4.68 4.05 3.48
Thailand 5.42 5.14 5.01 4.27 2.96 2.57
Korea (North) 5.75 7.00 5.70 3.46 2.77 2.50
China 5.93 5.99 4.76 2.90 2.52 2.38
Taiwan 5.46 4.46 3.47 2.80 2.30 1.76
Korea (South) 5.40 4.52 4.11 2.80 2.40 1.73
Singapore 4.93 3.46 2.63 1.87 1.69 1.69
Hong Kong 5.30 4.01 2.89 2.31 1.80 1.36
1950s or 1960s in response to rising age at marriage as well as in-
creasing use of birth control. Careful analyses for Korea (Park, 1992)
and for Taiwan (Feeney, 1991) suggest that current period fertility
may be depressed by postponement of marriage and births and that
the underlying cohort level may be slightly above two births. This
interpretation is of considerable policy importance because there is
growing concern among several governments about the implications
of very low fertility. Singapore has already adopted explicitly prona-
talist policies, and it is possible that Taiwan and South Korea will
follow this lead, unless they can be reassured that period rates are
likely to rise.
Two other countries may join the below-replacement group be-
fore the end of the century: Thailand and North Korea. Thailand's
decline started in the late 1960s and has proceeded rapidly ever
since. Fertility is approaching replacement level with no sign thus
far of stabilization. Much less is known about the demography of
North Korea, and the government, unlike that of South Korea, has
been hostile or indifferent to the promotion offamily planning. Nev-
ertheless, there is evidence that fertility has fallen steeply: a vivid
demonstration that transition is not necessarily dependent on strong
government support. Another country of the region, Myanmar, ap-
pears also to have experienced fertility decline, despite government
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indifference to family planning and isolation from the rest of the
world.
Fertility trends in urban China closely parallel those in the city
states of Hong Kong and Singapore. Decline started in the early
1960s from a level of about 5.0 births. By 1980, fertility in all three
settings had fallen below or close to replacement level. While the
major mechanism was increased birth control within marriage, age
at marriage for women also rose sharply from about 20 years in 1960
to about 25 years in the early 1980s.
Of course, fertility in China as a whole is determined by rural
trends. As in India, traditional fertility levels in China appear to
have been modest, within the range of five to six births. Also like In-
dia, there is some evidence that natural fertility increased initially
under the impact of modernization. Marital fertility rates in the
mid-1950s appear to have been about 15 percent higher than rates
recorded in the 1930s (Coale and Freedman, 1993). The first ma-
jor destabilization of rural fertility was the disastrous Great Leap
Forward in the late 1950s. Mortality rose sharply and period fer-
tility plummeted to a little above three births before rebounding to
over seven in 1963. There followed a period of vacillation in fertility
rates during the Cultural Revolution. The dramatic decline in rural
fertility started in about 1970, coinciding with the introduction of
a forceful family-planning program. Between 1970 and 1980, the
TFR for the whole country fell from about 6.0 to 2.4 births. This
decline of nearly 60 percent in 10 years represents the single most
important contribution to the fall in global fertility over the last 30
years. However, the emergence of pronounced regional variations
during this period is often overlooked (Peng, 1981). By the end of
the decade, TFRs in more remote provinces of China, such as Tibet,
Guizhou, and Ningxia, was still over 4.0.
In 1979, the Chinese government announced the one-child pol-
icy, and in the following year passed a marriage law that was widely
interpreted as a relaxation of the previous strong discouragement
of early marriage. Both measures had profound but partially off-
setting effects on the course of fertility in the 1980s. The one-child
policy was enforced with considerable success in urban areas. By
1985-1987, urban fertility was well below 2.0 in all provinces of
China. Indeed in most of the larger cities, second- and higher-order
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births almost disappeared. In the rural areas, however, the policy
encountered strong resistance. The majority was not prepared to
sign the one-child pledge, and period fertility in nearly all provinces
remained well above 2.0.
For the whole country, the period TFR has fluctuated through-
out the 1980s around a level of 2.4 births per woman, with no clear
evidence of a continuation of the decline of the 1970s. Many com-
mentators assumed that the economic reforms of the 1980s made
it increasingly difficult for central and local officials to enforce an
unpopular policy. However, in 1989 population policy was again
strengthened and responsibility for enforcement transferred to local
civilian authorities. Preliminary results from a 1992 survey con-
ducted by the State Family Planning Commission suggest that fer-
tility fell sharply in the period 1989 to 1992.
Fertility transition in Indonesia shares several characteristics
with that in China. In both countries, levels of socioeconomic devel-
opment were low at the onset of decline and, in both cases, couples
were subjected to very strong official pressure to adopt birth con-
trol. The Indonesian government initially focused its attention on
densely settled Java, which comprises just 6 percent of the country's
land area but over 60 percent of the population. Fertility started to
decline there (and in Bali) in the early 1970s. By 1976, fertility in
Java was actually lower among the least-educated rural population
than among the urban, more-educated sectors: a highly unusual
situation that undoubtedly reflected the impact of the government
program (Freedman et al., 1981).
Between the late 1960s and the late 1980s, fertility in the whole
country fell from 5.7 to 3.5 births, a decline of nearly 40 percent. In
Java, the current level is below 3.0 births per woman but in Sumatra,
the second most populous island, fertility remains much higher.
The neighboring countries of the Philippines and Malaysia con-
trast in numerous and fascinating ways with Indonesia. In the 1960s,
economic and educational standards were higher than in Indonesia
and fertility began to decline earlier. But the pace of decline has
been much more gradual. Total fertility rates in Malaysia and the
Philippines - estimated by the UN to be 4.0 and 4.3 over the period
1985-1990 - are now markedly higher than in Indonesia.
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The stalling of fertility decline in Malaysia dates from the late
1970s and appears to originate with a resurgence in Islamic values
and shifts in government policy. While fertility among the Chinese
and Indian minorities continued to decline, and is now little above
replacement level, that of the majority Malay population actually
rose in the 1980s, in response to a decline in the use of contraception
(Leete and Tan, 1993). In 1984, the government announced a new
population policy which set a target of 70 million inhabitants by
the year 2100. It was widely perceived to be a pronatalist measure,
and a national survey conducted shortly afterward indicated that
a significant fraction of Malay women had revised their family-size
expectations upward in response (Arshat et ai., 1988).
In the Philippines, there was no radical change in population
policy but official support for family planning has always been rela-
tively weak because of the opposition of the Roman Catholic church.
Although President Marcos created in 1969 a Commission on Pop-
ulation to coordinate family-planning activities, it failed to secure
consensus support or widespread coverage of services. Between 1976
and 1987, the level of contraceptive practice among married women
rose only from 38 to 46 percent; and slightly over half of users at
both points in time relied on less effective traditional methods.
In summary, the fertility transition in East and Southeast Asia
is varied and complex. Variability is evident in the starting level
of fertility; the timing of the onset of decline and level of socioeco-
nomic development at the time; the speed of decline; and the role
of government policy. Anyone who still believes that the level of
reproduction is a predictable outcome of education, urbanization,
and living standards should pause to ponder the difference in fer-
tility transition between Indonesia and Thailand, on the one hand,
and Malaysia and the Philippines, on the other.
3.1.2 South Asia
For present purposes, this region is defined as the Indian subcon-
tinent, extending west to include Iran. It accounts for about 20
percent of the world's population and represents the largest numer-
ical concentration of poverty. Bangladesh and Nepal, with GDPs
per head of US $170-$180, are among the poorest countries of the
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Table 3.2. Fertility trends in continental South Asia.
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
Afghanistan 7.01 7.13 7.14 7.21 6.90 6.90
Pakistan 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75
Iran 7.26 6.97 6.54 6.50 6.50 6.50
Nepal 5.86 6.17 6.52 6.54 6.25 5.95
Bhutan 5.95 5.95 5.95 5.95 5.89 5.89
Bangladesh 6.68 6.91 7.02 6.66 6.15 5.10
India 5.81 5.69 5.43 4.83 4.73 4.20
world, while India and Pakistan, with per caput Gnps of $350, rank
twenty-second and twenty-third in the world of poverty.
In the region as a whole, fertility has declined modestly from a
level of about 6.0 in the early 1960s to a little over 4.5 births in the
late 1980s, a fall of some 25 percent. However, there is consider-
able uncertainty about South Asian demographic trends. For three
countries - Iran, Afghanistan, and Bhutan - recent fertility trends
are essentially unknown. For three other countries (Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and Nepal) they are a matter of controversy, leaving only
India for which vital rates are clearly established.
United Nations estimates for Afghanistan, Iran, and Bhutan
show high fertility rates in the 1960s of about seven births per
woman and very modest declines in the last 20 years (Table 3.2).
For Afghanistan, a verdict of unchanging high fertility seems en-
tirely reasonable, though the military disruptions of recent years
may well have caused a temporary drop. The UN scenario for Iran
is more doubtful. Before the revolution, the country had a vigorous
family-planning program that claimed a considerable impact. Af-
ter the fall of the Shah, the program was discredited, but in recent
years the government has reaffirmed the need to moderate the pop-
ulation growth rate and is again promoting family planning. The
degree of success achieved remains uncertain but fertility may have
declined, rather than remaining at the constant level of 6.5 births,
as suggested by the UN
By contrast, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal generate a rela-
tive abundance of demographic data. All three countries have con-
ducted regular censuses; all have conducted a number of detailed
fertility surveys, supplemented by contraceptive prevalence surveys;
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and Bangladesh and Pakistan have sample registration systems that
publish vital rates. Yet demographic trends remain in dispute. The
reason for this uncertainty lies in the poor quality of the data. Sur-
veys, in particular, tend to suffer from the pernicious problem of
backward displacement of dates of recent births, leading to an un-
derestimation of the current level of fertility. Claims of fertility
decline are often made but these are equally often shown to be false
by the next survey.
Accordingly, the results of the 1991 Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) in Pakistan, which indicates a big decline in fertility
to about 5.5 births, should be regarded with great skepticism. Re-
liance on the sample registration system, run by the Federal Bureau
of Statistics in Karachi, is more prudent. This system portrays a
constant total fertility of about 7.0 births until 1988, when a drop to
6.5 is recorded. The preliminary results of 1989 show a level of 6.4.
Falls in lower birth order-specific rates tend to be more pronounced
than in higher-order births; thus it remains unclear whether marital
fertility decline (which normally affects higher-order births at the
initial stages) has really started. Certainly the level of contracep-
tive practice reported in the 1991 DHS (12 percent) is too low to
make an appreciable impact on fertility. To conclude, the level of
fertility in Pakistan remained high and constant until the late 1980s
but has probably fallen slightly in the period 1988-1990. The UN
estimates in Table 3.2 are essentially correct.
The 1991 Fertility, Family Planning, and Health Survey yielded
an unadjusted TFR of 5.1. The level of contraceptive use rose from
5 percent in 1976 to 23 percent in 1991, and age at marriage for
women also increased over this period. Thus fertility transition in
Nepal has almost certainly started.
In Bangladesh the pace of change is more rapid and pronounced
than in Pakistan and Nepal. It is increasingly apparent that fertil-
ity decline started in the late 1970s and gathered pace in the 1980s.
Between 1975 and 1990, the TFR fell from about 7.0 to about 4.5.
Evidence for these assertions comes largely from a 1989 fertility sur-
vey and from two contraceptive prevalence surveys in 1989 and 1991,
both of which collected truncated birth histories. The consistency of
the three data sets is striking. Detailed analysis of the 1989 fertility
survey shows that the main change has taken t4e form of a reduction
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in higher-order births; for instance, the percent decline in age-order
specific rates (cumulated to age 40) between the period 1974-1978
and 1984-1986 was 10 percent for second births but 38 percent for
fifth births. This evidence of increasing marital fertility control is
confirmed by the rising level of reported contraceptive use, from 7
percent in 1975 to 40 percent in 1991. Age at marriage for women
has also increased but the antinatal effect is modest and offset by a
decline in widowhood and in the length of the first-birth interval.
In broad terms, the remarkable transition in Bangladesh, the
fifth poorest country in the world, has affected all socioeconomic
strata equally. Thus fertility decline is as pronounced among illit-
erate, landless laborers as among the slightly more affluent culti-
vators. The experience of Bangladesh proves beyond doubt that
extreme poverty and low literacy do not represent absolute barriers
to fertility decline.
Like Nepal, but in contrast to its Islamic neighbors, the tradi-
tional level of fertility in India was low, fluctuating between 1880
and 1960 between five and six births per woman (Bhat, 1989). One
possible reason for the slow pace of fertility decline in India is that
modernization acted to increase natural fertility through changes
in lactational and sexual behavior. There is evidence that marital
fertility in the rural areas of many states actually increased during
the 1960s, despite the existence of a family-planning program and
a gradual rise in reported contraceptive practice (Srinivasan, 1989).
The onset of decline in total fertility occurred in the late 1960s and
continued for almost a decade; it then stalled before resuming its
downward path in the mid-1980s. The most obvious explanation
for this sequence concerns the politics of population control. In
the 1960s under Indira Ghandi, the family-planning program be-
came increasingly coercive and, when she fell from power in 1977,
its credibility also fell and recovered only gradually. Over the entire
period from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, total fertility in India
fell by only 28 percent, from 5.8 to 4.2 births. Various decomposi-
tions (e.g., Srikantan and Balasubramanian, 1989; Chaudhry, 1989)
indicate that one-fifth of this decline is attributable to rising age at
marriage and the rest to marital fertility.
Some of the reasons for the slow pace of change in India -
the possible relaxation of traditional restraints on fertility and the
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checkered history of the family-planning program - have already
been mentioned. However, no account ofIndian transition can fail to
note the immense cultural and economic diversity ofthe country and
its relevance to demographic trends. Transition is most advanced
in the southern states, notably Kerala and Tamil Nadu with TFRs
of 2.2 and 2.6, respectively. In most of the northern states such as
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, fertility and childhood mor-
tality remain high with TFRs ranging between 4.8 and 5.5. Many
(e.g., Dyson and Moore, 1983) attribute this north-south divide to
fundamental cultural differences that affect the status of women. In
Kerala, for instance, 87 percent of women are literate, compared to
20-30 percent in the high fertility, more northern states.
3.1.3 Latin America
Latin America is defined here to include all states of continental
South America and Central America, except Guyana and Suriname.
In contrast to other major developing regions, Latin America expe-
rienced large-scale and permanent settlement of European popula-
tions, and this legacy is evident in certain features of the economy
and fertility transition. Two countries, Argentina and Uruguay,
were once among the wealthiest in the world and are still ranked
in the upper-middle income category. Both had completed their
fertility transition by 1950, with TFRs of 3.2 and 2.7, respectively,
at that time. In the past 40 years, fertility in both countries has
changed little, remaining well above replacement level (Table 3.3).
This stabilization at levels ranging between 2.5 and 3.5 births per
woman appears to be characteristic of the region. In Chile, as in
Argentina and Uruguay, the era of rapid decline is over but pe-
riod fertility remains within this range. However, there is no good
reason for believing that Latin American culture possesses features
that will sustain moderate fertility indefinitely. The majorities of
the populations of these three countries are of Spanish and Italian
extraction. Fertility levels in the countries of origin, Spain and Italy,
are now among the lowest in the world. If Latin America experi-
ences the socioeconomic transformation - particularly with regard
to the position of women in society - that has characterized South-
ern Europe, it is probable that Latin American fertility will fall to
replacement level or below.
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Table 3.3. Fertility trends in Latin America.
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
Guatemala 6.85 6.60 6.45 6.40 6.12 5.77
Honduras 7.36 7.42 7.38 6.58 6.16 5.55
Nicaragua 7.37 7.17 6.79 6.40 6.00 5.55
Bolivia 6.63 6.56 6.50 6.15 5.50 5.00
Paraguay 6.80 6.40 5.65 5.05 4.82 4.58
El Salvador 6.85 6.62 6.10 5.70 5.00 4.52
Ecuador 6.90 6.70 6.05 5.40 4.70 4.10
Peru 6.85 6.56 6.00 5.38 4.65 4.00
Mexico 6.75 6.70 6.37 5.03 4.29 3.60
Venezuela 6.46 5.89 4.96 4.44 3.90 3.45
Costa Rica 6.95 5.80 4.33 3.89 3.50 3.36
Brazil 6.15 5.31 4.70 4.21 3.81 3.20
Panama 5.92 5.62 4.94 4.06 3.46 3.14
Argentina 3.09 3.05 3.15 3.36 3.15 2.96
Colombia 6.76 6.28 4.66 4.14 3.51 2.90
Chile 5.28 4.44 3.63 2.90 2.80 2.73
Uruguay 2.90 2.80 3.00 2.89 2.57 2.43
From speculations about the future, let us return to a consid-
eration of the past. Because the demography of Latin America is
rather well documented, it is possible to extend the historical de-
scription of fertility trends back to the 1950s. Between the early
1950s and the early 1960s, there is little evidence of any fertility
decline. Indeed, in some countries such as Costa Rica, El Salvador,
and Panama, a slight increase is registered, perhaps in response to
declines in widowhood (Dyson and Murphy, 1985). In this regard,
Latin America is very different from Asia, where rising age at mar-
riage for women heralded and then accompanied declines in marital
fertility. For most countries, the early 1960s represent the last quin-
quennium prior to the fertility transition. TFRs are typically close
to seven births per woman, though lower in Brazil, Chile, Panama,
and Venezuela.
The synchronicity of the onset of fertility decline in Latin Amer-
ica is its most remarkable feature. Leaving aside Argentina and
Uruguay, which belong to the earlier European transition, all but
two countries (Mexico and Bolivia) started their declines in the
1960s. However, the speed of change varied widely. Guzman's
(1991) calculations of the year of onset of decline and the percent
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Table 3.4. Year of onset of decline and percent decline in following
decade: Latin America.
Brazil
Guatemala
Venezuela
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Ecuador
Peru
Honduras
Bolivia
Mexico
Source: Guzman, 1991.
Year
1960
1960
1960
1961
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1963
1965
1965
1966
1972
1972
Percentage decline
8.3
9.6
15.6
37.5
34.3
28.7
10.8
8.5
20.0
19.7
20.0
16.8
11.5
13.8
36.4
decline in the following decade are shown in Table 3.4. Declines of
over 30 percent are registered on Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico.
At the other extreme are Brazil, Guatemala, and Nicaragua which
experienced declines of less than 10 percent. Interpretation of these
figures is difficult, because of the somewhat arbitrary definition of
the onset of decline. For instance, it is perfectly correct to charac-
terize the transition in Mexico as both late to start but extremely
rapid once under way; but it would be misleading to claim that fer-
tility decline in Brazil has been slow but steady. Over the whole
period from 1960 to 1990, the pace of change in Brazil has been as
great as in Costa Rica and Colombia.
In terms of their current situation, Latin American states fall
into four groups. The first group consists of Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay where fertility is low and stable. A large second group
follows where total fertility is now in the range of three to four births
and where there is some sign of incipient stabilization, particularly
in Costa Rica. The three most populous countries of the region
- Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia - fall into this group. It should
be noted that fertility in Colombia is now slightly lower than in
Argentina. The third group comprises four countries which are in
68 John Cleland
the midst of transition with recent fertility rates of four to five births
per woman. Finally, there is a cluster of four high fertility countries,
three of which are in Central America.
While the simultaneity of the onset of decline is the most re-
markable feature of Latin American transition, a further distin-
guishing feature is the emergence of very pronounced but tempo-
rary urban-rural, socioeconomic, and regional differentials during
the period of decline. In most countries of the region, decline started
among the more educated and metropolitan sectors and spread grad-
ually to less educated, rural sectors. The typical process is well illus-
trated by Rodriguez and Hobcraft (1984) in an analysis of Colom-
bian data. They were able to identify the beginnings of decline in
the 1960s for women with complete primary or higher education, in
the late 1960s for women with incomplete primary schooling, and
in the late 1970s for those with no formal schooling. Furthermore,
they demonstrated that, within each educational stratum, decline
was initially restricted to a reduction in higher-order births and only
subsequently affected earlier stages of family formation.
This sequence suggests strongly that fertility decline in Colom-
bia has taken the form of social diffusion of a new form of behavior,
birth control. A more recent analysis by Rodriguez (1990) supports
this view. He examined subgroup changes in fertility behavior, using
World Fertility Survey (WFS) and Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) data for five Latin American countries. Remarkable regular-
ities in the spacing and limitation components of marital fertility
were observed. Specifically, the strata with the least evidence of
fertility control at the start tended to experience the greatest pro-
portional change. Within strata, transition followed a self-sustaining
course that is consistent with a basic diffusion process. To the ex-
tent that Rodriguez's analysis and interpretation are correct, it is
inevitable that fertility in all strata will converge at a modest level.
Thus the prospects for a continuation offertility decline in the region
as a whole appear good.
3.1.4 The Arab states
The Arab states constitute a linguistic and cultural rather than a
compact geographical entity. Most have small populations: Egypt,
with over 50 million inhabitants, followed by Sudan, Morocco, and
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Algeria, with about 25 million each, are the main exceptions. There
is a very wide spread in living standards. At one extreme are the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, classified as high
income countries. At the other end of the spectrum are Sudan,
Mauritania, and Yemen with per caput GDPs of less than $500.
Information on the demography of the Arab world is patchy.
For Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and some of the Gulf states, there is
little recent evidence concerning fertility levels. In other countries
of the region - for instance, Sudan and Mauritania - recent survey
information is available, but, as in South Asia, data quality is poor
and estimation of trends correspondingly difficult.
Nevertheless, several features of Arab fertility have clearly been
established. At the start of the period under discussion, the early
1960s, levels of fertility were universally very high, with TFRs rang-
ing between 6.5 and 8.0. This exceptionally high level is the result
of an unusual combination of early marriage ages, relatively short
periods of breast-feeding, and little practice of birth control. It is
clear from Table 3.5 that fertility remains high in this region. Only
one country, Lebanon, records a rate decisively below 4.0.
For the entire region, total fertility has fallen from about 7.0 in
the early 1960s to about 5.0 in the late 1980s, a drop of 28 percent.
This average conceals very large differences in trends and current
levels and an equally large divergence in government policies toward
population and family planning. Apart from Lebanon, whose ethnic
and religious diversity sets it apart from the rest of the Arab world,
the Egyptian and Tunisian governments were the first to provide
public sector family-planning services and associated publicity, and
were among the few Arab states to experience fertility decline in
the 1960s. Tunisian fertility dropped steadily, and this country now
records one of the lowest TFRs in the region with 3.9 births per
woman. For reasons that are not fully understood, Egyptian fertility
plateaued in the 1970s, before resuming a downward path in the
1980s to reach a TFR of 4.5 in the period from 1985 to 1990.
In the 1970s, declines in Arab fertility became more widespread
with well-documented falls in Jordan, Morocco, and a number of
the small Gulf states. By the late 1980s, fertility decline had started
throughout most of the Arab world, though the change was often
modest. The main exceptions include two of the poorest countries,
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Table 3.5. Fertility trends in the Arab states.
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Yemen
Oman
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Mauritania
Sudan
Jordan
Iraq
Algeria
Morocco
UAE
Qatar
Egypt
Bahrain
Tunisia
Kuwait
Lebanon
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80
7.61 7.77 7.77 7.77
7.17 7.17 7.17 7.17
7.17 7.48 7.58 7.38
7.26 7.26 7.30 7.28
7.46 7.79 7.69 7.44
6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50
6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67
7.99 7.99 7.79 7.38
7.17 7.17 7.11 6.56
7.38 7.48 7.38 7.17
7.15 7.09 6.89 5.90
6.87 6.76 6.35 5.66
6.97 6.97 6.76 6.00
7.07 6.56 5.53 5.27
7.17 6.97 5.94 5.23
7.17 6.83 6.15 5.66
7.31 7.41 6.90 5.89
6.35 6.05 4.92 4.30
1980-85
7.71
7.17
7.17
7.28
7.38
6.50
6.58
6.76
6.35
6.35
5.43
5.23
5.00
5.06
4.63
4.88
4.87
3.79
1985-90
7.69
7.17
6.87
6.80
6.66
6.50
6.44
6.15
6.15
5.43
4.82
4.82
4.80
4.53
4.08
3.94
3.94
3.42
Yemen and Mauritania, but may also include some of the richest
states, such as Libya, and Oman. Little is known about fertility in
Libya but it is thought that any decline is recent and modest. In
Oman, fertility in 1987 was estimated from the Gulf Child Health
Survey to be 7.8 with only 9 percent of currently married women
reporting use of contraception. According to the results of the Gulf
Child Health Survey Program, fertility in the late 1980s also re-
mained high in several other Gulf states: 6.5 among the indigenous
populations of Kuwait and of Saudi Arabia, 5.9 in the United Arab
Emirates, and 5.3 in Iraq (Farid, 1993). However, fertility had fallen
more steeply in Bahrain and Qatar.
Fertility transition in this region shares some features of both
the Asian and the Latin American transitions. As in Asia, rising
age at marriage for women has made an important contribution to
fertility decline, and, as in Latin America, huge differences in fertility
have arisen between urban and rural strata and between educational
strata. This differentiation, in both Latin America and the Arab
states, may reflect the rather weak nature or nonexistence of many
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government family-planning services; under such circumstances, the
poor and less-educated have limited access to modern birth control.
In general, levels of Arab fertility remain much higher than
might be expected from consideration of living standards and ur-
banization. This resilience is sometimes attributed to low levels of
female autonomy and education. While it is true that female labor
force participation remains low, educational standards for women
are rising rapidly in many Arab countries. But even among educated
women, fertility is remarkably high. For instance, the 1990 Jorda-
nian Demographic and Health Survey records the following TFRs
by educational status of women: no schooling, 6.92; primary, 6.00;
secondary, 5.39; and postsecondary, 4.10. There are few highly ur-
banized countries with reasonable access to family-planning services
where fertility levels, even among educated couples, remain as buoy-
ant as in Jordan. It seems reasonable to conclude that replacement-
level fertility is a more distant prospect for the Arab world than for
some other regions.
3.1.5 Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa comprises only 10 percent of the population of
the Third World but accounts for a disproportionately large number
of the least developed countries. The economic plight of the region
deteriorated further in the 1980s, with declines in income per head in
many countries. Although it possesses more cultural diversity than
most of the other regions considered in this chapter, sub-Saharan
Africa exhibits features of social organization and cultural values
that distinguish it from other major regions: traditions of postnatal
abstinence, polygyny, and the importance of lineage are the best
known of these.
The first comprehensive account of Africa's demography had
little direct information on fertility at its disposal and had to rely
heavily on stable population analysis (Brass et aI., 1968). Since
that time, data availability has improved steadily. Large sums were
invested in censuses, and in the 1970s an increasing number of coun-
tries undertook more specialized demographic surveys. The World
Fertility Survey represented the next step forward with the partici-
pation of 10 African countries. Under the successor to this program
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Table 3.6. Fertility levels in sub-Saharan Africa: 1985-1990.
East Africa Southern Africa
Rwanda 8.49 Namibia 6.00
Malawi 7.60 Botswana 5.50
Uganda 7.30 Swaziland 5.25
Ethiopia 7.00 Lesotho 5.00
Somalia 7.00 South Africa 4.38
Burundi 6.80
Kenya 6.80 West Africa
Zambia 6.75 Cote d'Ivoire 7.41
Djibouti 6.60 Benin 7.10
Zimbabwe 5.79 Mali 7.10
Niger 7.10
Central Africa Guinea 7.00
Angola 7.20 Nigeria 6.90
Zaire 6.70 Togo 6.58
Congo 6.29 Burkina Faso 6.50
Central African Republic 6.20 Gambia 6.50
Cameroon 6.10 Senegal 6.50
Equatorial Guinea 5.89 Sierra Leone 6.50
Chad 5.89 Ghana 6.39
Gabon 4.99 Guinea-Bissau 5.79
(the Demographic and Health Survey Project) national surveys have
been conducted in a further 12 countries.
Despite this improvement, knowledge of fertility levels in Africa
remains uneven. Out of 35 continental states with a population of 1
million or more, direct information on fertility in the period 1985 to
1990 is available for only 17. Moreover, the reliability of estimates
is lower than in South Asia. Hence Table 3.6 is restricted to current
levels and no attempt is made to depict trends as for other regions.
However, the evidence strongly suggests that, prior to 1980, fer-
tility in Africa remained constant at a high level and even recorded
increases in some countries. Between the early 1960s and the 1980s,
UN statistics show increases of 0.5 births or more for Rwanda, An-
gola, Zaire, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Guinea-Bissau.
In some cases, the most plausible explanation is a decline in patho-
logical sterility. In other cases, it may be attributed to an attenua-
tion of traditional birth-spacing mechanisms. Indeed it is probable
that prior to 1960, fertility increase was more widespread. Feeney's
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analysis of Kenyan census data, for instance, suggests that fertility
rose substantially prior to 1960 (Feeney, 1988). Unfortunately few
countries have a record of census taking as good as Kenya's to allow
a similar historical depth of analysis.
The persistence of high fertility in Africa gave rise to a prevail-
ing view that this situation would continue for some time to come.
It was argued that Africa possessed unique cultural and economic
characteristics that would render reproductive behavior unusually
impervious to the forces of change (e.g., Caldwell and Caldwell,
1990). The high desired family sizes reported in surveys further
strengthened this prognosis.
Events of the last decade have transformed perceptions about
the stability of African reproductive regimes. First, an appreciable
shift in population policies has occurred, with governments increas-
ingly expressing concern about population growth and support for
family-planning services. According to Mauldin and Ross (1991),
sub-Saharan Africa recorded greater increases in the strength of
family-planning programs than any other region. There are also
signs of change in reproductive behavior. Nearly all Demographic
and Health Surveys have recorded appreciable increases in median
ages at first birth. For instance, the differences between cohorts
aged 30 to 34 and 20 to 24 amount to 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, and 0.8 years
in Kenya, Zambia, Burundi, and Togo, respectively. Improvements
in the educational attainment of young African women may be one
reason for this change. It is also possible that economic stress has
acted to delay the formation of stable partnerships and the onset of
childbearing.
Postponement of childbearing may be a temporary phe-
nomenon. But there is evidence in an increasing number of East
and Southern African states that fertility decline, fueled by contra-
ceptive use, has started. Such a trend is much more likely to mark
the onset of a sustained transition than to represent a transitory
response to economic hardship. At the forefront of this movement
is the Republic of South Africa. By the late 1980s, the level of con-
traceptive practice among the black population was estimated to be
about 50 percent and total fertility at about 4.5 births (Mostert,
1991). Moderate levels of use among married women have also been
recorded in Zimbabwe (43 percent), Botswana (33 percent), Kenya
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(27 percent), Namibia (23 percent), and Swaziland (21 percent). In
all these countries there is parallel evidence of declining fertility. In
South Africa and Zimbabwe, the decline has amounted to about 2.0
births, in Kenya and Botswana to about 1.5 births, and in Namibia
and Swaziland to less than 1.0 birth per woman.
Successive surveys in Kenya show how rapidly the climate of
reproductive opinion and behavior can change. The Kenya Fertility
Survey of 1977-1978 portrayed a very pronatalist society. Total
fertility was about 8.0; desired family size averaged 7.2 children;
only 7 percent of couples reported contraceptive use; and only 16
percent of women said that they wanted no more children. There
was little ground for believing that fertility transition was about
to start. Yet a mere decade later, desired family size had dropped
to 4.4 children, 49 percent of women expressed a wish to have no
more, contraceptive use had risen to 27 percent, and fertility had
fallen to 6.5 births. This radical change had affected women of all
educational backgrounds and ages.
This impression of change in the subregion should be balanced
by data from other countries. Recent Demographic and Health Sur-
veys provide no convincing evidence of appreciable decline in Bu-
rundi, Uganda, Zambia, or Tanzania. Nor is it reasonable to expect
any decline in Angola or Mozambique because of prolonged civil
unrest.
In West and Central Africa, fertility shows fewer signs of ac-
tual or incipient decline, though it is probable that fertility decline
has started among younger women in Senegal and in Southwest and
Southeast Nigeria (Cleland et al., 1993). Elsewhere, however, there
is no strong evidence of fertility decline. This stability is particu-
larly puzzling in a country such as Ghana. Ghana has long had a
rather well-educated and urbanized population, where women pos-
sess considerable autonomy and indeed dominate trading. Moreover,
there has been some attempt, since the late 1960s, to promote fam-
ily planning, albeit on a limited scale. Despite the severe economic
recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s which threatened living
standards of the urban middle classes, fertility has remained more or
less constant over the past 15 years (Onuoha, 1993). The experience
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Table 3.7. Fertility trends in island states.
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
Comoros 6.91 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05
Madagascar 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60
Maldives 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75 6.50
Melanesia 6.24 6.01 5.80 5.59 5.31 4.95
Cape Verde 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.70 6.29 4.83
Micronesia 6.21 5.92 5.49 5.30 5.00 4.70
Polynesia 7.30 6.80 6.30 5.80 5.20 4.50
Caribbean 5.46 5.01 4.37 3.49 3.18 2.96
Sri Lanka 5.16 4.68 4.00 3.83 3.26 2.67
Reunion 5.65 4.82 3.93 3.28 2.90 2.54
Mauritius 5.73 4.25 3.25 3.07 2.46 2.10
suggests that Ghanaian society and perhaps other West African so-
cieties present obstacles to fertility decline and mass adoption of
contraception that are absent in East and Southern Africa. While
the prospects are good for widespread fertility decline in the East
and South, the prognosis for West and Central Africa is uncertain.
3.1.6 Island states
To complete this geographic account of fertility trends, Table 3.7
depicts relevant data for the main islands and island groups. Their
contribution to global population trends is minimal. Yet the demog-
raphy of islands is of special interest, and several have been at the
forefront of fertility transition.
In the 1960s, for instance, Fiji, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka were
among the very few developing countries to have started fertility
transition. This evidence gave rise to speculations that Malthusian
constraints on population growth may take a particularly visible
form in islands where territorial expansion is precluded.
Table 3.7 shows that such simple generalizations are unjustified.
In the period 1985 to 1990, fertility in island states ranged from
close to replacement level in Mauritius to about to seven births per
woman in Comoros and Madagascar.
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3.2 Synthesis and Implications
for the Future
Several lessons can be drawn from this regional review of fertility
trends in the period 1960 to 1990. The first provides grounds for op-
timism about the economic and environmental future of the planet.
During the past 30 years, fertility transition has spread throughout
the developing world with a speed that has dazzled demographers
and confounded many experts. It is easy to forget the profound pes-
simism about the prospects for fertility decline that prevailed in the
1960s and much of the 1970s. In particular, it was doubted that the
mere promotion of birth control services could have an impact on the
birth rate of largely agricultural, low income, and poorly educated
nations. As a consequence, there was intense interest in so-called
beyond family-planning measures that included, inter alia, the use
of financial payments to induce couples to accept contraception or
to have fewer children.
The turning point in popular perceptions came in the mid-1970s
with convincing signs that fertility decline was under way in Thai-
land and Indonesia, both largely agricultural countries with low in-
comes at that time. Hitherto, fertility decline had been confined
to countries with atypically favorable conditions: rapid economic
transformation in the case of Taiwan and South Korea; a metropoli-
tan environment as in Hong Kong and Singapore; and the idiosyn-
crasies of an insular status such as Fiji, Mauritius, and parts of the
Caribbean.
As we have seen, fertility decline in the Third World is now
the norm rather than the exception. In Asia, the main exceptions
are Pakistan, Afghanistan, and some of the small countries of Indo-
China. In Central and South America, fertility decline is already
completed or under way in all countries. Among the Arab states of
North Africa and the Middle East, most countries have experienced
falls in fertility though decline is not yet ubiquitous. Finally in
sub-Saharan Africa, fertility transition is clearly starting in East
and Southern Africa, leaving Central and West Africa as the main
areas where fertility remains largely unchanged. Such widespread
transformations of reproductive behavior have come as a surprise
and their existence is not yet fully appreciated outside the specialist
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domain of demography. The rates of population growth in most
developing countries remain high because of the continued decline
in mortality and because crude birth rates are buoyed by increases
in the relative and absolute numbers of couples in the reproductive
ages. Thus, the impact of declining fertility is offset by these other
demographic forces and, in many countries, will not be felt until the
next century.
A major generalization of demographic transition theory is that
once fertility decline, fueled by birth control within marriage, is un-
der way, the trend is irreversible and sustained until fertility reaches
replacement level or thereabouts. Like most simple generalizations,
this one has to be qualified. Reversals have occurred, most notably
the post-World War II baby boom in Western Europe and North
America. More commonly, fertility may plateau before resuming a
downward path, as has been the case in Egypt and Malaysia. More-
over, the speed of decline has varied from the near-precipitous drops
in China and Mexico to a slow pace of change, as, for instance, in
the Philippines or Jordan. A much more profound uncertainty ex-
ists about the proposition that fertility will continue to fall until the
replacement level of a little over two births per woman is reached.
In the aggregate, there is a logic in this ultimate destination for
levels of human reproduction because it implies long-term stability
of population sizes and, in the very long term, no animal popula-
tion can continue to grow or decline indefinitely. But, at the level
of families and individuals, such aggregate considerations may hold
little force. It has already been noted that family sizes appear to
have stabilized in some Latin American countries at a level that is
well above replacement. In other regions, most notably sub-Saharan
Africa and the Arab states, it is difficult to imagine the achievement
of replacement-level fertility under existing socioeconomic and cul-
tural conditions. Fertility aspirations, as recorded in surveys, remain
much higher. In Zimbabwe, for instance, which is at the forefront
of fertility transition in Africa, the 1988 Demographic and Health
Survey indicates a mean ideal family size of 5.4 children among cur-
rently married women; and nearly half of women who already have
4 or more living children want additional children.
Of course, societal conditions do not remain stable. Indeed one
of the biggest mistakes of demographers has been to underestimate
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the rapidity with which societies change. Nevertheless, the prospects
for the attainment of replacement-level fertility within the next 40
years remain doubtful in some parts of the developing world.
The second major lesson from this review concerns the need for
humility on the part of scientists. Despite a huge volume of new em-
pirical evidence concerning fertility transition that has accumulated
in the past 30 years, our understanding of the underlying causes
remains rudimentary. Nor is there any sign of a growing consensus
among population scientists regarding fertility theories or the rela-
tive importance of specific causes. The gulf remains wide between
the two dominant schools of thought - one placing emphasis on eco-
nomic determinism and the other on culture and the diffusion of
ideas.
At the start of this chapter, the inadequacy of simple mono-
causal explanations of fertility decline was noted. This point is
vividly illustrated by recent reviews of the socioeconomic status of
Asian and Latin American countries at the onset of fertility de-
cline (Casterline, 1991; Guzman, 1991). For every indicator (life ex-
pectancy, infant mortality, urbanization, adult literacy, income per
head, percent engaged in agriculture), there was a very wide spread
among countries. To take but two examples from Latin America,
infant mortality ranged from 62 per 1,000 births in Paraguay to 151
in Bolivia, and adult literacy from 84 percent in Costa Rica to 34
percent in Guatemala. This huge disparity in the stage of socio-
economic development reinforces similar conclusions from studies of
the European transition, where birth control spread across a region
with little regard for socioeconomic differences between counties,
bringing lower fertility in its wake.
With the steady increase in the number of countries where fertil-
ity transition has already started, research priorities will shift from
the study of the determinants of the onset of decline to the study
of factors that influence speed of decline and point of stabilization.
Here again though it is unlikely that very strong links will be found
between speed of transition and socioeconomic indicators. The ear-
lier comparison between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines is
a pertinent example. Even more striking is the rapid fertility decline
that has taken place in Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in
the world.
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The reason for this complexity is that both culture and govern-
ment policies exert strong independent influences on fertility. It is
appropriate to end this chapter with a brief consideration of one of
these factors, government policies, because of its practical relevance.
To the extent that state-sponsored initiatives to promote birth con-
trol and the acceptability of smaller families can be effective, the
future course of human fertility depends, at least in part, on gov-
ernment policies and the availability of funds to implement them.
Conversely, if the influence of such interventions is minor, then fu-
ture fertility trends will be determined by broader forces of cultural
and socioeconomic change that are less amenable to governmental
and international decisions.
The effectiveness of family-planning programs has been high on
the demographic research agenda for the past 20 years. The most
influential body of work comprises statistical estimations of the rela-
tionship between the strength of family-planning programs and the
demographic outcomes such as level of fertility, percent decline in
fertility, and contraceptive use, using countries as units of analysis
(e.g., Mauldin and Berelson, 1978; Mauldin and Ross, 1991). The
general finding is that strong programs do reduce fertility, though
this effect is conditioned by, and subordinate to, the effect of so-
cioeconomic development. It is also clear from these analyses that
the creation of family-planning programs cannot be divorced eas-
ily from general development. Few of the least developed countries
have birth control services, education, and publicity that are rated
as strong. Conversely, few of the more developed countries have
programs that are rated as nonexistent or weak. This correlation
obviously complicates the task of isolating the effect of programs
from effects of broader development.
One major limitation of this type of study is that program
strength is taken as an exogenous factor. The analytic design is
vulnerable to the criticism that serious programs are most likely to
arise in response to spontaneous expressions of need and prior fer-
tility decline, and only grow in strength (i.e., political commitment
and resource allocation) when success is already visible. Programs
can thus be seen as a consequence as well as a potential cause of
demographic change. This weakness severely limits the validity of
results.
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Perhaps a more convincing approach to an assessment of pro-
gram impact would be to compare fertility trends in countries that
are broadly similar in cultural characteristics and stage of devel-
opment but where population policies have diverged, perhaps be-
cause of the convictions of political leadership. Algeria and Tunisia,
Pakistan and Bangladesh, Mexico and Colombia, North Korea and
South Korea, Zambia and Zimbabwe are possible candidates for such
a study. In each pair, the first country was much slower than the
second country to adopt and implement policies and programs to
reduce fertility. And in each case, the timing of the start of fertility
decline appears to reflect the policy divergence. Thus it is hard to
resist the inference that Mexico's very late fertility transition is con-
nected to the government's hostility to provision of family-planning
services until the dramatic change in 1972. Similarly, the persistence
of high fertility in Algeria until the early 1980s is surely related to
the low priority attached to birth control, which shifted only in the
1980s.
Such a comparative case study approach shows that government
policies can have and have had appreciable demographic impacts by
changing reproductive attitudes, by legitimizing birth control, and
by enhancing access to family-planning services. To the extent that
this verdict is valid, the future course of fertility in regions where
it is still high depends to some extent on political leadership. As a
consequence, demographic forecasting becomes more uncertain but
the politics of population and birth control become more important
and exciting.
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Chapter 4
Reproductive Preferences
and Future Fertility in
Developing Countries
Charles F. Westoff
The classical paradigm of the demographic transition features a de-
cline in the rate of reproduction from the conditions of natural fertil-
ity at high levels to a regimen in which fertility is highly controlled
and has declined to replacement or lower levels. In many of the
developing countries that have entered this transitional stage, in-
creases in age at marriage have played an important role. But the
principal mechanism driving this transition is birth control, mainly
in the form of contraception, though abortion has made significant
impacts at different times and in different places.
In Asia and in Latin America, the use of contraception has typ-
ically been adopted at higher parities after couples have achieved
the number of children desired; its use at lower parities for the reg-
ulation of spacing has appeared later in the fertility transition. In
contrast, in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a demand for
spacing evidently has emerged before a demand for limiting fertil-
ity. Currently, in the nine sub-Saharan African countries included in
the first phase of the Demographic and Health Surveys (1986-1990),
the average percentage of married women using contraception for
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spacing purposes was 10 percent compared with 8 percent for lim-
iting fertility. In the 16 other developing countries (including those
in North Africa), the corresponding percentages were 12 and 36
percent, respectively, a dramatically different ratio (calculated from
data presented in Westoff and Ochoa, 1991:7).
Whether contraception is employed for purposes of spacing or
for purposes of limiting fertility, it reduces the likelihood of preg-
nancy and thus has an impact on the period rate of fertility. There
is evidence that contraceptive failure rates are greater when meth-
ods are used for spacing rather than for limiting births, but, even
with such higher failure rates, fertility is reduced far below that im-
plied in the natural fertility model (especially considering the higher
fecundability at the younger ages, where spacing behavior is more
common). In any event, a full appraisal of the subject of reproduc-
tive preferences should ideally include both preferences to postpone
the next birth and preferences to terminate fertility. Data on spacing
preferences are not as widely available, however, as data on prefer-
ences to terminate fertility. The World Fertility Survey included no
direct questions on the subject, and the DHS-I questionnaire did not
include the questions necessary to estimate preferred lengths of birth
intervals for all women. Therefore, the emphasis in this chapter is
on the number of children desired and the intention to terminate fer-
tility. These measures are particularly relevant for Asian and Latin
American populations where the contraceptive prevalence level is
determined largely by such limiting practice. As noted above, the
use of contraception for birth spacing dominates in the sub-Saharan
African countries and thus makes more of a contribution to the pre-
diction of fertility in that part of the world.
4.1 Desired Number of Children
The most common measure of reproductive preferences is the num-
ber of children desired. The basic question included in all DHS
interviews was "If you could go back to the time you did not have
any children and could choose exactly the number of children to
have in your whole life, how many would that be?"
The mean number of children desired is shown in the first col-
umn of Table 4.1 for currently married women in all of the countries
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Table 4.l. Indices of reproductive preferences.
Mean desired Percent who Percent
number of children have more want no
(currently married) than desired TFR DTFR more
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 5.4 14 5.0 4.1 38
Burundi 5.5 12 6.7 5.7 24
Ghana 5.5 13 6.4 5.3 23
Kenya 4.8 30 6.4 4.5 49
Liberia 6.5 6 6.9 6.3 17
Mali 6.9 5 7.6 7.1 16
Ondo State 6.1 5 6.1 5.8 23
Senegal 7.2 9 6.6 5.6 19
Sudan 5.9 8 5.0 4.2 25
Togo 5.6 18 6.6 5.1 25
Uganda 6.8 9 7.5 6.5 23
Zimbabwe 5.4 15 5.2 4.3 33
North Africa
Egypt 2.9 37 4.4 2.8 60
Morocco 3.7 27 4.6 3.3 47
Tunisia 3.5 34 4.1 2.9 58
Asia
Indonesia 3.2 19 2.9 2.4 51
Sri Lanka 3.1 21 2.6 2.2 64
Thailand 2.8 21 2.2 1.8 66
Latin America
Bolivia 2.8 42 5.1 2.8 68
Brazil 3.0 35 3.3 2.2 64
Colombia 3.0 31 3.1 2.1 69
Dominican Rep. 3.7 28 3.6 2.6 63
Ecuador 3.4 30 4.3 2.9 65
Guatemala 4.2 18 5.5 4.5 47
Mexico 3.3 29 4.0 2.9 65
Peru 2.9 44 4.0 2.3 75
Trinidad/Tobago 3.1 24 3.0 2.2 54
included in DRS-I. The range of these preferences varies widely, from
as high as seven children in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa
to under three children in a few countries elsewhere.
One well-known difficulty with this measure is that it is influ-
enced by the number of children already born (and surviving), some
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of whom may not have been wanted at the time. The second col-
umn of Table 4.1 shows, for each country, the percent of currently
married women whose number of living children exceeds their de-
sired number. Even considering the likely tendency for women to
rationalize unwanted births as wanted, this statistic indicates sig-
nificant proportions of women who prefer fewer children than they
have. In sub-Saharan Africa, this measure shows the lowest levels of
excess fertility, ranging between 5 and 18 percent except in Kenya,
where 30 percent of women are classified as preferring fewer children
than they have. The percentages with unwanted fertility are much
higher elsewhere, involving roughly between one-fifth and two-fifths
of married women. It is clear, even from this simple measure, that
fertility is significantly higher in many countries of the Third World
than it would be if women's preferences prevailed.
What do these levels of unwanted births imply for the rates
of reproduction? In column 3 of Table 4.1, the total fertility rate
(TFR) is shown for each country. These rates have been calculated
from the birth histories of all women based on person-months of ex-
perience up to 24 months before the survey. A desired total fertility
rate (DTFR) has been derived by confining the numerator for each
age-specific category to those births classified as desired or, con-
versely, by deleting those births in excess of the number preferred.
The DTFR (in column 4) is intended as an estimate of what the
TFR would be if only wanted births prevailed.
In sub-Saharan Africa (including Sudan), the DTFR averages
about 15 percent below the TFR. The greatest differences are in
North Africa and in Latin America, where the DTFR averages 31
and 32 percent, respectively, below their TFRs. The levels offertility
implied by women's preferences are quite low. The lowest level is
for Thailand, where the DTFR reaches 1.8, some 18 percent below
the TFR of 2.2. In Latin America, all of the values of the DTFR
except for Guatemala fall below three births per woman.
In sum, the evidence implies a potential for further major de-
clines in fertility in North Africa and in most of Latin America;
for moderate further declines approaching replacement levels in
Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia; and for smaller declines in
sub-Saharan Africa. Section 4.2 presents some short-term forecasts
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of the TFR and evaluates the ~xtent to which the DTFRs are likely
to be approximated.
4.2 Fertility Forecasts
The TFR can be forecast (with considerable accuracy, judging from
eight DHS-II surveys recently completed) by taking advantage ofthe
strong interrelationships among fertility, reproductive intentions,
and contraceptive prevalence. We know (Westoff, 1990; Mauldin
and Segal, 1988) that there is a very high correlation between the
TFR and the percentage of married women currently practicing con-
traception - an R2 of 0.91, based on a large number (84) of national
fertility surveys. We also now know that contraceptive prevalence
has a strong association with reproductive intentions, Le., the per-
centage of married women who want no more births. In a recent
analysis (Westoff, 1990) of data from these same countries, the R2
between these two variables was estimated at 0.78. We also know
that the same strong associations exist not only across countries
at a given time but also between successive surveys in the same
countries observed at five-year intervals. In developing forecasts
based on these associations, we relied upon the association between
reproductive intentions and contraceptive prevalence measured in
those countries where surveys have been repeated. The procedure
first estimated the future proportion of women who want no more
births based on the regression equation connecting this variable at
two points in time. The predicted value for each country is then in-
cluded in a second equation to forecast the contraceptive prevalence.
To improve this fit, the regression is expanded to include the ear-
lier contraceptive prevalence. Finally, the TFR is forecast from the
predicted prevalence and, to improve the fit, from the earlier TFR.
In short, the model relies upon estimates of the regressions between
tl and t2 to predict the values at t3, incorporating an additional
predictor at each stage (Westoff, 1991). The results are shown in
Table 4.2.
Let us examine the end product first - the forecasts of the TFR
- and then return to the foundation of reproductive intentions. The
forecasts of the TFR indicate an average decline over the next five
years or so of close to 10 percent in sub-Saharan African and range
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Table 4.2. Forecasts of reproductive preferences, contraceptive
prevalence, and fertility.
Percent want Contraceptive
no more prevalence TFR
--
Fore- Fore- Fore-
Current cast Current cast Current cast DTFR
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 38 45 33 37 5.0 4.5 4.1
Burundi 24 34 9 14 6.7 6.1 5.7
Ghana 23 33 13 18 6.4 5.8 5.3
Kenya 49 54 27 34 6.4 5.3 4.5
Liberia 17 28 7 11 6.9 6.3 6.3
Mali 16 27 5 10 7.6 6.8 7.1
Ondo State 23 33 6 12 6.1 5.7 5.8
Senegal 19 30 11 15 6.6 6.0 5.6
Sudan 25 35 9 15 5.0 4.8 4.2
Togo 25 34 12 17 6.6 6.0 5.1
Uganda 23 33 5 11 7.5 6.7 6.5
Zimbabwe 33 41 43 45 5.2 4.5 4.3
North Africa
Egypt 60 63 38 45 4.4 3.9 2.8
Morocco 47 52 36 41 4.6 4.1 3.3
Tunisia 58 61 50 55 4.1 3.5 2.9
Asia
Indonesia 51 55 48 52 2.9 2.7 2.4
Sri Lanka 64 66 62 66 2.6 2.3 2.2
Thailand 66 67 66 70 2.2 1.9 1.8
Latin America
Bolivia 68 69 30 39 5.1 4.5 2.8
Brazil 64 66 66 69 3.3 2.7 2.2
Colombia 69 70 63 68 3.1 2.6 2.1
Dominican Rep. 63 65 50 55 3.6 3.2 2.6
Ecuador 65 67 44 51 4.3 3.7 2.9
Guatemala 47 52 23 30 5.5 5.0 4.5
Mexico 65 67 53 58 4.0 3.4 2.9
Peru 75 75 46 54 4.0 3.5 2.3
Trinidad/Tobago 54 58 53 57 3.0 2.7 2.2
to an average of 13 percent in Latin America. How close are these
forecasts to the DTFR? A comparison of the values in the last
two columns of Table 4.2 reveals considerable variation across these
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countries. In most of the sub-Saharan African countries, the DTFR
is modestly lower than the forecasts. Kenya and Togo show the
largest differences, indicating that women's reproductive preferences
are declining more rapidly than the likelihood of such preferences
being realized. In a few countries, there is hardly any difference -
Liberia, Ondo State in Nigeria, and Uganda. Zimbabwe is also in
this category, with a forecast TFR of 4.5 and a DTFR, for example,
of 4.3.
The differences between these rates are much greater in North
Africa, with the DTFR considerably lower than the expected TFR.
In Egypt, the forecast shows a TFR of 3.9 with the DTFR at 2.8.
The three Asian countries have already gone through most of the
fertility transition; although the forecast TFRs show some contin-
ued decline, they are very close to the DTFRs. In contrast, Latin
America is more like the three countries in North Africa. Wide dif-
ferences remain between the forecast values and the desired levels,
especially in Bolivia and Peru, where the DTFR is around one-third
lower than the TFR forecast. In the other seven Latin American
countries, the DTFR is an average of one-sixth below the average
forecast value.
One of the intrinsically unsatisfactory features of the forecast-
ing procedure described here is its essential bootstrap nature, in
particular, the initial forecast of the proportion of (married) women
wanting no more children from the regression equation connecting
this variable at two points in time. It is not unlike forecasting to-
morrow's weather from today's weather in an area of the country
that typically sends its weather systems in one direction. The un-
derlying theory in this case is a knowledge of the prevailing wind
direction and the pace of its movement. Our procedure is even
less theoretically grounded. It recognizes that a population's re-
productive preferences at tl are highly correlated with those at t2
and that the sign of the regression coefficient indicates a decline.[l]
It then uses this relationship to predict the proportion wanting no
more births at t3. The next step, which relies upon the regression
of contraceptive prevalence on reproductive intentions, is less un-
satisfactory because it identifies a causal antecedent in substantive
terms,[2] whereas the forecast of reproductive intentions relies only
on the association between these intentions over time.
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The actual forecasts of reproductive intentions (columns 1 and
2 of Table 4.2) appear reasonable enough. The forecast for the
sub-Saharan African populations show a rise from an average of 27
percent to an average of 36 percent of women who want no more
children. The projected increases elsewhere in the percent who want
no more are less dramatic: in North Africa from 55 to 59 percent;
in Asia from 60 to 63 percent; and in Latin America from 63 to 65
percent.
4.3 Determinants of Reproductive
Preferences
The main reason that the forecast of reproductive intentions relies
on the same variable at an earlier time is simply that we have little
else to use. In a broad sense, the determinants of reproductive in-
tentions or preferences in developing countries cover the whole range
of social changes included in the concept of modernization. These
determinants are only partially represented in the WFS and DRS;
e.g., economic status is inadequately measured. We do know that
the desired number of children has been declining in many, proba-
bly in most, developing countries. The mechanics of this process are
less well known. The conventional explanations focus on the changes
in the economic value of children; recent speculation minimizes the
importance of structural economic changes and emphasizes the role
of Western or modern ideas about the control of reproduction and
small family norms (Cleland and Wilson, 1987). There is probably
a time lag in the process of change in reproductive norms. The most
likely process is one that first witnesses an increase in the propor-
tion of women who want no more children without a commensurate
decline in ideal or desired family size. In turn, this leads to a de-
mand for and the use of contraception and an ensuing decline in
fertility. Eventually the number of children desired begins its de-
cline as smaller family norms develop. The urban and middle-class
populations typically lead the transition.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the marital fertility transition may fol-
low a different path. As noted earlier, the primary stage may be the
adoption of fertility control to increase birth intervals, a motivation
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derived from health rather than from socioeconomic considerations.
Kenya is a major exception to this generalization; over the decade
from 1978 to 1988, the proportion of women wanting no more chil-
dren increased from 17 to 49 percent.
Analysis of the determinants of reproductive preferences can be
approached at two levels: the macro-demographic level, in which
the statistical units of observations are the provinces or regions of
countries, and the micro or individual woman level.
4.4 Regional-level Analysis
Analysis of the determinants of reproductive preferences at the
provincial or regional level focuses on the question of what char-
acteristics of these areas are associated with the mean number of
children desired or the proportion of married women who want no
more children. The areas assembled for this purpose are the 302
provinces or regions of the 51 countries that participated in the
WFS or in the first stage of the DRS. Although this is a relatively
large number of areas for analysis, it should be kept in mind that it
is not a representative sample of the developing world; China and
India, for example, are not included.
Since the object of interest is the number of children desired
rather than fertility and because there is some tendency to rational-
ize as desired children that may have been unwanted at the time of
conception, we have tried to eliminate the life-cycle effects by sin-
gling out a particular age group. Women aged 25-29 were selected
because most would be married by that age (removing the censor-
ing by age at marriage) and the experience of unwanted fertility
would be still largely in the future, thus minimizing the factor of
rationalization. The mean number of children desired for this age
group across the 302 regions is 4.6, with a range from 2.3 to 8.5.
For the proportion who want no more children a similar logic was
followed by confining the analysis to married women with four or
five children. The mean percentage of women at this parity who
want no more children is 58.0, with a range from 0 to 98.1. Because
there is a high correlation between these two measures (-0.92), the
same covariates are observed. Areas with women wanting no more
children or desiring smaller families are those with high proportions
of their population classified as urban, high proportions of husbands
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Figure 4.1. The nuptiality-fertility model for 216 regions.
in professional occupations, low proportions of women with no edu-
cation, lower proportions of women 15-19 currently married, lower
proportions having a birth before age 20, and are areas with lower
rates of infant mortality. This constellation of correlates is a fa-
miliar package of variables associated with development. There is
considerable overlap in these predictors that collectively account for
60 to 70 percent of the variance of reproductive preferences across
regions. The unexplained variance is partly error of measurement,
but also reflects the absence of other relevant explanatory variables,
perhaps measures of income or wealth.
The complete picture of the paths through which reproductive
intentions affect fertility and are determined by different variables is
shown in Figure 4.1. In this analysis, which shows imputed causal
directions and the path (standardized) regression coefficients, the
role of reproductive intentions is interconnected in various ways.
(The analysis is confined to a subset of 216 regions for which in-
formation on all variables is available.) The variable WNM is the
proportion of married women with 4-5 children who report that
they want no more children. This variable is directly influenced by
the percentage of women with no education and is indirectly in-
fluenced by the proportion who have had a birth by exact age 20
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(B20 ). In turn, the latter variable is determined by the proportions
first married by age 20 (M20 ), which is seen to be a function of res-
idence (the percent rural), the proportion that attended secondary
school, and a measure of educational change that reflects the gener-
ational decline in the proportion of women with no education. The
influence of reproductive intentions on the TFR, in turn, is seen
to operate indirectly through the prevalence of contraception and
directly, presumably through unmeasured non-contraceptive paths
such as abortion.
4.5 Individual-level Analysis
We have also explored the determinants of reproductive preferences
at the level of individual women in several countries, partly to val-
idate the aggregate analysis but also to exploit some economic and
media exposure data that have not been collected by many of the
surveys included in the regional-level analysis. Several countries
were selected from different areas that represent various stages in
the fertility transition: Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Guatemala, Peru,
Thailand, Tunisia, and Indonesia. The surveys in these countries
were all part of the DHS-I project.
In none of these countries are we able to account for much of the
individual variance ofthe desired number of children. The regression
equations for each country are shown in Table 4.3; the R 2 s range in
value from only 0.065 to 0.314. We have confined the examination to
women 25-29 years of age as a life-cycle control, and our multivariate
exploration has excluded measures of fertility that would add to the
explained variance. We have concentrated instead on social and
economic measures and have added only age at marriage and/or
age at first birth in order to parallel the aggregate analysis.
A similar set of determinants of reproductive norms operates
across these countries. Several variables stand out prominently in
all six countries. One is the importance of region of residence. In all
of these countries, region exerts a strong influence on the number of
children desired. It is a surrogate for many other variables: region
frequently reflects language, ethnic origin, or religion as well as the
stage of economic development. In principle, region could be further
dis aggregated to seek explanations at these compositional levels.
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Table 4.3. Linear regression equations for variables related to
number of children desireda by women 25-29 years of age.
Regression coefficientsb
Colom- Guate- Indo-
bia Ghana mala nesia Kenya
Thai- Tuni-
Peru land sia
-0.050
-0.669 -0.340 -0.266 -0.154 -0.473
-0.234 -0.299
-0.607 -0.733 -0.199
4.835 6.655 8.016 6.247 5.317 4.000 3.495 4.970
0.123 0.314 0.223 0.108 0.146 0.065 0.085 0.164
566 745 781 2448 1126 546 1252 836
2.74 5.73 5.36 3.61 4.74 2.69 2.54 3.51
1.38 2.66 3.56 2.16 1.99 1.21 1.08 1.52
-1.224
-0.895 -0.431 -0.209 -0.531 -0.124 -0.175
-0.443 -0.476 -0.169 -0.266
-0.065 -0.052 -0.030 -0.045 -0.053
0.237 0.462Urban-ruralc
Region d
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ethnicitye
Education (wife)!
Education (husband)!
Age at marriage9
Age at first birth9
Watch Tyh
Listen to radioh
Electricityi
Constant
R2
Number of women)
Mean number desired
Standard deviation
-0.365
0.586
-1.170 -1.100
-0.989
-0.538 -0.890
-0.651 -1.159
3.176
0.692
-0.457
0.892 -0.240
-0.758
-0.246 -0.604
-0.834
-1.020
0.346
-0.360
aNon-numeric responses of the type "as many as God sends" or "as many as come"
were usually recoded in category 12+ or with the highest numerical response if less than
12.
b All of the regression coefficients shown in the table were significant at least at the 0.05
level, mostly p < 0.001.
cUrban-rural residence scored as 0 and 1.
dRegions were defined as dummy variables. Those with the highest significant coeffi-
cients recorded here are Pacifica in Colombia; Volta, Ashanti, and upper and northern
regions in Ghana; Guatemala City, Central, Norte, and Norte Oriental in Guatemala;
Java-Bali in Indonesia; central, coast, and eastern regions in Kenya; Selva in Peru;
north and south in Thailand; and Tunis, north-east, north-west, and Sahel in Tunisia.
eEthnicity in Guatemala is coded as Indigina or Ladino.
!Education of wife and husband are coded here in terms of the categories: no educa-
tion, primary, secondary, higher. Single years of schooling were not used because of
significant numbers of missing cases.
9 Age at first marriage and age at first birth were coded in units of single years.
hWatching TV and listening to the radio coded as 0 for no and 1 for yes.
iElectricity coded as 0 for no and 1 for yes.
jThese are the unweighted numbers. Missing information cases are assigned to the
modal frequency category.
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Where such requisite data are available, the variable still retains its
power, although sometimes it obliterates rural-urban differences as
well. Of course, the importance of region in the study of differences
in fertility has been underscored in many other studies, including
the well-known 19th-century European fertility study (Coale and
Watkins, 1986). Urban-rural residence also features in half of the
countries in the multivariate analysis.
One variable that holds up consistently is education of women,
which is inversely related to preferences for fewer children, a pattern
that persists in the presence of all other variables. In a few countries,
the husband's education makes a similar and additive contribution
(in Peru, it overshadows women's education). Education has been
demonstrated to be probably the most dependable and predictable
determinant of fertility and fertility regulation behavior among all
of the socioeconomic measures examined in hundreds of studies.
Several other determinants operate in some countries but not
in others. Age at marriage or age at first birth is a factor in all
of these countries except Ghana and Guatemala: the later the age
of the event, the fewer the number of children desired. How of-
ten the woman reports listening to the radio or watching television
has an effect in all but these two countries as well. In all likelihood,
the mass media transmit outside values and ideas. In other research,
we have demonstrated a powerful association with reproductive atti-
tudes and behavior of media messages on family planning, including
soap operas that extol the advantages of smaller families (Westoff
and Rodriguez, forthcoming).
One of the more surprising findings is a negative one, viz., that
various measures of economic status either singly or in combina-
tion fail to disclose any significant associations with the number
of children desired. Admittedly, the availability of economic data
in these surveys is less than ideal. Nonetheless, there is a variety
of items including ownership of bicycles, cars, radios, televisions,
refrigerators, kinds of toilet facilities, source of drinking water, elec-
tricity, and different country-specific information on ownership of
homes, land, livestock, and so on. In only a few countries do any of
these measures seem to play any direct role in the determination of
reproductive preferences. Only in Colombia, Guatemala, and Thai-
land does one of these economic variables hold up - the presence of
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electricity in the household. The economic variables frequently show
the expected negative associations with reproductive preferences at
the zero-order level, but their influence is absorbed or dominated by
the regional and educational factors. It seems implausible that eco-
nomic status would be totally irrelevant to the number of children
women desire. However, there is simply no empirical support from
the data for the hypothesis that smaller or larger families are viewed
as inconsistent with economic resources, or more precisely, that any
such inconsistency persists in the presence of these other variables.
One might of course reason that economic resources play an earlier
role in facilitating education, but this notion is not testable with
these data.
4.6 Conclusions
So what do we know about reproductive preferences and the dy-
namics of fertility change in the developing world? A fair summary
would be as follows:
1. Whether measured by the average desired number of children or
by the proportion of married women who want no more children,
dramatic changes toward the small family norm are under way
in Latin America, much of Asia, and North Africa, but only in
a few sub-Saharan African countries (where spacing rather than
limiting preferences and behavior predominate).
2. Reproductive preferences are highly correlated (in the aggre-
gate) with the fertility rate, operating mainly, though not ex-
clusively, through contraceptive prevalence.
3. At the regional or provincial level, the main determinants of re-
productive preferences are those typically associated with mod-
ernization: residence in cities or in rural areas, education of
women, occupational status of men, and age at marriage and at
first birth.
4. Our knowledge of determinants at the level of the individual
woman remains very limited: region, rural-urban residence, ed-
ucation of women, age at marriage, and exposure to mass media
dominate the picture rather than individual economic variables.
However, the amount of variation explained is very small.
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[1] Unlike the direction of the wind in the weather analogy, the direction
of reproductive preferences cannot remain pointed in the same way
indefinitely. At the end of the fertility transition, reproductive prefer-
ences stabilize and may even change directions for periods of time, as
has been observed in some developed countries.
[2] Operationally, it is also corrupted by this bootstrapping quality in that
the actual forecasting equation adds the earlier prevalence value. The
redeeming feature here is that at least it does not depend exclusively on
the forecast value of intentions that is based on its own earlier values.
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Chapter 5
Population Policies and
Family-Planning in
Southeast Asia
Mercedes B. Concepcion
Impressive gains in the control of fertility and in the reduction
of population growth rates have been observed in many countries
within the purview of the Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Family-planning (FP) and mater-
nal and child health (MCR) programs have played an important
role in reducing population growth, improving the quality of life,
and developing human resources in the region. The success of FP
and MCR programs is closely associated with the enhanced role and
status of women, lower infant, child, and maternal mortality rates,
better birth-spacing and breast-feeding practices, and the delivery
of services by trained personnel. Nevertheless, the population as a
whole continues to grow by more than 50 million yearly. Moreover,
progress in lessening population growth rates has been uneven and
has generally widened the gap between countries with continued
high growth rates and those which have succeeded in moderating or
lowering their growth rates.
In Southeast Asia, three of the region's 10 component countries
are expected to grow at rates of 1.8 percent or less per annum during
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the 1990-1995 quinquennium while the rest are expected to increase
annually by at least 2.1 percent. By the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, all but one of the countries in Southeast Asia are projected to
grow no faster than 1.7 percent yearly. Total fertility rates (TFRs)
during the early 1990s are also expected to range from Singapore's
reported low 1.7 children to the estimated 6.4 children per woman
in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. These rates are foreseen
by the United Nations to drop to about 3 children or fewer at the
start of the next century (UN, 1991). The exceptions are Cambodia
and the Lao People's Democratic Republic.
Governments in 5 of the 10 Southeast Asian countries perceive
their current fertility levels as unsatisfactory and have ongoing pro-
grams to lower such rates. Three others - Brunei Darussalam, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, and Myanmar - are satisfied with
their present fertility levels. Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar do
not report any direct intervention, while the Lao People's Demo-
cratic Republic is intervening to maintain current rates. Cambodia
and Singapore consider their fertility rates too low. The former re-
stricts access to contraception, while the latter has been offering tax
rebates to couples having a third or fourth child.
This chapter examines the population policies and FP pro-
grams in selected Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and attempts
to draw from their experience the critical preconditions for family-
planning program success. Such experiences have been gleaned from
the country statements provided by participants of the 4th Asian
and Pacific Population Conference (APPC) held in Bali, Indonesia,
on 19-27 August 1992.
5.1 Demographic Situation
During the 4th APPC, which was entitled Population and Sustain-
able Development: Goals and Strategies into the 21st Century, the
present population situation and future outlook were reviewed in the
light of the 1982 APPC Asia-Pacific Call for Action on Population
and Development. The participants noted that while substantial
progress had been achieved by the ESCAP region in responding to
the Asia-Pacific Call for Action, population issues continue to pose
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a most critical challenge. The conference adopted the Bali Decla-
ration on Population and Sustainable Development, which set goals
and made recommendations for population and sustainable devel-
opment into the next century.
One of the population goals included in the Bali Declaration
enjoined countries and areas to adopt suitable strategies to attain
replacement-level fertility, equivalent to a TFR of around 2.2 chil-
dren per woman, by the year 2010 or earlier. In addition, member
countries were also urged to reduce the level of infant mortality to
no more than 40 infant deaths per 1,000 live births during the same
period. Countries and areas where maternal mortality remains high
were called upon to effect a 50 percent reduction by the year 2010.
The Bali Declaration recommended that priority be given to
strengthening policy development and related processes in those
countries where the MCH and FP programs have not yet achieved
desired objectives. Furthermore, such countries were urged to
expand and streamline MCH and FP delivery systems within
the primary health-care framework, adopt innovative management
and multi-sectoral approaches, and encourage wider community
and inter-sectoral participation in program implementation efforts.
Countries which have already reduced their fertility to low or ac-
ceptable levels were prompted to devise program strategies aimed
at achieving self-sustainability.
5.2 Family-planning Policies and Programs
The country statements circulated during the 4th APPC contained
a section on the policy and objectives of national FP Ifamily health
and welfare programs.
5.2.1 Indonesia
The state policy guidelines, issued by the 1973 People's Consultative
Assembly, declared that the objective of the national FP program
during the second five-year development plan period (1974-1978)
was to improve maternal and child health in order to create a small,
happy, and prosperous family. The guidelines also stated that eco-
nomic and social welfare development can be implemented rapidly,
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together with population growth control, through a properly admin-
istered national FP program. The most recent guidelines, issued in
1988, added that the Indonesian FP program should also be di-
rected at reducing mortality rates. At the same time, the need for
successful implementation without endangering future generations
was emphasized. In addition, a policy to enhance support to FP
acceptors through improvements in the quality of available contra-
ceptives and services was outlined. As a general course of action,
FP acceptors are encouraged to use more effective contraceptives,
thus ensuring better protection against pregnancy and accelerating
fertility reduction.
The Indonesian FP program has three broad objectives: expan-
sion of contraceptive coverage in accordance with government tar-
gets; promotion of continued contraceptive use; and institutionaliza-
tion of FP and small family norm concepts by shifting responsibility
for FP decisions to the individual, the family, and the community.
Nine important program strategy elements have been taken into
account in the Indonesian FP program: integration of an array
of governmental, nongovernmental, private, and community agen-
cies; decentralization of responsibility and authority; commitment
to meet targets at every program level; provision of FP services
combined with medical advice; National Family Planning Coordi-
nating Board (BKKBN) cooperation with the Ministry of Health in
health services beyond FP in order to improve FP outreach; devel-
opment of a climate of community support for FP through the co-
operation of community and religious leaders; support for activities
which raise women's social and economic status; emphasis on reach-
ing the rapidly increasing numbers of youth; and encouragement
of self-reliance, the newest strategy element involving the private
sector.
The Indonesian Country Report (1992) stated that the TFR
which was 5.6 children between 1965 and 1969 fell to 3.0 by 1992.
The corresponding decrease for the crude birth rate (CBR) was from
42.6 to 25.2 births per 1,000. By 1990, the crude death rate (CDR)
was estimated to be 9.7 deaths, down from 21 deaths per 1,000 over
the period 1961-1971. The CDR is projected to reach 8.5 deaths
per 1,000 at the start of 1993, declining to around 7 per 1,000 by
the year 2020. The infant mortality rate (IMR), currently estimated
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at 65 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, is expected to drop to 28
by the year 2020. The life expectancy at birth, now reported to
be around 60 years for both sexes, is forecast to lengthen by 10
years during the next quarter of a century. Maternal mortality is
predicted to fall from a level of 450 deaths per 100,000 live births in
1986 to 200 by 2020.
The Indonesians foresee a likely deceleration in the future rate
of fertility decline. The reasons given in the Country Report were
that the desired family size of some couples is unlikely to decrease
further; those who most want to avail themselves of family planning
as well as those for whom the services are most accessible have al-
ready been covered by the program; and the couples who still need
to be brought into the program express larger family-size preferences
and are more difficult to reach. Among these are the urban poor,
those living in outlying areas, those with low educational levels as
well as those who find it difficult to use contraceptives correctly.
Therefore, further mortality and fertility reductions will entail con-
siderably greater efforts. For example, the family-planning program
will have to reach unprecedented numbers of contraceptive acceptors
and motivate couples with high fertility preferences, people who are
less likely to know about health and family-planning programs and
are less disposed to seek services.
5.2.2 Malaysia
Given the rapid economic growth and the prospect of a further de-
cline in fertility, the Malaysian government changed its official stance
in 1984 and promulgated a national population policy. As expressed
in the Malaysian Country Report (1992), a long-term target of 70
million people by the year 2100 is to be achieved through deceler-
ating the TFR decline. The plan is to reduce the TFR by 0.1 point
over five-year periods until a level of 2.05 children is reached in the
year 2070. The TFR in peninsular Malaysia had fallen from a high
6.8 children in 1957 to about 3.3 children in 1990. At this pace, a
TFR of 2.1 could be reached by 2010. The average age at marriage
for females had risen from 22.1 in 1970 to 24.6 years in 1990. The
IMR was recorded at 13.3 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990.
The life expectancy at birth of Malaysian males was lengthened from
55.8 years in 1957 to 69.1 years in 1990. The corresponding rates
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for females were 58.2 and 73.3 years, respectively. Given current
trends, the most probable outlook during the next three decades is
for small nuclear families with the couples participating actively in
the labor force.
Since its inception in 1966, the Malaysian FP program has un-
dergone several phases of development, each involving expansion in
terms of the approach used, the area covered, or the number of agen-
cies involved in the provision of contraceptive services. The spread
of FP services to the rural areas as part of an integrated MCH/FP
program was initiated in the early 1970s and led to FP services be-
ing integrated in the MCH services provided by the Health Ministry.
The blending of FP with health and other social programs not only
aided in overcoming the resource constraints but also in contributing
to wider FP acceptance and a heightened contraceptive prevalence
rate.
In line with the national objective of improving the quality of
life, a comprehensive family development program has been devel-
oped and is now being implemented. It emphasizes the improvement
of family health and welfare through family-life education, parent-
ing courses, and marriage and family counseling. The stress is now
on improving infrastructure in underserved and remote areas, on
enhancing coverage and quality of care in designated areas of low
coverage, and on program consolidation. The implementation of the
risk approach in MCH/FP care has for its ultimate objective the
availability and accessibility of a range of services, including FP, to
all women and families for their better health and well- being.
5.2.3 The Philippines
Since 1970, the Philippine FP program as described in the Coun-
try Report (1992) has been a social development initiative aimed
at diminishing the country's fertility level for the benefit of family
and national welfare. Over the course of its history, the program
has adopted varying approaches and strategies to suit the changing
needs and conditions of the time. There have been modest increases
in contraceptive prevalence rate coupled with moderate declines in
total fertility. Program efforts have contributed substantially to
this decline. However, the gains made did not approximate those of
Population Policies in Southeast Asia 105
neighboring countries owing to problems besetting policy and pro-
gram implementation.
In response to the difficulties experienced in relying on static
clinics, the Outreach Project was implemented in 1976 to expand
the availability and accessibility of services. The Outreach Project
viewed FP not only as a means to reduce fertility but, more impor-
tantly, as advancing family welfare. Furthermore, a closer integra-
tion of broader population concerns into the country's development
plans, policies, and programs was sought. The Outreach Project
also paved the way for strengthening and deepening local govern-
ment involvement in, and support for, FP.
In 1987, a new population policy statement was formulated, tak-
ing into account relevant provisions of the 1987 constitution. The
new policy broadened program concern beyond that of fertility re-
duction. Consequently, the 1989-1993 five-year population program
directional plan was drawn up focusing on two components, namely,
responsible parenthood/FP and population and development. The
program's institutional arrangement was altered along with the pol-
icy and the program. The Department of Health was designated as
the implementing agency for the FP program with jurisdiction over
the activities of all FP service delivery agencies. The Commission
on Population, on the other hand, remained as the overall planning,
policy-making, coordinating, and monitoring body of the entire pro-
gram with specific responsibility for coordinating the population and
development integration thrust.
The new FP program uses a health-oriented, demand-driven ap-
proach, anchored on safe motherhood and child survival. Its primary
objective is to reduce the level of unmet needs for FP, particularly
among poor families. The population and development thrust is one
of systematically incorporating population matters into the devel-
opment efforts of concerned agencies.
Whether the program will be able to make a more significant
contribution toward development goals depends on its ability to
align policies and operational aspects to individual and societal
needs. Some considerations include expanding and intensifying the
provision of women's health and family-planning services; integrat-
ing FP in other health programs, particularly MCH; strengthen-
ing the capacity of agencies to manage the services; promoting
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collaboration among the governments, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and other private organizations and local communi-
ties to improve access to these services; and shortening the gestation
period for an effective program implementation by local government
units, including appropriating local funds for the program.
As stated earlier, the slow pace of decline in Philippine pop-
ulation growth is the consequence of a moderately decreasing fer-
tility and a decelerating mortality decline. The CBR fell from a
level of 46 births per 1,000 in 1969 to about 30 in 1990. The CDR
dropped from 32 deaths per 1,000 in 1940 to around 7.2 in 1990.
Further pronounced decreases are not expected as the pace of de-
cline has slackened significantly. The IMR has fluctuated around 61
infant deaths per 1,000 live births since the 1960s. The estimate for
1990 was 57. Communicable diseases still account for the majority
of morbidity and mortality cases. Since 1970, the TFR has been
slowly but steadily declining and was estimated to be around 4 chil-
dren per woman in 1990. This gradual descent can be attributed
to four causes: the continued expansion in the number of women of
reproductive age as an outcome of past high fertility; shrinkage in
the prevalence and duration of breast-feeding; low-level use of the
more effective contraceptive methods; and the Roman Catholic hier-
archy's open and active opposition to the government's FP program,
thus affecting its political support.
5.2.4 Singapore
The country's FP and population program was initiated in 1966,
soon after independence. Ambitious FP targets were set for each
five-year plan (1966-1970,1971-1975, and 1976-1980), and social
disincentives were introduced. The government actively promoted
the two-child family norm. Contraceptives were made easily avail-
able, and abortion and sterilization were legalized. With the attain-
ment of replacement-level fertility in 1975, the government started
to emphasize child spacing as the main policy orientation. The pro-
gram impact on population growth was significant. According to
the Country Report, Singapore's fertility fell by almost 70 percent
within a span of two decades (Ministry of Health, 1992). The TFR
dropped from 4.7 children in 1965 to a historic low of 1.4 in 1986.
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With the continued decline in fertility rates in the early 1980s,
population projections indicated that if below-replacement fertility
were to continue, the country would experience negative popula-
tion growth within the next 30 years. A new population policy was
promulgated in 1987 in response to the prospect of a decline in num-
bers. The new policy thrust encourages marriage and childbearing.
A new slogan, "Have three or more if you can afford it," was adopted
reflecting the new direction. Generous incentives are being provided
such as income tax rebates, subsidies for child-care centers and for
delivery fees, and special leave schemes. In addition, two programs
- Strengthening the Marriage Program and Family Life Education
Program - have been implemented.
Since the adoption of the new policy, TFRs have inched up-
ward. The rate rose to 1.9 in 1988, but is now about 1.7 children.
Since the tax incentives were announced, the number of third- and
fourth-order births have gone up. However, marriage trends have
not manifested significant improvements. The critical issue on pop-
ulation and development facing policy makers is one of ensuring
replacement-level fertility to achieve the optimum population size
and a balanced age structure.
5.2.5 Thailand
In 1970, the government officially launched the National Family
Planning Program (NFPP) aimed at further reducing the popu-
lation growth rate. According to targets set by successive five-year
plans in the last two decades, the program succeeded in decreasing
the growth rate through quantitative target-oriented strategies. The
provision of an extensive contraceptive distribution system and the
efforts to legitimize the preference for fewer children and to increase
awareness of the possibility of controlling family size through ef-
fective and acceptable means contributed to the program's success.
Past successes, however, do not imply that there are no longer any
unmet needs or new and more difficult challenges ahead. The sev-
enth plan (1992-1996) has renewed the emphasis on human resource
development, thus posing new challenges to the health sector. The
strategy for MCH/FP over the next five years will be to maintain
the program momentum to raise contraceptive prevalence rates in
the face of a 10 percent rise in the number of women of childbearing
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age; provide effective follow-up for couples who are already using
contraceptives; meet more effectively the special needs of adoles-
cents and ethnic minorities; and improve the management, training,
and information systems, particularly at the regional level. Since
health is a national responsibility, the strategy calls for providing
MCH/FP services within a national and inter-sectoral framework.
Thailand's fairly well-developed and extensive health infrastruc-
ture has brought about a significant improvement in the health sta-
tus of mothers and children. The NFPP is well integrated in the
tasks of the Ministry of Public Health's Family Health Division. The
NFPP has effectively utilized the wide primary health care network
to make contraceptive services available throughout the country.
However, equal attention needs be given to both the quality of ser-
vices and the achievement of the plan's targets. This action entails
strong collaboration with other government agencies, with the pri-
vate sector and with NGOs, all of whom have important roles to
play in supplementing government activities.
The population growth rate decreased from 3.0-3.3 percent in
the 1960s to about 1.4 percent in 1991, as stated in the Thailand
Country Statement (1992). The seventh plan has targeted the re-
duction of the growth rate to 1.2 percent by the end of the plan
period. The TFR has dropped from about 6.1 during the period
1968-1969 to less than 2.5 children per woman today. In 1990, the
CDR was estimated at about 5 to 6 deaths per 1,000 population,
with the IMR at approximately 34.5 infant deaths per 1,000 live
births a year later. Currently, life expectancy is estimated to be 66
years for males and 71 years for females. Recently, married couples
whether rural- or urban-based, lesser or better educated, have over-
whelmingly expressed a desire for a family size of some two children.
5.2.6 Vietnam
As recorded in the Country Report (1992), decision number 29 ofthe
Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, issued on
12 August 1981, contained the following objectives for the national
population and FP program: married women should be prompted to
have their first birth after age 22; each couple should be persuaded
to have only one or two children; and a spacing of five years should
be encouraged between the first and second birth.
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According to the country's 1989 population census, there were
64.4 million people in Vietnam. The intercensal growth rate for
the period 1979-1989 was 2.1 percent. The population in 1991 was
estimated at 67.7 million. The CBR recorded for the 12-month
period preceding the 1989 census was 31 births per 1,000, with urban
and rural areas reporting 23 and 34 births per 1,000, respectively.
The CDR was 8.4 deaths per 1,000, while the IMR was 49 infant
deaths per 1,000 live births. The average life expectancy at birth
was 63 years for men and 67.5 years for women.
On 18 October 1988, the Council of Ministers' Decree on Pop-
ulation and Family Planning Policies was promulgated (Vietnam,
1989). The stated goal is to reinforce and strengthen measures
to lower population growth and to ensure that adequate family-
planning methods are readily available and utilized by the popula-
tion. Norms were set for the minimum age at first birth (at least
22 years for urban women, 19 for rural women), for the number of
children (no more than two for most families), and for birth spacing
(three to five years after the first).
A national health law passed by the National Assembly on 30
June 1989 legalized some of the above-mentioned measures. In ad-
dition, the law gives legal force to the individual's right to choose to
limit births and provides for recourse to the judicial system should
this right be violated (Allman et at., 1991).
The population of Vietnam is projected to reach 87 million by
the period 2005-2010 with a growth rate of 1.4 percent, a CBR
of 22.2 births per 1,000 population, and a CDR of 7.9 deaths per
1,000. In projecting the future population, the National Committee
for Population and Family Planning (NCPFP) took into account the
over 17 million women currently of reproductive age who comprise
nearly half of the country's total female population. Moreover, past
high fertility rates are obviously affecting the replacement capaci-
ties of future generations. Starting in the year 2000, half a million
women, on the average, will be added yearly to the cohort of repro-
ductive age. This poses additional constraints on the achievement
of an annual decrease in the TFR of 0.11 in the 1990s and of 0.6 in
the first decade of the 21st century.
To achieve the immediate as well as long-term objectives set
forth in the national population program, Vietnam will endeavor
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to improve the quality and effectiveness of FP activities by utiliz-
ing a network of intercommunal FP centers and communal health
clinics; make a wider choice of contraceptives available; integrate
FP activities in other MeR, nutrition, rural development, income
generation, and women's status improvement programs; train FP
staff at the grass-roots level; and support studies on impacts of FP
programs and contraceptive methods as a basis for the formulation
of a more effective and practical FP program.
5.3 Family-Planning Program Effectiveness
Family-planning programs have a long tradition in the Asian region,
and are firmly established there. Various countries in the region
have conceived novel approaches and have devised new strategies
to reduce fertility. In this section an attempt is made to extract
the most important factors contributing to family-planning program
effectiveness from the experiences of the countries considered in this
chapter.
In common with other Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand boast of a relatively longer ex-
perience with intervention schemes to modify reproductive behavior.
All these countries directly support family-planning programs and
provide unlimited access to modern contraceptives. As a whole, the
most common approaches in these countries consist of integrating
family-planning services in the health care system at the community
level or in rural development schemes. Incentives and disincentives
have been introduced to discourage large families.
Singapore, which achieved replacement fertility in 1975, intro-
duced a comprehensive package of incentives and disincentives in
1969 which was further intensified in 1972 to exert pressure on cou-
ples to limit their family size. In addition, sterilization was promoted
as the best contraceptive method for those who had completed their
families. Abortion became available on demand for a small fee in
government facilities. There were graduated charges for delivery in
government hospitals, paid maternity leaves covering the first two
children only, preferential treatment in choice of primary school for
the first three children in a family, and no priority for public hous-
ing for large families. An additional policy which was made known
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to the public in 1976 was designed to encourage later marriage and
wider birth spacing.
The high commitment of President Soeharto, reflected in the
above-mentioned state policy guidelines, represents one of the keys
to the success ofthe Indonesian family-planning program. This com-
mitment is not merely a personal one but is institutionalized in the
existing systems, both in the People's Consultative Assembly and in
Parliament and other executive systems. The program strengthened
its links with rural communities by recruiting acceptors by means of
a village- based delivery system. Acceptors in the program are main-
tained through various measures extending beyond family planning.
To enhance family planning within the framework of institutionaliz-
ing the small family-size norm, the BKKBN developed a system of
nonmonetary rewards for individual or group acceptors. A system
was introduced in 1989 whereby a community with high contracep-
tive prevalence rates receives a deep well. The reward can also be
in the form of scholarships for children of low income families that
have been resorting to contraception for at least a decade. More-
over, some private Indonesian firms give discount cards to certain
acceptor groups in major cities for the purchase of selected items.
The success of Thailand's family-planning program, as stated
in the preceding section, can be traced to both the provision of
an extensive system of contraceptive distribution and the efforts to
legitimize the preference for fewer children and increase awareness
of the possibility of controlling family size through effective and
acceptable means.
The Philippines has tried a variety of schemes intended to in-
duce couples to have fewer children. Among these are income tax
deductions limited to four dependents, abolition of paid maternity
leaves after the fourth child, and payment of lower interest rates
for rural bank loans by couples using contraceptives. However, the
coverage of these schemes was limited and therefore of little value
in motivating couples to limit their family size. Malaysia also intro-
duced tax deductions and maternity benefits but limited them to
the first three children.
In Vietnam the rewards that had been implemented since 1982
included monetary bonuses and exemption from the required month
per year of corvee labor for sterilization, IUD insertion, or agreeing
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not to have another child (Banister, 1989). Violations of family-
planning policy resulted in loss of bonuses, benefits, and family
allowances. The Council of Ministers' Decision in October 1988
limited couples in cities, deltas, or lowlands to a maximum of two
children. Those couples having more than the allowed number are
made to pay extra for housing or land space, education, and health
care. Such couples are prohibited to move to urban areas and are
required to perform more corvee work.
There is still considerable uncertainty concerning the processes
and factors that motivate couples to limit the number of the children
and account for the adoption of contraception in various societies
at different periods of time. There is general agreement that so-
cioeconomic development and organized family-planning programs
play prominent roles in altering reproductive behavior. According
to Bongaarts et at. (1990), socioeconomic development and family-
planning programs operate synergistically, with one reinforcing the
other.
The family-planning program experience of the selected South-
east Asian countries demonstrates that by making contraceptives
easily available and by encouraging smaller families through a vari-
ety of measures, public and private sector family-planning programs
have heightened contraceptive use. In turn, fertility and population
growth rates have been reduced. The key to effective programs is to
emphasize integrated high-quality outreach services and to take into
account the traditional social structure and norms where the deliv-
ery system is to be introduced. Moreover, careful trial and phased
development of alternative approaches to service delivery systems
are critical to the success of a program. Finally, political support
for family planning is often essential for the establishment of strong
program effort.
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Chapter 6
Fertility in China:
Past, Present, Prospects
Griffith Feeney
Future population growth in any population is determined by the
current age distribution and by future trends in fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration. The influence of the current age distribution
is governed by purely formal demographic considerations that are
the same for every population. The role of mortality depends cru-
cially on its current level. Under conditions of high mortality, rapid
declines are possible, and the normal interaction of mortality and
age structure may lead to rapid population increase even in the
face of substantial fertility decline. Once mortality has declined to
the levels now observed in much of the world, however, mortality is
relatively stable, largely because the features relevant to future pop-
ulation growth reflect biology more than social circumstance. Under
current world demographic conditions, then, appropriate consider-
ation of mortality and age distribution may be given without close
attention to social structure or to policy issues that vary widely from
one country to another.
The assessment of future levels and trends in fertility and mi-
gration is a different matter altogether. Circumstances influencing
fertility, and even more so circumstances influencing migration, vary
widely from one country to another, and all but the most superficial
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consideration of possible future trends requires study of particular
circumstances. International migration may be an important in-
fluence of future population growth for particular countries, large
as well as small. Immigration and emigration cancel out for the
world as a whole, however, whence a global perspective renders the
assessment of migration trends relatively unimportant.
Fertility behavior is heavily conditioned by both biology and so-
ciety. Social influences may be roughly classified into the direct and
intended consequences of national government policy and all other
influences. The distinction is relevant to consideration of future fer-
tility levels because it focuses attention in different directions: to
broad social and economic conditions thought to influence fertility
in the population at large, on the one hand, and to the minds of a
relatively small number of policy makers, on the other. It should
hardly be necessary to point out that the existence of policies to
limit fertility and/or population growth does not imply the effec-
tiveness of such policies. This is an issue to be decided by empirical
analysis in each case.
The argument for country-specific consideration of influences on
future fertility is particularly compelling for China, which is unique
both in the nature and in the impacts of governmental popula-
tion policies. This chapter aims to give a reasonably comprehen-
sive treatment of China's fertility decline at the national level, with
emphasis on those factors relevant to a consideration of the future
trajectory of fertility. The qualifying clause is important, for there
is now such a quantity of demographic data available for China that
it is difficult to conceive, much less write in the space of one book
chapter, anything that might reasonably be called definitive.
6.1 China's Fertility Decline in
International Perspective
That fertility declined rapidly in China is well known, but the speed
of the decline can be appreciated only when China's experience is
systematically compared with that of other countries. This section
compares Chinese experience with that of the rest of the develop-
ing world. The analysis relies primarily on the historical estimates
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Figure 6.1. Fertility decline in China compared with fertility de-
cline in other areas in the developing world. Source: Table 6.1.
developed by the United Nations (1991). These estimates share the
weakness of all secondary compilations, most importantly the spu-
rious impression of the uniformity of information available for var-
ious countries. An independent familiarity with demographic data
sources in the various countries mitigates serious misunderstand-
ing, however, and the United Nations estimates render a valuable
service in making possible an international comparison that would
otherwise be impossible.
Figure 6.1 compares fertility decline in China with fertility de-
cline in the major regions of the developing world. In each case
we plot the total fertility rates for quinquennial periods from 1950
through 1985, shown in Table 6.1. During the 1950s and 1960s,
the level of fertility in China was similar to that of the developing
countries generally. Beginning in the 1970s, however, China's to-
tal fertility rate fell from around six children per woman to slightly
over two children per woman in the space of 15 years. Fertility in
the rest of the developing world declined also, but at a much slower
rate. Thus at the end of the period shown, total fertility for other
areas ranged from a high of over six children per woman in Africa
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Table 6.1. Total fertility rates in China and in other major areas
in the developing world.
China
Africa
West Asia
South Asia
Southeast Asia
Latin America
1950- 1955-
1954 1959
6.24 5.40
6.65 6.74
6.82 6.68
6.11 6.09
5.99 6.08
5.87 5.90
1960-
1964
5.93
6.79
6.54
6.03
5.89
5.96
1965-
1969
5.99
6.73
6.32
5.96
5.79
5.53
1970-
1974
4.76
6.62
5.97
5.76
5.26
4.99
1975-
1979
2.90
6.54
5.64
5.27
4.79
4.36
1980-
1984
2.36
6.40
5.35
5.14
4.27
3.93
Source: UN, 1991:354, 232, 262, 260, 258, 244, respectively, for the six regions
shown.
to slightly under four children per woman in Latin America, all far
above the level in China.
There may be considerable variation in fertility trends between
different countries in the same region. This is particularly true
within Asia, which contains many countries that have experienced
rapid fertility decline, as well as a few that have experienced little
or none. To make country comparisons it is desirable to summarize
the information contained in the time series of total fertility rates,
and a natural way to do this is to calculate a rate of decline. In the
case of China, for example, we see from Figure 6.1 that the total
fertility rate declined after 1970, with two rapid drops followed by
a more modest fall. Consulting Table 6.1, we see that the total fer-
tility rate for 1965-1969, before the decline, was 5.99 children per
woman, that the two sharp drops brought it down to 2.90 children
per woman for 1975-1979, and that it fell further to 2.36 children
per woman for 1980-1985. To calculate a rate of decline we begin
with the 5.99 children per woman in 1965-1969, the last point be-
fore the decline begins, but we may end either with the 2.90 children
per women for 1975-1979, which will give a higher rate, or with the
2.36 children per woman for 1980-1984, which will give a lower rate.
To make a conservative comparison, we take the latter rate. This
gives a decline of 3.63 children per woman over 15 years, for a rate
of decline of 0.24 children per woman per year.
Similar calculations have been made for 20 other Asian countries
and for Taiwan, yielding the results shown in Table 6.2.[1] The
median rate of decline for the 22 populations shown in Table 6.2 is
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Table 6.2. Comparative data on fertility decline in the developing
world.
Period TFR
Country Begin End Begin End Yrs. Dec!. Rate
1. China 1965-69 1980-84 5.99 2.36 15 3.63 0.24
2. Taiwan 1955 1986 6.53 1.68 31 4.85 0.16
3. Hong Kong 1960-64 1980-84 5.30 1.80 20 3.50 0.18
4. Japan 1933 1953 4.42 2.26 20 2.16 0.11
5. Korea (S) 1955-59 1980-84 6.07 2.40 25 3.67 0.15
6. Korea (N) 1965-69 1980-84 6.97 2.76 15 4.21 0.29
7. Mongolia 1970-74 1980-84 5.80 5.25 10 0.55 0.06
8. Indonesia 1965-:-69 1980-84 5.57 4.05 15 1.52 0.10
9. Lao (PDR) 1970-74 1975-79 6.15 6.69 5 -0.54 -0.11
10. Malaysia 1960-64 1975-79 6.72 4.16 15 2.56 0.17
11. Myanmar 1965-69 1980-84 5.74 4.61 15 1.13 0.08
12. Philippines 1950-54 1980-84 7.29 4.74 30 2.55 0.09
13. Singapore 1955-59 1980-84 6.41 1.87 25 4.54 0.18
14. Thailand 1965-69 1980-84 6.14 3.52 15 2.62 0.17
15. Vietnam 1968-72 1983-88 5.90 3.98 15 1.92 0.13
16. Afghanistan 1975-79 1980-84 7.21 6.90 5 0.31 0.06
17. Bangladesh 1970-74 1980-84 7.02 6.15 10 0.87 0.09
18. India 1965-69 1975-79 5.69 4.83 10 0.86 0.09
19. Iran 1960-64 1980-84 7.26 5.64 20 1.62 0.08
20. Nepal 1975-79 1980-84 6.54 6.25 5 0.29 0.06
21. Pakistan 1960-65 1980-84 7.00 7.00 20 0.00 0.00
22. Sri Lanka 1950-54 1980-84 5.74 3.25 30 2.49 0.08
Stem and leaf ---+ 0 0
(excl. Lao)
*
666888999
1 013
Median=0.10
*
567788
2 4
*
9
Sources: Table 46 of UN, 1991, except for Japan and Taiwan. Data for Tai-
wan from Taiwan Demogmphic Yearbook, various years. Data for Japan from
Feeney, 1990, time/TFR as follows: 1933.5/4.42 (Table 11:32), 1938.5/3.84 (Ta-
ble 12:33), 1943.5/3.17, 1948.5/2.66, and 1953.5/2.26 (Table 13:34).
0.10 child per woman per year, or one child per woman per decade.
At this rate, decline from a roughly typical premodern fertility level
of six children per woman to an equally roughly typical modern level
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of two children per woman would take 40 years. China, with a rate
of decline of 0.24 children per woman per year, experienced a decline
nearly this large in only 15 years.
The range of values in Table 6.2 illustrates the difficulties of in-
ternational comparisons. Neither of the extreme values, for example,
-0.11 for Lao People's Democratic Republic and 0.29 for Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, should be given much weight. The de-
mographic data necessary for calculating total fertility rates for Lao
People's Democratic Republic over this period do not exist, and
even casual scrutiny of the estimates given in the United Nations
source will raise suspicion that the numbers are little more than
rough guesses. Little is known of data sources for Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea, for they are almost without exception not
public, and here again scrutiny of the values shown in the source
places their accuracy in doubt. For most of the other countries,
however, sources are plentiful and public, and while accuracy varies
from one country to another, the estimates of rate of decline may
be regarded as reasonably sound.
China's rapid fertility decline is more surprising and significant
for having occurred in the largest country in the world. It is more
surprising because, insofar as fertility decline reflects government
policy initiatives, it is a reasonable hypothesis that larger countries
pose greater challenges. It is more significant because an interest in
world population growth will weigh larger populations more heavily
than smaller ones. The rates of fertility decline shown in Table
6.2 are therefore displayed together with population size in Figure
6.2, which compares size and rate of fertility decline in China with
that for 20 other Asian populations. Because of the great range in
population sizes, from under 2 million for Mongolia to over 1 billion
for China, we use the logarithm of population size, rather than size
as such, as the indicator. Thus the vertical axis shows the logarithm
of population size, and the horizontal axis the rate of decline in the
total fertility rate.
We see at once how far removed China is from the experience of
other countries. Only one other country in the world, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, has a rate of fertility decline exceeding
that of China, and we have just noted that these data are suspect.
The highest rate of decline for all other countries is 0.18, shared by
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Figure 6.2. Rate offertility decline and log population size for 21
Asian countries. Source: Table 6.2.
Hong Kong and Singapore. Pakistan, one of the largest countries in
the world, shows no decline whatever, though also no increase. This
is the extreme low value for the populations shown in Figure 6.2,
from which Lao People's Democratic Republic has been excluded.
It is interesting to note the level and distribution of rates of
decline among countries. Until rather recently, Japan was generally
considered to have experienced the most rapid fertility decline in
the world. Yet the rate of decline shown here for Japan is only
0.11 children per woman per year, just over the median value for
the 21 populations displayed in Figure 6.2. It is notable, moreover,
that with the exceptions of the Philippines and Myanmar, every
country in East and Southeast Asia had a rate of decline higher
than Japan, and every country in South and West Asia a lower
rate of decline than Japan. It is significant that the higher rates of
decline are observed not only in the small city-states of Hong Kong
and Singapore, but also in the large nations of Malaysia, Vietnam
and Thailand.
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The inverted V pattern in the plot is particularly notable.
Smaller countries tend to have either relatively high or relatively
low rates of fertility decline, with a convergence toward the median
as size increases. Perhaps this reflects the possibility that, in the dif-
fusion of modernization, small countries may be bypassed altogether
for a time, but may also modernize rapidly once the process begins,
whereas larger countries cannot escape modernizing influences, but
tend to react more slowly to them.
6.2 China's Fertility Decline:
A Closer Look
Looking at total fertility rates for quinquennial periods obscures im-
portant details of China's fertility decline. In this section we exam-
ine several single-year time series to provide a more precise picture of
fertility decline, a picture that may then be compared with govern-
ment population policy initiatives. Incidentally, we present evidence
of the accuracy of the data from which these fertility statistics are
calculated. While certainly not perfect, the Chinese data are supe-
rior to that available for most countries in the world, developed as
well as developing.
Figure 6.3 shows conventional total fertility rates (TFR) for
China from 1965 through mid-1987.[2] We are in fact looking at
two different series here, shown in the first two columns in Table 6.3.
The first, plotted with solid dots, is calculated from age-specific birth
rates (ASBR) derived from the birth histories collected in the 1982
One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey conducted by the State Fam-
ily Planning Commission (see China Population Information Center
1984; Coale 1984; Coale and Chen 1987). The values shown are
those given in Coale and Chen (1987), though these hardly differ
from those reported in the first survey (China Population Informa-
tion Center 1984). These values are for calendar years.
The second series in Figure 6.3, plotted with small circles, is cal-
culated from age-specific birth rates derived from birth histories re-
constructed from a 10 percent sample of the 1987 One-per-Hundred
Survey carried out by the State Statistical Bureau. The reconstruc-
tion procedure, developed by Luther, is described in Luther and
Cho (1988). An extension of the own-children method (Cho et al.,
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Table 6.3. Total fertility rates and mean age at marriage for China,
various sources and calculations: 1965-1987.
ASBR TFR Mean age at marriage PPPRTFR
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1987 2.46 21.8 22.0 2.33 2.26
1986 2.33 21.8 21.8 2.17 2.11
1985 2.27 21.7 22.0 2.07 1.97
1984 2.35 21.7 22.1 2.06 1.99
1983 - 2.53 21.8 22.1 2.32 2.10
1982 2.83 22.1 21.9 2.63 2.58
1981 2.71 2.41 22.8 22.6 22.0 2.65 2.61 2.56
1980 2.32 2.55 23.0 22.8 22.4 2.70 2.90 2.58
1979 2.80 2.77 23.1 23.0 23.0 3.20 3.14 3.20
1978 2.75 2.72 22.8 22.8 23.2 3.16 3.14 3.16
1977 2.87 3.09 22.5 22.6 23.4 3.23 3.40 3.14
1976 3.25 3.30 22.3 22.3 23.1 3.47 3.52 3.48
1975 3.58 3.80 21.7 22.0 23.2 3.73 3.93 3.75
1974 4.15 4.24 21.4 21.5 22.8 4.14 4.33 4.33
1973 4.51 4.72 21.0 21.1 22.5 4.37 4.69
1972 4.92 20.6 20.7 22.2 4.73 4.85
1971 5.40 20.3 20.4 21.9 5.08
1970 5.75 20.2 20.3 21.1 5.43
1969 5.67 20.3 20.4 20.8 5.41
1968 6.37 20.1 20.2 20.6 5.68
1967 5.25 20.0 20.2 21.0 4.98
1966 6.2] ]9.8 5.75
]965 6.02 ]9.7 5.96
Values in columns 2 and 7 refer to years ending June 30 of each year. Other
values refer to calendar years.
Sources: column 1 from Coale and Chen (1987, Basic Table l.A.:25); column
2 from Luther et ai. (1990, Table 4:350); column 3 from Banister (1987, Table
6.1:156); column 4 from unpublished computer printouts of the 1988 Two-per-
Thousand Survey; column 5 from Feeney and Wang (1993, Table 2:69); column
6 from Feeney and Yu (1987, Table 1:81); column 7 from Luther et al. (1990,
Table 5:353); column 8 from Feeney and Wang (1993, Table 2:69).
1986), it begins with the "own-children histories" generated by that
method and imputes deceased and non-own children to each woman
based on reported numbers of children ever born and surviving and
on the standard own-children estimates of age-specific birth rates.
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Figure 6.3. Conventional total fertility rates for China: 1965-1987.
Source: Table 6.3, columns 1 and 2.
The consistency of the two series shown in Figure 6.3 testifies
to the exceptional accuracy of these Chinese data. These two series
are derived from different survey operations, conducted by different
organizations, using different methods applied to different question-
naire items. Given these differences, the consistency displayed in
Figure 6.3 is most unlikely to be the result of common errors, and
of course the likelihood of chance agreement over this long time
series is negligible.
The total fertility rates plotted in Figure 6.3 decline nearly lin-
early from 5.75 children per woman in calendar year 1970 to 2.72
children per woman for the year ending June 30, 1978. This rep-
resents a decline of 3.03 children per woman over a period of seven
and one-half years for a rate of decline of 0.40 children per woman
per year. This is much higher than the 0.24 children per woman
per year based on the last three points shown in Figure 6.1. It is
also substantially higher than the rate of decline indicated in Figure
6.1 if we leave off the last point and calculate the decline between
1965-1969 and 1975-1979, which works out to be 0.31 children per
woman per year. In short, the speed and timing of China's fertility
decline are such that the use of quinquennial periods substantially
underestimates the speed of the decline.
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Figure 6.4. Mean age at first marriage in China: 1965-1987.
Source: Table 6.3, columns 3 and 4.
In reading the record of fertility change shown in Figure 6.3,
however, there is a confounding factor that must be taken into ac-
count. Figure 6.4 shows mean age at marriage in China for the pe-
riod in question (data from columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.3), defined as
the mean of all marriages occurring in each year. As in previous fig-
ures, we have statistics from two data sources, in this case the 1982
One-per-Thousand Survey and the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Survey,
both taken by the State Family Planning Commission. The consis-
tency between the two series gives an indication of their remarkably
high accuracy.
Mean age at marriage rose rapidly during most of the 1970s.
The mean age at first marriage series shown in column 4 of Table
6.3 rose from 20.3 years in 1970 to a high of 23.1 years in 1979, a
rate of 0.4 years per year.[3] If this rate of increase translated into
a corresponding rate of increase in mean age at childbearing, and if
the increase were observed over a sufficiently long period of time, it
would have increased period total fertility rates by approximately 40
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Figure 6.5. Approximate annual numbers of first marriages III
China: 1965-1987. Source: Appendix Table 6.1.
percent over corresponding cohort levels (Ryder, 1983:741). These
conditions do not hold, and the actual effect is less than this, but it
is nonetheless substantial.
Figure 6.5 shows numbers of first marriages in China during
1965-1987, based on the 1982 and 1988 surveys. Since we are looking
at numbers here, there is a bias due both to mortality and to the
upper age limit in the surveys.[4] The comparison of the series from
the two surveys shows that this bias is not serious during the period
in question.
The striking feature of Figure 6.5 is the extraordinary rise in
numbers of marriages between the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
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During the late 1960s and mid- to late 1970s, we observe 5 to 6
million first marriages per year. During the 1980s the numbers range
from slightly under 10 million in 1984 to over 12 million in 1986, fully
twice the level of the 1970s.
This jump in marriages exerts a powerful upward influence on
birth rates. Since virtually all Chinese women have a first birth
within a few years of first marriage,[5] the increases in numbers of
first marriages translate almost directly into a slightly lagged in-
crease in numbers of first births. Thus in Appendix Tables 6.1 and
6.2 we see that annual numbers of first births rise from about 5
million during the mid-1970s to about 10 million during the mid-
1980s. This increase is due not to any change in the childbearing
behavior of Chinese women, but to the rapidly increasing numbers
of recently married women. If we choose to interpret the total fer-
tility rates shown in Figure 6.3 merely as indicators of numbers
of births, these observations are irrelevant. If we wish to interpret
them as indicators of childbearing behavior, however, it is necessary
to recognize that they are distorted by the rapid changes in age at
marriage and numbers of marriages during the period in question.
6.3 Period Parity Progression Measures
of Fertility
The simplest approach to dealing with the effects of changing mar-
riage patterns on the conventional fertility measures presented in the
preceding section is to use alternative measures that are less sensi-
tive to changing marriage patterns. Period parity progression ratios
(PPPRs) calculated from birth probabilities specific for parity and
birth interval provide an effective way to do this. In the calculation
of probabilities of progression from marriage to first birth, for exam-
ple, numbers of women marrying each year and the corresponding
numbers of married women remaining in parity zero appear in the
denominator of each birth probability, whence an increase in num-
bers of marriages from one year to the next does not imply any
increase in the proportion of women progressing to first birth.
The parity progression approach to fertility measurement asks
what proportions of women move from one childbearing event to
the next. Of all women born, what proportion ever have a first
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birth? Of all women who have a first birth, what proportion go
on (progress) to have a second, and so on? The answers to these
questions are parity progression ratios, and, like other demographic
measures, they may be calculated on a period as well as on a cohort
basis. (For a general discussion of period parity progression ratio
measures of fertility, see Feeney and Lutz, 1991. For applications
to China, see Feeney and Yu, 1987; Feeney et al., 1989; Luther
et al., 1990; Feeney and Wang, 1993.) For populations in which
fertility is restricted to married couples, as in China, it is useful to
break down the proportion of women ever having a first birth into
two multiplicative components: the proportion of women who ever
marry and the proportion of women marrying who ever have a first
birth.
Total fertility rates may be calculated from period parity pro-
gression ratios as well as from age-specific birth rates, and the logic
of the calculation is parallel. We ask what average number of chil-
dren would be born to a hypothetical cohort of women that expe-
rience the parity progression ratios observed during a given time
period. The formula is easily shown to be (see, for example, Feeney
and Yu, 1987)
TFR = Po +POPI +POPIP2 +....
A convenient approximation for use with incomplete series of
parity progression ratios is given by replacing the last term in the
series by itself divided by 1-Pn' where Pn is the last available ratio.[6]
Period parity progression ratios are unusual fertility measures,
even within the field of demography, and it will be useful to pro-
vide some examples of their values for different countries.[7] Table
6.4 assembles schedules of parity progression ratios for a variety of
high and low fertility countries. Progression to marriage and first
and second births is generally high for both high and low fertility
countries. Among the high fertility Hutterites, some 97 percent of
all married women have at least one child. In China, virtually all
women married and had a first birth, both before fertility began to
decline (1965) and after it had declined nearly to replacement level
(1982).[8] The lowest levels of progression from marriage to first
birth occur in low fertility countries, to be sure, but even here it is
unusual for less than 80 percent of women who have a first birth to
go on to have a second.
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Table 6.4. Parity progression ratios for selected populations, per
1,000.
Progression
Canada 1985
Netherlands 1985
East Germany 1985-
Hungary 1984
Yugoslavia 1982
Population
Hutterites
China 1965
China 1979
Rural
Urban
Taiwan 1986
Thailand
1960-1964
1975-1979
Japan 1982
USA
1941
1960
1984
France 1976
Italy 1978
England
& Wales 1977
B---+M M---+l 0---+11---+22---+33---+44---+55----.66---+77----.8
971 - 988 972 968 967 953 929 905
990 982 972 979 964 929 886 845 786 720
994 991 985 959 700 539 431 414 322 309
997 992 989 978 759 572 448 422 328 310
981 979 960 799 259 168 131 185 44 373
992 959 951 782 428 212 170 185 198 216
948 966 951 925 918 890 859 800
813 917 771 681 646 610 580 548
925 916 847 856 320 137 221 a -
779 745 628 639 651 670 666 635 a
923 922 746 645 619 650 682 689 a
802 789 488 386 382 419 439 456 a
793 423 301 287 370 412 430 a
835 382 298 363 483 555 562 a
688 274 300 366 427 443 422 a
750 242 249 377 414 470 458 a
815 318 416 518 567 547 464a
891 939 837 645 325 267 277a -
926 861 797 739 345 280 287a -
829 - 855 347 267 241 a -
aValues are aggregates for progression from i-th or higher order to (i+l)st or
higher-order births.
Sources: Cohort data for Hutterites calculated from Eaton and Mayer (1954:20,
Table 10). All remaining figures are period data. China from Feeney and Yu
(1987:81). Thailand from Luther and Pejaranondam (1991:Tables Bl and B2).
Japan from Feeney (1986:20). USA from Feeney (1988:Table 1). East Germany
from Feeney and Lutz (1991). Values for Canada, the Netherlands, East Ger-
many, Hungary, and Yugoslavia estimated by the indirect procedure described
in the text from time series of registered births by order from United Nations
Demographic Yearbooks. Values for France, Italy, and England and Wales from
Penhale (1984:Tables 12-14).
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The difference between high and low fertility populations is most
pronounced in the higher-order parity progression ratios, and most
importantly in the proportion of women progressing from second
to third birth. In a high fertility population - for the high fertility
Hutterites, for China in 1965, and for Thailand in 1960-1964 - parity
progression ratios decline slowly with increasing parity, remaining
in the 70 to 90 percent range even for progression from seventh
to eighth birth. In a low fertility population, however, progression
from second to third birth is sharply lower than progression to first
or from first to second. The values shown in Table 6.4 range from
a low of 24 percent for Hungary to a high of 75 percent for the
United States near the height of the baby boom, but this last value
is atypically high. The normal range for progression from second to
third birth in low fertility populations is 25 to 50 percent.
Higher-order parity progression ratios in low fertility popula-
tions are surprisingly high - the median value for progression from
seventh to ninth birth for the low fertility countries in Table 6.4 is
44 percent. There can be little doubt that this reflects a selection
effect. In a low fertility population, the only women who reach high
parities are necessarily highly fecund, regularly exposed to the risk
of conception, and either nonusers or inept users of contraception.
These relatively high parity progression ratios have little effect on
the overall level of fertility, however, since only a small fraction of
women reach high parities.
6.4 Period Parity Progression Measures of
Fertility in China
Total fertility rates calculated from period parity progression ratios
are plotted in Figure 6.6. Here as in Figure 6.3 we have values
both from the 1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey conducted
by the State Family Planning Commission and from the 1987 One-
per-Hundred Survey conducted by the State Statistical Bureau, and
the consistency of the two series attests to their accuracy.
The total fertility rates in Figure 6.6 decline irregularly along
a linear trend from 5.43 children per woman for calendar year 1970
to 2.06 children per woman for the year ending June 30, 1984. This
is a decline of 3.37 children per woman in 13.5 years, for a rate of
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Figure 6.6. Total fertility rates calculated from period parity pro-
gression ratios for China: 1965-1987. Source: Table 6.3, columns 6
and 7.
0.25 children per woman per year - remarkably close, though only
by coincidence, to the 0.24 children per woman per year indicated
by the quinquennial data shown in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1.
The contrast between this picture and that shown by the con-
ventional total fertility rates plotted in Figure 6.3 illustrates the
distorting effects of changing marriage patterns. There are two
main differences. First, the rate of decline shown by the conven-
tional total fertility rates is much more rapid, 0040 as compared
with 0.25 children per woman per year, because rapidly rising age
at marriage during the 1980s caused a decline beyond that due to
declining childbearing within marriage. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the conventional total fertility rates indicate a decline ending
in 1978, whereas the total fertility rates calculated from period par-
ity progression ratios continue until 1984, a full six years later.
The parity progression ratio total fertility rates show that the
level of fertility implicit in the childbearing behavior of Chinese
women continued to decline until the mid-1980s. Because of the
tremendous surge of marriages beginning in the late 1970s, this
continuing behavioral change is completely obscured by the con-
ventional total fertility rates. The conventional total fertility rates
suggest that fertility decline in China ended, at least temporarily,
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Figure 6.7. Period parity progression ratios for China: 1967-1987.
Source: Table 6.5.
in 1979. This was precisely the year in which a major new policy
initiative, the one-child family program, was taken. The time se-
ries of conventional total fertility rates suggest that the new policy
was unsuccessful. In fact, as we see below, it achieved considerable
success.
One advantage of total fertility rates calculated from period par-
ity progression ratios is superior control for the distorting effects of
changing marriage patterns. A second advantage, and one partic-
ularly important in the Chinese context, is the correspondence es-
tablished with the period parity progression ratios themselves. The
level of progression from first to second birth, in particular, reflects
the demographic impact of the one-child family policy.
Table 6.5 and Figure 6.7 show period parity progression ra-
tios and the corresponding total fertility rates for the years 1967-
1987 calculated from the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey
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Table 6.5. Period progression ratios and PPR total fertility rates
for China: 1967~1987.
Progression and progression ratio
Year B-+M M-+1 1-+2 2-+3 3+ -+4+ TFR
1987 995 968 765 466 384 2.26
1986 997 950 734 440 345 2.11
1985 996 944 678 423 312 1.97
1984 999 961 626 465 338 1.99
1983 997 963 695 465 339 2.10
1982 1000 979 821 571 404 2.58
1981 998 963 858 558 388 2.56
1980 999 960 886 562 340 2.58
1979 999 970 951 743 446 3.20
1978 996 963 969 710 442 3.16
1977 996 958 958 713 441 3.14
1976 983 970 964 808 508 3.48
1975 992 946 982 848 565 3.75
1974 992 958 985 883 672 4.33
1973 993 952 986
1972 973 941 984
1971 994 944 991
1970 999 952 984
1969 997 948 984
1968 998 961 988
1967 999 930 970
Calculated from birth histories collected in the National Fertility and Birth Con-
trol Survey of 1988. TFR values calculated from parity progression ratio schedule
extending to progression from seventh to eighth birth. Progression from third
and higher to fourth and higher is the aggregate of progression from third to
fourth through progression from seventh to eighth. So few women reach these
high parities, however, that the difference is entirely negligible.
Source: Feeney and Wang (1993:Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16) and unpublished
computer printouts for annual values in first column.
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission (Feeney and
Wang, 1993; see also Lavely, 1991). Because progression to first
marriage is virtually constant at close to one throughout the period
shown, Figure 6.7 shows proportions of women progressing to first
birth (B-+ 1), the product of women progressing to first marriage
(B-+M) and women progressing from first marriage to first birth
(M-+ 1), rather than showing these two series separately.
134 Griffith Feeney
Figure 6.7 shows that proportions of women ever having a first
birth have been high, around 95 percent, throughout the period
considered. Fertility decline has resulted entirely from declines in
progression to higher-order births. Progression from first to second
birth, in particular, shows the impact of the one-child family pro-
gram. In 1979, the year the program was introduced, 95 percent
of all women were progressing from first to second birth. By 1984,
after the policy had been in effect for only five years, progression to
second birth had been reduced to 63 percent. That year, however,
marked a relaxation in the policy, and progression to second birth
rose continuously through 1987, the last year of the series, at which
point it stood at 76 percent.
Progression to both first and second births was essentially con-
stant through 1979, whence the great fertility decline of the 1970s
was due entirely to declines in third- and higher-order births. Pro-
gression from second to third birth declined by more than half be-
tween 1974 (88 percent) and 1985 (42 percent), and progression from
third- and higher-order births to fourth- and higher-order births de-
clined from 67 to 31 percent over the same period.
6.5 Scenarios for Future Fertility Change
The foregoing analysis of fertility decline in China indicates that gov-
ernment policy and programs played a major role in these trends.
(For a more detailed assessment see Feeney and Wang, 1993:92-95.
On population policy in China, see Chen and Kols, 1982; Tuan,
1982; Greenhalgh, 1986, 1990, 1993; Hardee-Cleaveland and Ban-
ister, 1988; Zeng, 1989; and Kaufman et al., 1989. See also the
ethnographic accounts of Huang, 1989; Moser, 1983; and Potter and
Potter, 1990.) The rapidity of the fall in age at marriage following
the relaxation of administrative controls circa 1980 strongly suggests
that the earlier rise in age at marriage was in substantial part due to
explicit government policy, specifically to the later (wan) marriage
component of the wan-shi-shao policy. The sudden decline in pro-
gression from first to second birth following the introduction of the
one-child family program in 1979 and the subsequent rise following
the relaxation of 1984 are even stronger evidence that this particular
component of fertility decline was due largely to government policy.
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The structure of China's birth-planning efforts and the attention
and resources allocated to them make this remarkable effectiveness
more plausible than it might otherwise be. Government policy was
effective despite imperfect implementation. Substantial proportions
of men and women married beneath the prescribed ages in the 1970s,
for example, but the encouragement to later marriage did result in
a very substantial increase in mean age at marriage. Even at the
peak of its effectiveness to date, the one-child family program saw
well over half of all Chinese women having two or more children,
but the program nonetheless had a substantial and continuing effect
on fertility levels.
In considering future fertility trends, then, it makes sense to em-
phasize the role of government policy. The centerpiece of China's
current birth-planning efforts is still the one-child family policy in-
troduced in 1979, but this simple statement conceals a more com-
plicated demographic reality. One-child families have been realized
among most of the urban population, with progression from first to
second birth in recent years between 10 and 20 percent (Feeney and
Wang, 1993:Table 6.5). The one-child family remains the official
population policy in rural areas as well, but numerous adaptations
belie the "one-child" label, and progression from first to second birth
in recent years has been around 85 percent. At the national level,
progression from first to second birth in rural areas rose from a low
of 63 percent in 1984 to 76 percent in 1987 (Figure 6.7), with a
continued increase indicated.
This discussion of scenarios is limited to high and low extremes
for the next two decades. A high trajectory is obtained by assuming
a continued relaxation of the one-child family policy, with progres-
sion from first to second birth rising to about 95 percent, the level
observed before the introduction of the policy in 1979; and with
progression from second to third birth rising modestly from 47 to
62 percent, both plausible extrapolations of recent experience. This
yields total fertility rates rising from 2.3 in 1987 to 2.5 in 1990, to
2.7 in 1995 and 2000, and finally to 2.8 in 2005.
A low trajectory is obtained by assuming implementation of
the one-child policy in rural as well as urban areas, but assuming
both a somewhat higher level of progression from first to second
birth than has been achieved in cities (30 percent as opposed to
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about 15 percent recently) and a slower rate of decline (15 years for
rural areas as compared with only four years for cities). Progression
from second to third birth is assumed to decline as well, though the
very low values of progression from first to second birth make this
relatively unimportant. This yields total fertility rates falling from
2.3 in 1987 to 2.2 in 1990, to 1.7 in 1995, to 1.5 in 2000, and finally
to 1.4 in 2005.
Between now and the beginning of the next century, we expect
fertility in China not to exceed 2.7 children per woman or to fall
below 1.5 children per woman.[9]
6.6 Conclusion
For most countries in the world, consideration of future fertility
levels focuses on how rapidly fertility will decline. The success of
China's birth-planning policies urges us to consider the possibility
of rising fertility, for to say that government policies have been suc-
cessful is to say that fertility under less restrictive policies would
be higher. Our analysis of the Chinese situation suggests that fer-
tility might rise as high as 3 children per woman over the next 20
years, an eventuality that could occur if the one-child family policy
were relaxed to the point of allowing second children in essentially
all families that wanted them. At the other extreme, a relatively
successful implementation of the one-child policy in rural as well as
urban areas might bring fertility down to between 1 and 1.5 children
per woman. It should be emphasized that these are both improba-
ble extremes. We would be very surprised to see fertility go outside
of this range, and not at all surprised to see it fluctuate modestly
around levels of 2 to 2.5 children per woman.
There is very little basis for speculation about the longer-term
future of fertility. The only thing that can be said with any sem-
blance of scientific support is that world demographic trends to date
suggest that a plausible range is between 1.5 and 3 children per
woman. It is a reasonable supposition that levels and trends of fer-
tility over the past few decades contain information about the likely
trends over the next few decades, and that is the basis of our con-
clusions about fertility in China through the early years of the next
century. Recent levels and trends cannot plausibly be expected to
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contain any information about detailed levels 50 or 100 years into
the future, however. Assumptions about these more distant levels
must either be regarded as purely formal or be made on some basis
other than a study of recent levels and trends.
Notes
[1] Since fertility decline occurs during different periods in different coun-
tries, it makes little sense to compute rates of decline for the same
period for all countries. At the same time, choosing a suitable time
period over which to compute a rate of decline involves an element of
judgment, if not of arbitrariness. The periods shown in Table 6.1 have
been selected by examining the plot of the TFR trend in each country.
Because we are interested in showing how different China is from other
countries, we have chosen periods to give larger rather than smaller
rates of declines for all other countries.
[2] "Conventional" total fertility rates means rates calculated from age-
specific birth rates. These are to be distinguished from total fertility
rates calculated from period parity progression ratios, discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.
[3] Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.3 show mean age at first marriage calcu-
lated directly as the mean of all first marriages occurring during the
indicated year. Column 5 shows mean age at first marriage calculated
from first marriage probabilities, i.e., for the period nuptiality table,
for the given year. The former statistic is more readily computed and
more common. The latter has the advantage of being uninfluenced by
changing age distribution. All three series show a sharp rise in mean
age at marriage. Comparing the plot of the nuptiality table values
(not shown) with Figure 6.4 shows sharp divergences between the two
types of means. See Feeney and Wang (1993:70-71) for discussion of
these differences and their significance.
[4] The 1982 survey included women less than exact age 68 years; the 1988
survey, women less than exact age 58 years.
[5] The evidence of this is given below in the form of period parity pro-
gression ratios for progression from marriage to first birth. See Table
6.5 and the corresponding text discussion.
[6] The approximation assumes that parity progression ratios beyond Pn
are identically equal to Pn. Although not in the least realistic, the
approximation is very good as long as Pn is not too large, which in
practice means not much over one-half. The 1-Pn arises from a geo-
metric series, as a little algebra readily shows.
[7] The reasons for this are beyond the scope of the present discussion; for
more information see Feeney and Lutz (1991:186-187).
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[8] The value shown for the proportion of married women having a first
birth is probably too high, one of the relatively few imperfections in
the data from the 1982 One-per-Thousand Survey. See Feeney and
Wang (1993:71) for a discussion of evidence.
[9] Since this was written, 1990 census data have become available. The
analysis given in Feeney et al. (1992) indicates that fertility decline
resumed after 1987, falling to 2.02 children per woman (period parity
progression ratio TFR) for the year ending June 30, 1990.
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Appendix Table 6.1. Annual first marriages and births by order.
Birth order
Year M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1987 11,605 11 ,951 7,283 2,619 1,022 321 145 107 55
1986 12,237 10,055 6,624 2,319 897 418 193 95 59
1985 10,624 8,937 5,416 2,151 754 298 275 143 48
1984 9,851 9,147 5,056 2,325 975 442 290 89 59
1983 9,044 9,161 5,060 2,148 923 547 348 113 59
1982 10,001 10,459 5,491 2,702 1,391 663 398 223 53
1981 10,516 9,332 4,097 2,607 1,406 842 357 285 94
1980 9,850 7,289 4,662 2,395 1,369 674 328 219 61
1979 8,036 6,923 5,365 3,564 1,874 1,080 649 266 183
1978 7,048 6,256 4,935 3,218 2,111 1,014 580 416 216
1977 5,947 5,596 4,661 3,276 1,904 1,252 676 389 234
1976 6,376 5,948 4,719 3,995 2,122 1,435 894 628 334
1975 5,191 5,117 4,975 3,785 2,594 1,650 1,156 533 365
1974 5,559 5,643 5,459 4,058 2,896 2,140 1,378 909 425
1973 5,430 5,288 5,213 4,161 3,164 2,366 1,524 1,004 510
1972 5,193 4,985 4,824 4,046 3,332 2,512 1,699 1,029 560
1971 4,964 5,193 5,383 4,151 3,832 2,609 1,616 971 530
1970 5,586 5,680 4,568 3,841 3,882 2,527 1,809 852 479
1969 5,956 5,141 4,150 4,384 3,129 2,186 1,548 826 407
1968 6,047 5,298 4,761 5,109 3,645 2,512 1,459 829 382
1967 5,226 3,781 4,020 4,030 2,592 2,077 1,001 547 191
1966 4,047 4,225 5,425 3,869 2,689 1,912 1,107 448 193
1965 3,827 4,241 4,836 3,285 2,650 1,707 821 351 143
Source: 1988 Two-per-Thousand National Fertility and Birth Control Survey.
Appendix Table 6.2. Annual first marriages and births by order.
Birth order
Year M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1981 10,673 9,912 5,486 2,971 1,498 779 461 233
1980 9,779 7,504 4,858 2,699 1,482 690 389 222
1979 7,993 7,542 5,704 3,470 2,025 1,061 688 340
1978 7,166 6,713 5,178 3,459 1,980 1,220 671 431
1977 6,489 6,178 4,892 3,575 2,108 1,323 835 527
1976 6,399 6,004 5,224 3,837 2,468 1,565 1,058 709
1975 5,731 5,572 5,132 4,097 2,742 1,924 1,270 835
1974 5,530 5,834 5,579 4,374 3,117 2,271 1,597 1,056
1973 5,213 5,389 5,628 4,294 3,415 2,606 1,841 1,186
1972 5,350 5,500 5,488 4,195 3,702 2,914 2,119 1,356
1971 5,435 5,891 5,343 4,449 4,126 3,245 2,208 1,480
1970 5,942 6,092 5,029 4,713 4,285 3,187 2,459 1,580
1969 6,583 5,643 4,447 4,927 4,130 3,121 2,262 1,493
1968 6,293 5,618 5,319 5,586 4,400 3,276 2,522 1,729
1967 4,929 4,007 4,758 4,571 3,403 2,706 2,028 1,302
1966 4,172 4,689 5,864 4,730 3,798 3,121 2,445 1,551
1965 3,896 4,687 5,579 4,197 3,601 3,062 2,316 1,494
Source: 1982 National One-per-Thousand Population Fertility Sampling Survey.

Editor's Note for Part II
The material presented in Part II shows that fertility has started to
decline in virtually all countries of the world. Even countries that
until recently showed very high fertility levels seem to have entered
the fertility transition toward low average fertility. The majority
of developing countries are in the middle of this transition process.
China is most advanced, followed by Latin America and Southeast
Asia; Africa is least advanced in this process. Research on desired
family sizes, as stated in surveys, also suggests further fertility de-
clines as do Asian success stories in government population policy
and family planning.
Fertility is assumed to decline further in the future in all re-
gions except in China, where fertility has already reached such a
low level that one could even infer a slight increase if the one-child
policy is relaxed in the future. In all other developing regions, dif-
ferences between high- and low-fertility scenarios mostly reflect dif-
ferent assumed speeds of decline. But the ultimate fertility level
to be reached at the end of the transition process is also an open
question. There seems to be little substantive justification to assume
that eventually fertility will stay at the replacement level of two sur-
viving children per woman. Accordingly the low-fertility scenarios
assume below-replacement fertility by 2030 in all regions except in
sub-Saharan Africa, where fertility was still above six children per
woman in 1990; the high scenarios assume a retardation of decline
and fertility around three children in 2030.
A more detailed justification of the numerical assumptions is
given in Chapter 15.
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Chapter 7
Mortality Trends in
Developing Countries:
A Survey
Birgitta Bueht
In preparing population projections for low mortality developed
countries with good statistics, mortality assumptions are considered
the least problematic, at least for short-term projections, because
mortality rates tend to change slowly. In developing countries, as-
sumptions about future mortality trends are much less certain, even
for short-term projections, because of the inadequacy of reliable in-
formation on past levels and trends.
This chapter reviews past levels and trends of mortality in de-
veloping countries, makes assumptions about future trends made by
the United Nations, compares past assumptions with actual perfor-
mance, and concludes with a review of recent and possible future
changes in the pace of mortality decline. Mortality assumptions
made more recently by the World Bank are also reviewed.
The review of past levels and trends is based on mortality es-
timates prepared for the World Population Monitoring, 1993 (UN,
1994) as well as the latest United Nations population estimates and
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.
147
148 Birgitta Bucht
projections, World Population Prospects: The 1992 Revision (UN,
1993).
7.1 Levels and Trends of Mortality
Since 1950
Considerable progress has been made in reducing mortality in the
less developed regions in recent decades. Over a period of 35 years
from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, the average expectation of life
at birth in the less developed regions is estimated to have increased
20 years, from about 40.7 in 1950-1955 to 60.7 in 1985-1990 accord-
ing to the United Nations latest world population estimates and pro-
jections (Table 7.1). The difference between the more and the less
developed regions narrowed during this period, from 25 years in the
early 1950s to 13 years in 1985-1990. Life expectancy is projected
to further increase to 71.2 in 2020-2025, and the difference between
the more and the less developed regions is expected to reduce to
seven years. There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity, how-
ever, at the regional and subregional levels and differences among
countries are even larger as will be discussed below. Progress has
been slowest in Africa and life expectancy is still estimated at only
about 50 years in East, Central, and West Africa. Mortality is some-
what lower in North and Southern Africa where life expectancy is
estimated at 59 and 60 years, respectively, in 1985~1990. In Asia,
estimates of life expectancies at birth in 1985-1990 are generally
higher and range from 57 in South Asia to 70 in East Asia. (It
should be noted that the latter region includes Japan, which is a
developed country.) There was little regional diversity in Asia in
the early 1950s, with life expectancy estimated at 39 in South Asia,
41 in Southeast Asia, and 43 in East and West Asia. The estimates
for the Latin American regions are still higher on the average and
fall within a narrow range: 66 in South America and 68 years in
the Caribbean and Central America. Among the developing regions
of Oceania, life expectancy ranges from 57 years in Melanesia to 69
years in Polynesia.
It should also be noted that the estimates shown in Table 7.1, in
particular those for the 1980s, are a mixture of estimates and pro-
jections and may be revised as more recent data become available.
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Table 7.1. Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth, world
and major areas and regions: 1950-2025.
Life expectancy (years)
Major area 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000- 2010- 2020-
and region 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025
World 46.4 52.4 57.9 61.4 64.7 67.5 70.2 72.5
More developed regionsa 66.0 69.8 71.1 72.7 74.6 76.2 77.5 78.6
Less developed regionsb 40.7 47.4 54.5 58.6 62.4 65.5 68.6 71.2
Africa 37.7 41.9 46.1 49.6 53.0 56.2 61.1 65.6
East Africa 36.2 40.7 44.8 46.8 49.0 51.6 58.0 63.6
Central Africa 36.0 39.6 43.9 47.9 51.0 53.3 59.3 65.4
North Africa 41.7 46.2 51.1 56.2 61.0 65.2 68.4 71.1
Southern Africa 44.2 49.2 53.4 57.5 62.5 66.9 70.1 72.5
West Africa 35.6 39.4 43.3 47.3 51.1 54.8 59.1 63.4
Asia 41.0 48.1 56.1 60.5 64.8 68.1 71.1 73.4
East Asia 42.9 51.4 64.1 68.8 71.7 73.9 75.1 77.3
Southeast Asia 40.6 46.4 51.9 58.0 63.3 67.3 70.4 72.9
South Asia 38.8 44.9 49.5 54.4 59.4 63.9 67.7 70.5
West Asia 43.2 50.3 56.5 61.7 66.4 69.6 72.1 74.3
Europe 65.7 69.9 71.5 73.4 75.2 76.8 78.0 79.1
Eastern Europe 62.7 68.6 70.1 70.5 71.3 73.3 74.8 76.3
North Europe 69.2 71.2 72.3 74.0 76.0 77.5 78.6 79.6
South Europe 63.4 68.6 71.4 74.1 76.1 77.5 78.6 79.5
Western Europe 67.6 70.8 71.8 74.3 76.4 77.8 78.9 79.9
Latin America 51.4 56.9 61.1 65.0 68.0 70.3 72.0 73.3
Caribbean 52.0 58.4 63.1 66.2 68.8 70.8 72.5 73.7
Central America 49.3 56.6 61.5 65.5 69.4 71.9 73.6 74.8
South America 52.0 56.8 60.7 64.6 67.4 69.6 71.4 72.7
North America 69.0 70.1 71.5 74.7 76.1 77.5 78.8 79.8
Oceania 61.1 64.8 66.8 70.4 72.6 74.6 76.4 77.9
Australia-New Zealand 69.5 70.9 71.7 75.0 76.7 78.0 79.0 80.0
Melanesia 37.5 45.1 50.4 54.8 58.5 62.3 66.1 69.4
Micronesia 47.5 52.6 57.5 62.6 67.3 71.0 73.7 75.9
Polynesia 55.9 59.9 63.9 68.0 70.8 73.0 74.9 76.5
USSR (former)" 64.1 69.2 68.6 67.9 70.4 72.4 74.1 75.5
aMore developed regions comprise North America, Japan, Europe, Australia-
New Zealand, and the former USSR.
bLess developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia (ex-
cluding Japan), and Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.
cInciuding Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania are included in North Europe.
Source: UN, I993:Table A.IS.
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Table 7.2. Distribution of developing countriesa with relatively
reliable data according to the reference period of latest estimate,
since 1970.
Number of Number of countries
countries Prior 1975- 1980- 1985
Region in region Total to 1975 1979 1984 and later
With estimates of life expectancy at birth
Africa 51 16 3 4 7 2
Asia and Oceania 42 23 5 5 13
Latin America 27 23 5 3 9 6
Total 120 62 8 12 21 21
With estimates of infant and child mortality
Africa 51 36 2 9 12 13
Asia and Oceania 42 31 3 5 23
Latin America 27 27 5 22
Total 120 94 2 12 22 58
aCountries with an estimated population of 300,000 or more in 1990.
Source: UN, 1994.
The availability of data on mortality in developing countries has im-
proved considerably during the past two decades. Vital registration
is gradually becoming more complete, particularly in Latin Amer-
ica and East Asia. Data that permit estimation of infant and child
mortality have been widely collected in censuses and surveys, in
particular those conducted by the World Fertility Survey program
(WFS) and more recently by the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS). Despite these improvements, lack of reliable data continues
to be a serious handicap in the analysis of mortality in developing
countries. Table 7.2 shows the distribution of countries with rela-
tively reliable data since 1970 together with the reference period of
the latest estimate. With regard to recency of data, less than half
of the countries have any data referring to 1985 and later. This is
because the results of the 1990 censuses have not yet been analyzed.
However, estimates for the second half of the 1980s have success-
fully been provided by DHS for countries covered by that survey.
Twenty-six countries have no mortality data since 1970. Obviously,
countries for which data on mortality are available may not neces-
sarily be representative of other countries since mortality conditions
are likely to be worse in countries lacking data. There are no recent
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surveys or registration data, for example, in countries affected by
war or civil strife. The countries without any national-level data,
however, form only about 4 percent of the total population of the
less developed regions, so that even large errors in the country esti-
mates will not affect the regional totals very much.
Although the data situation has improved in Africa, it is still
more problematic there than in other less developed regions to es-
timate levels and trends. The only countries in sub-Saharan Africa
with reliable systems of vital registration from which life tables can
be derived are three small island countries in the Indian Ocean:
Mauritius, Reunion, and the Seychelles. All three countries have
reached low levels of mortality with life expectancies now above 69
years. Most of the available information in mainland sub-Saharan
Africa refers to child mortality. Few countries have adequate data
on adult mortality.
Mortality is high throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, but
there is variation among countries in terms of both levels and trends.
Child mortality has generally been most severe in West Africa, a fact
attributed both to the level of socioeconomic development and to
environmental factors (Blacker, 1991). Although differences with
the other regions have narrowed, West Africa as a whole still has
the highest child mortality on the continent. Sierra Leone, a West
African country, exhibits the highest mortality ever measured in
a contemporary country: a probability of dying by age 5 of 364
per 1,000 in 1971, declining to 334 per 1,000 in 1981 according to
the 1974 and 1985 censuses. Gambia and Mali in West Africa and
Malawi in East Africa which had similarly high levels of child mor-
tality in the 1970s have experienced larger improvements, but the
latest estimates of mortality under the age of 5 for these countries
are still above 240 per 1,000. The lowest mortality in mainland sub-
Saharan Africa has been achieved by Kenya and Zimbabwe in East
Africa and Botswana in Southern Africa. The low child mortality
in Botswana (65 per 1,000 in 1984) may be explained, in addition
to its impressive economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s, by
the high proportion of women receiving prenatal care and immu-
nization with tetanus toxoid, the high proportion of births delivered
by trained health personnel, and the high immunization coverage of
children (Lesetedi et al., 1989; World Bank, 1992). Immunization
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coverage and proportions of women receiving prenatal care are also
high in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Kenya, 1989; Zimbabwe, 1989).
The countries of North Africa have experienced more rapid mor-
tality declines with an acceleration in the decline since the mid-1970s
or late 1970s. In Algeria, the only country in the region with a
series of life tables derived from vital registration, life expectancy
increased slowly from 53 in 1970 to 57 in 1978 and then to 64 in
1985, an annual increase of one year. Life tables after 1985 are
not yet available, but later data on infants show that mortality has
continued to decline. The latest official life table for Egypt refers
to 1975-1977, when life expectancy at birth was estimated at 53
years. Later data on infant and child mortality show that mortality
has declined rapidly since then: mortality fell by more than half
between 1976 and 1986. In Tunisia, which currently has the lowest
infant and child mortality rates in North Africa, the decline has been
equally impressive, from an under-five mortality of 204 per 1,000 in
1968-1969 to 65 per 1,000 in 1983-1987 according to a 1968-1969
demographic survey, the 1975 census, and the 1988 DHS.
Asia presents the most varied picture among the developing re-
gions, both in terms of levels and trends in mortality and in terms
of availability and quality of data, reflecting very diverse histories
and levels of development.
East Asia has achieved the lowest mortality levels in the region.
The main reason here is obviously the remarkable progress achieved
by China. Life expectancy in China was estimated at 41 in 1950-
1955, reached 68 in 1981 and despite the high level continued to
increase to 72 in 1986, an annual increase of almost a year; infant
mortality was estimated at 195 per 1,000 in 1950-1955, reached 35
in 1981 and 22 in 1986. The other countries of the region with
available data, Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, have also
successfully reduced their mortality levels. According to its civil
registration data, Hong Kong now has the lowest mortality among
all developing countries with a life expectancy in 1987-1989 of 77
years (80 for females and 74 for males) and an infant and under-five
mortality of 7 and 9 per 1,000, respectively.
Southeast Asia is characterized by a wide disparity of mor-
tality levels and trends. Brunei Darussalam, peninsular Malaysia,
and Singapore have achieved mortality levels comparable to those
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of developed countries with life-expectancy estimates above 70.
Progress has also been made in other countries of the region, partic-
ularly in Thailand where expectation of life at birth reached 66 in
1985-1986 and in the Philippines where it reached 64 in 1987-1989.
On the other hand, the region includes countries such as East Timor,
Cambodia, and Lao People's Democratic Republic where mortality
is believed to be high and life expectancy estimated to be below 50
years.
South Asia exhibits the highest mortality levels and has expe-
rienced the slowest decline in Asia, although one country in that
region, Sri Lanka, has attained relatively low mortality: life ex-
pectancy was 69 in 1980-1981, and is now estimated to exceed 70.
Afghanistan has the highest mortality in the region which is not
surprising in view of the social and political circumstances of that
country. Although mortality is still high in the three largest coun-
tries of the Indian subcontinent - Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan
- the levels have been declining. In Bangladesh, life expectancy
increased from 48 in the late 1970s to 56 in 1987. In India, life ex-
pectancy was estimated at 53 in 1981-1983. More recent data from
the Sample Registration System show that infant mortality has con-
tinued to decline, from 107 per 1,000 in 1981-1983 to 94 per 1,000
in 1988. The latest data for Pakistan give a life expectancy of 60 in
1984-1988, an increase from 53 in 1972-1981.
In West Asia, several countries have experienced very rapid de-
clines, not only the small oil-producing countries of the region, but
also countries such as Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Turkey.
Cyprus and Israel have the lowest mortality in the region with life
expectancies above 75, followed by Kuwait where life expectancy was
estimated at 72 in 1984-1986. The only country with high mortality
in the region is Yemen, where infant and under-five mortality were
162 and 237 per 1,000, respectively, according to the 1979 WFS.
As mentioned earlier, Latin America has achieved lower mor-
tality levels than Africa and Asia. The mortality decline in the
Caribbean Islands is particularly impressive with levels of life ex-
pectancy reaching those of the developed countries despite lower
levels of economic development. Life expectancy at birth is esti-
mated to be above 70 in all islands except the Dominican Republic
and Haiti. In Cuba and Puerto Rico life expectancy was 75 in
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1985-1986 and 1986-1988, respectively, the highest in Latin Amer-
ica. To give an example of the mortality decline that has occurred
in some of those countries, life expectancy at birth in Barbados
increased from 57 in 1950-1955 to 72 in 1980. Infant mortality de-
clined from 132 per 1,000 in the early 1950s to 13 per 1,000 in the
late 1980s, or by over 90 percent. On the other hand, the decline has
been slow in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Under-five mortal-
ity in Haiti was still estimated at 193 per 1,000 in 1983, higher than
in many African countries.
Two countries in Central America - Costa Rica and Panama -
have also achieved very low levels of mortality with life expectan-
cies above 70. In Mexico, the largest country of the region, life
expectancy at birth increased from 61 in 1970 to 66 in 1980 and is
now believed to be close to 70.
In South America, the lowest mortality levels are observed in
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In Chile, life expectancy
at birth increased from 62 to 71 during the 12-year period between
1970 and 1982, and infant and child mortality declined by almost
70 percent during the same period. Recent data show a continuing
but slower decline during the 1980s. Bolivia and Peru, on the other
hand, have the highest mortality in the region, but like all South
American countries, have experienced substantial mortality reduc-
tions. In Bolivia, for example, the probability of dying by age 5
declined by almost half between 1972 and 1988, from 254 to 130 per
1,000. In Brazil, the largest country of the region, with half its pop-
ulation, the mortality decline has been moderate. Life expectancy
at birth increased from 58 in 1970 to 62 in 1976-1980 and may be
above 65 at present.
Mortality has also declined steadily in the developing countries
of Oceania, and some countries have achieved low levels of mortality.
In Guam, Micronesia, life expectancy was estimated at 73 in 1979-
1981 and infant mortality at 11 per 1,000 in 1985-1987. The only
countries where mortality is still high is Kiribati, a small island in
Micronesia, where under-five mortality was estimated at 123 in 1981
according to the 1985 census and in Papua New Guinea, Melanesia,
where under-five mortality was estimated at 96 in 1976.
The United Nations has recently completed a review of child
mortality since the 1960s in developing countries with an estimated
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1990 population of 1 million or more (UN, 1992). Among the coun-
tries with adequate estimates of the probability of dying by age 5 for
two points in time between 1960 and 1985, altogether 79 observa-
tions, child mortality declined by about 3 percent per annum. Asia
and Latin America both experienced rates slightly above this aver-
age, whereas the rate of decline in Africa was only about 2 percent
per annum. These figures may be somewhat different, however, if
data for all countries were available. In sub-Saharan Africa, there
are a few countries where available data show that child mortality
declines may have stalled or even increased, although the observed
trend could be due to poor data quality. Data are so defective in
some countries, not only in Africa, that it is not really possible to tell
how mortality has evolved. In many countries outside sub-Saharan
Africa with sufficient data to indicate a change in trends, child mor-
tality decline appears to have accelerated in the late 1970s and in
the 1980s.
7.2 Assumptions about Future Trends
in Mortality
The United Nations has prepared global population projections
since the 1950s. The details of the projections have expanded over
time with improvements in data and methods of analysis and with
the utilization of computer technology. Detailed mortality assump-
tions by country were first made in 1968. The assumptions are
formulated in terms of life expectancy at birth and age and sex
patterns of probabilities of surviving, corresponding to the different
levels of life expectancy at birth. The age-specific survival ratios
needed for the projections are derived from appropriate model life
tables. For countries with reliable data on mortality by age and
sex, that information is used to complement the derivation of the
required survival ratios. A national life table for a given date is
used as a base for the projections, and, as mortality is projected to
decline, it is assumed that the mortality rates of the national life
table will gradually approach those of a model life table. This pro-
cedure has been referred to as the "modified method" of mortality
projection (UN, 1977a). For countries without reliable mortality
data by age and sex, the mortality rates are taken directly from
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the model life tables selected for the projections. The Coale and
Demeny regional model life tables (Coale and Demeny, 1966, 1983)
and, since the 1988 assessment, the United Nations model life ta-
bles for developing countries (UN, 1982) are used in preparing the
United Nations projections.
One of the roles of the United Nations projections is to pro-
duce comparable global and interregional prospects of population.
To maintain comparability in the assumptions of mortality between
regions and among countries within regions, a uniform procedure
is used for all countries. The assumptions about life expectancy at
birth are made to follow models of mortality improvement. These
models have been developed on the basis of data from countries
with reliable death statistics and have been revised and modified
as new data have become available, reflecting the most recent ob-
servations about mortality decline. It has generally been assumed
that life expectancy at birth would increase by half a year annu-
ally until life expectancy for females reaches 55, 62.5, or 65 years,
followed by a slowdown in the gain thereafter. In countries where
evidence suggests that the mortality decline has been faster or slower
than the model implies, the assumptions have been adjusted. The
most recent working model, which was developed for the 1988 as-
sessment and summarized in Table 7.3, introduces three variations
in the speed of improvement and labels them fast, middle, and slow
models.
In the model developed for the 1973 assessment, it was assumed
that the highest female life expectancy that could be attained would
be 77.5 years, the value given as maximum in the Coale-Demeny re-
gional model life tables, and the highest male life expectancy, 72.6
years, the value given as maximum in the first United Nations model
life tables (Table 7.4). In the 1978 assessment, the maximum life
expectancies were raised to 80 for females and 73.5 for males. In
the 1982 assessment, the maxima were further raised to 82.5 years
for females and 75 for males. The Coale-Demeny regional model
life tables were extrapolated to incorporate survival ratios corre-
sponding to these higher levels of life expectancies. The most recent
model, developed for the 1988 assessment, represents a major revi-
sion in terms of long-range mortality assumptions. The highest life
expectancies at birth were extended to 87.5 for females and 82.5 for
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Table 7.3. Working model for mortality improvement, quinquen-
nial gains (in years) in life expectancy at birth (0 eo) according to
initial level of mortality.
Initial Fast Middle Slow
--
mortality level Male Female Male Female Male Female
55.0-57.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0
57.5-60.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0
60.0-62.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0
62.5-65.0 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0
65.0-67.5 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.3 1.5 2.0
67.5-70.0 1.5 2.3 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.5
70.0-72.5 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.8 1.2
72.5-75.0 1.0 1.5 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.0
75.0-77.5 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.8
77.5-80.0 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.5
80.0-82.5 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
82.5-85.0 0.5 - 0.4 0.3
85.0-87.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Source: UN, 1989:Table 1.4.
Table 7.4. Limit life expectancies in United Nations working mod-
els of mortality decline.
Assessment year Male Female
1973 72.6 77.5
1978 73.5 80.0
1982 75.0 82.5
1988 82.5 87.5
Sources: UN, 1977b:llj 1981:3j 1985:10j and 1989:15.
males. In order to extend the model life tables to the new maxi-
mum life expectancies, working life tables with life expectancies of
87.5 for females and 82.5 for males were constructed by using the
reduced values of age-specific probabilities of dying (qx) available
from countries that now have the lowest mortality rates. The high-
est levels of survival of each of the nine model life tables (West,
North, South, and East model of the Coale and Demeny regional
model life tables and General, Latin American, Chilean, Far East-
ern, and South Asian model life tables of the United Nations) were
linked individually with the age-specific survival ratios derived from
the working life table so that survival ratios of other intermediate
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mortality levels could be obtained through interpolation (UN, 1989).
These survival ratios have been used in the 1988, 1990, and 1992
revisions of the population projections.
Several developing countries have now surpassed the maximum
life expectancy for females of 77.5 assumed in 1973. Only one coun-
try, Hong Kong, is currently estimated to have a life expectancy
above 80 for females, the maximum assumed in 1980, although sev-
eral other countries, mainly small island countries, have reached life
expectancies close to that level. No country has yet reached the
limit for females set in 1982, but two developed countries - Japan
and Sweden - have surpassed the limit assumed for males, 75 years.
The most recent United Nations projections have taken into
account the effects of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) pandemic for 15 high prevalence countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. The number of deaths related to AIDS is estimated and
projected using an epidemiological model developed by the World
Health Organization (Chin and Lwanga, 1991). In applying the
model at the United Nations, it is assumed that there are no new
adult human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infections after 2005;
mother-to-child infections do continue to occur after this date and
AIDS deaths follow for many years thereafter due to the long latency
period between HIV and AIDS. This assumption has little effect on
projected AIDS mortality until after 2015. The estimates of deaths
due to AIDS by age and sex, for each five-year period, are then in-
tegrated into the existing (non-AIDS) model life tables, producing
a set of life tables which incorporates the risk of dying from AIDS
and which are used for the projections.
The World Bank has published projections in recent years;
the first results were published in World Development Report 1978
(World Bank, 1978). Detailed results of the projections have only
been published since 1984 in World Population Projections, various
years. The base-year mortality estimates used in the World Bank
projections are mainly obtained from the United Nations, but meth-
ods used to prepare assumptions about future trends are different.
In the 1984 to 1987-1988 assessments, life expectancy at birth was
projected with a model using past patterns of relationships between
the change in life expectancy, the level of life expectancy, and the
female primary school enrollment ratio. Two different schedules of
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annual increments in female life expectancy were developed: one for
countries with female primary school enrollment less than 70 percent
and another for those where the enrollment is 70 percent or more.
For a given expectation of life at birth, survival ratios for males and
females were derived from the Coale and Demeny regional model
life tables. In the more recent projections, a different procedure
has been used to project mortality (Bulatao and Bos, 1989). Life
expectancy and infant mortality are projected separately using lo-
gistic functions, taking into account past trends and socioeconomic
factors. The logistic function is determined so that life expectancy
rises most rapidly from a level of 50 years and increasingly slowly
at higher levels. Rates of change are estimated from past rates of
change and from the female secondary school enrollment ratio or,
in a few cases where data on school enrollment are not available,
from the percent urban. Maximum life expectancies were assumed
to be 90 for females and 83.3 for males. Life tables are selected
from the Coale-Demeny regional model life tables combining differ-
ent levels to give exactly the desired infant mortality rate and life
expectancy. Coale and Guo's (1989) new extended model life tables
are used at low levels of mortality. The most recent World Bank
projections have also taken into account the effects of AIDS, apply-
ing an epidemiological model developed by Bulatao (1991) and Bos
et al. (1992).
The World Bank assumptions show more variation among indi-
vidual countries than do those assumed by the United Nations, and
indicate, on average, slightly faster decline at lower levels of life ex-
pectancy and slower decline at higher levels. Mortality assumptions
for the less developed regions according to different United Nations
and World Bank assessments are shown in Tables 7.S and 7.6.
7.3 Comparison of Past Assumptions with
Actual Performance
Since the United Nations has a long series of population estimates
and projections, assumptions made in past projections can be com-
pared to more recent assumptions and to actual performance. Table
7.S shows estimated and projected life expectancies at birth for
the less developed regions for different periods available from the
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Table 7.5. Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth for less
developed regions, both sexes, according to different United Nations
assessments.
J'ear 1980-1985
1968 58.0
1973 56.7
1978 57.1
1980 57.0
1982 56.6
1984 57.3
1988 57.6
1990 59.4
1992 58.6
1985-1990
60.6
58.7
59.2
58.9
58.2
59.1
59.7
61.4
60.7
1990-1995
63.0
60.7
61.1
60.7
60.0
60.8
61.5
63.3
62.4
2020-2025
69.6
68.9
69.5
70.4
71.6
71.2
Sources: UN, 1973:Table A.2.1; 1977b:Table 41; 1979; 1981:Table A-15; 1985:Ta-
ble A-15; 1986:Table A-15; 1989:Table 15; 1991:Table 44; and 1993:Table A-15.
Table 7.6. Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth for
less developed regions, both sexes, according to different World Bank
assessments.
J'ear
1984
1985
1987-1988
1989-1990
1992-1993
1980-1985
59.5
59.4
1985-1990
61.2
61.1
61.4
62.1
61.9
1990-1995
62.8
62.8
62.9
63.6
63.2
2020-2025
70.7
70.8
70.3
69.3
71.1
Sources: Vu, 1984, 1985; Zachariah and Vu, 1988; Bulatao et al., 1990; and Bos
et al., 1992.
different series of United Nations projections prepared between 1968
and 1992. The projected life expectancy at birth for the less devel-
oped regions as a whole has turned out to be reasonably accurate
in each revision carried out over a quarter of a century. In 1968,
when detailed projections were first performed for each country, life
expectancy at birth was projected to be 60.6 in 1985-1990 for the
less developed regions. In 1992, it was estimated at 60.7 for the
same period. The long-range projections show a small and gradual
improvement in assumed mortality levels over time. In 1980, life
expectancy at birth was projected to be 69.6 in 2020-2025. In 1992,
it was projected to be 71.2 in the same period.
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It is remarkable that the projected life expectancy for the less
developed regions has changed so little despite large revisions for
individual countries. Country estimates have been raised or lowered
as new data have become available and with new and better methods
of estimating mortality. Several countries have experienced unfore-
seen and almost spectacular gains in the life expectancy at birth,
most notably China, the most populous country in the world. The
1968 mortality assumption for China, a life expectancy of 62 years
in 1985-1990, was surpassed by 10 years. The mortality decline has
been slower than projected in a sufficient number of countries, how-
ever, to offset the more rapid decline in others so that the regional
averages have not changed much. For the more developed regions, in
contrast, the projected life expectancies have gradually been revised
upward.
It should be noted that the sudden increase in life expectancy
at birth between the 1988 and the 1990 revisions is partly the result
of a new method of calculating life expectancy at the regional and
global levels from country-specific figures. In the earlier revisions,
regional and global life expectancies were estimated by weighing the
country-specific life expectancy figures by the number of births. This
method provided unbiased estimates only when countries within the
region had similar age structures and similar levels of fertility. Be-
ginning with the 1990 revision, the method was changed to exactly
calculate survival ratios (and hence life expectancies) at the regional
and country levels by aggregating deaths and population by age and
sex at the country level (UN, 1991:91).
7.4 Possible Changes in the Pace of
Future Mortality Decline
There has been some concern that the deteriorating economic con-
ditions since the mid-1970s in many developing countries would lead
to a slowdown or stagnation in the mortality decline because of a
reduction in expenditures on social services implemented to cope
with the economic crisis. There is no evidence yet of such a change
except possibly for a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the
mortality trends are difficult to interpret. In countries with nega-
tive growth of GDP per capita from 1965-1980 or 1980-1990 (World
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Bank, 1992) and with sufficient data to estimate mortality trends,
for example, Senegal in sub-Saharan Africa and several countries in
Latin America, mortality has continued to decline without change.
However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the deterioration
in economic conditions and reduced spending on health could have
a delayed effect on mortality in some countries.
A most important measure that is likely to have a substan-
tial effect on mortality trends in the near future is the child sur-
vival programs that have been implemented during the 1980s by
governments and international organizations. These programs have
consisted mainly in making a few simple and low-cost technologies
widely available, in particular immunization and oral rehydration
therapy (ORT). When the World Health Organization launched its
Expanded Programme on Immunization in 1974, it was estimated
that less than 5 percent of children in the developing world were
immunized (UNICEF, 1989). In 1985, the coverage had increased
to around 30 percent for measles and 40 percent for the other tar-
geted diseases. Since then, many countries have sharply increased
their coverage, and it is estimated that by 1990 between 79 and 90
percent of infants were vaccinated against the target diseases. Im-
munization of women against tetanus still lags behind at about 56
percent (UNICEF, 1992). Awareness and use of oral rehydration
therapy have also increased substantially. These efforts should have
an important impact on child mortality, and favorable results have
already been reported in a number of countries. However, since the
programs have only recently gained momentum in many countries
and since data for the late 1980s are still not available in many coun-
tries, the full impact of these programs cannot yet be measured.
Other factors that will affect child survival in the future are
increasing education of women and declines in fertility, with a re-
duction in high-risk births. Reduced fertility is also likely to have
indirect positive effects on a child's survival chances because a family
with fewer children can allocate more resources per child, including
parental care and attention, food, schooling, and access to health
services. There is also a reduced risk of infection of children in
smaller, less-crowded households. Maternal mortality which is high
in many developing countries is also lowered with fertility declines.
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In the near future, the outlook in general indicates a continua-
tion of the mortality decline. Among the helpful factors will be, in
addition to those mentioned above, further improvements in educa-
tion, medical research, training of health personnel, and the spread
of democracy which will enable people to put pressure on govern-
ments to improve health services.
Several developing countries have reached mortality levels com-
parable to those in the developed countries, even in countries where
the levels of economic development are far behind those of the devel-
oped countries. There is no reason that the mortality declines will
not continue and that other countries will follow, barring of course
wars, famines, and other catastrophes.
This does not mean that it is going to be easy to achieve contin-
ued impressive improvements. The progress in sub-Saharan Africa
is likely to still lag behind that of the other developing regions.
Apart from the droughts and famines that are plaguing substantial
parts of Africa at the present time and the civil strife that exists
not only in Africa but also in Asia, there are two important con-
cerns: the AIDS epidemic and the spread of chloroquine-resistant
malaria. Both are likely to have a particularly devastating effect in
sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental problems of various kinds ag-
gravated by population growth, such as water scarcity and loss of
agricultural land and cutbacks in food production, could also lead
to increased risks to health.
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Chapter 8
Mortality in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Trends and
Prospects
Michel Garenne
Interest in the population growth of the Third World began after
World War II, owing mostly to the growing concern for population
pressure and its possible effects upon the world economy, ecology,
and political balance. The sources of the high rate of population
growth were the fast-declining mortality and to a lesser extent the
increasing natality. The primary concern was with Asia, in partic-
ular China and the Indian subcontinent, and with Latin America,
in particular Central America. Somewhat later, the demography of
sub-Saharan Africa became a subject for research.
The first systematic studies of African populations took place
in the early 1960s. A team of researchers working at Princeton
University published the first comprehensive account of African de-
mography in 1968 (Brass, 1968). At about the same time, a group
of French demographers published a summary of their experiences
and findings on tropical Africa, with emphasis on the sample sur-
veys conducted by the French National Statistical Office (INSEE)
beginning in 1954 (GDA, 1967). Since this pioneer period, only a
few syntheses on the population dynamics of the region have been
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published. Mandjale (1985) analyzes infant and child mortality. Van
de Walle et al., (1988) review the state of African demography. The
collection of work edited by Feachem and Jamison (1991) focuses on
morbidity and mortality.
Fertility in Africa experienced minimal fluctuations over the
past 50 years, whereas mortality underwent a major decline, cre-
ating considerable potential for population growth. The decline in
mortality has been documented only recently in a systematic way
(Hill and Hill, 1988; Hill, 1991; Timaeus, 1991). However, there
is a growing concern that the mortality decline will not continue,
and may even be reversed under new conditions such as the AIDS
epidemic.
This chapter reviews the available evidence of mortality decline,
before and after independence, and discusses the future of mortal-
ity. It focuses on the countries of continental sub-Saharan Africa
listed in Table 8.1. The islands such as Cape Verde, Sao Tome and
Principe, Mauritius, and the Seychelles have very different popula-
tion dynamics, and data from Madagascar are too poor to be used.
8.1 The Colonial Period: 1920-1959
8.1.1 Mortality trends
Data from the end of the colonial period (1920-1959) are very scarce,
and there is virtually no data available on tropical Africa prior to
1915. The only long-term series available come from Dakar and
Saint-Louis, two cities in Senegal, where a high-quality vital reg-
istration system has been maintained. The vital registration data
from Saint-Louis were analyzed in a PhD dissertation (Diop, 1990),
and the vital data from Dakar were discussed in a recent paper
(Garenne et al., 1993). In Dakar, there was clear evidence of a de-
cline in mortality since at least 1920, the 1915-1919 period being se-
riously disturbed by the 1918 influenza world epidemic as well as by
a local plague epidemic. In Saint-Louis, mortality has been declining
steadily since 1930, the earliest date for which data were analyzed
(Figure 8.1). In both cases, the crude death rates at the begin-
ning of the series were among the highest recorded, and were only
slightly lower than the crude birth rate: CDR = 35/1000 in Dakar
during the 1920-1924 period, and CDR = 36/1000 in Saint-Louis
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Table 8.1. Reconstructed levels and trends in child mortality in
continental sub-Saharan Africa, by country and period: probability
of dying before age 5, q(5), per 1,000.
Country <1960 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Angola 360
Benin 360 - 255 240 200
Botswana 175 160 140 120 90 60
Burkina Faso 420 315 295 275 255 220 215
Burundi 270 240 220 220 210 175
Cameroon 290 - 235 220 185
Central Afr. Rep. 325 295 245
Chad 340 310
Congo, People's Rep. 290 200 165 140
Cote d'Ivoire - 265 245 210 165 140
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia 235 230 225 220
Gabon 350 250
Gambia 350 345 310 275 240
Ghana 370 220 210 185 170 155 160
Guinea (Conakry) 380
Guinea-Bissau 300
Kenya 260 210 185 165 145 125 100
Lesotho 200 195 185 175
Liberia - 280 270 255 245 235 220
Malawi 360 345 335 320 285
Mali 385 360 310 250
Mozambique 260 280 280 280
Namibia
Niger 300
Nigeria - - 195 190
Rwanda 240 220 220 220 220
Senegal 375 300 295 285 265 220 190
Sierra Leone 400 385 365
Somalia 240 225 210
South Africa
Sudan 220 205 170 150 145 135
Swaziland 240 230 220 215
Tanzania 260 240 235 225 215
Togo 350 300 245 220 200 180 160
Uganda 245 225 195 180 175 185 185
Zaire 285 - - 235 210 200
Zambia 220 190 180 165 150
Zimbabwe 160 155 145 140 135 95
Source: Adapted from Hill, 1992.
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Figure 8.1. Crude death rates in Dakar and Saint-Louis (Senegal):
vital registration 1915-1989. Source: Garenne et al., 1993.
in 1930-1934. It is reasonable to conclude that mortality began to
decline dramatically during the period just following World War 1.
This finding is confirmed by the fact that the population increased
significantly between 1920 and 1960, as shown by the series of ad-
ministrative censuses in Senegal (Becker and Martin, 1983).
Other evidence is available in early censuses and from the retro-
spective questioning of mothers. In Ghana, the probability of dying
before the fifth birthday, q(5), was estimated at 380/1000 in 1933
and has been declining since then. In Angola, q(5) was estimated
at 356 in 1926 (Hill, 1991). Again, these values are very high, and
they probably no longer exist in any country of the continent.
By 1960, when most countries obtained independence, major
differences in infant and child mortality already existed among coun-
tries. The quotient q(5) ranged from 160/1000 in Zimbabwe to
400/1000 in Sierra Leone (Table 8.1). These large differences among
countries were attributed primarily to the level of development (for
instance, Zimbabwe and Botswana were countries much wealthier
than the average) and to a certain extent to the environment: the
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highland countries of East Africa were reputed to have fewer cases
of malaria and therefore a lower mortality rate (Blacker, 1991). The
classic exception to this pattern was Malawi, a country known to
have a high prevalence of malnutrition and vitamin-A deficiency
(Feachem and Jamison, 1991).
8.1.2 Socioeconomic change
Reasons for the mortality decline during the 40 years following
World War I are poorly understood. Colonial powers opened roads
in most of Africa, sometimes railways, which have drawn most of
the villages out of their isolation. One noticeable consequence of
improving communications, well documented in the past in Europe
and also in the 20th century in India (Davis, 1951), is the drastic
reduction in the number of famines. In northern Senegal in the
19th century, there were famines every three to four years (Chas-
tanet, 1982). Severe famines virtually disappeared after World War
I, with the exception of the year 1942, and, although food short-
ages continued to occur with the same frequency, they became far
less acute. Colonization also brought to Africa the monetary econ-
omy, in particular the following cash crops - peanuts, coffee, cocoa,
rubber - which gave the peasants the power to purchase what they
needed.
Cities were rare and small in Africa prior to 1900. However, they
developed rapidly thereafter, which subsequently provided for the
opening of schools and the creation of an elite branch of Africans who
had a modern education. The level of modern education has been
shown to be closely associated with mortality decline throughout
the world (Caldwell, 1986).
8.1.3 Public health
In addition to improving socioeconomic conditions, considerable ef-
forts were made to improve public health. Health programs focused
on diseases affecting the expatriate community, especially adults,
but they were directed to the whole population as well. Modern
hospitals were built at the turn of the century. Local dispensaries
soon followed in the secondary towns. The water supply was treated
in cities at about the same period (1928 in Dakar).
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Newly developed vaccines against tuberculosis (BCG), yellow
fever, smallpox, and the plague became available and widely used,
even in the most remote villages. As a consequence, the last three
of these deadly diseases were under control by 1960. Tuberculosis
was more difficult to control, mostly because the BCG has a low effi-
cacy but also because the disease has a more complex epidemiology.
Major efforts were also made to control syphilis and yaws, as well
as trypanosomiasis. The control of syphilis and other infectious dis-
eases reached a new dimension with the marketing of antibiotics just
after World War II. Synthetic antimalarial drugs became available
in 1945 in most of tropical Africa. Malaria control programs started
also after World War II, and, although they failed to achieve their
goals, they certainly contributed to mortality decline and perhaps
to an increase in fertility.
8.2 Evolution since Independence:
1960-1992
8.2.1 Recent trends in mortality
After 1960, a relatively large amount of data concerning mortality
became available: censuses with retrospective questions, sample sur-
veys (prospective or retrospective), maternity histories in the World
Fertility Survey (WFS), and the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS). These surveys provide levels and trends in child mortality at
various points in time from which a history of mortality decline can
be reconstructed (Hill, 1989, 1991; Cantrelle et a1., 1986; Garenne
et a1., 1985). Results of this reconstruction are shown in Table 8.1.
Among the countries listed in Table 8.1, data are satisfactory
in more than half of the cases and indicate a 40 percent decline in
q(5) between 1960 and 1985, from an average of 275 in 1960 to an
average of 165 in 1985. This represents a rapid decline in mortality.
In England and Wales, it took about 85 years to achieve the same
decline.
Some countries did not seem to enjoy the favorable evolution of
the majority. For instance, Uganda was rather advanced in 1960,
but failed to continue along its path; mortality trends may have even
been reversed after 1975. Although less dramatic a case, mortality
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Figure 8.2. Under-five mortality risk, West Africa: 1926-1980.
Source: Hill, 1991.
decline seems to have stopped in Ghana after 1980. Ghana had
virtually the same mortality as Kenya in 1960, but had a 60 percent
higher mortality in 1985 (see Figures 8.2 and 8.3).
Adult mortality has also been studied, from retrospective ques-
tions and from direct estimates from sample surveys (Timaeus,
1991). Adult mortality data are available in 21 countries, but
only a few provide trends over time. Convincing evidence ex-
ists of an increase in adult survival in Benin (1967-1978), Congo
(1962-1971), Cameroon (1945-1976), Sudan (1960-1974), Kenya
(1955-1975), Uganda (1955-1965), Tanzania (1958-1968), Zim-
babwe (1973-1979), and Swaziland (1960-1974). For those coun-
tries on the average, life expectancy at age 15 increased by about
10 years between 1960 and 1980, from around 45 years to approxi-
mately 55 years. The only two exceptions in this study were Lesotho
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and Botswana, for which no change was visible during the period
studied, which is surprising.
8.2.2 Socioeconomic correlates
Despite the poor quality of both demographic and socioeconomic
data and the numerous missing values, various socioeconomic vari-
ables appear to be significant correlates of child survival. Feachem
and Jamison (1991) found a significant correlation between the level
of infant and child mortality and income, measured by the GNP per
capita in 1987, as well as with secondary school enrollment. A sys-
tematic review of these correlations was undertaken by Trani (1992),
using all the available evidence from socioeconomic data published
by the World Bank (Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4).
In the linear simple regressions, seven variables appear sig-
nificant: two measures of income (index of GDP/capita and
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Table 8.2. Values of socioeconomic indicators: 1984-1990.
Country Pop Urb GNP FLFP Lit Phys Nurse Cal Prim Sec IGDP q(5)
Benin 4.74137.7 390 47.4 74 15940 1750 2145 63 16 5.0 187
Botswana 1.254 27.5 2040 34.9 29 6900 7002269 116 33 19.3 59
Burkina Faso 9.016 9.0 330 46.2 87 265250 1680 2061 32 6 199
Burundi 5.470 5.5 210 47.3 66 21030 4380 2253 70 4 151
Cameroon 11.94141.2 940 33.3 44 2161 111 27 10.0 123
Centr.Afr.R. 3.03646.7 390 45.7 60 1980 67 11 156
Chad 5.67929.5 190 21.1 75 38360 3390 1852 51 6 223
Congo, PR 2.277 40.5 1010 38.8 37 2512 12.8
Cote d'Ivoire 12.233 40.4 730 34.2 57 2365 19 8.2 140
Eq. Guinea 0.41728.7 330 39.9
Ethiopia 51.183 12.9 120 37.4 38 78770 5390 1658 36 15 1.6 216
Gabon 1.135 45.7 3220 37.3 38 2790 2702396 0.0
Gambia 0.87523.2 260 40.3 206
Ghana 14.87033.0 390 39.7 40 20460 1670 2209 73 39 153
Guinea-Bissau 0.981 19.9 180 40.8
Kenya 24.36823.6 370 39.9 41 10050 1973 93 23 5.2 87
Lesotho 1.771 20.3 470 43.4 26 18610 2307 112 25 165
Liberia 2.56045.9 450 30.2 65 9350 1380 2270 35 215
Madagascar 11.620 25.0 230 39.3 33 9780 2101 97 19 3.4
Malawi 8.504 11.8 200 41.2 59 11340 2009 72 4 3.2 211
Mali 8.461 19.2 270 16.2 83 25390 1350 2181 23 6 2.5 248
Mauritania 1.96946.8 500 22.2 11900 1180 2528 52 16
Mozambique 15.784 26.8 80 47.4 62 1632 68 5 291
Namibia 1.78027.8 23.8 1889
Niger 7.666 19.5 310 46.7 86 39670 4602340 30 7
Nigeria 117.510 35.2 270 34.8 58 6440 9002039 62 16 6.2 193
Rwanda 7.113 7.7 310 47.7 53 35090 36901786 64 6 3.0 204
Senegal 7.428 38.4 710 39.3 72 2030 1989 59 16 6.5 186
Sierra Leone 4.13732.2 240 32.7 71 13620 1090 1806 53 18 2.6
Somalia 6.28436.4 150 38.7 88 16080 1530 1736 169
Sudan 25.191 22.0 520 21.9 10190 1260 1996 49 20 130
Swaziland 0.78933.1 840 38.8 199
Tanzania 24.518 32.8 120 47.9 24980 5490 2151 66 4 2.3 199
Togo 3.63825.7 410 36.4 59 8700 1240 2133 101 24 164
Uganda 17.358 10.4 220 41.1 43 2013 77 8 183
Zaire 35.56439.5 230 35.5 39 12940 1800 2034 76 22
Zambia 8.122 49.9 480 29.0 24 7150 740 2026 97 4.3 117
Zimbabwe 9.80927.6 640 34.6 26 6700 10002232 128 51 8.8 79
Pop = population (million), Urb = percent urban, GNP = GNP/capita (US$), FLFP
= female labor force participation, Lit = percent adult illiterate, Phys = number of
people/physician, Nurse = number of people/nurse, Cal = caloric consumption/capita
(cal), Prim = primary school enrollment, Sec = secondary school enrollment, IGDP =
index of GOP/capita (USA=100), q(5) = mortality age 0-4 per 1000 live births.
Source: Hill, 1992, and World Development Indicators.
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Table 8.3. Mean annual changes in socioeconomic indicators dur-
ing the 1970-1990 period, per 1,000 people per year.
Country Pop Urb GNP Phys Nurse Cal Prim Sec q(5)
Benin 29 36 63 37 20 03 26 72 40.6
Botswana 35 59 137 73 170 06 25 104 65.7
Burkina Faso 24 23 70 -67 48 05 42 77 46.9
Burundi 25 41 54 51 27 -02 43 60 41.2
Cameroon 30 35 82 03 7 73 53.9
Centro Afr. R. 24 21 63 -01 7 74 47.7
Chad 22 48 32 33 73 -10 17 77 27.8
Congo, PR 32 11 71 05
Cote d'Ivoire 40 19 49 01 50 55.1
Eq. Guinea 19 4
Ethiopia 29 20 34 -06 5 -03 51 87 8.1
Gabon 41 29 79 54 12
Gambia 32 22 47 41.6
Ghana 27 6 22 -21 42 06 2 47 33.8
Guinea-Bissau 31 14 6
Kenya 38 41 52 15 -04 23 76 58.8
Lesotho 25 43 77 4 05 7 79 18.3
Liberia 30 28 23 16 28 03 -06 30.9
Madagascar 27 29 15 4 -05 17 37
Malawi 32 34 60 75 -04 21 30 40.7
Mali 23 15 67 37 48 07 -01 17 29.3
Mauritania 24 61 51 59 14 60 120
Mozambique 26 77 -02 26 22 -5.1
Namibia 28 20 00
Niger 31 42 33 26 137 08 43 84
Nigeria 29 28 29 80 101 -03 28 50 2.0
Rwanda 33 44 82 38 37 03 8 47 21.5
Senegal 29 07 58 10 -09 16 35 38.6
Sierra Leone 22 29 20 11 74 -04 26 55
Somalia 28 24 25 44 50 09 38.3
Sudan 28 15 77 44 52 03 22 69 35.0
Swaziland 32 61 56 11.6
Tanzania 30 79 09 -07 -51 07 31 30 17.1
Togo 29 34 53 52 73 -04 26 68 47.4
Uganda 29 13 7 -06 6 30 22.1
Zaire 29 13 -04 52 -02 3 64
Zambia 33 25 4 24 109 -00 26 43.8
Zimbabwe 31 25 36 9 -1 04 6 93 48.7
Pop = population, Urb = percent urban, GNP = GNP/capita, Phys = nwnber of
physician/capita, Nurse = nwnber of nurse/capita, Cal = caloric consumption/capita,
Prim = primary school enrolhnent, Sec = secondary school enrolhnent.
Source: World Development Indicators.
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Table 8.4. Elasticities of q(5) with respect to various socioeconomic
indicators, in 36 countries of continental tropical Africa: 1980-1990.
Standardized
coefficient
Index of GDP/capita (US=100)
Secondary school enrollment
Primary school enrollment
% Adult illiterate
GNP/capita
Population/physician
Mean caloric consumption
Population/nurse
Export of agricultural products
% Urban population
Exports of fuel, minerals, and metals
% Female in labor force
-0.745
-0.734
-0.711
0.590
-0.517
0.499
-0.460
0.524
0.287
-0.201
-0.138
0.091
0.002a
o.oooa
o.oooa
0.002 a
0.006a
0.030a
0.018a
0.080
0.155
0.306
0.586
0.645
0.556
0.539
0.506
0.348
0.267
0.249
0.211
0.179
0.082
0.040
0.019
0.008
a p < 0.05.
Source: Trani, 1992.
GNP/capita), three measures of education (literacy and primary
and secondary school enrollment), one measure of public health
(the number of physicians), and one measure of nutrition (caloric
consumption). Owing to the poor quality of the data, no further
analysis could be done. However, these correlations indicate that
the mortality decline is part of the whole development process, and
that countries doing well in economic and social terms are also doing
well in mortality terms. There were, however, a number of outliers
in the regression analysis. Countries such as Sierra Leone, Gambia,
and Malawi have a mortality higher than expected; this was the
case already in 1960. Countries such as Kenya, Botswana, and Zim-
babwe have a lower than expected mortality, and they were among
the lowest mortality countries in 1960 (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5).
8.2.3 Public health and primary health care
Modern health infrastructures developed significantly after 1960 and
the number of health personnel per capita also increased. In par-
ticular the number of physicians per capita increased by about 100
percent during the 1960-1985 period and the number of nurses per
capita, by 373 percent. In Botswana, the number of physicians
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Jamison, 1991.
per capita has multiplied by 6.2 and the number of nurses by 70.
Botswana has 38 times more physicians per capita than Burkina
Faso. Hence, there is little wonder why Botswana has the lowest
mortality.
Major health programs were also implemented in Africa after
1960. The interest of the health authorities and of donor agen-
cies shifted from tropical diseases affecting adult mortality toward
maternal and pediatric care. Major efforts were made to provide
new vaccines, in particular vaccines against measles and poliomyeli-
tis. After 1978, selective primary health care strategies were im-
plemented throughout the continent. Emphasis was on the treat-
ment of diarrhea, using oral rehydration therapy, and to a certain
extent on growth monitoring. More recent efforts focused on in-
creasing vaccination coverage, on the treatment of acute respiratory
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infections (ARI), on the use of antibiotics, on essential drugs, and
on the financing and management of the primary health care sys-
tems. Little is known yet about the exact impact of these strategies.
However, it is certain that, when well implemented, they can have a
dramatic effect on a child's survival, as exemplified in a number of
small-scale case studies (Lamb et al., 1984; Garenne et al., 1991).
8.3 Prospects
The recent history of sub-Saharan Africa indicates a major mortality
decline, virtually universal, which began probably as early as 1920
in the most advanced countries. The decline was faster in certain
countries than in others. A clear association exists between the
180 Michel Garenne
pace of the mortality decline, the general level of socioeconomic
development, and the intensity of public-health efforts.
8.3.1 Sociopolitical factors
There are documented examples of countries experiencing a stagnant
or even reverse mortality trend. These countries went through major
political turmoil, and usually the changes in the trends are seen 5 to
10 years after the political crisis erupted. The level of sociopolitical
organization seems therefore to be the most crucial determinant of
mortality trends. It also determines the economic performances and
the level of social investments.
Our picture of African mortality may even be optimistically bi-
ased, since the demographic situations of the most critical cases are
not documented. For instance, recent reports of a major famine in
Somalia claim that the life of one-third of the population is threat-
ened. The demographic effect of the recurrent famines in Ethiopia
has been poorly documented, and the little we do know leads to
serious worries (Seaman, 1987). Relatively little is known about
the situation in southern Sudan, which has been under the pres-
sure of a civil war for more than three decades. The recent Su-
danese data cover only the northern part of the country. The same
is true for Angola and Mozambique, also amid the turmoil of civil
wars. Griffiths (1988) displays a striking map of Africa: famines,
political unrest, and civil wars occur simultaneously in the same
countries and in the same regions. The future of African mortality
may be divided into two categories: countries which do well and
continue on their rapid trend toward low mortality situations, and
countries which are so disturbed politically and economically that
any improvements in the mortality situation will be postponed to
an unforeseeable future (see Figure 8.6). International aid seems to
reinforce this dichotomy rather than to diminish it. For instance,
USAID, the most active agency for child survival programs, has a
red list of countries for which it will not intervene. They are of-
ten the poorest and the most desperate of all. On the other hand,
countries which are democratic, and in general are developing more
rapidly, receive more international support than the others.
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8.3.2 Epidemiological factors
Tropical Africa is also experiencing a profound sociological and epi-
demiological transition. The emergence of the modern economy de-
stroyed most of the traditional agricultural and economic systems
and perturbated the ecological balance between population and re-
sources. It led to massive migration flows and to a very rapid ur-
banization. In Senegal, more than half of the population now lives
in cities or large towns, whereas at the turn of the century 99 per-
cent of the population was rural and no city accounted for more
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than 5000 inhabitants. In Mauritania, 80 percent of the population
became urban in less than one generation.
This pattern of migration has been favorable to the rapid spread
of communicable diseases, in particular sexually transmitted dis-
eases, as happened with syphilis at the onset of economic develop-
ment in Europe, and for the same reasons (Shorter, 1990). The
AIDS epidemic is the leading source of concern in this respect. The
dynamics of the AIDS epidemic has been affected by the existence
of the network of international truck drivers (in Tanzania-Kenya-
Uganda), by the emergence of urban commercial sex workers, and
by the appearance of large communities of single male migrants in
cities, like in Abidjan. The spread of AIDS is probably the most
important negative factor affecting the future of mortality decline
in sub-Saharan Africa. Projections made of the mortality of future
generations are alarming: up to 50 percent of the population of cer-
tain countries or regions may have AIDS as a cause of death. The
death rates may even exceed the birth rates in the most extreme
situations, reversing the pattern of population growth (Anderson,
1991). The AIDS epidemic has another major consequence: the dis-
ruption of families, by the death of one or both parents, exposing
new orphans to the multiple risks of infection, malnutrition, and
accidents. Closely related to AIDS, there is also a risk of increasing
mortality from tuberculosis, as already shown in developed countries
(Murray et ai., 1990).
The massive implementation of modern medicine has also af-
fected the ecology of certain diseases. This is the case for malaria,
as more and more cases of strains resistant to chloroquine are doc-
umented (Bradley, 1991). Malaria has always been a leading cause
of death in Africa. Although there is no documented evidence on
increasing malaria mortality, resistant malaria strains may lead in
the future toward an increase in deaths attributed to this disease.
Furthermore, the wide-scale use of antimalarial drugs may have led
to a decline in natural immunity. This in turn may make certain
populations vulnerable to major outbreaks of malaria, such as what
happened in Madagascar in 1988.
Cholera came back in 1971 to Africa, after some 80 years of
absence. The index case was brought by plane to Conakry, Guinea,
an example of a new pattern of spread of communicable diseases.
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Since then, cholera has become endemic in most of tropical Africa,
and seems also to have become a leading cause of death, at least in
the Sahel of West Africa.
The vaccination coverage against yellow fever has dropped
markedly in many countries. Recent outbreaks have taken place in
Nigeria, and will occur again unless vaccination coverage increases
dramatically. Although rare, the plague still exists in Madagascar
and occurs occasionally on the east coast of Africa.
With changing lifestyles and urbanization, new diseases will also
emerge or develop from increasing risk factors or changing ecological
conditions. Smoking habits are increasing in Africa, with the help of
the massive commercial campaigns by tobacco companies. Obesity,
rare in the villages, has become prevalent in cities, and may be
linked with a probable increase in the prevalence of diabetes. Car
accidents are also becoming a significant cause of death, and African
roads are among the most dangerous in the world.
8.4 Discussion
The past trends of mortality in Africa have been induced by trans-
fers of technology from the West, which have affected virtually all
countries in the continent in a short period of time. Public health,
nutrition, economic development, and modern education seem to
have been the key determinants in mortality change. However, the
future of mortality in Africa is hard to determine and even harder to
quantify. There are reasons for believing that the major mortality
decline of the past 30 years will not be followed by a compara-
ble decline in the next 30 years in all the countries of continental
sub-Saharan Africa. Most likely, the major differences that already
exist between countries will prevail, and may even increase. Some
will continue along their successful routes to low mortality and oth-
ers will see their health transition stop or even be reversed for some
period of time. Besides the sociopolitical conditions, a critical factor
will be the spread of the HIV virus in the general population.
The control that the countries have over the health of their
population is also a function of their research capacity to identify
new problems and to choose the most appropriate solutions in time.
Essential national health research has been seen recently as one of
184 Michel Garenne
the top priorities for developing countries (ENHR Report, 1990,
1991). Data information systems to identify and tackle new diseases
and new health problems may be an important component of the
success of health policies in the future. The AIDS epidemics could
have been smaller in size if similar and appropriate steps had been
taken at its onset.
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Chapter 9
Projection of the
Mortality Impact of
AIDS in Africa
John Bongaarts
The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) began spreading widely
around 1980, and it has now reached every corner of the world. This
rapidly growing epidemic is considered an unprecedented health
threat because AIDS, which follows HIV infection, results always
in fatal illness, and the prospects for a cure or a vaccine in the near
future are not good (Anderson and May, 1992). The speed with
which the epidemic has spread is particularly disturbing. The num-
ber of reported AIDS cases worldwide doubled annually for most
of the 1980s. By early 1991 more than 1 million AIDS cases had
occurred among adults (WHO, 1991). Further large increases in
the epidemic are essentially inevitable because millions more are al-
ready infected with HIV and the large majority of these individuals
are expected to develop AIDS eventually. Moreover, new infections
continue to occur. WHO expects the total number of AIDS cases
to rise to 9-10 million among adults and 4-8 million among infants
by the end of the century.
The African continent is more severely affected by this epidemic
than any other major part of the world. More than two out of
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three adult AIDS cases and more than nine out of ten pediatric
cases have occurred in Africa (WHO, 1991). In some urban areas of
Central Africa more than 20 percent of the general adult population
is already infected. A large proportion of all sexually active adults
in Africa and elsewhere must be considered at risk of infection with
HIV.
The future course of the epidemic is highly uncertain and the
subject of considerable controversy. A variety of computerized
mathematical models have been developed to project the future
course of the AIDS epidemic and its demographic impact (UN,
1991a). A review of these different approaches is not attempted
here, but it should be noted that the range of projections is very
wide. Some investigators (e.g., Anderson et ai., 1991) conclude that
the epidemic will be sufficiently severe in a few decades to cause
a decline in population size in parts of Africa. Results obtained
by others (e.g., Bos and Bulatao, forthcoming) indicate that even in
the countries with the highest infection levels, the annual population
growth rate will be reduced by only a fraction of 1 percent.
The overall objective of this chapter is to obtain estimates of
plausible upper and lower boundaries of the mortality impact of the
AIDS epidemic in Africa by the end of this century. A brief review
of recent trends in the epidemic and the causes of intra-country
variation is presented first. This is followed by an application of a
computer simulation model to project alternative scenarios for the
future HIV epidemic and its mortality impact in Africa.
9.1 Recent Trends in HIV Infections and
AIDS Cases Worldwide
The number of AIDS cases reported to WHO is the most widely
available statistic used for monitoring the evolution of the epidemic.
Although some conclusions can be drawn from levels and trends in
the number of AIDS cases, this indicator can be highly misleading
for two reasons. First, underreporting is a serious problem in some
countries, particularly in Africa, due to the unwillingness to recog-
nize this disease, lack of diagnostic facilities, and a reluctance on the
part of medical personnel and governments to report the full extent
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of the epidemic. According to WHO (1991) only about one out of
every ten AIDS cases in Africa has been reported. Second, the in-
terval between infection with HIV and the onset of AIDS is long -
nearly a decade on average. As a result, trends in AIDS cases can
be very different from trends in HIV infections and one cannot draw
firm conclusions about the former from the latter. The epidemic
in the USA provides an example of this problem. The number of
new AIDS cases (which are fairly completely reported in the USA)
rose steadily during the early 1980s suggesting a continuous spread
of the disease. However, since the mid-1980s, HIV seroprevalence
rates among homosexuals as well as in sentinel groups representative
of the general population have shown little increase, thus suggesting
that the incidence of HIV infections has been declining and that the
epidemic has not been spreading rapidly in recent years except in
certain high risk populations such as IV drug users and their part-
ners (Brookmeyer, 1991; Centers for Disease Control, 1987). This
conclusion is consistent with a leveling off in the annual number of
new AIDS cases in the early 1990s. To assess future trends in an
AIDS epidemic it is clearly preferable to monitor HIV infection rates
rather than to rely on extrapolation of reported AIDS cases.
Unfortunately, reliable HIV seroprevalence estimates based on
national samples of the general population are virtually nonexistent
in Africa (Uganda is the only exception). Seroprevalence data are
often only available for specific subpopulations (e.g., prostitutes or
pregnant women). Many surveys are taken in settings such as hospi-
tals and clinics where blood samples can be obtained relatively eas-
ily. Estimates of HIV prevalence in the general population are there-
fore typically based on data from pregnant women or blood donors.
While certainly subject to error, this procedure gives reasonable
approximations in most countries. Another problem with existing
seroprevalence data is the focus on urban populations, which are
definitely not representative of a country as a whole. In most coun-
tries where both rural and urban estimates are available, the former
is only a fraction of the latter.
Estimates of seroprevalence are available from the HIV / AIDS
Surveillance Data Base maintained by the Center for International
Research at the US Bureau of the Census (1991). The distribution
of countries by level of infection is given in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1. Urban HIV seroprevalence in African countries.
Percent of low-risk
adult population
> 10%
5-10%
2-5%
< 2%
Countries
Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda,
Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Zambia
Central African Republic, Congo,
Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe
40 other countries
Seroprevalence rates of over 10 percent in urban areas of a few
countries are extremely high and not found anywhere else in the
world. On the other hand, in 40 African countries the epidemic
has thus far affected less than 2 percent of the adult population. It
should be emphasized that these are urban estimates. Countrywide
data are rarely available, but they should be much lower because
the large majority of Africans live in rural areas. For Africa as a
whole WHO (1991) estimates a total of 6 million infected individ-
uals. With an adult population of 353 million, in mid-1990 (UN,
1991b) the average seroprevalence among adults in the continent is
therefore 1.7 percent.
Figure 9.1 plots trends in a few capital cities where repeated
measurements have been made since 1985. In most cases the trend
is firmly upward, indicating a continuing spread of HIV. Interest-
ingly, in one instance, Kinshasa, seroprevalence has stabilized and in
three other cities, Kampala, Nairobi, and Abidjan, prevalence rates
among pregnant women appear to be growing slower in recent years
than in the mid-1980s. Given the unreliability of some estimates it
would be inappropriate to conclude that epidemics in these cities
are approaching a plateau, but the absence of continued explosive
growth is somewhat encouraging.
9.2 Determinants of Geographic Variation
in the Spread of HIV
Available HIV seroprevalence data demonstrate clearly that the
AIDS virus has spread rapidly in some African countries, while in
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Figure 9.1. Trends in HIV seroprevalence among pregnant women
in selected capital cities in Africa.
other parts of Africa HIV seroprevalence is still low or negligible.
The causes of these geographic differences are not well understood,
but they are probably due to variations in the following factors:
• The timing of the onset of the epidemic. In the unlikely case
that all African populations are equally susceptible to an HIV
epidemic, differences in HIV seroprevalence at one point in time
could be due to the later introduction of HIV in the coun-
tries with low current levels of infection. However, all popu-
lations would then eventually be expected to experience similar
epidemics.
• Sexual behavior. Sexual mobility is necessary for the spread of
HIV because an HIV epidemic cannot occur in a population in
which all or nearly all sexually active adults live in monoga-
mous unions. The frequency of sexual contact with individuals
other than a permanent partner and the frequency of change in
partners are therefore important determinants of the size of the
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epidemic. Although data on sexual behavior are often lacking
or unreliable, it appears likely that there are substantial differ-
ences in sexual behavior between countries and between urban
and rural areas within countries.
• The prevalence of infectious agents. Infections with viruses and
parasites (e.g., hepatitis, cytomegalovirus, herpes simplex, tox-
oplasmosis) are common in Africa. Quinn et al. (1986, 1987)
suggest that exposure to these agents results in a chronic acti-
vation of the immune system, which in turn may lead to greater
susceptibility to HIV infection.
• Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) that cause genital ulcers.
In African case-control studies, the presence of genital ulcers in
both men and women is correlated with the rate of infection
with HIV (Simonson et al., 1988; Plummer et al., 1987, 1991).
Substantial variation in the prevalence of STDs and hence in
the presence of genital ulcers may be inferred from demographic
evidence on variation in the levels of infertility among African
populations (Frank, 1983).
• The absence of male circumcision. A case-control study of men
attending a clinic for sexually transmitted diseases in Nairobi
found that uncircumcised males were significantly more likely
to be infected with HIV than circumcised controls (Simonson
et al., 1988). Supporting evidence for this possibly crucial role
of circumcision is provided by Bongaarts et al. (1989). In this
study a review of the anthropological literature yielded esti-
mates on circumcision practices for 409 African ethnic groups
from which corresponding national estimates were derived. A
strong correlation (r = 0.9) was found between the estimated
national proportion of males who were not circumcised and the
HIV prevalence in capital cities. Enhanced viral survival un-
der the foreskin and the more frequent occurrence of balanitis
(inflammation of the glans of the penis) may be responsible for
the increased susceptibility to HIV among uncircumcised males
(Piot et al., 1988; Fink, 1986).
• Gender differences in sexual activity. While premarital or extra-
marital sexual mobility of males is socially acceptable in most
African populations, this behavior is much less tolerated among
women. Moreover, important differences exist among societies
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in sexual permissiveness for girls and women. In much of Africa,
women enter a permanent marital union at an early age and,
once married, are expected to remain faithful. The implication
of this behavior pattern is that males engage in premarital and
extramarital sex with relatively few promiscuous women, mostly
prostitutes. Seroprevalence in this small group of women with
high sexual activity rates therefore rises quickly to a high level
in the early years of the epidemic. This in turn leads to higher
rates of HIV infection among their male partners than would
have been the case had sexual activity been less concentrated
among these females. In contrast, in a few other societies - e.g.,
cities of Zaire and Tanzania - women are permitted greater sex-
ual freedom and the pool of potential female sexual partners
is relatively larger. Paradoxically, the more equal levels of ex-
tramarital sexual activity of males and females in these cities
could, other things being equal, produce lower rates of infection
with HIV.
Although a lack of detailed measurements prevents a quantita-
tive assessment of the roles played by these explanatory variables,
it is likely that all have contributed to current differences in the
severity of the epidemic. Differences in these behavioral and epi-
demiological factors (usually referred to as cofactors) need not be
large to cause epidemics of widely varying sizes. In fact, relatively
modest differences in transmission risks or sexual behavior can make
the difference between epidemics that are self-sustaining and those
that are not. The former are referred to as epidemics with a re-
productive rate above 1.0 while the latter have reproductive rates
below 1.0. (The reproductive rate, R, is defined as the number
of new infections caused by one infected individual over his or her
lifetime.) In populations in which R exceeds 1, epidemics growex-
ponentially once the virus has been introduced. Examples of such
epidemics are found among homosexuals and IV drug users in the
USA and among heterosexuals in many African cities. In contrast,
no such epidemics occur in populations with reproductive rates be-
low 1. This is true even if the virus is introduced repeatedly. The
AIDS epidemic is apparently not self-sustaining among US hetero-
sexuals who are not IV drug users because HIV seroprevalence in
this group has remained stable at a fraction of 1 percent despite
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the presence of highly infected core groups of homosexuals and IV
drug users (Centers for Disease Control, 1987). Similarly, it is quite
possible, indeed probable, that substantial parts of rural Africa still
have reproductive rates below 1. In areas where this is the case, in-
fections can occur through contacts with infected individuals from
nearby cities or countries, but HIV seroprevalence can be expected
to remain at a low and relatively stable level. An illustration of this
phenomenon may be found in Rwanda. Kigali is experiencing one
of the most severe epidemics found anywhere in Africa, but in ru-
ral Rwanda (which is close to the capital in this small country) HIV
seroprevalence is only 2 percent (Godefroid et at., 1988). A large dif-
ference between the reproductive rates of urban and rural Rwanda is
the most likely explanation for this contrast in HIV seroprevalence
levels.
Important policy implications follow if these untested hypothe-
ses for the causes of the geographic variation in the size of epidemics
prove to be largely correct. At present much of the effort to control
the spread of AIDS is focused on high-risk groups in urban areas,
i.e., on prostitutes and their clients. Where the reproductive rate in
these groups is large (e.g., over 10), even a successful intervention
program that cuts the rate in half (e.g., by promoting widespread
use of condoms) would only put a small dent in the epidemic. On
the other hand, if one could identify populations with a reproduc-
tive rate just above 1 (which implies that they are at risk of experi-
encing substantial future epidemics), then a successful intervention
program might reduce the reproductive rate below 1, thus prevent-
ing the occurrence of an epidemic. Intervention strategies aimed
at changing sexual behavior or cofactors among all sexually active
males and females in both rural and urban areas may therefore be
more effective in the long run than highly targeted control efforts.
As demonstrated in Section 9.3, the future course of an AIDS
epidemic depends to a large extent on which of the above causes of
the geographic variation in epidemic sizes predominates.
9.3 A Summary of the Projection Model
The objective of the AIDS simulation model discussed in this section
is to make long-range projections of the annual incidence and the
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prevalence of HIV infection and AIDS, as well as of the number of
AIDS deaths in a population with given epidemiological, behavioral,
and demographic characteristics. In addition, projections provide
estimates of the impact of AIDS on a variety of demographic vari-
ables, including the population size and growth rate, age and sex
structure, and birth and death rates. The model is highly complex
and only a few key features can be described here (see Bongaarts,
1989, for further details).
The overall model is based on a demographic framework into
which a number of epidemiological submodels are integrated. This
framework consists essentially of a standard cohort-component pro-
jection model that uses single-year cohorts and single-year projec-
tion increments instead of the more conventional five-year intervals.
With this conventional demographic structure as a basis, the
population is then stratified into different sexual behavior groups.
Sexual behavior, and hence the risk of HIV infection, varies widely
among subgroups within a population. To take into account this
heterogeneity in sexual activity, each cohort is divided into the fol-
lowing strata:
• Males. Heterosexuals with high sexual mobility (e.g., clients
of prostitutes); partners in monogamous unions; and sexually
inactive males.
• Females. Prostitutes and other females with high sexual mobil-
ity; monogamous partners of sexually mobile males; partners in
monogamous unions; and sexually inactive females.
Homosexuality and IV drug use, which apparently do not con-
tribute significantly to the spread of the epidemic in Africa, are not
considered. Heterosexual contact is therefore the main route of HIV
transmission. At the core of the epidemic are prostitutes (or other
females with high sexual mobility) and their male clients. These
two groups infect one another, thus producing a self-sustaining epi-
demic. From these core groups infection spreads to others, primarily
because male clients of prostitutes usually also have sexual contact
with their spouses or other females (polygamy is common in parts
of Africa). These females, in turn, can infect their newborns either
in utero or at birth and perhaps through breast-feeding as well.
The distribution of individuals among the different sexual be-
havior groups changes as each cohort ages. After being sexually
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inactive until early adulthood, cohort members enter one of the sex-
ual behavior groups and over time may switch between them. In
addition to keeping track of the distribution of individuals among
these groups, the model allows the rate of sexual activity to change
as the cohort ages.
The model is completed by adding the epidemiological com-
ponents. This requires a further stratification of each cohort and
each sexual behavior stratum into subgroups with different infec-
tion/disease states. Three such states are included in the model:
uninfected, infected, and AIDS. Sets of differential equations de-
scribe the rates at which the numbers of individuals in these states
change over time. The key events associated with transfers between
infection/disease states are:
• HIV infection. The probability of infection in a given period
is assumed to depend on the frequency of sexual contact, the
prevalence of infection in and the infectiousness of the contact
group (having sex with a prostitute is more risky than having
sex with one's spouse), and the rate of partner change (for ex-
ample, marital disruption and remarriage). The infectiousness
of a partner is a function of gender (male-to-female transmission
is apparently more efficient than the reverse), cofactors, stage
of disease (individuals with AIDS or symptomatic HIV diseases
such as AR~ are most infectious), and the use of condoms.
• AIDS onset. The incubation period - i.e., the interval between
infection with HIV and the onset of AIDS - is a key determinant
of the demographic impact of the epidemic. In the model this
highly variable incubation interval is described with a gamma
distribution. The mean of this distribution is 9.3 years, and
90 percent of infected individuals are assumed to be at risk of
contracting AIDS. These parameters were obtained by fitting
a cumulative gamma distribution to observed proportions pro-
gressing to AIDS in a cohort of homosexuals in a San Francisco
city clinic (Hessol et al., 1987).
• Death from AIDS. The interval between the onset of AIDS and
death is assumed to be exponentially distributed, and all AIDS
cases are assumed to die eventually. The average survival time
for an AIDS patient is assumed to be 1.5 years.
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In the discussion of HIV infection routes, only sexual and perina-
tal transmissions have been mentioned thus far. Other modes of HIV
transmission do exist in Africa, but they are believed to contribute
only a minority of infections. Piot and Carael (1988) estimate that
perhaps 5 to 10 percent of HIV infections among adults are due
to transfusions with infected blood. This percentage is probably
higher among infected infants and children. In addition, injections
with contaminated needles (e.g., for vaccinations) may cause some
infections although this is difficult to document conclusively. These
factors are also included in the model, but their effect is assumed to
decline over time, because inexpensive screening tests will make it
possible to reduce infection from blood transfusions in the future.
9.4 The Relationship Between HIV
Seroprevalence and AIDS Mortality
A set of model simulations was carried out to determine the mortal-
ity effects of epidemics of different sizes. Before presenting the main
results of this exercise, selected findings of an earlier application
of the model are examined briefly. The objective of this previous
application was to project the future course of epidemiological and
demographic variables in a hypothetical Central African country
with a severe HIV epidemic (Bongaarts, 1988). Table 9.2 presents
the principal input parameters for this simulation. Figure 9.2 plots
the projected trajectory of HIV seroprevalence for the period 1975-
2000. The epidemic is assumed to have started in 1975, and by 1987
seroprevalence had reached 11 percent among adults, a level roughly
comparable with that of Uganda. The projection to the year 2000
indicates substantial further growth of the epidemic, approaching a
plateau with HIV seroprevalence at 21 percent by the end of the
century. Figure 9.2 also plots the corresponding trend in AIDS
mortality (measured in AIDS deaths per 1,000 total population).
The rise in AIDS mortality occurs several years after the increase in
seroprevalence. In the model AIDS mortality is estimated at 3.5 per
1,000 population in 1987, and by the end of the century it triples to
10.5. About three-quarters of this mortality occurs among adults,
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Table 9.2. Input parameters for the illustrative projection of an
HIV/ AIDS epidemic in Africa.
Disease progression
Average duration of incubation period (years)
Average interval between AIDS onset and death (years)
Proportion infected at risk of developing AIDS
Sexual behavior
Monthly frequency of sexual contact before marriage
highly mobile males/females
Monthly frequency of sexual contact after marriage
highly mobile males/females
Monthly frequency of sexual contact between spouses
Proportion highly mobile before marriage (males/females)
Proportion highly mobile after marriage (males/females)
Age at marriage
Annual risk of marital disruption
Proportion remarrying
Average number of wives per married male
Determinants of infectiousness
Standard transmission risk per contact
male to female/female to male
Cofactor multiplier (highly mobile/other)
Infectiousness multiplier for ARC and AIDS cases
Frequency of contact multiplier for AIDS cases
Proportion using condoms
Nonsexual transmission
Probability of perinatal transmission
Proportion of infections among infants/adult females
due to blood transfusion
Demographic structure
Initial population size (millions)
Initial population growth rate (percent)
Initial life expectancy at birth in years (male/female)
Annual increment in life expectancy (male/female)
Annual decrement in fertility rate (births per woman)
Source: Bongaarts, 1988.
9.3
1.5
0.9
10/25
4/100
8
0.4/0.2
0.2/0.02
20
0.02
1.0
1.25
0.001/0.0005
3.0/1.5
10.0
0.0
0.1
0.35
0.2/0.1
100.0
3.0
44/47
0.3/0.3
0.02
with the remainder occurring among children. Three key conclu-
sions are drawn from this particular simulation of a severe epidemic
(Bongaarts, 1988):
1. HIV seroprevalence will roughly double between 1987 and 2000.
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Figure 9.2. Model projection of HIV seroprevalence and AIDS
death rate for a severe African epidemic.
2. Rapid changes in HIV seroprevalence and AIDS mortality occur
in the first 25 years of the epidemic, but thereafter relatively
stable levels are achieved for these variables.
3. AIDS mortality causes a substantial decline in the population
growth rate, but, given the high birth rates that exist in much of
Africa, the rise in the crude death rate is insufficient to produce
negative population growth.
Most countries in Africa are experiencing epidemics that are
less severe than the one just described. To obtain simulations of
epidemics of different sizes, model input parameters related to sex-
ual behavior and cofactors were varied. Two findings from these
simulations are noteworthy. First, the AIDS death rate was directly
related to the size of the epidemic. Figure 9.3 plots the relationship
between these two variables in the year 2000. Interestingly, the effect
of epidemic size on AIDS mortality is close to linear. As a simple
rule of thumb, the number of AIDS deaths per 1,000 population in
the year 2000 is about half of the HIV seroprevalence among adults
in that year. For smaller epidemics mortality is slightly lower than
this rule implies, but the resulting modest overestimate of AIDS
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Figure 9.3. Estimated relationship between AIDS death rate and
adult HIV seroprevalence in 2000.
mortality was considered acceptable. Second, the patterns of change
over time in seroprevalence and AIDS mortality are similar to those
for the severe epidemic depicted in Figure 9.2; nevertheless, the
smaller an epidemic is, the later equilibrium tends to be reached.
The results of these simulations are used in Section 9.5 to make
alternative projections for the African continent as a whole.
9.5 Projection of AIDS Mortality for the
African Continent
One approach to estimating the future death rate attributable to
AIDS would be to simulate epidemics in the urban and rural parts
of each African country, and then to aggregate these country-specific
results into a continentwide estimate of mortality. Such an exercise
would be very time consuming and difficult because accurate statis-
tics for many epidemiological and demographic variables are lacking
for most African countries. Fortunately, a much simpler approach is
available. This alternative is made possible by the essentially linear
relationship between the seroprevalence level and the corresponding
AIDS death rate in the year 2000 (see Figure 9.3). As a consequence
of this linear relationship one can estimate AIDS mortality for the
African continent from the average seroprevalence in Africa in 2000,
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rather than from country-specific projections. This shortcut gives
quite accurate results, because (assuming linearity) the AIDS death
rate is not sensitive to variation in epidemic size around the aver-
age. In other words, it is the average African seroprevalence that
matters, and for our purpose it is not important that epidemics in
many countries will in fact be much larger or smaller than average.
To estimate the AIDS death rate for all of Africa in the year
2000, answers to two questions have to be provided: (1) how large
will the HIV epidemic be by the end of the century; and (2) given
this epidemic size, what is the related AIDS death rate? To answer
the second question we use the simple rule derived from Figure 9.3:
the AIDS death rate per 1,000 population is estimated at half the
HIV seroprevalence (in percent of adults). This leaves the much
more difficult first question. Needless to say, it is impossible to
estimate the future course of the African HIV epidemic with any
accuracy. However, it is possible to set plausible upper and lower
limits for the epidemic. The upper limit for the African continent
is set here at 21 percent seroprevalence, based on the simulation of
a Uganda-like epidemic as summarized in Figure 9.2. The implied
assumptions for this scenario are that no important behavioral or
epidemiological differences exist among African countries and that
it is only a matter of time before all of Africa will experience the
explosive epidemic observed in parts of Central Africa. The lower
limit for seroprevalence in 2000 is derived by assuming that the
relative increase in seroprevalence over time found in the simulation
of the less severe epidemics (roughly a doubling between 1990 and
2000) will apply to all of Africa. Since HIV seroprevalence currently
is estimated at about 1.7 percent this gives a lower limit of 3.4
percent for the epidemic in 2000. The implied assumption in this
best case scenario is that current differences in seroprevalence among
African countries are largely attributable to specific epidemiological
and behavioral factors and that those differences will be maintained
in the future. To sum up, the estimates for the year 2000 are:
Worst case: HIV seroprevalence, 21 percent of adults; AIDS death
rate, 10.5 per 1,000 population.
Best case: HIV seroprevalence, 3.4 percent of adults; AIDS death
rate, 1. 7 per 1,000 population.
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Since the evidence reviewed earlier suggests that sexual behavior
and cofactors are the principal determinants of the existing varia-
tion in epidemic sizes in African populations, it appears likely that
actual future trends in HIV seroprevalence and AIDS mortality will
be closer to the low end than to the high end of the spectrum of
projections presented here.
9.6 Conclusion
The available country-specific evidence on the spread of HIV in-
dicates very large differences in the size of epidemics between and
within African countries. Seroprevalence is low or negligible in large
parts of Africa, particularly in rural areas, while a few urban areas
are very heavily infected. Since the majority of Africans live in rural
areas, HIV seroprevalence for Africa as a whole is currently "only"
about 1.7 percent among adults. But there is little doubt that the
epidemic will grow substantially in the future.
Given the uncertainty about the past course of the epidemic
and about the roles of different behavioral and biological determi-
nants, precise projections are not possible. However, results from
computer simulations can be used to project ranges of future epi-
demic sizes and the corresponding mortality impacts. A key finding
from a set of simulations was that the death rate (per 1,000 pop-
ulation) in the year 2000 will be approximately equal to half the
HIV seroprevalence (percent of adults) in that year. Based on this
simple relationship, two alternative projections for the African con-
tinent have been made. In the worst case scenario all of Africa is
assumed to follow the route of the most severely affected countries
in Central Africa, resulting in an AIDS death rate of over 10 per
1,000 population in the year 2000. In this extreme case, the AIDS
death rate will approach the rate from all other causes of death,
but the population growth rate, while substantially reduced, will
remain positive. An African epidemic of this magnitude would of
course have disastrous effects on the health care system, the econ-
omy, and the society in general. At the other end of the plausible
spectrum for the evolution of the epidemic, a doubling of seropreva-
lence throughout Africa is projected between 1990 and 2000. In that
case the death rate attributable to AIDS will grow to about 1.7 per
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1,000, implying a minimal impact on population growth in Africa
as a whole. But even in this most optimistic scenario AIDS will
become a major cause of mortality in many countries.
Finally, the projections presented here do not take into account
two factors that may affect the course of the epidemic and its mor-
tality impact. The first is a change in sexual behavior that may
occur (or may have already occurred) in response to the epidemic.
It seems likely that at least some adults with high sexual mobility
will change their behavior once they learn of the potentially fatal
consequences of this behavior. Any reduction in the frequency of
sexual intercourse and/or the number of sexual partners would tend
to dampen the epidemic. At present no solid evidence indicates a
change in sexual behavior, although such a change may be respon-
sible for the reported recent leveling off of the HIV epidemic in Kin-
shasa (N'Galy et al., 1988). A second factor that is not taken into
account in our projections is the potential impact of the AIDS epi-
demic on mortality from other causes of death. The AIDS epidemic
will put strains on an already overburdened health care system, and
resources devoted to AIDS will tend to reduce the effectiveness of
programs aimed at fighting other diseases. Since these two factors
tend to offset one another and are of unknown magnitude, it is not
clear whether their net impact will be positive, negative, or negligi-
ble, and for that reason they have been excluded from this analysis.
References
Anderson, R.M., and Maym, R.M., 1992, Understanding the AIDS pan-
demic, Scientific American May:58-66.
Anderson, R.M., May, R.M., Boily, M.C., Garnett, G.P., and Rowley, J.T.,
1991, The spread of HIV-I in Africa: Sexual contact patterns and the
predicted demographic impact of AIDS, Nature 352:581~589.
Bongaarts, J., 1988, Modeling the demographic impact of AIDS in Africa,
in R. Kulstad, ed., AIDS 1988: AAAS Symposium Papers, AAAS
Press, Washington, DC, USA.
Bongaarts, J., 1989, A model of the spread of HIV infection and the de-
mographic impact of AIDS, Statistics in Medicine 8:103-120.
Bongaarts, J., Reining, P., Way, P., and Conant, F., 1989, The relationship
between male circumcision and HIV infection in African populations,
AIDS 3:373-377.
Bos, E., and Bulatao, R.A., forthcoming, The Demographic Impact of
AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Short- and Long-term Projections,
204 John Bongaarts
Mimeo, Population, Health, and Nutrition Division, World Bank,
Washington, DC, USA.
Brookmeyer, R., 1991, Reconstruction and future trends of the AIDS epi-
demic in the United States, Science 253:37-41.
Centers for Disease Control (USA), 1987, Human immunodeficiency virus
infection in the United States: A review of current knowledge, Mor-
bidity and Mortality Weekly Report 36(5-6):1-48.
Fink, A.J., 1986, A possible explanation for heterosexual male infection
with AIDS, The New England Journal of Medicine 315(18):1167.
Frank, 0., 1983, Infertility in sub-Saharan Africa: Estimates and implica-
tions, Population and Development Review 9:137-144.
Godefroid, B., Augustin, N., and Didacem, N., 1988, Etude sur la
seropositive liee it l'infection au Virus de l'Immunodeficience Humaine
au Rwanda, Revue Medicale Rwandaise 20(54):37.
Hessol, N., Lifson, A.R., Rutherford, G.W., O'Malley, P.M., Franks, D.R.,
Darrow, W.W., and Jaffe, H.W., 1987, The natural history of hu-
man immunodeficiency virus infection in a cohort of homosexual and
bisexual men: A 7-year prospective study, in Abstract Volume, III
International Conference on AIDS, Washington, DC, USA.
N'Galy, B., Ryder, B., and Francis, H., 1988, HIV Prevalence in Zaire,
1984 to 1988, 4th International Conference on AIDS, June, abstract
5632, Stockholm, Sweden.
Piot, P., and Carael, M., 1988, Epidemiological and sociological aspects
of HIV infection in developing countries, British Medical Bulletin
44(1):68-88.
Piot, P., Plummer, F., Mhalu, F., Lamboray, J., Chin, J., and Mann, J.,
1988, AIDS: An international perspective, Science 239:573.
Plummer, F.A., Simonson, J.N., Ngugi, E., Cameron, D.W., Piot, P.,
and Ndinya-Achola, J .0., 1987, Incidence of human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) infection and related disease in a cohort of Nairobi pros-
titutes, in Abstract Volume, III International Conference on AIDS,
Washington, DC, USA.
Plummer, F.A., Simonson, J.N., Cameron, D.W., Ndinya-Achola, J.O.,
Kreiss, J.K., Galeinya, M.N., Waiyaki, P., Cheang, M., Piot, P.,
Ronald, A.R., and Ngugi, E.N., 1991, Cofactors in male-female sexual
transmission of human immunodeficiency virus type 1, The Journal
of Infectious Diseases 163:233-239.
Quinn, T.C., Mann, J.M., Curran, J .W., and Piot, P., 1986, AIDS in
Africa: An epidemiological paradigm, Science 234:955-963.
Quinn, T.C., Piot, P., McCormick, J.B., Feinsod, F.M., Taelman, H.,
Kapita, B., Stevens, W., and Fauci, A.S., 1987, Serologic and im-
munologic studies in patients with AIDS in North America and Africa,
Journal of the American Medical Association 257:2617-2621.
Projection of the Mortality Impact of AIDS in Africa 205
Simonson, J.N., Cameron, D.W., Gakinya, M.N., Ndinya-Achola, J.O.,
D'Costa, L.K., Karasira, P., Cheang, M., Ronald, A.R., Piot, P.,
and Plummer, F.A., 1988, Human immunodeficiency virus infection
among men with sexually transmitted diseases, The New England
Journal of Medicine 319(5):274-278.
UN, 1991a, The AIDS Epidemic and its Demographic Consequences, De-
partment of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Na-
tions, New York, NY, USA.
UN, 1991b, World Population Prospects: 1990, Population Studies, No.
120, Publication No. STjESAjSER.AjI20, Department of Interna-
tional Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY,
USA.
US Bureau of the Census, 1991, Recent HIV Seroprevalence Levels by
Country: November 1991, Research Note No.4, Health Studies Re-
search, Center for International Research, Washington, DC, USA.
WHO, 1991, Current and Future Dimensions of the HIV/ AIDS Pan-
demic, Global Program on AIDS, World Health Organization, Geneva,
Switzerland.

Chapter 10
How Many People Can
Be Fed on Earth?
Gerhard K. Heilig
Many distinguished writers have studied the question whether food
is a limiting factor for population growth. Since the time when
Malthus started the debate some 200 years ago (see Malthus, 1967;
Ricardo, 1964) thousands of books, research papers, and study re-
ports have been published on the subject (Boserup, 1965, 1981;
Clark, 1967; Clark and Haswell, 1964j Livi Bacci, 1991).[1] Despite
these intense efforts, we are still far from consensus. A screening
of available literature on estimating the earth's population carrying
capacity reveals surprising diversity of results (see Table 10.1).
In 1945 Pearson and Harper calculated that between 902 million
and 2.8 billion people could be supported by the earth's agriculture.
Some 20 years later Clark (1967) estimated the sustainable popu-
lation maximum of the earth to range between 40 and 157 billion!
However, in the 1970s Buringh et al. (1975) considered the world
food production potential equivalent to just 5.3 billion people. In
the late 1970s and early 1980s a large FAO study (Higgins et al.,
1983) concluded that - only on Third World soils - between 3.9 and
32.4 billion people could be fed, depending on the level of agricul-
tural inputs. Only a decade ago, Simon's (1981) Ultimate Resource
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Table 10.1. Estimates of the earth's population carrying capacity
during the past 100 years.
Source
Ravenstein (1891)
Penck (1925)
Pearson and Harper (1945)
Baade (1960)a
Clark (1967)b
Revelle (1967)a
Miickenhausen (1973)°
Buringh et al. (1977, 1975)
Westing (1981), Mann (1981)
Simon (1981), Kahn (1982)
FAO/UNFPA/IIASAd
(Higgins et al., 1982)
Gilland (1983)a
Resources for the Future (1984)
Marchetti (1978)
World Hunger Program"
(Cohen, 1992)
Ehrlich et al. (1993)
Earth's maximum population
carrying capacity
6 billion
7.7-9.5 billion
0.9-2.8 billion
30 billion
47-157 billion
41 billion
35-40 billion
2.7-6.7 billion
about 2 billion
no meaningful limitation
for 1975: 1.957-32.407 billion
for 2000: 3.590-33.195 billion
7.5 million
6.1 billion
1 trillion
2.8-5.5 billion
< 5.5 billion
Date
1891
1925
1945
1960
1967
1967
1973
1975
1981
1982
1982
1983
1984
1978
1992
1993
aEstimates are based on very low estimates of average food caloric consumption.
According to Norse (1992) the three estimates of the global population carrying
capacity would be much lower, if an average grain consumption of 800 kilograms
per year were applied. Baade's estimate would be more than 18 billion; Revelle's
would be 14 billion; and Gilland's would be 8.8 billion.
b"If we take world resources of agricultural land at 10.7 billion hectares of stan-
dard land equivalent, this could feed, at maximum standards, 47 billion people.
. .. For people living at Japanese standards offood consumption and Asian stan-
dards of timber requirements only 680 sq.m.jperson is required, and the world's
potential agricultural and forest land could supply the needs of 157 billion peo-
ple." See Clark (1967).
cMiickenhausen's estimate was based on a report of the US President's Science
Advisory Commitee in 1967 which analyzed the world's production capacity of
soils (US, 1967).
dThe FAOjUNFPAjIlASA study estimated the global population carrying ca-
pacity for 1975 and 2000 at three agricultural input levels (low, medium high).
For details see Appendix Tables 1 and 2 in Higgins et al. (1982).
e "The World Hunger Program at Brown University estimated that, with present
levels of food production and an equal distribution of food, the world could sus-
tain either 5.5 billion vegetarians, 3.7 billion people who get 15 percent of their
calories from animal products, ... or 2.8 billion people who derive 25 percent of
their calories from animal products" (Cohen, 1992).
Among other sources the author uses a compilation on "Estimates of Arable
Land: Past Studies" in Shah et al. (1985).
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became a popular book. It resolutely denied any limits to (pop-
ulation) growth; people were considered the "ultimate resource."
Today Beyond the Limits by Meadows et at. (1992) is a bestseller.
They argue that we have already passed the limits of sustainabil-
ity and are on the way to ecological disaster. In 1992 the World
Resources Institute published a wealth of data and analyses which
imply that we are already approaching ecological limits in many
sectors of our economies, including agriculture.
Most recently Ehrlich et al. (1993) analyzed the subject. Ac-
cording to their estimate it is "doubtful ... whether food security
could be achieved indefinitely for a global population of 10 or 12
billion people." They thought it "rather likely that a sustainable
population, one comfortable below Earth's nutritional capacity, will
number far fewer than today's 5.5 billion people." There are many
other studies, but probably the highest estimate of the globe's pop-
ulation carrying capacity was published by Marchetti (1978), who
argued that a world population of 1 trillion people would not be
impossible.
Obviously, these numbers are not much help to the student of
future population trends. One reason for the large discrepancies is
methodological divergences of the various approaches. Some authors
deal with global averages of carrying capacity; others study small
agro-ecological areas and only later aggregate the results. Some
authors base their estimates on the most advanced agricultural tech-
nology or assume future innovation; others define the carrying ca-
pacity in terms of current, and in some regions rather low, levels
of agricultural output. Biologists usually explain carrying capac-
ity as the balance between natural resources and the number of
people; social scientists consider human resources the critical factor
and accentuate social limits to growth. More systematically, we can
identify four reasons for the conceptual confusion: dissent about the
reference area, disagreement about the means of sustenance, contro-
versy on the mode of reaction to limitations, and confusion about
the time frame. We discuss some of these problems in detail in later
sections of this chapter. For now we can only conclude that there
are more dimensions to the problem than one would expect at first
sight. It seems to be necessary to combine the various aspects of the
earth's carrying capacity into a consistent theoretical framework.
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10.1 Dimensions of the Earth's
Carrying Capacity
Gerhard K. Heilig
To visualize the major dimensions of the problem, imagine a pipe
through which the earth's food resources have to pass before they
can be used for feeding people (see Figure 10.1). The diameter of
the pipe, however, is not constant. While it is quite large on the
"input" side, it is significantly smaller on the "output" end. The
pipe's stepwise decreasing diameter symbolizes different kinds of re-
strictions to the earth's carrying capacity - technological, economic,
ecological, and sociocultural.
10.1.1 The hypothetical maximum carrying capacity
On the input side of our conceptual pipe we have the theoretical
maximum of the earth's food production capacity. This purely hy-
pothetical measure is roughly equivalent to what biologists have
termed the net primary production (NPP) of the earth. The mea-
sure is based on the assumption that the ultimate limitation of food
production is given by the energy conversion ratio of photosynthe-
sis. This is the basic biochemical process by which green plants
transform solar radiation into biomass. Since we (roughly) know
the total solar radiation input of the earth, we can calculate the
globe's maximum biomass production, which quantifies the initial
product of all animal and human food chains.
The NPP is only restricted by physical constants, such as the
total solar radiation energy input of earth, and by natural laws that
govern the biochemical processes of plant growth.[2] In its most
extreme version the measure ignores not only economic, social, cul-
tural, and political restrictions offood production, but also technical
constraints and ecological feedback mechanisms. It assumes homo-
geneous implementation of most advanced agricultural technologies
throughout the world. Authors who have adopted this rather nar-
row definition of carrying capacity estimate the maximum world
population that can be sustained indefinitely into the future in the
range of 16 to 147 billion people, depending on the specific method
applied. [3] Marchetti's (1978) monstrous estimate of several trillion
carrying capacity of the earth is based on a similar approach.
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10.1.2 Technical and logistic restrictions and chances
The previous definition of carrying capacity assumes homogeneous
distribution and instantaneous implementation of (advanced) food
production technology. But this is impossible in reality. Even with
existing agricultural technologies we would need years before we
could use them throughout the world. They have to be adapted to
local conditions; they must be integrated with existing food dis-
tribution channels; and they often require previous implementa-
tion of service and support schemes. The production and distri-
bution of regionally adapted high-yield seeds, for instance, can take
years or decades. Also the breeding cycles in husbandry have to be
considered.
In addition to the usual delays in technology transfer, we have
to realize that advanced agricultural methods are primarily avail-
able for good-quality soils in temperate climates and for subtropical
and tropical irrigation cultures (such as Asian paddy rice crops).
In the arid and semiarid zones of Africa, however, we still have
traditional pastoral systems which survived quite well as long as
animal and human population density was low. But since the pop-
ulation has doubled or tripled, the socioecological system is out of
balance. The situation obviously requires new technology to increase
productivity of food production. However, we cannot be sure that
high-tech alternatives of animal husbandry, which could potentially
boost productivity by orders of magnitude, are adaptable to the hot
and dry climate. Current experiments are not too promising. It
is not impossible that there simply is no high-tech alternative to
traditional cattle ranging and primitive agriculture in certain parts
of the world. We are just beginning to apply scientific methods to
the management of arid and tropical soils, and it will probably take
years or decades before we have drought-resistant, high-yield crops
and livestock.
This indicates that the global carrying capacity is certainly
diminished by agro-technical and logistic restrictions and delays.
Some studies have tried to take this into account by defining dif-
ferent input levels for various agro-climatic regions. The FAG/
UNDP /HASA (1982) study, for instance, assumed three levels of
agricultural input which largely correspond to levels of technology.
How Many People Can Be Fed on Earth?
10.1.3 Economic barriers
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Nothing in the world is free. Also the implementation of advanced
agricultural technology and the expansion of agricultural areas into
previously unused land is costly. One needs investment capital, func-
tioning price mechanisms, adequate incentives for farmers, and a
whole set of other economic conditions and mechanisms to boost
food production for a world population of several billion. Current
estimates of a global carrying capacity usually ignore these economic
dimensions. However, in reality we find numerous economic diffi-
culties and limitations which could further restrict global carrying
capacity. On the other hand, few spheres in human life are capable
of generating more powerful incentives and driving forces than the
economy. Recent history has shown (for instance, in China) that
agriculture can modernize within a few years and double or triple
its productivity when the economic framework is right. Only few
studies have developed agricultural models that take into account
economic mechanisms, such as prices and (international) trade. Un-
fortunately these models are extremely complex and their method-
ology and assumptions are highly debatable (Parikh et al., 1988).
It is an illusion to believe that economic development is pre-
dictable for more than a few years. The fundamental changes in
global economic patterns, from the rise of the Asian Tigers (Tai-
wan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia) and the eco-
nomic boom in China to the total breakdown of Soviet and East
European economies, should have taught us a lesson. The economic
framework of agriculture is man-made and can be changed for the
better or the worse.
The earth's carrying capacity in the 21st century will be a mat-
ter of economic decisions at least to the same extent as it will be
a matter of sufficient natural resources. Three aspects are most
important: the conditions of international agricultural trade, the
dissemination of agricultural technology, and the implementation
of functioning incentive structures. We can strengthen or weaken
worldwide agricultural productivity, depending on what we do with
trade restrictions and food subsidies. We can speed up or slow down
agricultural modernization, depending on what we do with the re-
sults of agricultural research and development. We can block farm-
ers' initiative or encourage their entrepreneurial spirit, depending on
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how we arrange property rights, taxation, price mechanisms, access
to modern agricultural inputs, and education. The earth's carrying
capacity not only depends on natural conditions and technology, it
is also a function of specific economic arrangements.
10.1.4 Ecological constraints and feedback
mechanisms
Since agriculture and livestock production - as everything else -
is embedded into a natural environment, we also have to take into
account ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms, such as
acidification, soil loss, groundwater pollution, or desertification.
These consequences of intense agriculture and animal production
can gradually diminish returns. Some ecologists have argued that
the overutilization of arable land and forest areas in Europe and
North America has already degraded the soils to such an extent
that artificial fertilization and soil management techniques cannot
repair the damage.
However, there is more to the ecological perspective than the
necessary modification of production systems in order to minimize
harmful impact on the environment. For instance, we need to re-
serve space for the (still. remaining) fauna and flora, if we want to
avoid additional termination of whole strains of evolution. Keep-
ing biodiversity at a high level is not (only) a matter of aesthetics
and respect - a large pool of plant and animal genes could be a
primary resource for future bio-sciences. We must also reserve nat-
ural space for human recreation. The 10 billion world population
of the 21st century, cramped into multi-million urban agglomerates,
will certainly need some of the potential crop area for leisure activ-
ities, such as playing golf or riding a horse. Finally, a significant
proportion of our environment cannot be utilized for agriculture or
cattle ranging because it has vital functions in stabilizing the cli-
mate. Cutting down tropical rain forests for agricultural expansion
would probably backfire. It would trigger or speed up climate change
which could worsen agricultural conditions elsewhere and diminish
overall food production. These examples show that the ecologically
sustainable population maximum is certainly below a level that is
determined by physical laws, technological possibilities, or optimal
economic structures.
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10.1.5 Social, cultural, and political conditions
Some people believe that we just have to provide land, tractors,
high-yield seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, agricultural training, and
free markets to make a farmer highly efficient. This technocratic ap-
proach, however, ignores the social nature of man. We must realize
that probably the most serious restrictions for maximal utilization of
the earth's population carrying capacity arise from social, political,
and cultural conditions.
Social and cultural constraints which prevent optimal land uti-
lization can be found not only among traditional food collectors,
hunters, and cattle rangers of Africa and Asia. In many societies
we have political and social conditions which hinder farmers from
fully exploiting the carrying capacity of their land. In some cases
these restrictions are voluntary and based on ecological consider-
ations. For instance, a growing number of European farmers and
agricultural politicians have realized that maximizing food produc-
tion by means of agrochemistry and mechanization cannot be the
ultimate goal of agriculture. They begin to exclude land from cul-
tivation to make it available for natural reservations or recreational
purposes. In Germany, for instance, 911,576 hectares (or 7.8 per-
cent) of arable land was taken out of production between 1988-1989
and 1990-1991. In the new states of eastern Germany even 12.8
percent of the arable land was excluded from cultivation in 1990-
1991. There are similar trends in all European countries, especially
in Italy and France, where 357,922 and 113,922 hectares of land
were taken out of agricultural production (Bundesministerium fur
Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Stadtebau, 1991:62-64).
However, this noble self-restriction of agriculture (which is fa-
cilitated by substantial government subsidies) is rather untypical.
Usually, there are other, more unpleasant sociocultural and political
constraints. Many farmers throughout the world are working their
fields amid (civil) wars, suffer from lack of technology and modern
inputs, or are restricted by ridiculously low producer prices or mar-
ket regulations. They are forced into collectivization by fanatical
bureaucrats, and their children are deprived of adequate education
and training. These kinds of sociocultural and political constraints
probably restrict the carrying capacity of the earth much more than
anything else.
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To my knowledge there is no estimate of carrying capacity which
takes into account all five kinds of restrictions. Scientists partic-
ularly shy away from addressing sociocultural and political con-
straints. Usually, the concept is defined in terms of natural resources
available for food production at a given level of agricultural technol-
ogy. This reflects widespread ignorance of key factors - economic,
social, cultural, and political - that limit food production. In Sec-
tion 10.2 we examine the multiple dimensions of the earth's carrying
capacity in greater detail.
10.2 Natural Resources
According to our pipe concept of carrying capacity, natural con-
ditions (such as the globe's solar radiation input) and basic bio-
chemical processes (such as photosynthesis) ultimately determine
the earth's food production potential. If we could transform the
total solar energy input of the earth into biomass - and if we could
eat this biomass - we could probably feed 1 trillion people. But this
is just a theoretical exercise (which we discuss later). For all practi-
cal purposes we have to consider real agro-climatic conditions. Four
natural resources and conditions directly limit the globe's carrying
capacity: land, water, climate, and fossil energy.
10.2.1 Land
Since the beginning of the debate on the globe's carrying capacity,
the land factor has usually been considered a limitation for increas-
ing food production. The world's land area is, undoubtedly, limited,
and only a small proportion is suitable for agriculture (Table 10.2).
Many physical and chemical constraints restrict the arable area -
some land is too steep or too shallow, other areas have drainage
or tillage problems. There are serious constraints of soil fertility,
such as low nutrient retention capacity, aluminum toxicity, phos-
phorus fixations hazards, low potassium reserves, or excess of salts
or sodium.
Both in its 1990-1991 and 1992-1993 reports on world resources,
the World Resources Institute (WRI) published detailed estimates
of these physical and chemical soil constraints by climatic class for
major regions and on a country-by-country basis. The estimates in
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Table 10.2. Cropland in percent of land without soil constraints,
25 highest and lowest, in 1989.
Country
Lesotho
Malaysia
Lao PDR
Thailand
Burundi
Mauritius
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Syrian Arab Rep.
Vietnam
Uganda
Bangladesh
Benin
Lebanon
India
Cote d 'Ivoire
Brazil
Togo
Cambodia
Nigeria
Pakistan
Cuba
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Mexico
Kenya
Argentina
Botswana
Sudan
Peru
Somalia
Bolivia
Uruguay
Kuwait
Egypt
Chad
Niger
Namibia
Mali
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Yemen, PDR
Oman
United Arab Emirates
Albania
Mauritania
Land
Popu- Land Crop- without soil Cropland in %
lation area land Constraints of land without
(1000) (1000 ha) (1000 ha) (1000 ha) soil constraints
1724 3035 320 1 32000.0
8451 32855 4880 196 2489.8
4024 23080 901 37 2435.1
54857 51089 22126 983 2250.9
5315 2565 1336 66 2024.2
1069 185 106 7 1514.3
6994 2467 1153 91 1267.0
4049 7162 1801 187 963.1
12085 18406 5503 643 855.8
65276 32549 6600 989 667.3
18118 19955 6705 1210 554.1
112548 13017 9292 1719 540.5
4493 11062 1860 360 516.7
2694 1023 301 59 510.2
835610 297319 168990 33232 508.5
11552 31800 3660 730 501.4
147283845651 78650 17081 460.5
3424 5439 1444 319 452.7
8044 17652 3056 695 439.7
105015 91077 31335 7797 401.9
118476 77088 20730 5250 394.9
10500 10982 3329 888 374.9
11453 46540 7008 1949 359.6
47942 110100 13930 30079 46.3
86672 190869 24710 55930 44.2
23187 56969 2428 7342 33.1
31914273669 35750 111781 32.0
1256 56673 1380 4792 28.8
24487 237600 12510 50390 24.8
21105 128000 3730 15264 24.4
7257 62734 1039 4519 23.0
7115 108439 3460 15415 22.4
3077 17481 1304 6100 21.4
1971 1782 4 31 12.9
51186 99545 2585 24633 10.5
5539 125920 3205 34160 9.4
7492 126670 3605 41388 8.7
1725 82329 662 9308 7.1
8938 122019 2093 40865 5.1
4382 175954 2150 54004 4.0
13585 214969 1185 30579 3.9
2416 33297 119 3870 3.1
1446 21246 48 3897 1.2
1538 8360 39 3707 1.1
3186 2740 707 96958 0.7
1970 102522 199 58867 0.3
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this discussion are from the 1992-1993 WRI report and are based
on a complex methodology, which combines the Fertility Capabil-
ity Classification (FCC) system developed at North Carolina State
University (Sanches et ai., 1982), agro-climatic data from FAO's
Agro-Ecological Zones project (FAO 1978a, 1978b, 1981a, 1981b),
and the FAO/UNESCO soil map of the world.
The estimates are shocking. The most seriously handicapped
region is Southeast Asia: more than 93 percent of the soils have
physical or chemical constraints. The situation is not much better
in Southwest Asia: only 12 percent of the soils are free of inherent
fertility constraints. In South America 80 percent and in Africa 82
percent of the soils have constraints. Central America is a little bet-
ter: "only" 73 percent of the soils are hampered by physical or chem-
ical restrictions (World Resources Institute/United Nations En-
vironment Programme/United Nations Development Programme,
1990:286-287).[4J On a country-by-country basis the estimates are
even more dramatic. For India, the WRI reports just 33.2 million
hectares of unconstrained soils; this would be equivalent to just 0.04
hectares (or 400 square meters) per person. Bangladesh's uncon-
strained soil resources would be even less: only 0.02 hectares per
person. Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia would have from
0.4 to 0.6 hectares per person of soil without inherent physical or
chemical constraints.
What do these statistics indicate? The WRI reports that "the
extent of land with soil constraints is an important indicator of
agricultural costs, the potential and success of future expansion [em-
phasis added], and the comparative advantage of a nation's agricul-
tural production" (World Resources Institute/United Nations En-
vironment Programme/United Nations Development Programme,
1990:289).
The WRI further explains that "in the past 10 years, the FCC
system has proven a meaningful tool for describing fertility limita-
tions on crop yields" (ibid:289). Do the estimates - in other words -
indicate that we are already short offertile soils for future expansion
of food production?
Not at all! First, one has to read the footnotes attached to the
WRI tables. Here we find a few hints that explain what is meant by
the various soil constraints. It turns out that most of the so-called
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constraints are just specific natural conditions that can be somewhat
easily overcome with modern agricultural technology. Consider the
case of soils with "low potassium reserves" which constrain crops
because of potassium deficiency. There is a simple solution: throw
potassium fertilizer on them! Other examples of soil constraints are
"steep slopes" or "drainage problems": would one think that many
of these soils can be found in the extremely productive paddy rice
and wheat areas of Asia, where agriculture in some places has been
practiced for more than 8000 years (as in China)? "Aluminum toxi-
city" is also a so-called constraints that turn out to be less dramatic
than its name: it limits the growth of common crops, "unless lime is
applied" (World Resources Institute/United Nations Environment
Programme/United Nations Development Programme, 1992:284)-
a practice that should not be completely impossible.
There are, of course, serious soil constraints that cannot be over-
come by technology, but the WRI data do not distinguish between
these and simple problems of soil management. For thousands of
years farmers had to cope with soils that were less than perfect.
They had to build terraces, add (natural) fertilizers, irrigate or drain
the soil. But this did not hinder them from supplying some of the
most prominent empires of history, such as the dynasties of China
or the kingdoms of ancient Egypt.
There is a second reason why the WRI data on soil constraints
are worthless as indicators of the earth's carrying capacity: they
do not match with current trends in food production - to be more
precise, in some cases the indicators are just absurd when compared
with agricultural performance. For instance, according to the WRI
the continent-size nation of India has only 33.2 million hectares of
internally unconstrained soils, but FAa reports that India's farmers
are cultivating some 169 million hectares of cropland - which is five
times the area of "unconstrained soils" (cropland equals arable land
plus land under permanent crops). In other words, according to the
WRI most of India's farmers are producing on marginal land, which
should limit crop yields. But just the opposite has happened during
the past 30 years. Between 1961 and 1989 India's farmers increased
cereal production by a spectacular 129 percent (from 87,376,000 to
199,816,000 tons). They also increased the cereal yields from 947
to 1,921 kg per hectare area harvested. In Thailand just 983,000
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hectares are free of soil constraints, according to WRI data. Is
it not strange that the country's farmers actually cultivated 22.1
million hectares of cropland - nearly 23 times the area of the un-
constrained soils? Only the rice area harvested was 10 times the size
of the unconstrained soils area. Thailand's farmers also managed to
increase cereal production by 131 percent between 1961 and 1989.
Most absurd are the estimates of soil constraints for Malaysia. Ac-
cording to WRI data only 0.6 percent (or 196,000 hectares) of the
country's land area is covered by unconstrained soils. Obviously
this did not have a great effect on the country's farmers, who culti-
vated 4.9 million hectares of cropland in 1989 - 25 times the area of
unconstrained soils. It also did not affect their productivity, since
they managed to increase cereal production by 62 percent between
1961 and 1989. These are only a few examples. We can find a
large number of countries where the farmers expanded cultivation
far into the area of so-called constrained soils, while at the same
time substantially increasing crop yields.
There is a third reason why WRI's soil data have limited rele-
vance: a high percentage of unconstrained soils in a country does
not correlate with good agricultural performance. For example, ac-
cording to the WRI, Chad has one of the largest areas of excellent
soils - 34.2 million hectares have no inherent physical or chemical
constraints, an opulent 6.2 hectares per person. Is it not strange
that the farmers use less than 10 percent of this area for cultivation
and that famines are notorious in a place with one of the largest per
capita resources of first-rate soils? This is not just an isolated case.
According to WRI data, nearly all typical famine countries of Africa
(Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali) have huge areas of top-rated soils
which are many times the size of their actual cropland.
Given these examples it is obvious that factors other than soil
quality by itself are responsible for agricultural performance. There
is simply no correlation between food production and soil constraints
as reported by the WRI.
On the other hand, we have a large number of agricultural tech-
niques available that could help to either expand the arable land and
increase yields on marginal soils or improve the overall efficiency of
crop production.
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First, we could expand the area of multiple harvests. In many
places farmers could use their land several times during a grow-
ing season instead of only once or twice. Modern seeds, advanced
agricultural technology, artificial fertilizers, and other agricultural
inputs have made these techniques of multi-cropping possible. It is
a myth that we are already overutilizing the world's arable land.
This is only true in some European and Asian regions. Large parts
of Latin America and Africa have excellent soils which are still cul-
tivated with most primitive agricultural technology. Crop yields are
often 60 to 90 percent below the average European level. Better in-
puts and modern agricultural methods could substantially expand
the area of multiple harvests.
Second, we could expand cultivation to marginal land. There is
still plenty of dry land that could be irrigated, swamps that could
be drained, steep hills which could be terraced. We could cover
land with greenhouses in cold regions or use forests for multilay-
ered cultivation. It is also possible to convert shallow seas into
agricultural land. The Netherlands have demonstrated that even
in an adverse climate one can produce more than enough (tropical)
fruits and vegetables on artificially climatized and drained land. In
most countries it was not necessary to increase arable land dur-
ing the past decades, but some agricultures have demonstrated that
a spectacular expansion of cultivation is still possible. Libya, for
instance, has converted desert into circles of irrigated cropland; be-
tween 1961 and 1989 its area of irrigated agriculture nearly doubled
from 121,000 to 242,000 hectares (Allan, 1976). Burundi, which is
already densely populated, managed to increase its arable land from
765,000 to 1,120,000 hectares and the area of irrigated agriculture
from 3,000 to 72,000 hectares. Tanzania nearly doubled its arable
land and increased the irrigated agriculture more than seven times.
There are still spectacular land reserves in parts of Africa and Latin
America. Of course, some of these expansions are rather absurd in
terms of energy efficiency or economic costs; one might even con-
sider the idea of growing wheat in the desert a form of hypocrisy.
But these cases show what could be done in agriculture if money
and technology were accessible and environmental concerns could
be ignored.
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Third, we can expand food production areas to the water bod-
ies of our globe - lakes, rivers, and seas (Sindermann, 1982). While
there is certainly a danger of exploiting the natural fish population
of the sea, efforts are being made to begin exploring the potential
of fish farming. There is already some fish farming on the northern
coast of England, in Norwegian fjords, along the coast of Sweden,
and in Chinese paddy rice fields. A significant proportion of Eu-
rope's salmon supply is produced in fish farms near the Shetland
Islands. But these are still small production sites compared with
the huge coastal zones of our continents. It has been argued that
large-scale fish-farming schemes might disturb the natural balance
of the maritime ecosystem, which, in turn, could limit its produc-
tion potential (Uthoff, 1978; UNO/FAD, 1976). However, recent
research has found only a minimal risk of local sea pollution caused
by a discharge of nutrients in intense fish farming (Ackefors and
Enell, 1990).
Fourth, we can switch from nonfood to food crops. Currently, a
significant proportion of fertile land is used not for food production
in a narrow sense, but to grow lifestyle-related cash crops, such as
tobacco, tea, cocoa, or coffee. It is hard to estimate the areas wasted
for the illegal cultivation of drugs (marijuana, coca, etc.), but it
must be substantial. Farmers also spend arable land for producing
natural fibers, such as jute, flax, or sisal - nonfood products for
which synthetic substitutes are available. In some countries, such
as Brazil, there is substantial energy-cropping (sugar cane), and
some European governments encourage farmers to grow rape seed
and produce bio-fuel. In some countries (Italy, Spain) large areas are
used to grow wine. And -last but not least - we spend considerable
amounts of land to produce hops, which is mainly used for brewing
beer. According to FAD statistics, it is quite likely that some 20
percent of all arable land worldwide is used to produce nonfood or
lifestyle-related products, including drugs (see Table 10.3).
Previously it was thought that a given plot of land can only
feed a fixed number of people. Later, scientists realized that it is
not only the size and natural quality of the land, but mainly the
level of agricultural technology which determines the land's food
production capacity. This basic understanding is still rare among
today's environmental doomsdayers, such as the World Resources
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Table 10.3. Lifestyle-related and nonfood agricultural production.
Area harvested In % of total
(1000 hal Growth (%) arable land
1961 1990 1961-1990 1961 1990
Drugs (marijuana, coca) ? ? ? ? ?
Wine ? ? ? ? ?
Tobacco leaves 3,397 4,629 36.6 0.3 0.3
Hopsa 55 79 43.6 0.0 0.0
Tea 1,318 2,442 85.3 0.1 0.2
Coffee 9,706 11,241 15.8 0.8 0.8
Cocoa beans 4,100 5,312 29.6 0.3 0.4
Sugar beets 6,917 8,656 25.1 0.6 0.6
Sugar cane 8,914 17,120 92.1 0.7 1.3
Flax fiber 2,041 1,113 -45.5 0.2 0.1
Hemp fiber 685 233 -66.0 0.1 0.0
Jute, jutelike fibers 2,629 2,218 -15.6 0.2 0.2
Linseed 7,615 4,078 -46.4 0.6 0.3
Rape seeda 6,277 17,588 180.2 0.5 1.3
Sunflower seed 6,667 16,913 153.7 0.5 1.3
Seed cottona 31,897 32,984 3.4 2.5 2.4
Sesame seeda 5,051 6,336 25.4 0.4 0.5
Soybeans 23,806 56,351 136.7 1.9 4.2
Castor beans 1,233 1,657 34.4 0.1 0.1
Groundnuts 16,641 20,135 21.0 1.3 1.5
Total 138,949 209,085 50.5 11.1 15.5
a1961-1991.
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization, 1994: PC-AGROSTAT, Rome.
Institute. They continue to focus their attention on the physical
conditions of soils, collecting ever-more detailed inventories of soil
characteristics. But they are obviously blind to the fact that these
characteristics are becoming relevant. The size and quality of soils
are just two variables in a multiterm equation of agricultural pro-
ductivity, which is mainly determined by technological, economic,
sociocultural, and political factors.
10.2.2 Water
Some experts have argued that it is not land, but water which is the
critical resource for the global carrying capacity (Riviere, 1989). The
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most prominent Cassandra of a world water crisis is Malin Falken-
mark. She has argued that "water scarcity [is] now threatening
two-thirds of the African population" (Falkenmark, 1989:118). Her
pessimism, however, is not shared by prominent hydrologists who
have collected detailed water resource inventories for Africa. Al-
most three dozen water experts, assisted by five major hydrological
institutes, contributed to a UN publication which concluded:
There is almost nowhere in Africa where groundwater is not found
at one depth or another. . .. Mineral-water and thermo-mineral
springs abound in the African continent in the fracture zones.
They constitute a major potential resource which has been ex-
plored and exploited in only a few places. [UN, 1988:13-14]
Other water experts have raised the argument that we should
not confuse man-induced regional or local water shortages with
climate-related resource scarcity (Bandyopadhyay, 1989).
Globally around 70 percent of all water withdrawal is used in
agriculture (Table 10.4). This explains why the water situation
is, in fact, important to the food production capacity of the earth.
There are also some reasons for concern. Available statistics confirm
that in some river basins, freshwater is being extracted for human
use (including agriculture) at rates approaching those at which the
supply is renewed. In particular, Egypt is probably on the brink of
a water crisis. The country's renewable freshwater resources include
some 58.3 km3 , of which 56.5 km3 are from the Nile's annual flow and
1.8 km3 from other internal renewable resources. Some 97 percent of
these resources (or 56.4 km3 ) are already being withdrawn. Egypt's
agriculture needs 49.6 km3 of water. Only 2.8 km3 are used in
industry, and the withdrawal for domestic purposes is about 3.9
km 3 .
Libya's agriculture might also be limited by extreme water
shortages. According to recent estimates the country has a renew-
able freshwater resource of some 0.7 km3 per year - mostly from
underground aquifers. Libya's annual withdrawal, however, is esti-
mated at 2.83 km3 - which is four times the rate of natural replace-
ment. Some 75 percent of this unsustainable withdrawal is used in
agriculture. The country's spectacular increase of grain production
is obviously borrowed from future generations.
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Another interesting case is Saudi Arabia. Since 1961 the desert
country has increased its wheat production by a spectacular 4706
percent, from merely 85,000 to 4,000,000 metric tons. Today, the
country's farmers are not only able to provide more than 35 percent
of the domestic food supply - which is a spectacular achievement
in itself - but they actually produce more grain than the country
needs. In 1991 Saudi Arabia's net export of wheat was 1,805,000
metric tons, as compared with a net import of 67,600 metric tons
in 1974. Ecologists have argued that the bumper harvests were
mainly achieved by exploiting fossil - that is nonrenewable ~ water
resources below the desert. They estimate that in 1988 the country
withdrew some 20.5 km3 of water, 90 percent from nonrenewable
fossil groundwater aquifers. They also estimate that Saudi Arabia's
agriculture needs 90 percent of the water available, with 35 percent
of the agricultural water consumption being used in wheat produc-
tion. According to the Middle East Economic Digest (Hopes dry
up ... , 1989:15), which cites a confidential US Government agency
report, at the current rate of depletion Saudi Arabia's fossil ground-
water would be exhausted by 2007.
Many authors have argued that Africa is a parched continent
(Pearce, 1991). The most pessimistic position maintains that by
the year 2000, Tunisia, Kenya, Malawi, Burundi, and Rwanda will
suffer a permanent water crisis (Falkenmark, 1989:116).
There is also much concern about the arid regions of the north
China plain. According to recent calculations by the World Re-
sources Institute, the 200 million population is already exploiting
the freshwater resources to a large extent. The WRI concludes that
"if present trends continue, the region will have 6 percent less water
than needed by the end of the century" (World Resources Insti-
tute/United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations De-
velopment Programme, 1992:163). These examples certainly seem
to confirm the conclusion that water is a critical factor for limiting
global carrying capacity, but there is also empirical evidence that
does not fit into the pessimistic outlook.
According to the most recent estimate the earth's total annual
freshwater resource is some 40,673 km3 . The annual agricultural
withdrawal is about 2,236 km3 , which is less than 6 percent of
the globe's renewable water. Worldwide industrial and domestic
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water consumption together account for another 995 km3 , or just
2.5 percent of the total water resource (World Resources Insti-
tute/United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations De-
velopment Programme, 1992:328). It is hard to imagine that we are
approaching global limits of freshwater withdrawal when more than
92 percent of the known reserves are still untouched.
If there is no scarcity at the global level, the uneven regional
distribution of resources might be the problem. Africa is frequently
considered an example of continentwide agricultural stagnation -
triggered, or at least intensified, by water scarcity (Falkenmark,
1991). Available statistics, however, do not confirm this theory.
Africa has 4,184 km3 of annual internal renewable water resources,
which was nearly 6,500 m3 per person per year in 1990. This is
almost five times the per capita freshwater availability of West Ger-
many, which was only 1,300 m3 . Moreover, Africa's freshwater is
not only located in the tropical areas, as one might suspect. There
are large reserves all over the continent: famine ridden Somalia has
more than twice the per capita internal freshwater resource of the
Netherlands (1,520 versus 680 m3 ).[5] The "arid" Chad has internal
freshwater sources of 6,760 m3 per person - more than three times
the per capita water resource of the rainy United Kingdom (which
is only 2,110 m3 ). In Angola there are 15,770 m3 of freshwater for
each person - nearly 28 times more than, for instance, in Hungary,
which has just 570 m3 available.
There is also more than enough freshwater in South America.
The total resource is estimated at 10,377 km3 which is equivalent
to the combined renewable water resources of Europe, the whole
(former) Soviet Union, and Africa. On average, each inhabitant
of South America has potential access to 34,960 m3 of freshwater,
which is 7.5 times more than in Europe. All large South American
nations have abundant per capita freshwater resources, ranging from
18,860 m3 in Uruguay to 43,370 m3 in Venezuela (which is many
times the typical ratio for Europe, Asia, or the USA). Only Peru is
somewhat "shorter" in freshwater: 1,790 m3 per person are available
- a still abundant amount, however, if compared with the 850 m3
of Belgium's internal renewable water resource.
The situation in North America and Central America is mixed:
very large resources in Canada, more limited resources on the
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Caribbean Islands. However, there is no indication that freshwater
resources are running out in the region. Mexico, for instance, has
larger internal freshwater resources than Italy: 4,030 versus 3,130
m3 per person per year.
The freshwater resources of Asian countries are very different.
At the national level, China has enough water - 2,470 m3 per person
per year.[6] India, Pakistan, and Thailand have a little less (2,170,
2,430, and 1,970 m3 per person per year, respectively), but are far
from critical. There is abundant freshwater in Indonesia (14,020
m3 ), Bangladesh (11,740 m3 ), and Malaysia (2,630 m3 ).
An interesting indicator of water stress is the proportion of an-
nual withdrawals from available resources. In 51 countries the an-
nual withdrawals are equal to or less than 1 percent of the renewable
freshwater resources - including populous nations such as Indonesia,
Brazil, and Nigeria. China uses 16 percent of its annual freshwater
resource; India, 18 percent; Kenya, just 7 percent. In all of Africa,
including the drought-affected Sahel, only three countries extract
more than 50 percent of their annual freshwater resource, namely,
Egypt (90 percent), Libya (404 percent), and Tunisia (53 percent).
Most African countries are extracting less than 3 percent of their
resources. In South America the highest extraction is reported from
Peru: a mere 15 percent. All other South American nations have
not even touched their renewable water reserves - they use typi-
cally less than 2 percent. Even in Asia, where the situation is a
little tighter, extraction rates typically range between 1 and 30 per-
cent. Only Afghanistan, Israel, and Cyprus have extraction rates of
more than 50 percent. For these countries the situation is certainly
serious. Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia are also critical. The real
"dramatic" cases, however, are only a small number of states of the
Arabian Peninsula: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen. They are all withdrawing water at much higher rates
than those at which their resource is renewed.
These statistics indicate that at the national level only a very
small number of countries are facing water resources shortages. On
the other hand, local or regional water shortages are well known, as
well as strong seasonal variation of availability. It is also obvious
that groundwater pollution is a major problem in some places, such
as in very intensely used agricultural or industrial areas. Can we
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solve these water problems, or will they impose serious restrictions
on the world's agricultural production? To answer these questions
three aspects have to be taken into account.
First, with a 10 to 15 billion world population there is no al-
ternative to the implementation of (advanced) water management
and exploitation technologies. It will also be necessary to find po-
litical solutions for water conflicts. But this is nothing new. Water
- as well as air - has always been a natural resource that must be
managed. No one knew this better than the ancient civilizations
along the Nile or in the desert. They developed highly sophisticated
methods of water exploitation, storage, distribution, and conserva-
tion. We tend to forget that large irrigation systems were built in
the Middle East some 4,000 to 5,000 years ago and that during the
Roman Empire the capital city could flourish only because it was
supplied with water through aqueducts across hundreds of miles.
We have to advance these methods (Meybeck et at., 1990). Most
likely it will be necessary to pump freshwater to agricultural areas
over long distances (such as from northern United States to south-
ern California); we certainly will have to settle conflicts over limited
water resources between neighboring countries (such as between Is-
rael and Lebanon); some islands (such as Malta) and some densely
populated agricultural regions (such as northern China) will require
the implementation of advanced water conservation and recycling
schemes. These methods are not impossible, and they have proved
to be successful in the past.
Second, we have to understand that water use is essentially a
recycling process: frequently water is just moved through biological
and technical systems for cleaning or as some kind of biological cat-
alyst. Much of the freshwater withdrawal (especially in agriculture)
is not consumed, but directly returned to a river or underground
aquifer. From there it can be used several times before it finally
reaches the sea. We usually do not consume water in the same way
we exploit fossil fuels or scarce minerals. These natural resources
have a much lower recycling rate than water - they are actually de-
stroyed or at least removed from natural cycles for a very long time
through human consumption. Consumptive uses of water, such as
the evaporation from industrial cooling towers and irrigation sys-
tems, make up only a small proportion of water withdrawal. The
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real water problem is not its natural scarcity, but the pollution we
add to the returning flows and the carelessness with which we use
freshwater in households, industries, and agriculture.
Finally, both industries and private households have already
caused serious local or regional water contamination. Unfortunately,
high-tech agriculture itself is a major polluter of groundwater and
river flows (Biswas, 1993). In some intensively cultivated agricul-
tural areas of Europe the excessive use of fertilizers has raised the
nitrate concentration in groundwater to dangerously high levels. We
can also observe pesticide contamination of freshwater resources in
some areas of North America and Europe (Hallberg, 1989; Leistra
and Boesten, 1989). An increase in food production could easily
lead to further deterioration of water resources. On the other hand,
this trend is not inevitable. All experts agree that there is still a
huge potential for improving the efficiency of fertilizer use, irriga-
tion, water treatment, and recycling (Biswas and Arar, 1988). Much
has already been done to clean lakes and rivers in Europe. Twenty-
five years ago the lakes in southern Germany frequently had to be
closed to swimmers because of pollution with coli bacteria; today
one could drink the water. European farmers have also realized the
danger of overfertilization. Contrary to popular belief they have not
increased nitrogen fertilizer application per hectare of arable land
during the past 10 years.
On the basis of these considerations we cannot see water as a
serious limitation for the globe's carrying capacity. No doubt, there
are nations with rather limited resources. As well, local or regional
shortages will require expensive water infrastructures. However, the
only dramatic shortages can be found in a small number of desert
states of North Africa and West Asia. Most of these countries are
enormously wealthy oil exporters that could artificially "produce"
water for their unconventional high-tech agriculture - in fact, this is
what they are doing with the highest density of desalination plants
in the world. But is the natural water scarcity of some oil billionaires
really worth the concern?
10.2.3 Climate
The globe's food production potential certainly depends on the cli-
mate. The annual fluxes of precipitation and evapotranspiration
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which determine the potential water supply available for human ex-
ploitation (runoff) vary greatly by region. They are much higher at
the equator than in the arid or semiarid regions around the latitudes
of 40° north or 30° south (Baumgartner and Reichel, 1975). The
vast deserts and arid lands of Asia and Africa that have emerged
from these climatic conditions are certainly among the most hos-
tile environments for agriculture on earth. The lowest precipitation
and evapotranspiration, and consequently the lowest potential water
supply for human exploitation, can be found at the poles.
The spatial pattern of the global water cycle not only influ-
ences the water supply for rainfed agriculture, but also determines
variations in the flux of solar radiation energy, which is the fuel of
photosynthesis - the basic process of plant growth. In the arid or
semiarid mid-latitudes of low precipitation, cloud cover is rare or
absent so that less solar radiation is absorbed or reflected. Conse-
quently, insolation in these regions is some 20 percent higher than
at the equator, where one would expect the highest solar energy flux
(Stanhill, 1983). Since there is also a low level of actual evapora-
tion in these arid zones, the solar energy input mainly heats up the
ground and the air, which further increases the region's water deficit
and worsens environmental conditions for agriculture.
It is not only the (absolute) shortage of water and the high
temperatures in arid and semiarid regions that make agriculture
difficult or impossible. There is also the interannual variation in
precipitation, which is typically three or four times greater in these
regions than in temperate regions. This high climatic variability
explains why the desert can widen and narrow in an unpredictable
temporal pattern. During the early 1970s we experienced a global
redistribution of rainfall which led to the 1970-1972 Sahel drought
and contributed to widespread famines in the Sahel and Ethiopia.
The bioclimatic zones of the Sahel moved to the south and expanded
the area of high desertification risk.
During the 1970s and 1980s many authors considered desertifi-
cation - triggered by climate variation - a major cause of declining
food production potential in large parts of Africa and Asia. But
there is no general consensus. Other scientists reported evidence
for a major anthropogenic component in the desertification process
(Garcia, 1981; Rubenson, 1991; Kiros, 1991). We also have to take
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into account that the transformation from arid and semiarid lands
to desert during the Sahel drought was (at least partially) compen-
sated by higher precipitation north of the Sahara (Stanhill, 1989).
There is still a debate over whether the total desert area really ex-
panded or just shifted southward into densely populated and more
intensely cultivated areas, causing serious famines.
There is also evidence that the climatic risk of desertification in
the arid and semiarid regions of Africa is amplified by unsustainable
practices of agriculture, deforestation, and cattle ranging in this re-
gion. According to some authors, human mismanagement of land
resources are major factors of desertification in the African Sahel
(Stanhill, 1989). Finally, climate data show that the drought was
not restricted to the famine areas of the Sahel. Much higher pre-
cipitation anomalies were observed during the same period in Asia
and south of the equator. The absence of serious famines in these
regions indicates that factors other than climatic conditions must
have caused the great African famines (Lamb, 1982).
Climate conditions are certainly important factors restricting
the area of profitable agriculture, but this does not mean that we
are totally dependent on them. We can grow tropical fruits in cold
climates or wheat in the desert. We can heat or cool, irrigate or
drain cultures. This is a matter of technology, food prices, and
investment capital. Of course, farmers are still restricted by natural
conditions, such as soils or climates, but they have also made great
steps toward reducing their dependence. Between 1961 and 1990
Finland, which certainly does not have the most favorable climate
for agriculture, increased its total production of cereals from 1.94
to 4.30 million tons (by almost doubling average yields from 1.88 to
3.54 tons per hectare).
Farmers in Sweden and Norway could also achieve spectacular
increases of cereal production. By comparison, climatically priv-
ileged Argentina only increased its cereal yields from 1.41 to 2.22
tons per hectare, and Brazil's farmers could only improve yields from
1.35 to 1.76 tons per hectare. Obviously, there must be important
conditions other than climate (and soils) which determine agricul-
tural output. As we discuss in Section 10.3, agricultural technology
plays a major role in agricultural output.
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10.2.4 Fossil energy input
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Most experts agree that we could boost food production in many de-
veloping regions if we modernize agriculture. Crop yields in Africa
and Latin America are frequently 70 to 80 percent below the Eu-
ropean average. Modern agricultural inputs, such as nitrogenous
fertilizers, irrigation, pesticides, and agricultural machinery, could
easily double or triple the output. There is no doubt that nitrogen
fertilizer production has to increase substantially to meet the food
demand of the rapidly growing Third World population. Recently it
was estimated that, until the year 2000, world nitrogen production
must increase by 15 million tons, which is equivalent to the output
of 10 large new plants each year (Constant and Sheldrick, 1992:115).
With modern technology after-harvest losses could also be reduced.
These losses are substantial in many developing countries. This
modernization, however, is linked to one basic factor: commercial
energy. Therefore, some authors have argued that (fossil) energy is
the limiting factor for the global carrying capacity.[7]
However, available statistics and research on energy consump-
tion in agriculture give no indication that fossil energy will be a
limiting factor for agricultural modernization. Modern agriculture
does not consume large amounts of commercial energy. On average,
just 3 percent of worldwide fossil energy consumption is used in
agriculture, and less than 1 percent is needed for the production of
(nitrogenous) fertilizers (Smil, 1987). Most likely it takes more fossil
energy to fly the doomsday advocates of the global food problem to
their many international conferences than it would cost to produce
adequate amounts of crop nutrients, pesticides, and fungicides for
the stagnating agricultures in Africa and Latin America.
Some critics have rejected agricultural modernization as an op-
tion for increasing global food production on the basis of its suppos-
edly high consumption of fossil energy. They obviously misunder-
stand energy statistics which indicate that some 70 to 80 percent
of all commercial energy is used in the food sector. While these
numbers might certainly be correct, they only indicate the overall
fossil energy consumption in human food chains. Most of this en-
ergy, however, is not spent in agriculture, but used for packaging,
cleaning, transport, conservation, bottling, canning, refrigeration,
and preparation of food. We spend enormous amounts of fossil
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energy for post-harvest processing of food and for running a most
energy-consuming international food distribution network (Heilig,
1993). We have accepted the preposterous situation that, for in-
stance, French or Austrian mineral water is bottled and shipped to
the USA or Australia - completely unaware of the fact that a huge
amount of fossil energy is needed to produce the bottles and ship
the water halfway around the globe. Most of the energy consump-
tion in the food sector has nothing to do with agriculture, but with
lifestyles, trade regulations, state subsidies, or marketing strategies.
If we would discontinue only the most absurd practices in the food
processing and distribution sector, we could save much more fossil
energy than is needed for modernization of agricultures in develop-
ing countries.
10.2.5 Conclusion: Are the natural resources limited?
If we take into account the creative potential of man, there is no
foreseeable limitation to the basic natural resources of food produc-
tion, which are space, water, climate conditions, solar energy, and
man-made inputs. All these resources are either unlimited or can be
expanded, better utilized, or redesigned to a very large extent. This
might be the reason why several experts have denied any upper limit
to population growth. The notion of "physical limits to growth" is
a faulty concept. It makes it easy for agricultural technocrats to
deny any basic problems in boosting the world food supply. Bet-
ter arguments must be found to convince people that global food
production may be limited.
10.3 Technical Limitations and Chances
Technology is certainly one of the most important determinants of
the earth's carrying capacity. If the human race would have failed to
invent agriculture some 10,000 years ago, only a few million people
could have survived on this planet as hunters and gatherers. Cut
and burn agriculture, which was the next step in the evolution of
human sustenance, lifted the carrying capacity to at least twice or
three times the level of primitive food collectors (Pimentel, 1984:4).
The invention of soil cultivation and animal husbandry in stable
settlements, which was the first agricultural revolution, prepared
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the way for the empires at the Nile, Euphrates, and Tigris and
along the great Asian rivers.
Since World War II, the second - chemo-technological - revolu-
tion of agriculture has established a new level of sustenance. We are
certainly capable of producing enough food for a world population
of 5 to 6 billion; in fact we are facing severe problems of overproduc-
tion. Now, the important question is whether technologies will be
available that could further increase the earth's carrying capacity?
And what are the restrictions and risks for their implementation?
10.3.1 Chances
Despite nearly hysterical criticism by some scholars, only the appli-
cation of modern technology to agriculture will provide the necessary
tools for increasing the earth's carrying capacity. Of course, we are
not talking about simple-minded high-input agriculture which - for
the sake of short-term increase of yields - would degrade soils, pol-
lute groundwater, or harm the environment in some other way. We
are talking about the numerous technical options that could improve
yields, while at the same time reduce the environmental impact of
agriculture. In general these technical options would be targeted
to improve energy and water efficiency, refertilize exhausted soils,
or minimize pesticide application. They would optimize crop rota-
tion, adapt cultivation methods to local soil conditions, or prevent
adverse effects of large-scale irrigation.
10.3.2 Fertilizer application
Many people are not aware that in some developing countries there
is a threat to the environment, not because of too much use of mod-
ern technology, but because of too little. A case in point is fertilizer
application. Especially in less developed Africa there is the problem
of excessive nutrient removal or "nutrient mining" from soils. While
farmers try to respond to the growing food demand by using better
crop seeds, reducing fallow periods, and so on, they have frequently
failed to prevent the constant nutrient removal which is typical for
modern crops. These require an essential supply of plant nutrients
(such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium), because with each
harvest the farmer permanently removes some 100 to 150 kgJha of
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these major plant nutrients from his field. Therefore it is imperative
that (artificial) fertilizers are applied to ensure sustained produc-
tivity of the soil. However, according to recent estimates, African
farmers replace only some 50 percent of the harvest-related crop
nutrient loss in their soil by applying (artificial) fertilizers. They
permanently degrade their soils because of a less than optimal in-
put of fertilizers (Constant and Sheldrick, 1992:114).
10.3.3 Irrigation
One possibility for increasing the earth's food production capacity
is the expansion of irrigation. However, since two-thirds of global
freshwater withdrawal is already used in agriculture it would be es-
sential to implement only those technologies that improve irrigation
efficiency, reduce water loss, and prevent environmental damage in
irrigation schemes. Fortunately, techniques are available that could
achieve these objectives. In a study on agricultural water efficiency
Xie et at. (1983) conclude:
Technologically, there is great potential to improve water use effi-
ciency in both the agriculture and urban sectors. Despite demon-
strated success in water saving and favorable experience in many
developing countries, advanced technologies, such as sprinkler and
drip systems, are applied to less than 3 percent of the world's ir-
rigated lands.
We cannot go into detail, but list a few options that are con-
sidered rather promising by agricultural experts (most examples are
from Stanhill, 1989).
An obvious technical option is the conservation of existing wa-
ter resources (rather than the exploitation of new ones). In most
irrigation schemes efficiency is incredibly low - usually less than 25
percent of the applied water is consumed by plants. In the USA it
was possible to double water use efficiency by simple means, such
as laser land leveling and automatic pulsed water application.
Runoff control, cleaning, and recycling of agricultural waste-
water could also contribute to the conservation of existing water
resources.
A modification of cropping practices could save water or increase
yields with available resources. For instance, farmers could switch
to crops that can be grown during seasons of lower climatic water
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demand - which are the cooler and more humid seasons of the year.
This simple measure could increase yields per unit of water by up to
50 percent. Only by carefully timing planting dates are substantial
yield increases possible.
Insufficient leaching is one of the most serious dangers in ir-
rigation agriculture.[8] To avoid problems farmers tend to apply
more water to their irrigated fields than would be necessary. This
frequently results in serious soil damage and has already destroyed
large irrigation areas. Agricultural science and technology could
prevent this irrigation mismanagement. There are methods for cal-
culating and applying the amount of water needed for leaching re-
quirements, which take into account soil salinity and evaporation.
Desertification and soil loss is frequently triggered by removal of
significant areas of the vegetation cover - through overgrazing, cat-
tle trampling, or deforestation. Intelligent land-use practices which
avoid phases of total vegetation removal could substantially increase
the local water availability. Afforestation on water catchment areas
would also help to conserve water resources.
Modern technology could reduce water evaporation losses. The
three major sources of water evaporation in agriculture are water
storage and conveyances, irrigation systems, and plant evapotran-
spiration. All three can be reduced by technical means. There are
several methods for reducing plant transpiration (Stanhill, 1986),
but the gains are probably not too big and negative side effects
are likely. Much, however, could be done to reduce evaporation
in irrigation, such as better timing of water application and trickle
irrigation. The evaporation from lakes and conveyances could be
reduced by removing water plants and by building deep, instead of
shallow, reservoirs. It was estimated that lake Nasser, dammed by
the Aswan Dam, is losing more water by evaporation than it makes
available for irrigation (Stanhill, 1989:268).
Water harvesting is also a very attractive technical option for
increasing local water resources for agriculture (Reij et at., 1988).
For example, special kinds of fences can be used at high altitude to
"milk" water out of clouds, as is being done in some places in the
Andes Mountains. A very cost-efficient method is cloud seeding.
Certain chemicals are used to increase the number of condensation
nuclei in the atmosphere which can trigger precipitation. Recently
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detailed studies were undertaken to assess the possibility of water
harvesting in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and Zim-
babwe (Critchley et ai., 1992). Rapid development of desalination
technologies has also been observed. Prices for the desalination of
water are declining rapidly as larger plants with better technology
are set up (Wangnick, 1990).
Finally we can exploit previously neglected sources of water,
such as the large bodies of brackish water. Also several great rivers
are practically unused for irrigation, such as the Shari and Logone
rivers in Chad (Melamed, 1989). Their combined water flow is com-
parable to Egypt's withdrawal from the Nile. Well-designed irriga-
tion schemes could make the desert bloom.
Many arid and semiarid countries in Africa have vast resources
of fertile soils. If these countries were able to apply proper irrigation
technology to their lands (such as Israel did under similar climatic
conditions), they could significantly increase food production.
10.3.4 Breeding, bioengineering
Apart from irrigation there are many technological options to boost
rainfed agriculture. We have just started to explore the potential of
bioengineering for increasing crop yields (Gasser and Fraley, 1989)
and livestock efficiency (Pursel et ai., 1989). In a few years or
decades the creation of new plants by techniques of bioengineer-
ing could replace traditional breeding methods. This would speed
up the process of adapting animal and plant species to marginal
environments, such as arid regions or wetlands. The new techniques
could also lead to high-yield food and feed crops which bind nitro-
gen from the air and thus require less fertilizer inputs. There is
also speculation about bioengineering plants and animals that have
a natural resistance against many kinds of diseases, which would
reduce the consumption of pesticides and animal medicines. Most
experts agree that these techniques could possibly boost food pro-
duction by orders of magnitude (Hollo, 1986).
Photosynthesis is the complex and still poorly understood bio-
chemical process by which plants build up biomass. It is fueled
by solar radiation energy, and needs - among other things - atmo-
spheric carbon, plant nutrients, and water as inputs. Until today
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not much could be done to increase the overall efficiency of the pro-
cess - other than creating artificially CO2-enriched atmospheres in
greenhouses. However, there is a chance that recent advances in
biochemistry and plant genetics can somewhat improve the net ef-
ficiency of photosynthesis by reducing the respiratory losses of CO2
(Smil, 1987:165-166). The gains will probably not be spectacular
in food grain, but it is possible that animal food with very high
photosynthetic efficiency can be bioengineered.
10.3.5 Food processing
Much can be done to optimize post-harvest crop processing, drying,
transport, and storage. In some parts of the Third World (such as
India) enormous amounts of food and feed crops are lost to mice,
rats, and fungi. Improper storage and transport frequently causes
after-harvest losses of up to between 40 and 50 percent.
Much can also be done to improve the processing, transport, and
preparation offood. Most people are not aware that some 90 percent
of fossil energy use in the food chain is linked to nonagricultural
activities - only 5 to 10 percent is consumed on the farm.
Also, if we were to reduce meat consumption in Europe and
North America by a few percent we could save enormous amounts
of grain. Finally, we could boost the productivity of agriculture
by optimizing system integration of farms, such as linking energy
generation (biogas) and livestock production.
10.3.6 "Frankenfood"
Finally, there is the option of synthetic food production. Those who
shiver from abhorrence about this possibility have coined the term
"frankenfood"; but they should think twice about this option. We
are already using considerable amounts of artificial ingredients in
our food. The yeast in our beer and bread is industrially produced
in bioconverters, and citric acid and hundreds of food preservatives
are manufactured by the biochemical industry.[9] The taste of fruit
yoghurt is usually a synthetically redesigned and enforced "natural"
flavor. The colors of meat sausages or fruit juices often come straight
from the chemical laboratory. In the not-tao-distant future it is
very possible that we will produce "synthetic" meat or vegetable
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protein in cell cultures. If this perspective affects your appetite, it
is just because you are not familiar with what is currently done in
slaughterhouses or chicken farms all over the world. Actually, it
might be more humane to feed a 10 or 12 billion world population
on bioengineered protein than to breed and kill billions of animals
or convert the last natural ecosystems into paddy rice fields.
A big step toward synthetic food production was recently made
in Japan, where 12 lettuce factories began production. They look
like high-tech electronic laboratories; the lettuce farmers wear white
gloves and breathing masks. The production sites are so-called clean
rooms - hermetically isolated and sterilized chambers which pre-
vent introduction of fungi, insects, and crop diseases. There is no
soil, rainfall, or sun. The lettuce is grown on a synthetic fiber, the
roots are automatically sprayed with fertilizer-enriched water, and
radiation energy (for photosynthesis) is applied by special electric
lights. Lettuce output is 10 times that of natural cultivation and
highly profitable. The taste of this high-tech lettuce cannot be dis-
tinguished from the naturally grown plant. Rash critics might jump
to the conclusion that this high-tech production is rather energy-
inefficient as compared with conventional cultivation, but this is
most likely not the case. More fossil energy is used to control the
production environment (heating, lighting, irrigation), but much less
is needed for production of pesticides, fungicides, weed killers, and
insecticides because of the sterile growing conditions.
Moreover, high-tech cultivation needs much less space and can
be located close to the consumers, such as in the middle of a city.
Thus, enormous amounts of fossil energy for transportation, conser-
vation, and storage can be saved. (Usually, the fossil energy con-
sumption needed for the production of lettuce and other vegetables
is a small fraction of the energy that is spent in packaging, trans-
portation, and storage of the product.) In some Japanese supermar-
kets lettuce is already produced directly on the spot and harvested
by the sales personnel according to demand. It is very likely that
the urban agglomerates of the 21st century will be supplied locally
with vegetables and fruits. This is not science fiction. Large pro-
portions of the tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchini, and eggplants we eat
in Europe are already produced in a similar way in the high-tech
greenhouses of the Netherlands.
How Many People Can Be Fed on Earth?
10.3.7 Limitations
243
After reading the previous section one might have the impression
that technology is the "golden key" to open the earth's unlimited
resources of food, but this is not the case. Agro-science and agro-
technology have limitations and dangers.
First, there are unintended side effects of agricultural technol-
ogy. Especially the input-oriented large-scale technology of the
1970s and early 1980s has caused many problems, such as soil degra-
dation, over-fertilization, salination or water logging in irrigated
soils, groundwater pollution, and toxification of agricultural work-
ers by pesticides. These problems are usually caused by lack of
know-how, poor management techniques, faulty maintenance of ir-
rigation systems and agricultural machinery, or simply corruption
and ignorance.
Second, we have consequences of agricultural modernization and
expansion that were well predicted but seem to be inevitable. When
farmers transform natural ecosystems into cropland or meadows,
they inevitably disturb their biological balance. Anew, artificial
balance has to be re-established. This requires careful planning and
proper long-term management of soils, water sources, and infra-
structure. One of the greatest threats to natural ecosystems - such
as the tropical rain forests - is the "unconfined cut-down, plant,
and move" exploitation by poorly trained, inexperienced farmers
(or ignorant and cynical agribusinesses).
Third, there is the problem of education and sociocultural adap-
tation. It is obvious that not every culture and ethnic group is flex-
ible enough to learn new ways of food production. Chinese farmers,
for instance, quickly adapted to using modern technology when the
government abandoned many restrictions of the communist econ-
omy during the 1970s. Within a few years China experienced one
of the most spectacular increases in nitrogenous fertilizer consump-
tion and tractor use - and a tripling of cereal production. Compare
this to Nigeria, the oil-wealthy African nation. The country has all
the resources (including capital, land, water, and fossil energy for
fertilizers) to make it the breadbasket of Africa, but agriculture has
stagnated for the last three decades.
Finally, there are enormous costs for implementing a more
efficient agricultural technology. We are not only referring to farmers
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who need investment capital. There is also the need for upgrading
the general infrastructure. Agricultural modernization requires a
steady supply of inputs (fertilizers, water for irrigation, crop san-
itation products) for which working transportation and distribu-
tion systems have to be implemented. There are also significant
social costs. Agricultural modernization inevitably increases the
pressures on the rural labor force. Both farmers and landless agricul-
tural workers have to adapt to new methods and conditions. They
must accept retraining and technical education, and there are al-
ways groups of the population that lack the necessary flexibility
for change. It is also very likely that agricultural modernization
will produce rural unemployment, even if labor-intensive produc-
tion methods are applied.
10.4 Ecological Limits
Ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms are frequently con-
sidered limiting factors of growing food production (Chen, 1990).
Currently scientists are discussing four types of problems. First,
the expansion of agricultural areas and increases in the catch of fish
could destroy large ecological systems. This would lead to a reduc-
tion of biodiversity in the fauna and flora and diminish the global
gene pool. Second, the increase of agricultural inputs, such as fertil-
izers, pesticides, fungicides, weed killers, and other chemicals, could
pollute groundwater bodies, lakes, and the sea. It could change the
chemistry of the soils and speed up soil erosion. Third, genetically
modified plants (and animals) could be a danger to the natural en-
vironment. Finally, a significant increase in food production could
even change the global climate; emissions of greenhouse gases, such
as methane, could dramatically increase due to the expansion of
livestock and paddy rice production. What evidence do we have
that these ecological consequences are in fact unavoidable?
10.4.1 Shrinking of natural ecological systems
There is little doubt that feeding an ever-growing number of people
will further diminish the living space of other species. For many
kinds of wild animals we leave only small niches of natural ecosys-
tems. This competitive race between man and other living creatures
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(including plants) is probably unavoidable. It seems to be an evolu-
tionary constant. The best we can hope for is that we will be able to
preserve key natural habitats in order to stop further extinction of
species. The only realistic protection of the planet's natural "gene
pools" and "green lungs," such as the Amazonas, is a combination
of strictly managed natural parks and careful economic utilization
with a minimum of environmental damage. If we want to reserve the
tropical rain forests exclusively for butterfly catchers, anthropolo-
gists, and botanists in the face of millions of landless hungry farmers,
we have to answer some tough questions on our moral standards.
Food production, however, is not the only activity that tends to
diminish the natural ecosystem. The spread of human settlements,
infrastructures, and industries must be added to a possible expan-
sion of agricultural land. Undoubtedly, the human race is changing
the surface of the earth with unprecedented speed.
10.4.2 Soil degradation (acidification, soil loss)
and water pollution
Many agricultural practices can have a destructive impact on the en-
vironment. Excessive use of fertilizers can contaminate the ground-
water; crop monocultures and unsuitable tillage practices can ag-
gravate soil erosion; the use of pesticides poses health risks on farm
workers; and the runoff of pesticides can pollute groundwater. There
are concerns that "artificial" pest and weed control can trigger the
emergence of resistant animal and plant species, which in turn would
require the further increase of pesticides. In some parts of Europe
we have industrial-size livestock production systems which produce
enormous amounts of manure. If the manure is not properly pro-
cessed and is only spread in large quantities on crop fields and mead-
ows, it can run off into rivers and lakes, seep into the groundwater,
or increase the already existing nitrogen overload of the soil. In
Africa's pastoral societies overgrazing and trampling by cattle is an
enormous problem.
These environmental risks of agriculture are well known and
certainly diminish the actual carrying capacity of many regions. A
recent study conducted by the International Soil Reference and In-
formation Centre in Wageningen has estimated that agricultural ac-
tivities have caused moderate to extreme soil degradation of 1.2
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billion hectares worldwide - which is about the combined size of
China and India (Oldemann et ai., 1990). This does not mean that
the soils are completely unproductive, but that their natural fer-
tility is more or less diminished. The impact of agriculture on the
water is also well documented: some 25 percent of the population in
the European Union is already drinking water with a nitrate level
greater than the recommended maximum of 25 milligrams per liter
(Gardner, 1990:5). Pesticides can be found in the groundwater of
34 states in the USA.
These problems of intensive crop and livestock production are
serious, but there is no reason why we should not be able to solve
them. With modern technology, agricultural know-how, and better
agricultural policy it would be possible to expand food production,
while reducing its environmental impact. A good example is Eu-
rope's agriculture. Contrary to widespread belief, the farmers did
not just proceed with their practices of overfertilization and mind-
less use of pesticides (which they in fact had adopted during most
of the 1970s and 1980s).
If the FAO statistics are correct the consumption of nitroge-
nous fertilizers significantly declined during the past six or seven
years in most European countries, while production increased. In
all of Europe the consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers fell from
some 15.1 in 1983-1984 to about 13.6 million tons in 1990-1991 -
a decline of more than 10 percent (FAO, 1992:56). In West Ger-
many farmers consumed 1.52 million tons in 1985; four years later
consumption was down to 1.48 million tons (FAO, AGROSTAT).
The fertilizer input in kilograms per hectare of cropland fell from
464 to 404 between 1977-1979 and 1987-1989 (World Resources
Institute/United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations
Development Programme, 1992:275).
Modern methods of crop management have tried to optimize,
rather than maximize, the input of crop nutrients and pesticides.
We also have to take into account that in large parts of the Third
World, especially in Africa, fertilizer consumption is a small fraction
of what is typical in Europe or some Asian countries. Even if these
farmers doubled or tripled fertilizer consumption they would be far
from the levels that are typical for high-input agriculture.
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10.4.3 Risks of genetic engineering and advanced
breeding practices
Previously we mentioned that genetic engineering could be a great
opportunity for increasing food production, especially if we could
breed drought- and pest-resistant crops, but it could also be a dan-
ger. There was much concern that genetically manipulated plants
and animals could escape and drive out other natural species from
their habitat. Also several other unintended side effects have been
under discussion. However, governments in Europe and North
America have recently loosened restrictions for field experiments
with genetically modified plants. They obviously consider the risks
rather low as compared with possible benefits.
10.4.4 Climate change
In theory, there are two links between climate change and global food
production. First, the expansion and intensification of agriculture,
which is necessary for sustenance of the growing world population,
could be a driving force for global warming. Emissions of methane
(CH4 ), which is the third most important greenhouse gas, could
increase when livestock and paddy rice areas are expanded. Live-
stock and paddy rice areas are important sources of anthropogenic
methane emission to the atmosphere (Heilig, in press). Agricultural
mechanization could boost CO2 emissions. The second link between
climate change and agriculture works the other way: global warm-
ing could reduce (or increase) agricultural output. One of the most
detailed approaches to the problem was IIASA's integrated climate
impact assessment which - for the first time - analyzed not only
first-order consequences of global warming to agriculture, but also
second-order impacts (Parry et al., 1988). This is not the place
to analyze this major scientific study, but it should be pointed out
that Parry and Carter (1988) are very cautious about the predictive
validity of their research. In a summary of results they write:
The estimates reported in this volume are not predictions [italics
in Parry and Carter] of future effects. Present-day uncertainties
and inaccuracies in simulating the behavior of the world's cli-
mate and in evaluating the agricultural implications of climatic
change do not permit realistic predictions to be made. Further-
more, we cannot forecast what technological, economic and social
248 Gerhard K. Heilig
developments in agriculture will occur over the next half century.
The estimates should therefore be considered as measures of the
present-day sensitivity [italics in Parry and Carter] of agriculture
to climate change. [Parry and Carter, 1988:69]
No doubt, there are links between climate and agriculture, but
it is also obvious that these links are not just simple one-way cau-
sations. They work through a complex system of intermediate vari-
ables, which not only can modify their strengths, but also can turn
them around from positive to negative (and vice versa). The most
important intermediate variables are the availability of advanced
technology, the existing economic arrangements, the political situ-
ation, and the level of education and training among the farmers.
If farmers have no access to advanced technology, are hampered by
poor education and training, or are restricted by stupid economic
arrangements, a worsening of climate conditions (such as the in-
crease of drought or unstable precipitation) can seriously diminish
agricultural output. However, the climate change could also have
the opposite effect: it could trigger the development of advanced
agricultural methods, which in the end are even more productive.
Israel's and Finland's farmers have demonstrated that high produc-
tive agriculture is possible under harsh, and diverse, agro-climatic
conditions.
Our knowledge is too limited to decide whether the projected
climate change would reduce global carrying capacity. However, we
believe that a possible (but by no means certain) global warming
would be a gradual process, which would give us enough time to
adapt the socioeconomic framework of agriculture and implement
new technologies in order to counterbalance its negative effects.
10.5 Social, Economic, and Political
Dimensions of Carrying Capacity
For decades the scientific discussion on the food-population nexus
has avoided a key issue. While the scientists spent their time
elaborating hypotheses with rather weak empirical evidence (such
as the law of diminishing returns) or engaged in intellectual self-
gratification by building all kinds of complex models of global carry-
ing capacity, they mostly ignored the political, social, and economic
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dimension of food production. The news media, however, reported
the facts on a day-by-day basis: in most cases it was colossal policy
failure which caused widespread undernutrition and famine during
the past four decades. Agricultural stagnation and food deficits .were
usually unrelated to a shortage of soil, water, rainfall, fossil energy,
or investment capital. They were also unrelated to high population
growth. Typically, food crises could be found where social, cultural,
and economic conditions have prevented agricultural modernization,
as in large parts of Africa.
There are so many sociocultural constraints to agricultural mod-
ernization that we could dedicate an entire chapter to this problem.
Due to space limitation we mention only a few of the most important
factors.
Policy failure. The most serious famines in recent times had noth-
ing to do with population pressure, crop failure, or natural disas-
ters. They were directly and intentionally triggered by unscrupu-
lous regimes as a means for executing their political strategies as
the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia (Becker, 1986; Barnett et al.,
1980), accepted as necessary side effects of coercive development
measures as in China's Great Leap Forward during the Mao Tse-
Tung era (Bernstein, 1984), or simply emerged from cynical igno-
rance because the regimes were more interested in other political
and military issues as in most civil wars of Africa from Ethiopia to
Somalia (Griffith, 1988).
False economic policy and corruption. The stagnation of agricul-
tural production in some parts of the Third World - especially in
sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of Latin America - was closely re-
lated to the notorious inefficiency, massive corruption, unbelievable
incompetence, and ideological blindness of political leaders and their
administration. Many of these incompetent regimes in Africa sim-
ply transplanted the Soviet model of a centrally planned command
economy to their preindustrial society. They eliminated traditional
market mechanisms by fixing food prices at ridiculously low lev-
els to appease urban masses (Bale, 1981). They collectivized most
of the fertile land (as in Ethiopia) and forced the farmers to sell
their production to state-owned trade agencies for prices that were
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close to production costs (as in Tanzania). The ideologically le-
gitimized lack of incentives discouraged the farmers and prevented
agricultural modernization (Bates, 1981). In Latin America military
regimes stabilized feudalistic rural societies and prevented agricul-
tural modernization. Very often these disasters of agricultural policy
were joined by a general failure of development policy. The political
and administrative elites in many developing countries of Africa and
Latin America did not do much to modernize infrastructure; they
neglected technical education and training and blocked industrial
modernization. Huge amounts of development aid were wasted on
expensive but useless prestige projects or simply vanished into bank
accounts of the small ruling class. Even rich countries, such as ex-
porters of oil and other natural resources (Nigeria), neglected the
agricultural sector.
Social inequality. There is still chronic undernutrition and hunger
among certain groups of the population in food surplus countries, as
in India or Indonesia. However, this kind of food problem can also
be found in highly developed, affluent countries, such as the USA.
It is a problem of income distribution and has nothing to do with
the availability of food. Lack of entitlements to acquire adequate
food in the lowest classes of society is the cause of the problem. The
class and cast structure of some societies also prevents adequate
distribution of agricultural land.
Development of human resources (health, education). Much land
in the Third World cannot be cultivated in the most efficient way
because farmers are suffering from chronic diseases (malaria, river
blindness) or are hampered by a lack of education and agricultural
know-how. Several studies, for instance, have shown the impact
of malaria among rural populations on food production (Bradley,
1991). A dramatic situation is evolving in parts of Africa and Asia
(Thailand) because of AIDS. The spread of this disease among rural
populations in East Africa has already made a measurable impact
on food production (Norse, 1991). Is it not rather absurd that we
spend considerable efforts on the collection of soil inventories to
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determine Africa's carrying capacity, while whole villages in Africa
are wiped out by a virus infection?
Traditions. Many traditions help people improve their suste-
nance. Agricultural societies have developed numerous rules, habits,
taboos, and traditions to prevent food crises, maintain soil fertility,
or improve the environment for the next generation. Consider the
traditional rules of crop rotation or the tradition to plant a tree
on certain occasions. Unfortunately some cultural values also pre-
vent agricultural modernization and a full utilization of resources.
For instance, in most of Africa agriculture is considered low-prestige
women's work. It is part of their household duties - in addition to
cooking and caring for children. Whenever a man can afford to avoid
working on a field, he will do so. This traditional disregard of food
production, deeply embedded in African men, can be also found in
development plans and investment decisions of African governments.
Culture and food are closely related. A society can only develop
sciences, technology, and arts when it has a highly productive sys-
tem of food supply. As long as everyone is busy collecting or hunting
food, no real modern development is possible. We can study this
link between cultural development and food in early agricultural so-
cieties that originated in the alluvial lowlands and river floodplains
of Africa and Asia. These ancient people developed complex social
and economic systems, which included bureaucratic hierarchies and
specialized professions. The social differentiation was necessary to
solve typical problems of agriculture, such as water management or
storage administration. The societies also institutionalized mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution - for instance, to settle conflicts of water
distribution and land ownership. They developed cognitive systems
which helped them to understand and predict the natural cycles of
floods and rainfalls. They also managed to establish a stable (if not
always peaceful) relationship with their neighbors. This social and
cultural framework was essential for making their agriculture pros-
per - and in turn, the highly productive agriculture also propelled
social and cultural development. In his many books on Indonesia,
Clifford Geertz (1963) has studied these dialectics of food and so-
ciocultural development.
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10.6 Discussion
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From a system-analytic point of view, most studies on carrying ca-
pacity are surprisingly unrealistic in their economic and social as-
sumptions. They usually define carrying capacity in terms of direct
agricultural self-supply - as a population supporting capacity of
land, given a certain level of agricultural technology. This concept
might be sufficient to describe traditional rural societies, which lack
a clear division of labor, international trade, political organization,
science, and industry. But this concept is inadequate for today's
functionally differentiated societies and economies. Here the divi-
sion of labor expands from the household to the national economy
and the international market. During the last decades, Arab no-
mads in the deserts of Saudi Arabia could feed their families quite
well from the scarce land by selling their oil resources on the world
market - for instance, to French farmers, who in turn produced a
significant proportion of their meat supply.
Today, the supply of food, which once was a simple process
of collecting, hunting, or self-sufficient local agriculture, has evolved
into a complex international network of production activities, indus-
trial processes, market and price mechanisms, trade arrangements,
food policies, and distribution channels. At each stage of this widely
expanding food chain we might find conditions that could limit the
food supply of a population. It might be a shortage of fertile soils or
water; it might be adverse climate conditions; or it could be a lack
of fossil energy for fertilizer production. But the limitation might
also arise from widespread analphabetism and a lack of agricultural
know-how in a population; it could be caused by the persistence of
inefficient market structures and production regulations; or it might
be the consequence of international trade restrictions.
The carrying capacity of the earth not only depends on its nat-
ural resources or the level of technology, but essentially on the qual-
ity of our worldwide economic, social, and political arrangements.
Land, water, climate, and energy are just four parameters in a much
more complex set of equations for calculating a realistic measure of
carrying capacity. These equations must describe the world as a sys-
tem of interdependencies - a system of exchange mechanisms (food
trade) and complementary production activities, which can coun-
terbalance regional variations in the density of natural and human
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resources. Today, carrying capacity cannot be defined at a purely
local or regional level. It cannot be calculated from the availability
of natural resources. We know that the natural supporting potential
ofland can only be realized if there are educated and trained people
who can live in peace, who have access to (world) markets, who can
use modern agricultural and industrial techniques and inputs, who
are not punished and unmotivated by a centrally planned command
economy.
10.7 Conclusion
How many people can be fed on earth if we take into account techni-
cal, ecological, political, and social constraints? Most experts would
probably agree that we could sustainably supply the current 5.5 bil-
lion world population. At the moment European governments are
pressing their farmers to reduce food production; grain is cheap on
international markets; and Asian countries are harvesting bumper
crops year after year. The scandal of famines in Africa is not a
result of agriculture approaching carrying capacity; it is mostly a
consequence of massive policy failures, corruption, ethnic conflicts,
ignorance, and incompetence of ruling elites. There are different
and more complex reasons for widespread undernutrition in some
parts of Asia, but they have nothing to do with natural limitations.
Certain groups of the population lack the means to acquire food,
which would be available in principle. Here we obviously have the
socioeconomic and cultural problems of uneven distribution of enti-
tlements. Latin America has vast resources of land, freshwater, and
- at least in some cases - oil money. The real problem is the feudal-
istic distribution of land which prevents a more efficient agriculture.
But could we also feed 10 or 15 billion people? Most likely,
if we can prevent (civil) wars with soldiers plundering harvests or
devastating crop fields with land mines; if we can stop the stupid-
ity of collectivization and central planning in agriculture; if we can
agree on free (international) trade for agricultural products; if we
redistribute agricultural land to those that actually use it for pro-
duction; if we provide credits, training, and high-yield seeds to poor
farmers; if we can adapt the modern high-yield agriculture to the
agro-climatic and sociocultural conditions of arid regions and use it
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carefully to avoid environmental destruction; if we implement opti-
mal water management and conservation practices. If we do all this
during the next few decades, we would certainly be able to feed a
doubled or tripled world population.
There are many "ifs" in our conclusion. Almost certainly, busi-
ness as usual will not provide the conditions which are necessary for
feeding the world population of the 21st century. We need funda-
mental political, social, and economic changes, especially in Africa,
Latin America, and parts of Asia. Only a democratization in these
regions will open the gates for the development of human resources,
for better education and training, for private economic initiatives,
and for functioning markets.
There are positive and negative signs that this change will be
possible: the governments of China, India, and some other Asian
countries have removed economic controls which prevented agricul-
tural productivity; they have provided a relatively stable political
environment and they have actively supported agricultural mod-
ernization (the green revolution). Consequently, they doubled or
tripled domestic food production within two or three decades. Many
African governments, on the other hand, neglected the agricultural
sector. They introduced rigid methods of central planning; sup-
pressed free markets; and collectivized or coercively resettled the
farmers. They did not stop the devastation of agricultural areas
due to civil wars, and they mostly failed in introducing modern
techniques of crop production and livestock management. It is no
wonder that per capita food production stagnated or declined in
most parts of Africa during the past three decades.
Let us do a simple exercise: How many people can be fed in
Sudan? The FAa estimated that at a low input level the coun-
try's arable land could sustain nearly 60 million people - 3.7 times
the actual population of 1975 (which was 16 million); a high-input
agriculture could feed 1.036 billion Sudanese, which would be twice
the actual population of Africa. All we hear from Sudan, how-
ever, are reports of persistent famines and slow degeneration of the
agricultural system. Theoretically, Sudan could be the breadbas-
ket of Africa; in practical terms it is one of the continent's famine
areas. On the other hand, the FAa has estimated that Algeria's
agro-climatic conditions could support only 7 million people at low
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inputs and 24.6 million at medium inputs. Currently Algeria has
a population of 25 million and not much can be heard about food
shortages in this country. Given the substantial restraints and diffi-
culties that can slow down or even prevent the theoretically almost
unlimited increase of global food production, we have to lower our
expectations. It is unlikely that the world food problem will be
solved within the next decades, despite the fact that it would be
possible in theory. There are serious social, economic, and political
limits to growth.
We should come back to the initial concept that visualizes the
problem of carrying capacity in a pipe with a declining diameter.
Using this image, we can conclude that the key for balancing people
and food is the speed with which the social, economic, cultural, and
political constraints are pushed back that hinder people to utilize
the full potential of the earth's food resources in a sustainable way.
If we can open the pipe quickly enough, if we can stop some of our
collective stupidities, we could produce more than enough food for
the people of the 21st century. The carrying capacity of the earth
is not a natural constant - it is a dynamic equilibrium, essentially
determined by human action.
Notes
[1] Malthus was not the first scholar dealing with the problem, but prob-
ably the most influential.
[2] Usually the total solar radiation input of earth is seen as a (near) con-
stant. However, at the soil level, it can certainly vary considerably with
specific atmospheric conditions, such as water vapor and dust concen-
tration in the higher atmosphere, as well as cloud cover conditions in
the lower atmosphere.
[3] Clark (1967) estimated that the earth could support between 47 billion
people on an American-type diet and 147 billion on a cereal-subsistence
diet.
[4] These data are from the 1992-1993 WRI report. The estimates of
soil constraints in the 1990-1991 report were even higher for most
countries.
[5] River flows from other countries are an unreliable source of water sup-
ply, since they can be influenced by neighboring countries. Therefore
we compare only "annual internal renewable water resources," such as
underground aquifers.
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[6] The situation within this continentlike country is, however, different.
There is water scarcity in the northeastern agricultural areas.
[7] In 1974 The Futurist wrote that Lester Brown "refuses to own an au-
tomobile and uses public transportation, so that more energy can go
into food production" (cited in Smil, 1987:100).
[8] In irrigation systems a certain proportion of the water applied is not
intended for plants, but for washing out (leaching) soluble salts which
are concentrated in the topsoil by evapotranspiration. Especially in
arid and semiarid areas this practice is absolutely essential. Otherwise
soil salinity would build up to toxic levels. Frequently farmers apply
too much water for leaching, which not only is a waste of the resource,
but also results in serious soil damage.
[9] This is a highly profitable industry; Austria's richest man made his
fortune by producing citric acid for the European food industry.
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Editor's Note for Part III
The papers in this part indicate that mortality in developing coun-
tries has experienced very impressive declines over the past decades,
which were mostly due to the decline in infectious diseases. Until
recently there was widespread optimism that these declines would
continue in the future and eventually approach the level of industri-
alized countries as some individual developing countries have already
done. The AIDS pandemic, the return of other infectious diseases
such as malaria, and increasing uncertainty about future food sup-
ply and environmental problems have significantly weakened this
optimism. Although at the global level there should be enough food
for a possible future world population of 15 billion, local political
and environmental problems as well as distributional problems may
cause at least temporary famine-related excess mortality. AIDS will
definitely have an effect on mortality in the most affected regions
of Africa and South Asia, but it is still unclear by how much it will
increase mortality.
Given this significant uncertainty in Africa, a decline in life ex-
pectancy of three years per decade is assumed as the worst case
and an increase of three years as the best case. This roughly corre-
sponds to the estimates of possible future AIDS mortality given in
Chapter 9. Because under favorable conditions there are still great
potentials for increases in life expectancies, in most other regions
average increases of two years have been assumed with a significant
range of uncertainty. These issues are discussed more extensively in
Chapter 15.
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Chapter 11
Future Reproductive
Behavior in
Industrialized Countries
Wolfgang Lutz
For countries that have fully passed through fertility transition from
high fertility to modern family limitation, there is no convincing
theory on what should happen to fertility trends in the future. This
is not for lack of trying. Approaching the issue from several different
disciplines, scientists have made innumerable efforts to analyze and
understand past trends and derive from these hypotheses about the
future.
Economists tended to look at the fertility fluctuations, trying
to discover regularities in the sequence of ups and downs and as-
sociations with economic cycles. Demographers have given much
attention to the comparison of period and cohort fertility rates. So-
ciologists and psychologists have studied myriads of survey data
and developed theories of increasing individualization and changing
gender roles. Family historians have pointed at the changing struc-
ture and function of the family. And the medical profession has
contributed to the issue by looking at sub-fecundity and effective-
ness of contraceptives. In sum, there is a large array of interesting
ideas and somewhat explicit hypotheses that tend to refer to specific
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aspects of reproductive behavior, but they are of limited value for
predicting the final outcome, namely, age-specific fertility rates in
the years to come.
The ideas in this chapter are based on the huge literature on the
determinants of fertility in modern industrialized countries which
cannot be exhaustively summarized here (this chapter has been in-
fluenced by Kiernan, 1993). The chapter is guided by the goal of de-
termining reasonable and defendable assumptions about alternative
high and low paths of future fertility trends in modern industrial-
ized countries. In doing this, we first look at unambiguous empirical
evidence from the past years, and then list possible arguments that
could be used to support the alternative assumptions of either fur-
ther declining fertility or increasing fertility levels. The final section
focuses on how these alternative assumed forces could work in a
heterogeneous society and result in specific assumed fertility levels.
11.1 Recent Trends in Partnership
Formation and Dissolution
Human procreation is intimately linked to the institution of mar-
riage in virtually all historical and contemporary societies. In some
populations this link has been stronger than in others, and re-
cently, in highly industrialized countries, new forms of partnership
have been spreading that are in direct competition with traditional
marriage. With respect to fertility, this bears the obvious ques-
tion whether such changes in living arrangements and partnership
have affected and will affect the average number of children born to
women and men. For this reason we first must look at changes in
the marital status composition of industrialized populations.
Over recent decades the proportion of the adult population that
is married has declined markedly in many industrialized countries.
Table 11.1 gives these proportions for 19'60 and 1985 in selected
European countries. This decline was most significant in Sweden,
where the proportion of married women declined from more than
60 percent in 1960 to only 48 percent in 1985. The decline for men
was of similar magnitude. It is mostly attributable to increases in
the proportions never married and divorced. This pattern is similar
in the other Scandinavian countries and in the UK. In the FRG the
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Table 11.1. Distribution of the population above age 15 by marital
status in selected European countries: 1960 and 1985.
Country
France
Women Men
-------------Never Mar- Di- Wid- Never Mar- Di- Wid-
married ried vorced owed married ried vorced owed
1960 20.7
1985 24.5
FRG
1960 22.7
1985 24.4
Hungary
1960 17.3
1985 14.2
Italy
1960 29.1
1985 24.5
Netherlands
1960 26.9
1985 26.4
Sweden
1960 26.2
1985 30.0
UK
1960 21.9
1985 24.0
Source: Prinz, 1994.
60.3 2.5
56.6 4.6
57.7 2.6
54.3 4.4
64.4 2.6
61.5 6.9
58.0 0.0
61.1 0.4
63.0 1.3
57.6 4.8
60.7 3.0
48.4 8.7
63.6 0.9
56.4 5.7
16.6 27.3
14.3 31.5
17.0 26.8
16.9 33.5
15.7 23.7
17.4 23.1
12.9 34.4
14.0 30.8
8.8 30.7
11.2 33.5
10.1 31.6
12.9 38.7
13.6 25.6
13.9 31.4
66.4 1.9
61.9 3.6
67.9 1.5
59.8 3.5
71.5 1.4
68.0 5.0
62.1 0.0
65.8 0.3
64.9 0.8
60.0 3.9
61.9 2.3
50.4 7.3
70.0 0.6
60.2 4.8
4.3
3.1
3.9
3.2
3.4
3.8
3.5
3.1
3.6
2.6
4.3
3.5
3.9
3.5
decline in the proportion married was much stronger for men than
for women, which is largely explained by a significant increase in
the never-married male population. Of the countries listed, Italy
shows a slight increase between 1960 and 1985 which is due to the
fact that in Italy, the decline in marriage rates started later than in
other countries and had not yet had much effect by 1985. This table
clearly shows that the proportion married is a cumulative indicator
which is largely determined by past trends; therefore it is hardly
appropriate to study recent behavioral changes.
Trends in contemporary marriage behavior are well described
by age-specific marriage rates. An analysis of such rates in the
industrialized countries since the 1960s makes it apparent that men
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Figure 11.1. Age-specific marriage rates in Sweden and the USA:
1967 and 1987. Source: National Statistical Yearbooks, various
years.
and women have changed their behavior toward later marriage and
lower probabilities of marriage. To illustrate this pattern, Figure
11.1 plots age-specific marriage rates of women for the USA and
Sweden in 1967 and 1987. In both countries in 1967, marriage rates
peaked in the 20-24 age group with around 20 percent of all women
in this group marrying. Twenty years later the peak moved to the
25-29 age group with marriage intensities at about half their 1967
levels in the USA and less than that in Sweden. The figures include
remarriages which explains why rates especially in the USA are still
rather high in the late 30s and 40s. In the USA marriage rates even
among women aged 40-44 are higher than in Sweden for women in
the traditional prime age group for marriage 20-24. While marriage
and especially remarriage after divorce still seem to be popular in the
USA, the new Swedish pattern can only be explained by a significant
societal change in the role of marriage as opposed to other living
arrangements.
Table 11.2 gives data on the evolution of nonmarital unions in
Europe between 1960 and 1985. It shows for Sweden that despite a
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Table 11.2.
Country
Austria
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
UK
Evolution of nonmarital unions in Europe.
Changes 1960 to 1985 Proportion of consensual
in percentage points of unions among all unions by
women living in age of woman (in %) ca. 1985
Marriage All unions 20-24 25-29 30-34
-3.0 1.6 25.8 8.2 3.5
-7.0 5.0 49.7 23.9 11.6
-4.6 4.6 35.8 14.0 10.1
-6.1 -1.5 30.0a 6.2a 6.2a
-2.8 0.1 3.3 2.4 2.7
4.4 5.9 2.1 1.8 1.6
-9.1 -1.7 36.3 15.9 6.7
-9.8 1.1 47.0 23.0 12.0
-20.3 -0.4 77.1 48.1 29.6
-11.3 -5.4 29.0 12.8 6.8
aData only given for 15-24 and 25-34 age groups.
Source: Prinz, 1994.
20 percent decline in proportions married, the proportion of women
living in unions (marriages and consensual unions) remained vir-
tually unchanged. Not surprisingly this trend toward nonmarital
unions is strongest for younger couples. In Sweden of all women
aged 20-24 and living together with a man, only 23 percent were
married. This trend toward nonmarital unions was less extreme in
other European countries but still went in the same direction. In all
countries a decline in proportions married was associated with an
increase in nonmarital unions. Of the countries listed, only Hungary
and Italy stand out with very low proportions of women living in
nonmarital unions in 1985.
The other significant trend over recent decades was the increase
in divorce rates that could be observed in all industrialized countries.
Figure 11.2 plots the crude divorce rates (the number of divorces
per 1,000 inhabitants) for eight selected countries. At every point in
time between 1950 and 1990, divorce rates were by far the highest
in the USA. Between 1965 and 1980 the rate more than doubled.
In one year approximately 5 out of 1,000 inhabitants in the USA
(including children) experience a divorce. Currently about every
second marriage ends in divorce in the USA. In Europe this propor-
tion ranges from about 1 out of 10 marriages in Southern Europe to
-~ ------------------------~----~
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Figure 11.2. Crude divorce rates from 1950 to 1990 in selected
industrialized countries.
3 out of 10 in Central Europe, and about 4 out of 10 in Scandinavia
and the UK.
In the present context the crucial question with regard to future
fertility levels is to what extent changes in the patterns of union for-
mation and dissolution affect the number of children. The empirical
evidence so far is very mixed. In Sweden the fertility of nonmarital
unions is not much different from that of married couples, although
dissolution rates of such unions are still much higher. In South-
ern and Eastern Europe fertility is still closely tied to marriage. In
western Germany, a very advanced country in many respects, with
rapidly declining proportions married, only 10 percent of all children
are born out of wedlock. In the USA, this proportion has recently
increased to about 25 percent (Pagnini and Rindfuss, 1993). For
most industrialized countries it seems likely that a possible future
decline in the prevalence of marriage and marital stability will tend
to decrease fertility, but the extent of this decline will largely de-
pend on whether other countries follow the Swedish or the German
pattern. This issue is discussed in Sections 11.4 and 11.5.
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11.2 Recent Trends in Period and
Cohort Fertility
Fertility can be measured and described with respect to different
demographic dimensions, such as age, duration of marriage, time
between births, and calendar year. One principal conceptual dis-
tinction is whether to consider the reproductive experience of birth
cohorts of women over their life span (cohort approach) or to study
the fertility of different age groups in a specific calendar year (pe-
riod approach). For population projections the number of children
born in a particular year is needed as an input parameter, which is
derived from the application of age-specific period fertility rates to
the age structure of the female population. Hence assumptions need
to be defined in terms of period fertility. If one believes, however,
that cohort fertility - because it has greater stability or because it
better captures the life course of women - is the more appropri-
ate indicator for making assumptions, assumed cohort fertility can
be translated into period rates if additional assumptions about the
timing of births over the course of a life are made.
Table 11.3 gives the period total fertility rates, Le., the mean
number of children per woman implied by age-specific fertility rates
of a year, for 30 industrialized countries for the period 1950-1990.
In all countries except for Eastern Europe, Malta, and Japan, fertil-
ity increased during the late 1950s. This is the famous postwar baby
boom which peaked around 1960 in the most affected countries. Of
the 30 countries listed, in 1960-1965 only Estonia and Hungary had
fertility rates below two children per woman, and several countries
had rates above 3.0. The 1970s were a period of fertility decline
in practically every industrialized country. By 1980-1985 only Ice-
land, Ireland, and Poland had a fertility level above 2.1. For all
industrialized countries together - which comprised 0.8 billion peo-
ple in 1950 and 1.2 in 1990 (UN, 1993) - fertility declined from 2.82
in 1955-1960 to 2.44 in 1965-1970, 2.00 in 1975-1980, and 1.92 in
1985-1990.
As to regional differences in fertility trends, there seems to be
a West European pattern with a moderate baby boom and a steep
decline during the 1970s. Southern Europe follows the pattern with
some delay. Eastern Europe shows rather stable moderate levels
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Table 11.3. Total fertility rates 1950 to 1990 in 30 industrialized
countries.
1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985-
TFR 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Australia 3.18 3.41 3.28 2.87 2.54 2.09 1.93 1.86
Austria 2.09 2.52 2.78 2.53 2.01 1.64 1.62 1.45
Belarusa 2.55 2.26 2.29 2.11 2.06 1.91
Belgium 2.34 2.51 2.66 2.34 1.94 1.71 1.59 1.56
Bulgaria 2.48 2.27 2.18 2.15 2.17 2.18 2.01 1.92
Czechoslovakia 2.89 2.57 2.40 2.08 2.34 2.35 2.09 2.00
Denmark 2.53 2.54 2.59 2.24 1.96 1.70 1.43 1.54
Estoniaa - 1.96 1.97 2.15 2.07 2.06 2.06
Finland 2.97 2.78 2.58 2.06 1.62 1.64 1.69 1.66
France 2.73 2.71 2.85 2.61 2.31 1.86 1.87 1.82
Germany, West 2.16 2.30 2.49 2.32 1.64 1.52 1.46 1.44
Greece 2.29 2.27 2.20 2.38 2.32 2.32 1.96 1.53
Hungary 2.73 2.21 1.82 1.97 2.09 2.11 1.81 1.82
Iceland 3.70 4.02 3.94 3.15 2.84 2.29 2.25 2.12
Ireland 3.37 3.67 3.96 3.86 3.80 3.46 2.87 2.28
Italy 2.32 2.35 2.55 2.49 2.27 1.92 1.55 1.33
Japan 2.75 2.08 2.01 2.00 2.07 1.81 1.76 1.68
Luxembourg 1.97 2.22 2.36 2.22 1.96 1.50 1.45 1.47
Malta 4.14 3.73 3.10 2.17 2.07 2.02 1.96 2.02
Netherlands 3.05 3.09 3.12 2.73 1.97 1.58 1.51 1.56
Norway 2.60 2.84 2.90 2.72 2.25 1.81 1.69 1.80
Poland 3.62 3.29 2.65 2.27 2.25 2.26 2.33 2.15
Portugal 3.05 3.04 3.09 2.86 2.76 2.42 1.99 1.60
Russiaa 2.40 2.06 2.01 1.95 1.97 1.89
Spain 2.57 2.75 2.89 2.93 2.89 2.63 1.86 1.46
Sweden 2.21 2.23 2.33 2.12 1.89 1.65 1.65 1.91
Switzerland 2.28 2.33 2.50 2.27 1.81 1.53 1.53 1.55
Ukrainea - 2.17 1.99 2.07 1.99 2.00 1.85
UK 2.18 2.50 2.82 2.52 2.04 1.72 1.80 1.81
USA 3.45 3.71 3.31 2.55 2.02 1.78 1.82 1.92
aFram Lutz and Scherbov, 1989. Data in last column refer to 1990 only (Lutz
et al., 1994).
Source: UN, 1993.
before the 1991 transition, which is mostly associated with steep
fertility declines (eastern Germany currently has a TFR of 0.8).
Figure 11.3 depicts these trends in more detail for seven selected
countries. The United States clearly falls out of the general pattern:
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Figure 11.3. Total fertility rates from 1950 to 1991 (annual data)
in selected industrialized countries.
because of the baby boom, it reached fertility levels of 3.7 in 1955,
which is above any level registered in Europe since early in this
century. Japan shows a completely different pattern with a steep
fertility decline during the 1950s which brought down total period
fertility from 3.6 in 1950 to 2.0 in 1960. An East Asian peculiarity
is the low fertility in 1966 which is attributable to the Hinoeuma
("fire horse") year during which it was considered unpropitious to
have a daughter (Atoh, 1989).
As can be expected the completed fertility of generations (co-
horts) shows a much smoother trend as plotted in Figure 11.4. The
figure gives the average number of children born between 1940 and
1960 to women by age 45. For cohorts born after 1945, the data
are partly based on estimations because the women have not yet
reached age 45. There seem to be two types of countries, those that
show a steadily declining trend, such as the FRG, Switzerland, Italy,
and the UK, and those that do not show much of a decline, such as
Sweden and Czechoslovakia. France also shows only little decline.
Under this cohort perspective, fertility declines over recent decades
look less dramatic than under the period perspective. The baby
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Figure 11.4. Completed fertility for birth cohorts born between
1940 and 1960. Source: Council of Europe, 1991.
boom and the following bust are not clearly visible because these
events were largely phenomena of timing of births.
11.3 Desired Family Size and Childlessness
Since the information derived from the analysis of past fertility
trends in industrialized countries that have already completed the
demographic transition does not suggest any obvious future trend,
one may look for other sources of information, such as reproductive
intentions as stated in interview surveys. For the short-term future,
such expressed intentions are clearly a relevant piece of informa-
tion although they cannot be readily translated into fertility rates
because of various biases.
The most recent survey with comparable data for a large number
of industrialized countries was given in an annex to the Eurobarom-
eter 1991 which asked identical questions in the 12 countries of the
European Community. Table 11.4 lists the answers to the question
regarding the ideal number of children in a family. Despite some
variation across countries, the general pattern is similar: very few
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Table 11.4. Answer to question: "[In your country] today what
do you think is the ideal number of children for a family like yours
or the one you might have?" Poll taken in 1989.
Number of children (in %)
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Germany, West
Greece
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
UK
EC12
012
5 18 52
3 9 65
7 14 58
2 13 42
3 19 47
2 9 33
2 9 61
3 21 56
3 5 65
3 21 55
4 22 55
2 10 67
4 14 57
3
21
20
18
33
28
30
24
19
22
16
15
15
21
4 or more
3
4
3
11
4
27
4
3
5
4
3
6
4
Mean
2.01
2.13
1.97
2.42
2.13
2.79
2.20
1.99
2.23
2.01
1.94
2.14
2.10
Source: Eurobarometer, 1991.
European men and women find a childless family ideal; the propor-
tion is highest in West Germany with 7 percent and Belgium with
5 percent. In all countries there is a clear majority for the two-child
family. In the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark, up to two-thirds
of the population thinks that two children are desirable. About one-
fifth thinks that three children are ideal. The proportion wanting
three children is 30 percent or higher only in Ireland and Greece.
In the UK and Spain it is as low as 15 percent. Again with the
exception of Ireland and Greece, the proportion mentioning four or
more children is extremely small. The mean family size resulting
from these answers is lowest in Spain, West Germany, Luxembourg,
Portugal, and Belgium. While the results for Germany are not sur-
prising, the results for Spain and Portugal are because they still had
rather high fertility recently (in the World Fertility Survey, Portugal
was considered part of the high fertility/developing country group).
The low levels of stated ideal family size in these countries also sup-
port the view that the present low period fertility rates are not just
a temporary phenomenon.
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Table 11.5. Answers to questions on family size in Austria, 1981-
1982, for women married five to eight years.
Desired Expected
Number of Societal Personal number of number of
children ideal ideal children children
Children already
born (incl.
pregnancies)
Zero
One
Two
Three
Four
Five or more
Mean
0.1
1.4
72.3
24.5
1.4
0.3
2.27
2.4
7.3
53.4
28.1
6.6
2.2
2.37
2.2
13.8
51.6
24.6
5.9
1.9
2.25
2.2
14.1
50.0
25.3
6.5
1.9
2.26
10.1
30.7
46.0
10.8
1.8
0.6
1.65
However, a stated ideal family size is not an actual family size,
especially if the ideal refers to an abstract average family rather than
one's personal life. Like several other surveys, an Austrian fertility
survey conducted during the early 1980s asked five different ques-
tions related to family size to better understand the personal biases
involved. Table 11.5 gives the answers to questions on the societal
ideal, the personal ideal, the actual desired number of children, the
realistically expected number of children, and the children already
born after five to eight years of marriage. A comparison shows the
interesting pattern that the further away the question is from one's
personal life, the greater the concentration on the two-child family.
It is especially dominant for the societal ideal.
Only 2 percent of the married women want to remain childless,
but the data on actual fertility show that the proportion childless
will be much higher. Because the Austrian data come from a panel
study, it was possible to analyze how many women have met their
stated plans over a three- to four-year period (see Lutz, 1985). Of
all children planned for that period, more than half were not born
(pregnancies were also counted as births). On the other hand, 13
percent of the women had more children than they planned. This
resulted in a significant net deficit. It also implies that if unplanned
pregnancies could be avoided by better contraception, the deficit
may become even larger.
The most significant case of a personal deficit, Le., having fewer
children than originally intended, seems to be with respect to the
first birth. The actual number of childless women tends to be much
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Table 11.6. Evolution of childlessness in German-speaking coun-
tries by cohorts.
Childless among all women
Childless among women
married 11 to 15 years
Age
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
Year of
birth
1901
1906
1911
1916
1921
1926
1931
1936
1941
1946
1951
Austria
(%)
33.8
29.9
26.2
23.2
20.9
20.5
16.4
14.4
14.7
15.8
23.2
East Germany
(%)
27.1
21.9
17.8
16.7
17.9
16.9
12.4
10.5
9.2
7.7
9.9
Year of West Germany
marriage (%)
1956-1960 11.2
1961-1965 13.7
1966-1970 15.8
1971-1975 19.3
Source: Biittner and Lutz, 1990b.
higher than the number of women who say in their early adult-
hood that they want to be childless. It is quite difficult to calculate
the proportion of women remaining without children (and complete
family-size distributions) as implied by period fertility rates because
birth-order specific information is required. A recent survey article
by Feeney and Lutz (1991) describes alternative methods and shows
estimates of childlessness among all women above age 45 in the early
1980s of 27 percent in the USA, 31 percent in the Netherlands, and
28 percent in Austria.
More accurate but less contemporary information on childless-
ness can be given for cohorts of women. Table 11.6 compares the
evolution of cohort childlessness in three German-speaking coun-
tries (Austria, East Germany, and West Germany) over the course
of this century (see Biittner and Lutz, 1990b). For West Germany
the data are only available for married women. In both Austria and
East Germany the proportion of childless women declined signifi-
cantly from around 30 percent for cohorts born at the beginning of
the century to just above 10 percent. This decline is evidence of
the disappearance of the "European marriage pattern" under which
high proportions of women remained unmarried. Childlessness has
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always been somewhat lower in East Germany, but after the co-
hort of 1940 the trend completely diverges from that in Austria,
with further decreases in East Germany and increases in Austria.
As is discussed later the very low levels of childlessness in East Ger-
many are partly attributable to government policies. The increasing
proportion in Austria is probably a mixture of actually increasing
childlessness and the fact that not all children were born to these
young cohorts.
In West Germany the existing data for marriage cohorts show
a clear increase over time of childlessness after 11 to 15 years of
marriage. Since one can assume that the overwhelming proportion
of first children is already born after 11 to 15 years of marriage, these
figures should corne close to final childlessness. Taken together with
the fact that the proportion of women that marry has been declining
and that fertility outside marriage is very low, this implies very high
levels of cohort childlessness in West Germany.
These family-size distributions, including childlessness, also
have direct implications on distributional and equity issues, such
as the concentration of childbearing and the division of labor for
society's reproduction among women of one generation. The rather
even distribution and low childlessness in East Germany in the late
1980s implies that 33 percent of all women have half the children
born, whereas in Austria 23 percent of all women have half the chil-
dren. In West Germany 29 percent of all married women have half
the children, but for all women together the proportion should be
lower than in Austria, Le., the concentration higher. The concen-
tration of childbearing has many implications which are discussed
in Lutz (1989).
One issue which is also relevant for future fertility levels is
whether there will be a trend toward some women specializing in
childrearing while the rest are career-oriented with few or no chil-
dren. Such a pattern, if accepted, could result in higher total fertil-
ity, but this is very unlikely. All empirical information shows that
very few women want to have a large number of children and that
the overwhelming majority wants to have at least one child or two
children. The normative trend toward the two-child family at least
as a goal seems to be very strong. This would imply lower concen-
tration in the future rather than an increase.
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11.4 Arguments Assuming Higher
Fertility
In several countries period fertility has been below the so-called
replacement-level fertility for more than two decades. Is this a sta-
ble and sustainable pattern of reproduction in modern industrial-
ized societies, or is it only a transitory state that will be followed
by higher fertility? One can think of several arguments and mech-
anisms that can potentially lead to higher average fertility in these
countries.
11.4.1 The homeostasis argument
The usual interpretation of the demographic transition theory is
that an initial equilibrium between high birth rates and high death
rates is disturbed by declining mortality which in course triggers
a fertility decline that will bring birth and death rates back to an
equilibrium at low levels. However, history has shown that fertil-
ity declines with all their irregularities and national particularities
generally do not stop at replacement level, but continue to decline
further. The homeostasis argument would stress that this is simply
an overshooting that will be reversed after some inevitable societal
adjustments. Most explicitly this has recently been expressed by
Vishnevsky (1991) who does not see fertility levels as the sum of
individual behavior, but rather as one aspect in the evolution of a
system that determines behavior. He believes that the development
of the demographic system is directed by a proper, inherent goal. In
the process of self-organization the system aims at self-maintenance
and survival. For human beings at a certain stage of the evolu-
tion, a new and higher goal is assumed to appear that goes beyond
pure population survival - namely, that of maintaining homeostasis
in the population's reproduction, even in the face of considerable
fluctuations in external conditions (see Vishnevsky, 1991 :265).
It is not yet possible to empirically test this hypothesis. Trends
such as the recent fertility increase in Sweden, which has been a
forerunner in many other social issues, may be taken as evidence by
its supporters. But the hypothesis is not specific enough to be tested
(e.g., it does not state by how much fertility should increase over
a period). Since studies have not addressed the mechanisms and
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motivations that induce couples to have more children, it remains
largely a philosophical argument. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile
considering at this individual level, although it is highly controver-
sial, and authors such as Westoff (1991) criticize the assumption of
a "magnetic force" toward replacement.
11.4.2 Assumption of fertility cycles
Several views summarized under this heading contend that the
present low level of period fertility is just the bottom of a cycle and
that the future will bring an upward trend. These shall be grouped
into arguments with respect to the timing of fertility within cohorts
and to intergenerational fertility fluctuations. The first argument is
based on the observation that in many countries the recent declines
in total fertility were accompanied by declines in the fertility rates
of younger women. Hence, one could assume that observed trends
only reflect a delay in childbearing (the timing of fertility) and do
not indicate a decline in the number of children a woman has over
her life span (the quantum of fertility). Especially in France there
has been a heated debate on this issue even beyond scientific circles;
it has been pointed out that the fertility of cohorts born until the
late 1950s was still above 2.0 children per woman (Le Bras, 1991).
As described above it is evident in all countries that declines in co-
hort fertility have been slower than in period fertility. But in most
European countries, meanwhile, cohort fertility is also below 2.0,
and in several countries even below 1.7.
It is difficult to evaluate the argument that women will soon
catch up and have their delayed births, hence increasing period fer-
tility. The slight recovery in total fertility over the last years in
several European countries may be partly attributable to this phe-
nomenon. Studies for Sweden have also shown that the presently
high period fertility is largely due to such a timing phenomenon and
is likely to decline soon (Hoem, 1990). This timing phenomenon
could only have a sizable impact on future period fertility levels if
one assumes that cohort fertility tends to be substantially higher
than present period rates. This may be the case in Southern Eu-
rope, where period fertility recently declined extremely fast, but
generally there is no clear substantive reason to assume that a sig-
nificant catch-up phenomenon will occur. For longer-term fertility
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trends (more than 10 years) such timing aspects are irrelevant in
any case.
The second argument focuses on longer-term cycles. It assumes
that the fertility level of the parent generation is a determinant of
their children's reproductive behavior. Best known in this context
is Easterlin's relative income hypothesis (Easterlin, 1980). In short,
it assumes that fertility is determined by income relative to aspira-
tions with cohort size determining income: generation one has low
relative income and low fertility; generation two grows up with low
aspirations for wealth but finds advantages in labor market condi-
tions because of few competitors, hence having high relative income
and high fertility; generation three is numerous and has high aspira-
tions resulting in low relative income and low fertility. Empirically,
this model fits nicely to the US baby boom in the 1960s and the
subsequent fertility decline. But this is only half a cycle. So far a
new baby boom has failed to materialize. For other countries even
the historical application fits less well. There are also a number
of conceptual problems such as the fact that within a generation
fertility is unevenly distributed among families - some have many
children, others only one (see discussion in Lutz, 1989) - and that
women have children at different ages which soon smoothes out any
cycles. But even if this assumed mechanism is not a dominating
factor for fertility trends, it may well play some role as one among
several factors.
11.4.3 Pronatalistic policies
Governments in countries with very low fertility have reason to
worry about the long-term implications of subreplacement together
with increasing life expectancy at higher ages on the pension sys-
tem and other social-security issues such as health care. Because the
baby boom generation is presently in their main productive ages, the
economic dependency burden is still quite favorable. But projections
indicate that in Western Europe, the proportion of the population
that is above age 60 will increase significantly over the next few
decades. This is an extremely serious threat to present forms of
pay-as-you-go pension schemes, where the active people pay for the
pensioners. For this and other reasons, several European countries
have tried to stimulate fertility through policies that make it more
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profitable to the individual to have another child. It needs to be
stressed, however, that most countries that provide extensive child-
care benefits do this for social policy rather than population policy
(Hahn, 1991). But still such policies might be relevant for individual
reproductive decisions.
If the reproductive behavior of couples reacts to incentives in
the way other human behavior does, then changes in the incen-
tive structure will have an impact on fertility. Monetary incentives
for having children are only one possible mechanism of government
policies directed toward higher fertility. There is very little evidence
that such monetary policies actually work. Compare, for instance,
the high direct and indirect child benefits in Germany and Austria
to the almost nonexisting benefits in the USA; and yet fertility is
much lower in Germany and Austria. Also over time it is hard to
detect responses of fertility rates to changes in government benefits
(Chesnais, 1985; Klinger, 1985). One exception is the marked fertil-
ity increase in the GDR between 1976 and 1977, which can clearly
be attributed to the introduction of a package of social-policy mea-
sures (Buttner and Lutz, 1990a; Vining, 1984). But conditions in the
GDR were very specific: there was a severe housing shortage, and
the birth of a child was an easy way to get access to an apartment
and other benefits. Since these benefits provided for basic needs
that otherwise could hardly be met, the motivation for childbearing
became very strong. But this already goes beyond the usual un-
derstanding of incentives, because it is associated with deprivations
that are hardly acceptable in democratic free market societies.
Beyond material incentives, social pressure and changing atti-
tudes as well as infrastructural arrangements for childrearing may
be very important. Because no monetary transfer can realistically
compensate the cost of children, including the opportunity costs,
nonmaterial motivation for parenthood remains the key issue. These
can also be influenced by government policies which try to remove
institutional and other obstacles for women to combine motherhood
with a professional career. In Sweden, the universal and low-cost
provision of public child-care starting at very young ages and easy
opportunities for part-time work may be important factors in ex-
plaining the high level of fertility.
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11.4.4 National identity and ethnic rivalry
While it cannot be expected that macroeconomic concerns, such as
the pension gap, influence individual reproductive behavior without
intervening public policies, this may well be the case with respect to
the issue of national identity. Fears related to the ethnic composition
of the population and ingroup-outgroup feelings can be powerful
emotional forces that may directly influence individual reproductive
behavior. Examples of this may be found in Israel, Northern Ireland,
and the Baltic states, where there is clear rivalry between two groups
of the population that seems to be associated with higher fertility
levels than could be expected from their socioeconomic standing and
comparison to other populations. One possible hypothesis is that
through international migration such rivalry may also affect other
industrialized countries. But there are strong counterexamples, such
as francophone Canadians, non-Hispanic Californians, or Germans
living in cities with many Turks, where ethnic-linguistic rivalry is
carried out by means other than fertility levels.
11.5 Arguments Assuming Lower Fertility
11.5.1 Trend toward individualism
According to the sociological theories of Durkheim (1902) and
T6nnies (1887) the process of "modernization" is characterized
by a transition from "community" (Gemeinschaft) to "society"
(Gesellschaft). While "community" refers to a lasting and complete
living together under a relatively stable structure, "society" means
a mere proximity of persons who are independent of one another
and is characterized by relatively open structures. In this process of
transition, an increasing number of functions that used to be met
by the family are now taken over by anonymous institutions. This
means an increase in equality and personal freedom, but also an
increase of individualism and a weakening of interpersonal bonds.
With respect to the future of the family, Hoffmann-Nowotny
(1987) assumes that the trend of increasing differentiation as well as
multiple and partial integration will continue, especially for women.
From a sociological point of view, he concludes that there is little
reason to believe that the family as we know it can and will survive
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as the mainstream model for future living patterns. This view is not
too different from the notion of a "second demographic transition"
put forward by Lestaeghe (1983) and van de Kaa (1987) to char-
acterize a new phase of demographic behavior that expresses itself
through lower marriage propensities, higher instability of unions,
increase in extramarital fertility, and lower total fertility.
Another psychological aspect of this supposed trend toward in-
dividualism is that men and women are increasingly reluctant to
make decisions which have long-term consequences and clearly limit
the future freedom of choice. The decision to have a child prede-
termines many choices for the next two decades, and makes sec-
ond thoughts impossible once the child is born. If the trend toward
greater mobility in all aspects of life continues, this might well mean
fewer responsible men and women daring to become parents.
There is little empirical basis to evaluate the validity of these
presumptions for the future, but they seem to be powerful arguments
and plausible explanations of recent trends. In the future it might
well happen that, if this trend goes to an extreme, counterforces
will be mobilized to compensate some of the negative aspects of this
trend. But a return to traditional patterns of "community" with
their restrictions on individual freedom is very unlikely. Most of
the following arguments are related to this general "continued mod-
ernization" argument, but they are mentioned individually because
they carry some specific weight in themselves.
11.5.2 Economic independence of women
One recent trend that has often been singled out as a dominating
feature of societal change is the increasing economic independence of
women. Female labor force participation has steeply been increas-
ing in virtually all industrialized countries over the past decades.
The increase has been strongest in Scandinavia, where labor force
participation is almost universal among adult women below age 50.
But female activity rates in North America are not much lower. In
Italy over the last decade, female labor force participation increased
by more than one-third. It seems obvious that this fundamental
change in the role and orientation of women with respect to eco-
nomic activity is connected to changing reproductive patterns. In-
creasing economic independence of women also tends to result in a
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postponement of marriage which typically is associated with lower
fertility.
One must be cautious, however, in pointing out female economic
activity as a major determinant of declining fertility. It may also
be that the lower desired number of children motivates women not
to stay at home but rather to enter the labor force, or there may
be a joint driving force behind both trends. This statement is sup-
ported by the evidence that in several countries fertility rates have
recently improved, despite very high and still increasing female la-
bor force participation. The key question in this multifaceted issue
seems to be how women can combine parenthood with participation
in the labor market (see, e.g., Kiernan, 1991). This may be a de-
cisive question for future European birth rates. Nevertheless, even
with flexible legal regulations and good child-care systems, working
women on average will not have very large families.
11.5.3 Instability of partnership
As described above, marital stability has been declining in all indus-
trialized countries. Part of the reason for this phenomenon clearly
lies in the increasing economic independence of women. Women are
no longer economically forced to stay in an unsatisfactory union if
they earn an independent income. Other reasons may lie in the gen-
eral increase in mobility in modern industrialized societies and in a
decreasing threshold in the level of dissatisfaction necessary to at-
tempt to change conditions. Whatever the social and psychological
reasons may be, a young couple today can count less on actually
staying together for 20 years, the minimum time required from the
children's perspective.
Increasing evidence from empirical studies (Kiernan, 1992)
shows that the separation of parents actually does more harm to
children than had been assumed in the past. Such effects range
from indicators of social behavior and intellectual performance to
happiness and feelings of security. Thus responsible prospective
parents who are sensitive about their children's likely psychologi-
cal well-being and would not like them to experience a trauma of
separation from one parent may decide not to have children, if they
have doubts about the stability of their partnership. This may be
true for marriages, but even more so for the increasing number of
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nonmarital unions which seem to have much lower stability, as in-
dicated by statistical data, e.g., in Sweden.
One possible counterargument would be that remarriage (or for-
mation of new nonmarital unions) may actually be an incentive to
have an additional child to strengthen the relationship with the new
partner. Although this may happen in individual cases, empirical
analysis on data cross-classified by marital status and number of
children for Finland (see Lutz, 1993) show that a slight effect ofthis
kind exists, but is clearly not significant for total fertility.
11.5.4 Consumerism and use of time
Commentators of the recent fertility decline often mention the in-
crease in consumerism as a basic underlying cause. Under this form
of materialism, people would supposedly rather invest in pleasure for
themselves than in children; they would rather buy a new car than
have another child; they would rather spend their time watching TV
than changing diapers. Underlying this view is the notion that hav-
ing children is work and not fun. As pointed out by Keyfitz (1991),
in earlier times couples had to work harder and more hours to earn
a living and still found the time to have many children. The extra
leisure time they have now is not being spent on having children.
Having children is defined as work and therefore one talks about its
opportunity cost. In the words of Keyfitz (1991:239): "No one com-
plains about the opportunity cost of having sex. Thus to talk about
opportunity cost of children indeed highlights the problem of non-
childbearing." He suggests thinking of a work-fun continuum and
trying to move childbearing toward the fun end of that continuum.
Whether or not childbearing, and especially childrearing, will
become a more favored leisure-time activity of men and women will
depend on the trade-offs between fun and burden. Some European
cities already have more dogs than children. Obviously the work-fun
balance is more favorable for pets, who mean less of a commitment
and in the worst case can always be given away. This argument
clearly suggests that unless the burden of having children is dimin-
ished or the rewards from children is enhanced, the balance will
continue to be negative for childbearing.
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11.5.5 Improving contraceptives
The final argument in this series is less concerned with changing
values but is at a more mechanical level. It is an empirical fact
that in all industrialized societies, a significant number of children
are born without being planned either for that specific time or at
all. Demographers often distinguish between timing failure (preg-
nancy too early) and quantum failure (unwanted pregnancy). Both
could be reduced by more efficient contraceptive use: for the latter
this would clearly imply lower fertility; for the former it is theoret-
ically neutral. In practice one can assume that a certain fraction
of the births categorized as timing failures may not have been real-
ized at a later point in time because of changing living conditions,
such as disruption of a union, a more demanding job. With respect
to unwanted pregnancies, Westoff et aZ. (1987) estimate that for a
number of low fertility countries, completely efficient contraception
would bring down fertility rates by somewhat less than 10 percent,
but would also have a significant effect in bringing down the number
of abortions.
Currently, we are still far from a perfect contraceptive that re-
quires no effort to use and has no negative side effects. An increasing
number of women report being tired of using the pill, yet sterilization
is not appealing to all (especially in continental Europe) because of
its irreversibility. This may have recently resulted (there is little
new empirical data yet) in an increase in the number of risk-takers
or couples practicing less reliable natural methods. A hypothetical
new perfect contraceptive without any side effects, which is only
taken once and then requires some reverse action to become preg-
nant, certainly would change the situation because in the numerous
cases of ambivalence and risk-taking this would clearly inhibit preg-
nancies which presently are still quite numerous. It will make quite
a difference for future fertility levels whether one must go to the
doctor to have a child or not to have a child, as is the case now.
11.6 Fertility Assumptions and Population
Heterogeneity
The above-stated arguments - and there are many more that are
not listed - suggesting the assumption of a tendency toward lower
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or higher future fertility levels have some degree of justification. All
these aspects will impact on future reproductive behavior in indus-
trialized countries, but it is unclear what the possible balance, the
synergism of these partly contradictory developments will be. For
this reason we cannot provide one estimate but can rather suggest
alternative scenario assumptions.
A probable situation is that the synergism of these various
trends will not result in a uniform pattern of childbearing in all pop-
ulation groups. Heterogeneity of reproductive behavior has been in-
creasing since the baby boom ofthe 1960s, and there is no indication
that this heterogeneity is likely to diminish. Quite the contrary, the
above-mentioned trend toward a societal structure labeled "society"
rather than "community" implies lower normative pressure toward
uniform behavioral patterns. There may be many subgroups and
subcultures in society that have quite different reproductive behav-
ior. On the other hand, it is often argued that mass media exert a
powerful force toward standardization. But with respect to fertility
it is not clear in which direction the standardization goes. Among
TV "protagonists" you find singles, childless couples, and traditional
families. It seems to be the case that the plurality of lifestyles is in
itself one of the key messages from the media.
Heterogeneity of the population has important impacts on de-
mographic dynamics. In mortality, heterogeneity affects the over-
all dynamics of the system through selection processes resulting in
changing weights of the subgroups. As to differential fertility -
aside from individual biological differences - subgroups with higher
fertility grow more rapidly and hence gain more weight in the pop-
ulation. Empirically this can be observed for certain high fertility
religious groups but also with respect to foreigners who have not
fully adapted to the host country's average fertility level. In Ger-
many, for instance, the recent slightly positive balance of births and
deaths was attributable to the large birth surplus offoreigners living
in Germany. While only 1 in 12 inhabitants of Germany is a for-
eigner, 1 in 8 children born has foreign citizenship. In other words,
without the foreigners the German fertility rate would still be lower.
Such considerations of heterogeneity also entered the final nu-
merical choice of fertility assumptions for the four industrialized
regions considered in this study. At least in the long run, fertility
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levels should not be seen independently from migration levels. For
this reason the population scenarios to the end of the next century
consider such interdependencies while the systematic permutation
scenarios until 2030 are based on the assumption of independence.
But in the assumed independent fertility level, heterogeneity result-
ing from past immigration levels is indirectly reflected.
Figure 11.5 shows the fertility assumptions for Western Europe
and North America together with the recent trend in total fertility
rates. The high, central, and low assumptions reflect different mixes
of the trends described above. The often-assumed replacement-
fertility level was not used as a benchmark because there is little
substantive reason for such a "magic" level. The low values of the
TFR to be reached by 2010, and then assumed to stay constant, are
1.3 in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Japan/Australia, and 1.4 in
North America. The assumed high values are 2.1 in Western Europe
and Japan/Australia, and 2.3 in Eastern Europe and North Amer-
ica. The range of uncertainty is assumed to be highest in Eastern
Europe, which is currently experiencing a profound transition, the
result of which is hardly predictable. The assumed central values
are always the arithmetic means of the low and high values. They
may be seen as the values with the greatest probability. In all cases
fertility levels for the period between 1990 and 2010 were derived
from linear interpolation starting from the 1990 values.
For the scenario calculations up to 2100, Le., more than a cen-
tury from today, a very different approach was chosen because fer-
tility in more than 100 years will hardly depend on today's fertility
level in a specific region. To propose an alternative to the ubiq-
uitous replacement fertility assumption, which is most prominent
in the World Bank's long-range projections, the long-term calcula-
tions in the Appendices of this volume assume fertility to be depen-
dent on the population density in the region. Within a predefined
range, it will be assumed that the lower the population density is,
the higher the fertility. This rationale, which has been inspired
by ecological considerations, needs to be discussed and evaluated
in a much broader context. Some empirical evidence, such as the
higher fertility in sparsely populated Scandinavia compared with
the fertility level in densely populated Central Europe, suggests
that the idea may at least be considered on an equal basis with the
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Figure 11.5. Total fertility rates since 1965 and assumptions until
2030 in North America and Western Europe.
replacement-level assumption that also has no behavioral theory be-
hind it. If this assumption of density dependence of the ultimate
fertility level helps initiate a discussion, it will have served part of
its purpose. In the long-range projections the assumptions will not
only be applied to the four regions of today's industrialized coun-
tries but also to the other world regions that are assumed to have
completed their demographic transition over the course of the next
century. More details on this are given in the projection chapters.
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Chapter 12
The Future of Mortality
at Older Ages in
Developed Countries
James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom
Death in developed countries usually strikes at older ages. In most
developed countries the life table probability of survival to age 65 is
over 75 percent for men and over 85 percent for women. Median life
table life spans typically exceed 75 years for men and 80 years for
women. Populations are aging, but even given current age distribu-
tions, about one-third of male deaths and half of female deaths in
developed countries occur after age 80.
Not only is mortality concentrated at advanced ages in devel-
oped countries, but uncertainty about the future of mortality in
these countries largely stems from uncertainty about the future of
death rates among the elderly. There may be some surprises in
trends at younger ages, analogous perhaps to the unanticipated epi-
demic of AIDS, but it seems plausible that the death rates at most
ages under 65 will continue to fall at rates of perhaps 1 or 2 percent
per year. In some countries for some subpopulations and in some
age categories - e.g., males in their 20s - death rates may rise some-
what, at least in the short term. In the longer term, however, any
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such rise in mortality will produce public health responses that will
probably lead to mortality improvements.
Whether or not it will be possible to continue to reduce death
rates at older ages is, in contrast, an open and highly controver-
sial question. Many gerontologists and demographers believe that
death rates at advanced ages cannot be substantially reduced and
that life expectancy will not increase beyond 85 years (Fries, 1980;
Fries et al., 1989; Olshansky et al., 1990; Lohman et al., 1992; Har-
man, 1991; Hayflick, 1977; Bourgeois-Pichat, 1978; Keyfitz, 1978;
Demeny, 1984). Most deaths after age 80 are taken to be natural,
senescent deaths due to intrinsic, intractable aging process. Little,
then, can be done about saving lives (Le., substantially postpon-
ing deaths) among the oldest-old. Opinions differ about whether
this barrier to progress is due primarily to biological causes or to
practical impediments, but the canonical view is that death rates
at advanced ages in developed countries are close to limits that can
only be relaxed by fundamental and currently unforeseeable break-
throughs in slowing the process of aging itself. This assumption
underlies the long-term mortality forecasts published by the World
Bank, the United Nations, and many national statistical offices.
Other researchers are skeptical about the existence of an upper
limit to life expectancy, at least at an age as early as 85. They fore-
see continuing and perhaps even accelerating progress in reducing
mortality rates at all ages, including the most advanced ages (Man-
ton et al., 1991). Some projections suggest that the life expectancy
of the current generation of children in the United States might be
100 years or more if progress in reducing mortality rates continues
over the next century (Vaupel and Gowan, 1986; Guralnik et al.,
1988).
If progress can be made, growth of the oldest-old population will
quicken, with major economic and social consequences, including es-
calation of the cost of public health care and retirement programs.
Progress is most important at the ages when most deaths occur; it is
the weighted average of age-specific rates of mortality improvement,
with weights corresponding to the product of death counts and re-
maining life expectancy, that determines change in life expectancy.
As a rule of thumb, an average rate of improvement of 1 percent
would yield an increase of one year in life expectancy per decade;
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an average progress rate of 2 percent would yield a two-year increase
per decade (Vaupel, 1986). At current mortality levels a newborn
girl in most developed countries has a life expectancy of about 80
years. If progress in reducing mortality rates could be maintained
at an average of 1 percent per year, then her life expectancy would
be about 90 years. Sustained 2 percent progress would imply that
the typical newborn girl in developed countries will live to celebrate
her 100th birthday (Vaupel and Owen, 1986; Vaupel and Gowan,
1986).
Such an increase in female life expectancy and a corresponding
increase in male life expectancy would result in a radical increase in
the number of persons at advanced ages. For instance, according to
one projection for the United States that assumes 2 percent annual
progress (Ahlburg and Vaupel, 1990), the population above age 85
could increase from 3 million in 1990 to 72 million in 2080. This
figure may be contrasted with the estimate of 17 million persons in
the "middle projection" of the US Bureau of the Census (Spencer,
1989), which assumes much lower rates of mortality improvement,
especially after 2005.
The conjunction of these three considerations - most deaths in
developed countries occur at older ages, future trends in death rates
at older ages are particularly uncertain, and alternative trends have
very different demographic implications - suggests that studies of
the future of mortality in developed countries should pay particular
attention to the future of death rates at older ages. In this chap-
ter we therefore review the reasons for the uncertainty surrounding
the future of death rates at older ages and then present some new
evidence based on Swedish data.
12.1 85 or 100+?
A major biomedical uncertainty lies at the core of the disagreement
between those who foresee life expectancy leveling off at about 80 or
85 years and those who predict more radical increases to a century
or more. Does the force of mortality (Le., the age-specific hazard
of death) sharply and inexorably rise for the typical individual to
extremely high levels around age 85 or increase after age 85 at about
the same rate or even at a slower rate than before age 85, with the
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likelihood that the rate of progress being made in reducing the force
of mortality among the very old will be of the same magnitude as
the rate of progress being made among the younger old?
The first perspective implies that life spans are limited. Indi-
viduals may differ somewhat in their maximum potential life spans,
with some individuals having a potential of 100 years and others a
potential of 75 years. On average, however, the typical individual's
longevity is unlikely to exceed the natural limit of 85 years or so that
has prevailed. Most of those who adhere to this perspective believe
that continued progress in reducing mortality rates up to age 75 or
so is likely to be made, so that death before age 75 will become
rare. Consequently, life expectancy will approach the length of the
typical maximum life span, i.e., about 85 years. Eventually, some
extraordinary breakthroughs may be made that permit humans to
live beyond their natural life spans, but when such breakthroughs
will occur, if ever, is uncertain.
This general point of view is often illustrated with diagrams
showing an increasing rectangularization of survivorship curves or
showing bell-shaped distributions, centered at age 85, of what Fries
(1983) describes as "natural death (due to senescent frailty)." Such
survivorship curves and distributions of deaths imply that little or
no progress can be made in reducing death rates after age 80.
The second perspective implies that the force of mortality rises
fairly smoothly to very advanced ages exceeding 100 years or more;
there is no sharp increase for the typical individual around age 85,
and there may even be some gradual lessening of the rate of increase
after age 90 (as implied by the power function or the logistic function
used instead of an exponential function in some models of mortality).
Furthermore, there is no discontinuity around age 85 in the rate of
progress that is likely to be made in reducing the force of mortality,
so that substantial reductions in mortality rates will probably be
achieved at all ages. Consequently, life expectancy will continue
to gradually but steadily increase and may rise to 90, 95, or even
longer by the year 2050. Major biomedical breakthroughs are likely
over the course of the next century, although the exact nature and
significance of these breakthroughs cannot now be foreseen: these
breakthroughs may result in some acceleration in the rate of progress
made in reducing the force of mortality, so that a life expectancy of
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well over 100 years less than 100 years from now cannot be ruled
out. In contrast to the limited life-span paradigm, this might be
called the mortality-reduction paradigm.
Given current knowledge, no judicious researcher can claim to
know for sure which of these two paradigms is more correct -
or whether some combination of them or some entirely different
perspective will eventually prove to be true. Furthermore, each
paradigm has numerous variants that have not yet been conclusively
shown to be inconsistent with reliable empirical evidence.
Broadly speaking and with many caveats, the limited life-
span paradigm can be associated with the stream of research done
by Pearson (1897), Pearl (1923), Clarke (1950), Bourgeois-Pichat
(1952, 1978), Comfort (1964), Ryder (1975), Hayflick (1977, 1980),
Sacher (1977), Keyfitz (1978), Kohn (1982), and their colleagues.
The most prominent advocate and popularizer of this general per-
spective is Fries (1980, 1983, 1984; Fries and Crapo, 1981; Fries
et al., 1989); useful reviews are also provided by Rosenfeld (1976)
and Gavrilov and Gavrilova (1991). These researchers generally as-
sume that there are biological barriers to longer life expectancy; in
contrast, Olshansky et ai. (1990) stress practical barriers that may
effectively limit life expectancy to values less than 85. Whether
the barriers are practical or genetic is, however, rarely explicitly
addressed: in much of the gerontological literature it is simply ac-
cepted as a stylized fact that natural or senescent death implies
that mortality rates cannot be substantially reduced at advanced
ages. Harman (1991) and Lohman et al. (1992) provide two recent
examples of the strength and persistence of this point of view.
The possibility that the mortality-reduction paradigm may be
more correct is implied by most of the process models of mortality
developed from Gompertz (1825) onward. This viewpoint has been
cogently argued by Manton (1982; Manton and Soldo, 1985; Man-
ton and Woodbury, 1987; Myers and Manton, 1984; Manton et al.,
1991), and is supported either explicitly or implicitly by Schatzkin
(1980), Schneider and Brody (1983), Peto et al. (1986), Vaupel and
Owen (1986), Vaupel and Gowan (1986), Schneider and Guralnik
(1987), Poterba and Summers (1987), and Rowe and Kahn (1987).
The key reason that the controversy between the limited life-
span and mortality-reduction paradigms has not been resolved is
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that there is relatively little reliable data on mortality rates over
age, time, and sex among the oldest-old (Le., after age 85). Indeed,
it is remarkable how little is known considering the rapidly increas-
ing population at advanced ages and the high life table probability,
approaching 50 percent for females in some countries, of survival
past age 85.
Very few published human life tables extend past age 85, and
the population and death counts that are available for the oldest-old
tend to be suspect. As reviewed by numerous demographers (includ-
ing Shryock and Siegel, 1976; Mazess and Forman, 1979; Rosen-
waike, 1981; Horiuchi and Coale, 1983; Spencer, 1986; Coale and
Kisker, 1986, 1990; Kannisto, 1988), various kinds of gross errors are
common in reported age-specific deaths and population sizes above
age 85. These errors - such as age-heaping caused by rounding off
ages to the nearest age divisible by five or ten, the tendency of some
older people to falsify their age, the fact that relatively few errors in
misclassifying younger people as very old people can swamp actual
counts of very old people, or failures to remove the deceased from
population registers so that the dead appear to survive eternally -
may represent systematic biases across populations. Hence it may
be impossible to reduce these errors by the usual statistical expedi-
ent of examining many data sets and either formally or informally
averaging them. It is consequently essential that large, reliable data
bases on oldest-old human mortality be assembled and analyzed.
The most reliable data on mortality rates up to the most ad-
vanced ages over a long period of time pertain to Sweden. Excel-
lent data exist for Sweden since 1750; superlative data have been
archived since 1895. The published Swedish data that are readily
available are highly accurate, but even these data have some defi-
ciencies at advanced ages. In particular, a large part ofthe published
data has been smoothed by actuarial methods after age 90 or so, and
the most widely available mortality rates are based on aggregated
data on several years of age and time rather than by single years of
age and time. Furthermore, the data, once published, have not been
revised as new information (from censuses or cohort death counts)
has become available.
Using unpublished information in the archives of Statistics Swe-
den, one of the authors (Hans Lundstrom) is in the process of
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meticulously verifying, correcting, and computerizing the death
counts and population counts needed to estimate mortality rates
at advanced ages in Sweden from 1750 to 1992. For this presenta-
tion, we made use of a nearly completed version of the data base
for 1895 to 1990. Minor changes may be made to a few of the death
and population counts in this data base, but the version used is
undoubtedly extremely close to the final version.
12.2 Force of Mortality at 85, 90, and 95
Figure 12.1 plots the force of mortality for Swedish females at ages
85,90, and 95 from 1900 through 1990. Other ages between 80 and
100 show similar patterns.
The force of mortality, also known as the hazard or intensity of
death, is a measure favored by demographers to capture the level of
mortality. It is defined, at age x and time y, by
/-L(x) = _ ds(x, y)jdx
s(x, y) ,y = Yo +x ,
where s( x, y) is the proportion of the cohort born x years ago that
is surviving at time y and Yo is the time the cohort was born. The
Swedish data are available by single years of age and time, so a
discrete approximation must be used to estimate /-L. We used the
standard approximation
/-L(x,y) = -In[l- D(x,y)jN(x,y)] ,
where D(x, y) represents the number of deaths among the cohort of
people who were between exact ages x - 1 and x on January 1 of
year y and N (x, y) represents the number of people in this cohort
on January 1. It should be noted that the members of this cohort
attain exact age x (Le., celebrate their x-th birthday) over the course
of year y. Also in- and out-migration is ignored: net migration is
negligible in Sweden after age 80.
Population sizes are small, especially at age 95, so the trajec-
tories in Figure 12.1 show considerable random fluctuation. The
overall trends, however, are clear. There was little progress in re-
ducing the force of mortality at advanced ages before 1940 or 1950.
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Figure 12.1. Force of mortality for females, ages 85, 90, and 95,
Sweden: 1900-1990.
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Figure 12.2. Force of mortality for males, ages 85, 90, and 95,
Sweden: 1900-1990.
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Table 12.1. Average annual rates of progress in reducing mortality
rates in various age categories and over various time periods.
Age 1900-09 to 1920-29 to 1940-49 to 1960-69 to
Sex category 1920-29 1940-49 1960-69 1980-89
Males 60-69 0.50 0.44 0.28 0.62
70-79 0.37 0.20 0.19 0.62
80-89 0.36 0.13 0.36 0.53
90-99 0.27 0.11 0.36 0.56
100+ 1.76 -1.07 0.97 0.18
Females 60-69 0.24 0.61 1.88 1.63
70-79 0.18 0.22 1.25 2.08
80-89 0.19 0.10 0.78 1.64
90-99 0.13 0.03 0.60 0.94
100+ 0.23 0.41 0.80 0.49
Afterward, the force of mortality declined considerably, even at age
95. At age 85 the force of mortality declined from about 0.2 to
about 0.1. At age 90 the decline was from a level of about 0.3 to
about 0.2. An absolute decline on the order of magnitude of 0.1,
from about 0.4 to about 0.3, is also apparent at age 95.
As shown in Figure 12.2, the trends for Swedish males are
roughly similar although less dramatic. It is clear that the force
of mortality for very old males in Sweden was substantially lower in
1990 than it was in 1900, although the reduction was less for males
than for females and the levels of mortality were higher for males
than for females. At each age, the absolute decline for males was on
the order of magnitude of 0.05 in contrast to the decline of roughly
0.1 for females.
12.3 Average Annual Rates of Progress in
Redueing Mortality Rates
To summarize the overall pattern of reduction, Table 12.1 presents
average annual rates of progress in reducing the force of mortality
for Swedish females and males over successive 20-year time peri-
ods and for people in their 60s and 70s as well as octogenarians,
nonagenarians, and centenarians.
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For males and for females, the average level of the force of mor-
tality over a decade of time and age was calculated as follows:
Yo+9 xo+9L L N(x)J-L(x,y)
Y-Yo X=Xo
Jl(xo,yo) = Yo+9xo+9
L LN(x)
Y=Yo X=Xo
In this equation N is used to standardize the age composition
of the population. We calculated N from the population of Sweden
in the 1980s:
1989
N(x) = L N(x,y)
y=1980
The values of J-L( x, y) were calculated as described above. If the
death count equaled the population count, then the standard ap-
proximation J-L equals 2 was used. Occasionally, at ages greater than
100, it was impossible to estimate J-L for some specific years because
no one was alive at that age and year. In such cases, the J-L term
was dropped from the numerator and a corresponding correction
was made in the denominator. The average annual rate of progress
in reducing the force of mortality was then calculated using
p(xo,Yo) = _ {[Jl(xo,Yo +20)]°·05 _ I}
J-L(x o, Yo) •
Table 12.1 indicates that progress has been made in Sweden in
reducing the force of mortality at all ages after 60 for both males
and females. Estimated rates of progress fluctuate erratically for
centenarian males, probably because there are so few observations
in this category, but even so the general trend is toward a reduction
in mortality rates. For females and for younger age categories, the
picture is clear: mortality rates among the elderly are declining
in Sweden and at a faster pace in recent decades than in the first
decades of the century.
For males in the most recent time period, the rate of progress is
roughly the same - about half a percent per year - for men in their
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60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. For females in the most recent time period,
the rate of progress is about 2 percent for women in their 70s and
half as much for women in their 90s. However, the rate of progress
for women in their 80s is the same, 1.6 percent, as that for women
in their 60s.
If rates of progress in the first 20 years of the century are com-
pared with the most recent 20-year period, it is apparent that there
has been a considerable acceleration of rates of progress. The accel-
eration is greater for females than for males. The acceleration is also
greater in older age categories than in younger ones, at least in the
age categories below age 100, where there are substantial numbers
of observations.
The overall acceleration in rates of progress and the greater ac-
celeration at older ages may reflect actual changes at the individual
level: the elderly today may be healthier than in the past, and they
may be receiving better health care. A supplemental explanation
was suggested by Vaupel et aZ. (1979). Progress in reducing mortal-
ity rates at younger ages makes it more difficult to make progress
at subsequent ages if the persons whose lives are saved are frail and
vulnerable. In effect, progress in reducing cohort mortality rates at
younger ages masks the true rate of progress (controlling for com-
positional changes) at older ages. As, however, mortality rates in an
age category decline, this effect diminishes in importance, resulting
in an apparent acceleration in rates of progress.
12.4 Lexis Maps of Force of Mortality
Another way to summarize data concerning a surface of demographic
rates over age and time is to present a Lexis map, i.e., a shaded con-
tour map of the surface (Vaupel et az', 1987). Figure 12.3 displays
a Lexis map of the force of mortality for Swedish females at ages 80
to 111 and from 1900 through 1990. Figure 12.4 displays a corre-
sponding map for Swedish males.
The data available include death counts by year of birth as well
as by current age and year. Furthermore, the data include popula-
tion counts of those attaining a specific age in some year (e.g., the
number of those who celebrated their 85th birthday in 1970) as well
as counts of the number of people at a given age on January 1 of a
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Figure 12.4. Force of mortality for males, ages 80-111. Sweden:
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Mortality at Older Ages in Developed Countries 307
given year. Hence it is possible to estimate the force of mortality for
triangular categories of age and time. Let q = D / N be the ratio of
the death count to the population at risk in one of these triangles.
To convert this to an annual probability of death, let
q* = 1 - (1 - q)2 .
Then, analogous to the formula used earlier, the force of mor-
tality can be estimated by
Jl = -In(l - q*) .
The four shades of gray in Figures 12.3 and 12.4 represent four
levels of this estimated force of mortality. The light gray tones along
diagonals above age 100, terminated by a black triangle, generally
represent cohorts with one remaining member: the force of mortality
is zero until this person dies.
Consider the age at which the force of mortality for females
crosses the level of 0.125, as shown in Figure 12.3. Until 1945 or
so, this age is around 81; by 1990 the age is up around 87. One
interpretation of this is that an 87-year-old Swedish female in 1990
was as healthy (at least in terms of probability of death) as an 81-
year-old Swedish female in the first four decades of the 20th century.
The age at which the force of mortality for females crosses the level of
0.250 increases by about five years from a level fluctuating around 89
to a level of 94. Despite substantial statistical noise, a shift upward
is also apparent at the level of 0.5, and there is also a clear increase
in the maximum age attained. The record longevity is 111 years,
attained by the grandmother of an employee of Statistics Sweden.
For males, as shown in Figure 12.4, the surface of mortality
rates is higher than for females. Furthermore, the upward shift is less
substantial at the 0.125, 0.25, and 0.5 levels and in the maximum age
attained. Nonetheless, it is clear that there has been a definite shift
on the order of three years. As noted above, this can be interpreted
as the result of a downward shift in mortality curves or, alternatively,
as a delay in the aging process: elderly Swedish males in 1990 can
be considered to be three years younger (in terms of their risk of
death) than Swedish males of the same age in the first part of this
century.
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Table 12.2. Age when remaining life expectancy is two years or
five years.
Two years left Five years left
Period Males Females Males Females
1900-1909 93.9 95.3 80.5 81.7
1910-1919 94.1 95.7 80.7 81.8
1920-1929 95.3 96.1 81.2 82.0
1930-1939 94.4 95.4 80.9 81.5
1940-1949 95.0 96.9 81.6 82.3
1950-1959 95.9 97.3 81.8 82.9
1960~1969 96.3 99.0 82.5 84.0
1970-1979 97.6 99.7 83.2 85.8
1980-1989 98.1 100.1 83.7 86.7
12.5 Remaining Life Expectancy
A final perspective on the decline in oldest-old mortality rates in
Sweden is presented in Table 12.2. For the various decades from
1900 until 1990, the table gives, for males and females, the age when
remaining life expectancy is two years and the age when remaining
life expectancy is five years.
The numbers given are based on decennial life tables. The age-
specific mortality rates, for single years of age, that form the basis
of these life tables were calculated using the following formula:
Yo+9L D(x,y)
Y=Yo
q(x, Yo) = Yo+9
L N(x,y)
Y=Yo
where, unlike above, D(x, y) now represents the number of deaths
of people who attain exact age x in year y and N(x, y) represents
the number of people who attain age x in year y.
It should be noted that in Table 12.2, for both males and females
and when remaining life expectancy is either two years or five years,
there was little net change between the decade from 1900 to 1909 and
the decade from 1930 to 1939. From the 1930s to the 1980s, however,
the shifts were substantial. For males, the age when two years of
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life expectancy are left increased by almost four years, from 94.4 to
98.1. For females, the corresponding shift was close to five years,
from 95.4 to 100.1. The age at which remaining life expectancy is
five years increased for males by almost three years, from 80.9 to
83.7. For females, the increase was five years, from 81.5 to 86.7.
As suggested earlier, one interpretation of these shifts is that
the process of aging has been slowed or delayed in Sweden such that
elderly Swedish men are effectively three or four years younger than
they used to be, and elderly Swedish females are five years younger.
Caution is required because these figures are based entirely on mor-
tality statistics, with no information about morbidity or disability.
Nonetheless, treated judiciously, this perspective suggests that cer-
tainly mortality, and perhaps health more generally, is plastic even
at the most advanced ages. It has been possible, at least in Sweden,
to lower the force of mortality and to significantly postpone death
even among the oldest-old.
12.6 Discussion
Swedish life expectancy has been among the very longest in the
world for many decades. If progress can be made in Sweden in low-
ering mortality rates at advanced ages, then the contention that
oldest-old mortality rates cannot be significantly reduced seems
questionable. Using highly reliable data, we presented four perspec-
tives on mortality changes in Sweden since 1900 among the elderly.
As shown in Figures 12.1 and 12.2, the force of mortality at ages
85, 90, and 95 has substantially declined, especially since 1945, and
more for females than for males. As shown in Table 12.1, rates of
progress in reducing mortality rates among the elderly have acceler-
ated over the course of the century, and from the 1960s to the 1980s
ran at an average annual rate of 1 to 2 percent for females and half
a percent for males. As shown in Figures 12.3 and 12.4, the age at
which the force of mortality attains the levels of 0.125,0.25, and 0.5
has shifted upward substantially since 1945, by about five years for
females and three years for males. Finally, as shown in Table 12.2,
the age when remaining life expectancy reaches two years or five
years has also shifted upward, by about five years for females and
three or four years for males. These four perspectives are consistent
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with each other. They indicate that the theory that oldest-old mor-
tality rates cannot be significantly reduced is incorrect.
A variety of other strands of evidence, reviewed by Manton et
al. (1991), point in the same direction. Most of this evidence per-
tains to small special populations followed for short periods of time
or is based on the results of sophisticated mathematical modeling.
The evidence from Sweden is highly reliable, pertains to a sizable
national population followed since 1900, and is so straightforward
that it does not have to be filtered through a statistical model.
The available evidence, taken together, suggests that if historical
rates of progress in reducing mortality rates continue to prevail in
the future, today's newborns can expect to live about 90 years on
average. If, as health and biomedical knowledge develops, progress
accelerates so that age-specific mortality rates come down at an
average rate of about 2 percent per year, then the typical newborn
in developed countries will live to celebrate his or her 100th birthday.
If our children survive to become centenarians, what will their
health be like during their extra life span? Will the added years be
active, healthy years or years of decrepitude, disability, and misery?
The answer to this question is central to forecasting the impact of
population aging on health and social needs and costs, on retirement
decisions and policies, and on other questions in the economics of
aging, but very little is currently known about what the answer
might be.
12.7 Conclusion
Let us return now to the original question: What is the future of
mortality in developed countries? It has been argued that the an-
swer to this question hinges on a narrower question: What is the
future of mortality at older ages? This question in turn hinges on
the question: Is it possible to substantially reduce death rates after
age 80? The Swedish data, together with other data reviewed by
Manton et al. (1991), indicate that it is possible. However, whether
progress in reducing mortality rates will continue at historical levels
or even accelerate is, of course, an open question.
Biomedical research may fail to continue to produce the ad-
vances needed to reduce mortality rates. Social and economic
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conditions may become unfavorable to further improvements. En-
vironmental conditions may substantially deteriorate. Nuclear war
may kill millions or even billions. New diseases, like AIDS, may
decimate populations.
On the other hand, the acceleration of mortality improvement at
older ages may continue, so that mortality rates may fall not at 1 or 2
percent per year but at 3 or 4 percent per year over the course of the
21st century. Biological, medical, and gerontological breakthroughs
could lead to considerable extensions of the human life span. The
life sciences may be poised at roughly the point the physical sciences
were at a century ago, and biological innovations comparable to
electricity, automobiles, television, rockets, and computers may be
forthcoming. Fundamental advances could occur over the next few
decades in genetic engineering, in the prevention and treatment of
such diseases as arteriosclerosis, cancer, or diabetes, and perhaps
even in understanding and controlling human aging itself.
The future is not just uncertain: it is surprisingly uncertain.
As Ascher (1978), Keyfitz (1981), Stoto (1983), and others reviewed
by Ahlburg and Land (1992) have demonstrated, the actual course
of demographic events often leads to outcomes beyond the most
extreme projections. Consequently, forecasts ought to include wide
bands of uncertainty that spread outward at an accelerating pace
into the more and more distant future.
Recent research by Lee (1992), Lee and Carter (1992), and Tul-
japurkar (1992) provides a good starting point. Using time-series
methods, Lee and Carter project life expectancy in the United
States, with confidence bands. Their forecast is that life expectancy
at birth in the United States in 2065 will be around 86 years with
a 95 percent confidence interval of plus or minus 4 or 5 years. This
projection, however, is based entirely on analysis of historical trends
of US data. The future of developed countries may not be like the
past of the United States: that is an important source of addi-
tional uncertainty. The results presented above for Sweden plus the
research summarized ,by Manton et al. (1991) suggest that future
improvements in death rates at older ages may be more rapid than
in the past.
Taking those two considerations into account and using meth-
ods of subjective probability assessment (as explained, e.g., in Behn
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and Vaupel, 1982), a more judicious guesstimate might be that life
expectancy in the typical developed country in 2065 is not 86 plus
or minus 4 or 5 but perhaps the following. There is a 50/50 chance
that life expectancy will be above or below 92. There is a 50 per-
cent chance that life expectancy will be between 85 and 100 and a
50 percent chance it will be outside this range. There is a 5 percent
chance that life expectancy will be below its current level of about
75 and a 5 percent chance that it will exceed the current record
longevity of 120. This is speculation, as are all predictions, but it is
informed speculation that takes into account our vast ignorance of
what breakthroughs or catastrophes the future might bring.
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Editor's Note for Part IV
The nature of uncertainties in fertility and mortality in today's in-
dustrialized countries is very different from that in developing re-
gions. For future trends in life expectancy the relevant questions
are what will happen to old age mortality and is life expectancy
already approaching an upper limit. This is a highly controver-
sial issue in the present scientific discussion. The Swedish evidence
presented in Chapter 12 suggests that mortality at very high ages
also shows a declining trend, and that there is no good reason to
assume that a limit will soon be reached. In our scenarios this op-
timistic view is translated into an assumed increase of three years
of life expectancy per decade. The alternative view of stagnating
improvements is reflected in the low assumption of only one year
of improvement per decade. The central assumption is two years.
Among industrialized regions, the uncertainty seems to be greatest
in Eastern Europe, where life expectancy has recently stagnated or
even declined. This stagnation either could continue or, under bet-
ter socioeconomic conditions, could even close some of the gap to
Western mortality conditions.
As to fertility, even in industrialized countries the direction of
future change is unclear. Fertility could further decline if certain
social trends such as increasing individualism and consumerism con-
tinue. On the other hand, fertility may increase to replacement level
or above if certain counterforces such as community orientation be-
come stronger and social services that make it easier for women to
combine motherhood and work are improved. Nevertheless more
factors seem to point toward lower fertility, but the issue remains
open. This can be translated into possible low values of 1.3-1.4 chil-
dren and high values of 2.1-2.3 children per woman depending on
the specific region.
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Chapter 13
Migration to and from
Developing Regions: A
Review of Past Trends
Hania Zlotnik
At least since the "discovery" of the Americas in 1492, interconti-
nental migration has been a key factor influencing the demographic
evolution of the developing world. During the first decades of this
century, the major international flows originated in Europe and were
directed mostly to the "New World," that is, to the overseas coun-
tries of permanent resettlement and certain Latin American coun-
tries. Despite the dampening effects of the two world wars and the
Depression, major intercontinental flows continued to be dominated
by Europeans until the early 1960s. Since then, migration from de-
veloping to developed countries has been growing and important
interregional flows within the developing world have also gained
prominence. This chapter provides a comprehensive view of the
main migration flows either originating in or directed toward seven
developing regions, namely, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and
West Asia, South Asia, China, the rest of developing Asia (called
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.
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East and Southeast Asia), Central America and the Caribbean, and
South America.[l]
The task of quantifying migration to and from the regions is
far from straightforward. A variety of data sources must be used to
piece together the facets of the phenomenon. The lack of compara-
bility between data sources severely constrains the types of estimates
that can be derived, so that in most cases only rough indications of
the magnitude of flows can be presented. On the other hand, the
use of major regions as units of analysis precludes the need to con-
sider every flow between developing countries. Most flows occurring
between neighboring countries, which are often the main sources of
migrants in specific countries, are excluded from the analysis.
Given the state of international migration statistics, more infor-
mation is available on migration to and from developed regions than
on that between developing regions. Therefore, most of the quanti-
tative analysis presented in this chapter focuses on statistics derived
from developed countries. Problems arising from lack of quantitative
information on a given flow are pointed out as appropriate. Before
proceeding with the presentation of migration estimates from a com-
parative perspective, an overview of the main data sources used and
their limitations is provided.
13.1 The Statistics Used
13.1.1 The universe covered
There are basically two different sources of information on inter-
national migration: those producing data on the stock of migrants
at a given time and those producing statistics on the flow of im-
migrants or emigrants over a given period. Clearly, the latter are
the most useful in tracking the evolution of migration through time
and thus providing the basis to project it. However, whereas ad-
equate estimates of migrant stocks can be obtained from censuses
that may be carried out at relatively lengthy intervals, the availabil-
ity of flow statistics depends on the existence of relatively sophisti-
cated data-collection systems that must function continuously. Only
a few countries have those systems in place, and both their existence
and adequacy are highly correlated with whether a country considers
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itself to be a recipient of immigrants or a sender of emigrants. In-
deed, most countries that gather information on migration on a con-
tinuous basis do so for administrative purposes and, consequently,
tend to identify migrants on the basis of administrative or regula-
tory principles rather than on demographic ones (Zlotnik, 1987).
The USA, for instance, gathers information on immigrants defined
as aliens granted the right of permanent residence. Since that right
may be granted to aliens who are already present in the country
under a temporary permit, the number of immigrants admitted an-
nually by the USA is not equivalent to the number of new arrivals
of aliens. In contrast, the statistics gathered on aliens granted only
temporary permission to stay in the USA refer to their entries into
the country. Consequently, to the extent that some such persons
enter the USA several times during a year, the statistics available
overestimate the number of persons involved.
Aside from data on permanent immigration to the United
States, this chapter makes use of those available for the other coun-
tries of permanent resettlement, namely, Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand. Information on immigration to Israel is also used,
together with those available for European countries having flow
statistics, namely, Belgium, Germany (the data refer only to the
former West Germany), the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Selected data on immigration to France are also used.
The data for Canada resemble those available for the United
States, because they reflect only the number of foreigners who are
granted the right of permanent residence. Australian and New
Zealand statistics are gathered at the time of entry and conform
better to demographic concepts. The Australian data in this chap-
ter refer to the arrivals of persons admitted as permanent settlers
and to their permanent departures. For New Zealand, the data also
reflect the number of arrivals of permanent immigrants and their de-
partures when they intend to stay away permanently. In all cases,
the data are classified by place of birth. No emigration data are
available for either Canada or the USA.
In the case of Israel, the data used represent the number of immi-
grants and the so-called potential immigrants entering the country
and classified by place of birth. Although some statistics on depar-
tures are gathered by the Israeli government, they are not tabulated
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by place of birth, thus precluding the estimation of net migration
by region of origin.
In France, l'Office National d'Immigration (aNI), which became
in 1988 1'Office des Migrations Internationales (aMI), has been in
charge of gathering statistics on the number of migrant workers
and their families being "introduced" into the country. However,
since the data are gathered through control procedures from which
many migrants are exempt by law, they have generally been in-
complete. In particular, after Algeria became independent in 1962,
Algerians have been subject to a special immigration regime that
has precluded a statistical accounting of their inflow (Tribalat and
Munoz-Perez, 1989). Given that France is a major receiving coun-
try of citizens from the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia) and Turkey, statistics on both workers and family members
from those countries are used as indicative of migration from North
Africa and West Asia to France. The data regarding Algerians have
been derived from estimates presented by Benamrane (1983) and
Tapinos (1975). It must be noted that aMI statistics include both
new arrivals and persons regularizing their status after being present
in France for a time.
Several European countries gathering information on migration
flows do so as part of the normal operation of their population regis-
ters (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Therefore,
the definition of immigrant and emigrant is derived in each case
from the rules establishing who can be added to or deleted from the
register. In the Netherlands a person is removed from the register
when he or she intends to stay abroad for at least a year. However,
Dutch citizens who have been abroad are inscribed in the register
when they intend to stay in the Netherlands for at least one month
and aliens are inscribed if they intend to stay for at least six months
(Verhoef, 1986). Statistics on immigrants and emigrants are appar-
ently adjusted to take into account only persons who intend to stay
in the country or out of it for a year or more (Schoorl and Voets,
1990).
In Belgium, an emigrant is someone coming from abroad and
intending to establish permanent residence in the country, whereas
an emigrant is someone giving up permanent residence (UN, 1978).
Similarly, in Germany, an immigrant is a person coming into the
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country to establish residence and an emigrant is a person departing
and intending to give up residence in the country (UN, 1978). In
both cases, "residence" is a legal concept that remains ill-defined
since it is not clear under what circumstances foreigners are allowed
to establish residence.
In Sweden, incoming persons must register if they intend to
stay in the country for at least a year and those leaving must de-
register if they intend to stay abroad for a year or more. Different
definitions, however, are applied to immigrants and emigrants from
Nordic countries in order to harmonize registration practices among
them (Nilsson, 1990).
In the United Kingdom, information on immigration and emi-
gration is gathered via the International Passenger Survey (IPS), a
survey of travelers entering or leaving the United Kingdom by the
principal air and sea routes. The IPS has been operational since
1964 and, although it gathers information on both British and for-
eign travelers, persons moving between the United Kingdom and
Ireland are beyond its scope (Haskey et ai., 1989). The IPS is based
on definitions of immigrant and emigrant consistent with United
Nations standards, using an intended stay of over a year and an
intended absence of over a year to identify each group, respectively.
It must be noted that both the systems based on population reg-
isters and the British IPS gather information on both immigration
and emigration. Furthermore, similar coverage is extended to citi-
zens and aliens. Consequently, there are major differences between
the data produced by such systems and those yielded by the admin-
istrative records used by Canada, France, or the USA. Aside from
the fact that the latter records lack information on emigration, both
of nationals and foreigners, their statistics are only rough indicators
of true population flows. Indeed, in the USA, a major problem of in-
terpretation has arisen lately because normal immigration statistics
have been artificially swollen by the regularization of undocumented
aliens carried out under the provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.
According to the IRCA, two groups of undocumented aliens
could legalize their status (US Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 1991). The first and larger group consisted of persons who
could prove that they had been present in the USA since before
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1 January 1982 and who began regularizing their status in 1989.
The second group consisted of "special agricultural workers" who
had to prove that they had worked in agriculture at least 90 days
during each of the three years preceding 1 May 1986 and who be-
came eligible to start adjusting their status to permanent resident
on 1 December 1989. Therefore, although these two groups began
appearing in the immigration statistics only in 1989, the first entry
of the former group must have taken place before 1982 and that of
the latter group before 1984. Since other evidence suggests that il-
legal immigration to the United States grew significantly during the
1970s, the data presented here have been estimated assuming that
those persons regularizing their status during 1989-1992 as part of
the first group entered during 1972-1991. Their entries over that pe-
riod were distributed according to a linearly increasing trend. That
assumption is validated, to a certain extent, by the terms of the reg-
ularization drive itself. With regard to special agricultural workers,
however, assumptions about their entry and stay in the USA are
less straightforward, particularly because many fraudulent applica-
tions were reportedly filed. Thus the group of migrants regularized
under the special agricultural worker program is likely to include
an important number of undocumented migrants who arrived in the
USA after the 1 January 1982 cutoff date and even up to the time at
which the IRCA was passed. It was decided, therefore, to distribute
their numbers uniformly over the 1982-1986 period.
13.1.2 Problems of data classification
Regarding the criteria used to identify region of origin, data clas-
sified by country of last or next residence would appear to be the
most useful for projection purposes, since they allow straightfor-
ward demographic accounting. However, aside from the misreport-
ing problems arising from the different possible interpretations of
the term "residence," data thus classified are often not available.
Consequently, consideration of data classified by place of birth or
citizenship becomes mandatory, though their use involves the tacit
assumption that persons born in a given country who leave another
are intending to return to their country of birth or that citizens of a
country who leave another are intending to return to their country
of citizenship (and the equivalent in terms of arrivals).
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The data used in this paper as indicative of migration flows
are classified by place of birth for Australia, Canada, Israel, New
Zealand, and the USA; by citizenship for Belgium, France, and the
Netherlands; and by country of last and next residence for Germany,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. However, citizenship being a cri-
terion so intrinsically linked to the international migration process,
it often colors the manner in which other criteria are used. Thus, the
data for Australia, Canada, Israel, and the USA include only foreign-
ers. In addition, German data distinguish between foreigners and
German citizens, thus permitting the consideration of only foreign-
ers as originating in or leaving for developing regions. Similarly, the
United Kingdom publishes data that are classified first by citizenship
(Commonwealth citizens vs. other) and then by place of residence.
Only the data thus classified distinguish between Commonwealth
citizens originating in Central American and Caribbean countries
and non-Commonwealth citizens originating mostly in South Amer-
ica. British data classified only by place of last or next residence
make no distinction between the two regions ofthe Americas. Hence,
the two series have been used, as appropriate, in presenting the data
by regions (see Table 13.1).
Although the use of data classified by citizenship has been kept
to a minimum, the series for the Netherlands is based on that cri-
terion; consequently Dutch citizens from overseas Dutch territories
migrating to the Netherlands cannot be identified separately. In par-
ticular, the relatively large flow of Dutch Surinamese who migrated
to the Netherlands just before and after Suriname's independence
in 1975 shows up as an increased inflow of Dutch citizens during the
1970s. To take this group into account in interregional migration, an
annual net gain of 4,000 persons during 1970-1974 and 6,000 during
1975-1979 has been added to the estimated number of migrants to
the Netherlands originating in South America (the net migration
gain of Dutch citizens during the 1970s was roughly of that mag-
nitude, whereas during earlier or later periods net gains of Dutch
citizens were negative or virtually nil).
A further caveat relates to the actual classification by country
of origin used by the various receiving countries in publishing flow
statistics. The practice of listing separately only the countries of
origin of sizable numbers of migrants and grouping the rest into a
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Table 13.1. Average annual number of immigrants originating in
the different developing regions and average annual net migration
by country of destination and period: 1960-1991; panel l.
Origin
Sub-Saharan Africa 1960-641965-691970-741975-791980-841985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 794 2,217 5,819 5,707 3,585 6,174
USA 1,106 1,888 4,276 10,110 13,921 14,768 16,191
Israel 318 465 670 807 2,803 1,330 4,329
Subtotal 2,218 4,570 10,765 16,624 20,309 22,272 20,520
Australia 1,604 2,551 3,401 2,719 4,308 5,708 3,960
New Zealand 468 172 431 404 146
Belgium 7,932 7,919 7,660 5,774 3,176 4,403
Germany 5,355 3,829 8,695 7,644 11,672 16,106
Netherlands 444 1,196 1,602 5,008
Sweden 698 2,367
UK - 25,940 34,200 27,640 20,220 23,760
Subtotal 15,359 40,411 54,831 45,377 41,822 57,352 3,960
Net emigration to
Australia 1,529 2,286 3,033 2,531 4,079 5,548 3,865
New Zealand 377 52 367 322 67
Belgium 6,565 5,174 4,736 2,929 541 824
Germany 3,145 1,262 3,872 1,589 2,056 5,297
Netherlands - - 139 761 1,032 4,282
Sweden - 445 2,096
UK - -6,960 -1,320 2,060 -5,520 13,160
Subtotal 11 ,616 1,814 10,827 10,192 2,700 31,207 3,865
Total emigrants 17,577 44,981 65,596 62,001 62,131 79,624 24,480
Maximum net loss 13,834 6,384 21,592 26,816 23,009 53,479 24,385
single figure often precludes an adequate calculation of regional indi-
cators. Problems encountered fairly frequently include the practice
of reporting together all persons originating in the People's Republic
of China and in Taiwan; the separate listing of only a few countries in
a continent thus precluding the proper identification of persons orig-
inating in the different subregions; the practice of using idiosyncratic
regions (e.g., the British Commonwealth); and the use of different
classifications through time which lead to spurious variations in the
regional estimates. Though there is no ideal solution for any of these
problems, the data on China were accepted as given (if given) and
the "other Asia" category was assigned to the East and Southeast
Asia region, "other Africa" was generally assigned to sub-Saharan
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 2.
Origin
North Africa
& West Asia 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 3,146 6,534 4,698 6,858 4,878 9,829
USA 5,348 9,652 14,620 19,180 22,105 21,653 26,521
Subtotal 8,494 16,185 19,319 26,038 26,983 31,482 26,521
Australia 2,133 4,777 9,027 7,461 2,625 6,217 5,701
New Zealand 38 14 60
Belgium 5,402 3,084 3,455 7,043 6,089 4,231
France 40,869 48,245 79,159 32,474 43,841 22,623
Germany 38,721 85,143 201,123 133,466 88,874 77,084
Netherlands 843 9,595 16,522 18,882 15,066 16,666
Sweden 113 569 686 1,393 1,135 1,411
UK 7,420 13,140 15,360
Subtotal 88,119 151,428 310,034208,139170,769 143,591 5,701
Net emigration to
Australia 2,090 4,673 8,841 7,281 2,455 6,039 5,621
New Zealand 29 4 45
Belgium 4,732 1,210 2,647 4,236 1,925 965
Germany 29,144 44,813 121,251 17,017 -26,939 25,304
Netherlands 746 6,599 13,132 14,563 8,244 10,770
Sweden 94 488 486 1,228 994 1,315
UK - -8,160 -9,700 260
Subtotal 36,835 57,787 146,403 36,164 -23,021 44,652 5,621
Total emigrants 96,613 167,613 329,349234,177197,752175,073 32,222
Maximum net loss 86,198 122,218 244,881 94,675 47,802 98,757 32,142
Israel
Immigrants from
North Africa
& West Asia 30,779 8,562 4,840 2,359 1,627 716 612
Immigrants from
elsewhere 26,233 19,698 26,532 31,089 15,101 13,323 198,904
Total immigrants 57,012 28,260 31,373 33,448 16,727 14,039 199,516
Net loss for North
Africa & West Asia -59,965 -102,520 -218,348 -63,586 -32,701 -85,434166,762
Subtotals and totals may not add up due to rounding.
Africa, and no general rule was followed for "other America." Be-
cause of the ensuing ambiguities in the last case, a region comprising
the whole of Central America, the Caribbean, and South America
(denominated Americas-developing) was also considered.
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 3.
Origin
South Asia 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 1,365 5,815 11,713 10,450 11,361 16,990
USA 1,387 5,393 17,335 25,739 45,271 54,540 64,553
Israel 3,007 3,014 2,194 1,647 858 1,158 162
Subtotal 5,759 14,222 31,242 37,836 57,490 72,689 64,715
Australia 1,042 2,521 4,547 1,909 2,166 5,687 8,280
New Zealand 330 276 342 43
Germany 4,234 3,318 4,395 7,170 10,636 21,824
UK - 32,440 21,600 28,260 26,280 23,520
Subtotal 5,606 38,555 30,884 37,339 39,125 51,031 8,280
Net emigration to
Australia 980 2,408 4,388 1,793 2,075 5,607 8,235
New Zealand 226 150 285 0 31
Germany 2,528 586 1,536 2,999 3,165 12,486
UK - 23,880 12,560 22,520 20,800 17,020
Subtotal 3,734 27,024 18,769 27,312 26,071 35,113 8,235
Total emigrants 11,365 52,777 62,126 75,175 96,615 123,720 72,995
Maximum net loss 9,493 41,246 50,011 65,148 83,561 107,802 72,950
Problems of classification by country of origin prevented the use
of the flow statistics available for Switzerland, a fairly important
migrant-receiving country in Europe. Since most of the migrants
in Switzerland originate in other European countries, exclusion of
Swiss data is not likely to lead to important biases. Indeed, the data
available did not identify separately a single category of migrants
originating in the developing world, though a fair number of Turkish
citizens and at least some Vietnamese refugees are known to have
been admitted by Switzerland.
The data discussed so far have been used to derive the estimates
presented in Table 13.1, which shows for each major region of origin
the number of emigrants that have originated in that region and
that have been recorded as immigrants by each receiving country
discussed. In addition, whenever possible net emigration from the
region of origin being considered has been presented. In general,
the table makes a distinction between the receiving countries that
have immigration and emigration statistics and those that have only
immigration statistics by region of origin. The sum of all emigrants
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 4.
Origin
East & Sou th-
east Africa 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 692 7,237 15,602 21,064 27,850 34,871
USA 9,156 21,783 66,070 114,762 186,948 168,707 183,552
Israel 26 23 20 19 79 21 677
Subtotal 9,874 29,043 81,692 135,845 214,877 203,599 184,229
Australia 1,010 2,071 3,910 10,661 23,059 31,759 43,069
New Zealand 391 472 496 1,080 925
Belgium 752 1,298 2,219 2,932 3,206 3,675
Germany 3,449 3,988 10,097 19,140 26,439 41,502
Netherlands 2,213 2,258 3,214 5,981 6,329 8,679
Sweden 3,144 12,559
UK - 25,420 27,100 29,800 30,100 32,680
Subtotal 7,815 35,507 47,036 69,594 93,202 130,854 43,069
Net emigration to
Australia 888 1,880 3,689 10,450 22,710 31,285 42,739
New Zealand 287 222 357 798 679
Belgium 464 849 1,250 1,552 1,655 1,778
Germany 2,257 1,836 6,243 10,932 9,378 22,776
Netherlands 1,886 1,830 1,971 4,298 4,186 6,475
Sweden -796 -1,409 -2,634 -2,059 1,365 11,808
UK 6,860 5,000 4,140 6,200 6,960
Subtotal 4,986 12,068 15,876 30,111 46,173 81,082 42,739
Total emigrants 17,689 64,550 128,728 205,439 308,079 334,453 227,298
Maximum net loss 14,860 41,111 97,568 165,956 261,050 284,681 226,968
originating in a certain region and recorded as immigrants by the
receiving countries listed in the table is presented under the label
"total emigrants." That number can be interpreted as representing
the gross emigration from the region of origin considered.
Since net emigration figures are available for certain receiving
countries, a second indicator of overall emigration is calculated by
adding the data for receiving countries without emigration statistics
to the net gains or losses recorded by the rest. This second indicator,
denominated "maximum net loss," represents an upper limit for the
number of emigrants originating in a given region or, equivalently,
the maximum net gain by the developed countries listed as receiving
countries of immigrants from the developing region considered.
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 5.
Origin
China 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 1,123 4,288 4,865 5,055 7,230 6,572
USA 4,116 13,142 16,434 21,390 26,642 26,492 30,223
Israel 10 8 6 5 9 7 29
Subtotal 5,249 17,438 21,305 26,450 33,881 33,071 30,252
Australia 694 393 376 883 1,452 4,150 4,690
New Zealand 110 103 70
Germany 108 27 53 308 1,245 2,733
Subtotal 912 523 499 1,191 2,697 6,883 4,690
Net emigration to
Australia 655 342 320 832 1,406 4,062 4,615
New Zealand 81 69 50
Germany 72 5 25 123 461 1,245
Subtotal 808 416 396 955 1,867 5,306 4,615
Total emigrants 6,160 17,961 21,804 27,641 36,578 39,954 34,942
Maximum net loss 6,057 17,854 21,701 27,405 35,748 38,377 34,867
All data are presented in terms of average annual number of em-
igrants or average annual net emigration for the periods indicated.
Average annual numbers were used not only to make comparisons
easier and thus facilitate the derivation of projection assumptions
on the basis of such a measure, but also to obviate the problem of
missing information for selected years: 1961, 1962, and 1989 in the
case of Belgium; 1960 in the case of Germany; 1988 and 1989 in the
case of British data for the Caribbean and South America only; and
1991 for Australia and Israel. Indeed, the set of data available for
the 1990s is so incomplete that it is only presented for illustrative
purposes.
13.1.3 Asylum seekers
A major development in the 1980s was the sharp increase in the
number of persons seeking asylum in developed countries, particu-
larly those of the European Community. Since a large proportion
of asylum seekers originates in developing countries, their numbers
must be considered in this overview. However, it is difficult to decide
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 6.
Origin
Central America
& Caribbean 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 2,381 8,947 16,490 13,244 9,822 15,176
USA 76,977 123,664 165,308 304,958 372,592 276,725 178,201
Israel 121 122 130 136 127 92 93
Subtotal 79,479 132,733 181,928 318,338 382,541 291,993 178,294
Australia 179 638 3,645 507 533 1,798 2,341
New Zealand 28 42 84 36 9
Belgium - - - 147 283 169
Germany 1,245 1,591 2,120 2,217 2,912 4,730
Netherlands - 442 6,451 6,570 5,323
Sweden 371 389 794 2,728 1,671 674
UK a 5,280 4,460 3,000 3,667
Subtotal 1,823 2,660 12,365 16,546 14,978 16,361 2,341
Net emigration to
Australia 165 588 3,494 443 485 1,754 2,311
New Zealand 21 29 78 21 3
Belgium 4 9 30
Germany 707 375 820 526 705 1,323
Netherlands - - 187 5,599 5,201 4,454
Sweden 91 85 406 2,271 1,173 366
UK a - - -2,000 1,280 -400 1,000
Subtotal 984 1,077 2,985 10,144 7,176 8,927 2,311
Total emigrants 81,302 135,393 194,293 334,884 397,519 308,354 180,635
Maximum net loss 80,463 133,810 184,913 328,482 389,717 300,920 180,605
aThe data for the UK are classified by both citizenship and place of previous residence.
how to use such numbers as indicators of migration since they have
several shortcomings.
First, statistics on asylum seekers represent applications filed
rather than persons and, at least during the 1980s, a person could
lodge asylum applications in several countries simultaneously. Sec-
ond, asylum seekers are not necessarily new arrivals: some were
already legal, albeit temporary, residents of the country where they
filed an application. Third, it is not clear what is the overlap be-
tween asylum statistics and normal migration statistics. In coun-
tries having population registers, for instance, at what point are
asylum seekers who are allowed to stay and work pending consider-
ation of their application inscribed in the register? Clearly, if such
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 7.
Origin
Sou th America 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 1,031 2,555 7,139 8,773 5,452 7,492
USA 20,026 23,844 22,495 37,870 44,498 44,316 46,732
Israel 1,894 1,667 2,132 2,442 1,633 1,675 2,522
Subtotal 22,951 28,066 31,766 49,085 51,583 53,483 49,254
Australia 809 3,300 1,164 2,399 1,604
New Zealand 9 7 39 102 15
Belgium 496 844 1,076 956 815 725
Germany 2,322 2,297 3,393 3,052 3,701 3,140
Netherlands 4,000 6,000
Sweden - 1,212 3,966
UK a 1,140 1,160 1,400 1,333
Subtotal 2,827 3,148 10,457 14,570 8,307 11,563 1,604
Net emigration to
Australia 797 3,167 1,002 2,265 1,529
New Zealand 5 36 90 3
Belgium 281 499 286 290 277 272
Germany 1,249 882 1,459 813 704 1,027
Netherlands 4,000 6,000
Sweden - 896 3,416
UK a -240 -560 -200
Subtotal 1,535 1,381 6,338 9,800 2,682 6,979 1,529
Total emigrants 25,778 31,214 42,223 63,655 59,890 65,046 50,858
Maximum net loss 24,486 29,447 38,104 58,885 54,265 60,462 50,783
aThe data for the UK are classified by both citizenship and place of previous residence.
inscription takes place at any time (which it must, at least in the case
of persons granted refugee status or who are otherwise allowed to
stay), asylum seekers will be counted twice. Table 13.2 presents the
data on asylum applications lodged in European countries during
1983-1990 classified by region of citizenship of the persons involved.
13.2 Overview of the Main Interregional
Migration Flows
13.2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa
Information on migration flows affecting sub-Saharan Africa since
1960 is highly asymmetric: there is more information on migration
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 8.
Origin
Americas
(developing) 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 3,413 11,502 23,629 22,017 15,274 22,668
USA 97,003 147,508 187,804 342,828 417,090 321,041 224,933
Israel 2,014 1,789 2,262 2,578 1,759 1,767 2,615
Subtotal 102,430 160,799 213,695 367,423 434,123 345,476 227,548
Australia 179 638 4,454 3,807 1,698 4,197 3,945
New Zealand 37 49 123 139 23
Belgium 496 844 1,076 1,102 1,098 894
Germany 3,567 3,888 5,513 5,269 6,613 7,870
Netherlands 4,442 12,451 6,570 5,323
Sweden 371 389 794 2,728 2,883 4,640
UK - 16,080 8,980 8,520 6,780 6,760
Subtotal 4,650 21,888 25,382 34,016 25,666 29,684 3,945
Net emigration to
Australia 165 588 4,291 3,610 1,487 4,019 3,840
New Zealand 26 29 114 111 6
Belgium 281 499 286 294 286 302
Germany 1,956 1,257 2,278 1,340 1,409 2,349
Netherlands 4,187 11,599 5,201 4,454
Sweden 91 85 406 2,271 2,069 3,783
UK 5,080 -1,200 1,360 -180 420
Subtotal 2,519 7,538 10,363 20,585 10,278 15,327 3,840
Total emigrants 107,080 182,687 239,077 401,439 459,788 375,160 231,493
Maximum net loss 104,949 168,337 224,058 388,008 444,401 360,803 231,388
originating in the region than on that directed toward the region.
Although sub-Saharan Africa attracted considerable numbers of Eu-
ropean and Asian migrants before 1960, the decolonization process
led to a reversal of the flow. Not only did the independence of cer-
tain countries trigger important repatriation flows directed mostly
to European countries, but there were also cases of outright expul-
sion (e.g., that of British Asians from Uganda ordered by President
Idi Amin in 1972).
As the first panel of Table 13.1 indicates, the total number of
immigrants originating in sub-Saharan Africa and recorded by the
selected set of receiving countries considered rose significantly be-
tween 1960-1964 and 1970-1974 and remained fairly stable until
the late 1980s when another increase was recorded. Although the
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Table 13.2. Average annual number of asylum seekers in Europe
by region of citizenship: 1983-1990.
Region of citizenship 1983-1984
Sub-Saharan Africa 15,890
North Africa and West Asia 12,896
South Asia 26,375
East and Southeast Asia 6,071
China °
Central America and Caribbean 1,097
South America 2,682
Total 88,024
1985-1989
38,991
60,266
58,029
3,971
869
1,318
5,629
240,876
1990a
76,660
97,671
65,867
13,671
1,946
867
3,544
412,889
a Data for 1990 are preliminary and do not necessarily refer to the whole year.
evolution of net migration (Le., net emigration from sub-Saharan
Africa) paralleled that of gross emigration as of 1970 (it changed
relatively little between 1970 and 1985, to rise sharply thereafter),
during the 1960s the trend in net emigration was the opposite of that
in gross emigration. The United Kingdom was mainly responsible
for such contrasting trends during the 1960s since, although it re-
ceived nearly 26,000 immigrants annually from sub-Saharan Africa
during 1965-1969, it sent out an annual average of 33,000 during
the period. However, British data include both British citizens and
foreigners, so that it is likely that a significant proportion of those
leaving for or coming from sub-Saharan Africa were British citizens.
The first panel of Table 13.1 also indicates that, since 1960,
there has been a steady rise in the number of persons from sub-
Saharan Africa admitted as immigrants by the main countries of
permanent resettlement. For Israel, in particular, the admission of
Ethiopian Jews led to the rise registered during the 1980s. Although
gross immigration from sub-Saharan Africa to European countries
has also, by and large, been growing, the changes registered during
the 1980s are the most significant: net emigration from the region
to Europe rose from 2,700 annually during 1980-1984 to over 31,000
annually during 1985-1989, with Germany, the Netherlands, and, es-
pecially, the United Kingdom registering very substantial gains. Not
surprisingly, the number of citizens from sub-Saharan African coun-
tries seeking asylum in Europe also rose dramatically: from 16,000
annually during 1983-1984 (an average that would be considerably
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lower if the data for the full five-year period were available) to 39,000
in 1985-1989 (see Table 13.2). Furthermore, preliminary data for
1990 already indicate that the number of Africans from south of the
Sahara filing asylum applications in Europe rose to nearly 77,000.
In addition to the flows documented in Tables 13.1 and 13.2,
between 500,000 and 800,000 inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies
of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique returned to
Portugal during the 1970s when those countries gained independence
(Ferreira de Paiva, 1983). The majority of these returnees were
Portuguese citizens. However, African nationals have also emigrated
to Portugal. By 1990, over 45,000 citizens of African countries,
mainly from Cape Verde (over 28,000), Angola (5,000), and Guinea-
Bissau (3,500), were legal residents of that country (OECD, 1991,
1992).
Italy has also experienced important inflows of migrants from
sub-Saharan Africa, especially during the 1980s. By the end of 1990,
75,000 citizens of countries in the region were registered as legal res-
idents in Italy: 25,000 from Senegal, 12,000 from Ethiopia, 11,000
from Ghana, and 9,000 from Somalia. At least 17,000 of the to-
tal had been regularized in 1986 and 36,000 in 1990. However, the
increase in these figures cannot be interpreted as necessarily indi-
cating an increase in inflows, since much depends on the stringency
of the regularization drive.
In Spain, where regularization drives were carried out in 1985
and 1991, the number of citizens from sub-Saharan African countries
who were officially registered as residents increased from about 1,000
by the end of 1980 to nearly 9,000 by the end of 1990 (Spain, 1991).
Among the 43,800 persons filing for regularization in 1985, 3,600
were Senegalese and 2,700 were Gambian (OECD, 1990). Prelimi-
nary data regarding the 1991 regularization drive are only available
for selected nationalities of applicants (0ECD, 1992).
Information on inflows of migrants from other regions to sub-
Saharan Africa is mostly lacking. Indirect indications can be ob-
tained from stock data derived from censuses, though very few coun-
tries have two censuses with comparable information. In Liberia, for
instance, the population born outside of Africa increased from 8,600
to 11,800 between 1962 and 1974, in Reunion it rose from 16,300 to
30,200 during 1974-1982, and in Swaziland it increased from 4,200
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to 6,700 during 1976-1986. The population of non-African citizen-
ship also rose from 5,500 in 1974 to 8,300 in 1984 in the Congo
and from 7,600 to 8,800 between 1963 and 1974 in Sierra Leone. A
very rough estimation of net migration based on the figures span-
ning the 1975-1980 period would suggest that at least 2,500 persons
immigrated annually to sub-Saharan Africa from other regions.
More recent data for the Republic of South Africa suggest
that this country alone may have recorded even higher net migra-
tion gains. Thus, its foreign-born population rose from 426,000 to
450,000 between 1980 and 1985. Making allowance for mortality
at the level of 8 per 1,000 (lower than the 11 per 1,000 estimated
by the United Nations for the total population of South Africa to
make some allowance for the selectivity of migration), the estimated
net inflow of migrants to South Africa during 1980-1985 would have
been of the order of 41,000 - that is, about 8,200 per year. However,
it is likely that at least some of those migrants have already been
accounted for by the emigration data of the United Kingdom.
Given the paucity of the information available, only guesses are
possible regarding the possible net inflow to sub-Saharan Africa of
persons originating in countries other than those presented in Table
13.1.
To conclude, it is worth noting that sub-Saharan Africa hosts
the second largest number of refugees in the world, amounting to
about 5.2 million in early 1991 (UN, 1994). Most of the refugees,
however, have found asylum in neighboring countries and have there-
fore remained within the region as defined here. Their movements,
therefore, need not be taken into account in projecting the total
sub-Saharan population.
13.2.2 North Africa and West Asia
The region comprising the northern part of Africa and the western
part of Asia has been one of the most dynamic in terms of its par-
ticipation in interregional migration flows, both as a region of origin
and as one of destination. There have also been important intrare-
gional flows that need not be documented here. The main sources of
interregional emigration have been the Maghreb countries (Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia) and Turkey.
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Because the region encompasses many of the oil-rich countries of
the developing world, particularly those having a limited work force
both in general terms and, more importantly, in terms of needed
skills, it has been a major destination of migrant workers, partic-
ularly those originating in countries of South, East, and Southeast
Asia. The region also includes Israel, one of the few countries pur-
suing an active policy of permanent resettlement. Lastly, as a result
of both internal and international conflict, the region has been the
source of important outflows of population both to neighboring re-
gions (South Asia) and, to a lesser extent, to the rest of the world
(via, for instance, the emigration of Lebanese).
13.2.3 North Africa and West Asia
The second panel of Table 13.1 shows that the region has been the
source of very sizable migrant outflows directed mainly to Euro-
pean countries, especially France and Germany. However, at least
in the case of Germany, gross inflows have been considerably larger
than net migration. The same may apply to France, although lack
of information on emigration from that country prevents an ade-
quate assessment of net gains. Indirect evidence suggests that net
migration from the Maghreb countries to France was positive dur-
ing the late 1970s but very low or possibly negative during at least
part of the 1980s. Thus, the number of citizens of Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, and Turkey enumerated by the censuses of France increased
from 1,161,000 in 1975 to 1,560,000 in 1982 and only to 1,614,000 in
1990 (DECD, 1992). Whereas the number of Moroccans, Tunisians,
and Turks in France grew between 1982 and 1990, that of Alge-
rians declined sharply, passing from 805,000 in 1982 to 620,000 in
1990. Although some of that change may have been due to natu-
ralization or better reporting of citizenship by persons of Algerian
descent (many of whom have the right to French citizenship), return
migration is also likely to have contributed to the change observed.
In 1990, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Swe-
den were hosting a total of 2,196,000 Turks, 951,000 Moroccans,
631,000 Algerians, and 242,000 Tunisians (DECD, 1992). Sizable
Turkish populations were also present in other European countries.
Thus, between 1980 and 1990, the number of Turks in Norway and
Switzerland increased from 40,600 to 69,700, and the number of
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Turkish workers in Austria rose from 28,300 to 50,500. At least
part of the increase in the Turkish population in Europe was asso-
ciated with the very sizable inflows of Turkish asylum seekers. As
Table 13.1 shows, the number of asylum seekers from North Africa
and West Asia rose very markedly between the early and late 1980s,
and Turks accounted for much of that increase (figures not shown).
Among the other nationalities, about 2,200 Moroccans were re-
ported to be present in Norway in 1990 and they figured prominently
in the regularization drives carried out by Italy and Spain since 1985.
In Italy, for instance, 146,000 persons from North Africa and 12,000
from West Asia were present in 1990, of which 78,000 were Moroc-
can, 41,000 Tunisian, 20,000 Egyptian, and 6,000 each Lebanese and
Jordanian. Of the total 158,000 North Africans and West Asians
present in 1990, 39,000 had regularized their status as a result of
the 1990 drive and 18,400 during that held in 1986 (OECD, 1991).
In Spain, the register of foreigners indicates that the North
African and West Asian population declined slightly from 1975 to
1980 (from 7,500 to 6,800), rose to 9,200 in 1985, and then increased
sharply to reach 21,100 by the end of 1990 (Spain, 1991). This rise
was partly due to the 1985 regularization drive where at least 8,000
Moroccans lodged applications for regularization (OECD, 1990).
Preliminary results from the 1991 drive indicate that a further
40,000 Moroccans may be regularized (OECD, 1992).
Lastly, it must be noted that the changes taking place in the
former East Bloc countries have made Turkey a migrant-receiving
country. Indeed, in 1989,314,000 Bulgarians of Turkish ethnic origin
moved into the country. By September of 1991 there were 358,000
Bulgarians in Turkey. Nearly two-thirds had settled permanently
and virtually all had acquired Turkish citizenship (OECD, 1992).
13.2.4 Israel
Panel 2 of Table 13.1 indicates that gross immigration to Israel,
most of which has originated outside the region in recent years, has
contributed significantly to reduce the net emigration balance of the
region (see the last line of the second panel). The high levels of im-
migration recorded by Israel during the 1970s and again during the
1990s are associated with the arrival of Soviet Jews whose emigra-
tion during the 1970s was permitted as part of "detente" and during
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the 1990s as a result of the liberalization of the Soviet and now the
Russian regime. In 1990 alone, 185,200 Soviet Jews immigrated to
Israel, and the figure for 1991 is 147,800 (Sabatello, 1992). The 1989
census of the USSR enumerated 1.45 million ethnic Jews. Taking
into account Jews registered under other "nationalities" and their
non-Jewish relatives, an estimated 1.8 to 2 million persons might
still be eligible for eventual admission to Israel (Sabatello, 1992).
Unfortunately, information on emigration from Israel by region
of origin or region of destination could not be obtained. Available
information on net migration indicates that during 1975-1979, it
amounted to only 12,200 persons annually (UN, 1985), a level far
lower than the gross immigration figure of 33,400 shown in Table
13.1. In addition, data on the number of Israeli residents who left
in a given year and had not yet returned by May 1990, indicate that,
on average, 9,700 emigrated annually during 1976-1979,12,100 did
so during 1980-1984, and 22,700 during 1984-1988 (Israel, 1990). Of
course, the last figure is likely to underestimate permanent emigra-
tion somewhat because the time elapsed since departure is shorter.
However, such figures indicate the approximate levels of emigration
that Israel has been experiencing, levels that would reduce consid-
erably the gross gains presented in Table 13.1.
13.2.5 Oil-rich countries
It is well known that the oil-rich countries of North Africa and West
Asia have been major importers of foreign labor. Even before the
dramatic rises in the price of oil during the early 1970s, several
countries in the region had been resorting to foreign workers. The
most complete estimates on worker migration to the region indicate
that, between 1975 and 1980, the total number of foreign workers
employed in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen increased from
1.8 to 2.8 million (Birks and Sinclair, cited in UN, 1985). The
largest proportions (43 percent in 1975 and 36 percent in 1980)
were employed in Saudi Arabia. Libya with 19 percent in 1980, the
United Arab Emirates with 15, and Kuwait with 13 followed.
Until 1980, most foreign workers in the region also originated
in countries of North Africa and West Asia: 71 percent in 1975 and
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63 percent in 1980. The rest were mostly citizens of India, Iran,
and Pakistan (25 percent in 1975 and 27 in 1980). Whereas Indians
and Pakistanis worked in almost every possible receiving country,
Iranians were mostly concentrated in Iraq and Kuwait.
During the late 1970s a new trend took hold. The main labor-
importing countries in the region turned to migrant workers from
East and Southeast Asia. Table 13.3 shows the average annual num-
ber of persons granted permission to work abroad under temporary
contractual agreements by various sending countries in both South
Asia and East and Southeast Asia. The data, though probably fairly
incomplete for earlier periods, indicate that by 1975-1979 an annual
average of 330,000 persons were being granted permission to work
abroad. During the 1980s, the equivalent figure remained above 1
million. The distribution by region of origin changed substantially
since 1975. Whereas during 1975-1979, 52 percent of all workers
securing permits to go abroad originated in South Asia, by 1980-
1984 their share had dropped to 43 percent, and during 1985-1989
it decreased further to 30 percent.
Care must be taken in interpreting the figures presented in Table
13.3. They represent generally the number of exit permits granted
by government authorities to persons wishing to work abroad. Since
temporary engagements are possible, multiple work permits may be
issued to a single person during a given year. Furthermore, even
from year to year, figures cannot be interpreted as representing new
workers joining the expatriate labor force. The policy of worker
rotation adopted by many receiving countries implies that foreign
workers usually remain abroad for relatively short periods (one or
two years) and need to return home before having their contracts re-
newed. Unfortunately, figures on net flows are not available. On the
other hand, since workers have been known to emigrate "illegally"
without obtaining the necessary permits, the figures presented may
be subject to a counterbalancing negative bias. Lastly, although
the oil-rich countries of West Asia have been a major destination of
migrants originating in most of the countries listed in Table 13.3,
it is by no means certain that they are the only destination. Data
classified crudely by region of destination indicate that, at least for
Indonesia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand,
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Table 13.3. Average annual number of migrant workers leaving
from selected countries of South Asia, East and Southeast Asia, and
China: 1970-1991.
Average annual number of work
Region and country permits issued (thousands)
of origin 1970-741975-791980-84 1985-89 1990-91
South Asia
Bangladesh 13.8 53.0 78.0 125.5
India 53.6 236.5 139.7 -
Nepal - - 0.2 0.3
Pakistan 7.3 92.3 133.9 80.3 128.3
Sri Lanka 11.5 28.5 (12.7)a -
Sri Lanka (final approvals) - 15.3 53.8
Subtotal 7.3 171.2 451.9 313.5 307.9
East and Southeast Asia
Indonesia 4.7 24.4 66.3 105.5
Korea, Republic of 2.9 72.3 171.1 77.0 -
Myanmar - - 1.6 9.8
Philippines 15.5 75.9 330.9 (460.3)a (650.3)a
Philippines (deployed) (70.2)a 426.0 530.6
Thailand 0.1 6.3 60.0 97.0 63.5
Vietnam 13.3 38.9 2.1
Subtotal 18.5 159.2 599.7 706.8 711.5
China 27.6 73.9
Total 25.8 330.4 1,051.6 1,047.9 1,093.3
aEntry has not been used in calculation.
the proportion of workers intending to go to the Middle East has
varied substantially since 1975 (see Table 13.4).
Unfortunately, data relative to the countries of destination are
generally lacking. In particular, no reliable information is available
regarding the size and composition of the foreign population present
in the main labor-importing country of the region, Saudi Arabia.
Although it has been estimated that the number of foreign workers
in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council - Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
- increased from 2.1 to 5.1 million between 1980 and 1985 (Russell,
1990), the bases for such estimates remain obscure. Data on entries
to and departures from Saudi Arabia indicate that the country has
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Table 13.4. Distribution of average annual number of migrant
workers originating in countries of East and Southeast Asia by des-
tination: 1975-1988.
Average annual number
Country of origin and of work permits issued
intended destination 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1988
Korea, Republic ofa
Total workers 97,500 171,800 96,200
Workers to Middle East 77,800 128,400 42,600
Percentage to Middle East 79.8% 74.7% 44.2%
Indonesia
Total workers - 24,400 61,400
Workers to Middle East 15,800 48,100
Percentage to Middle East 64.8% 78.4%
Philippines
Total workers 75,900 330,900 433,500
Workers to Middle East 28,500 232,300 278,700
Percentage to Middle East 37.6% 70.2% 64.3%
Thailand
Total workers 6,300 60,000 89,900
Workers to Middle East 5,100 56,400 75,600
Percentage to Middle East 81.2% 93.9% 84.1%
Total
Total workers 179,800 587,100 681,000
Workers to Middle East 111,500 432,900 445,000
Percentage to Middle East 62.0% 73.7% 65.3%
aData on Middle East destinations are available only since 1977.
been gaining population from regions other than North Africa and
West Asia, particularly from South Asia and East and Southeast
Asia (see Table 13.5). However, the usual drawbacks of entry and
departure statistics make them less than ideal indicators of long-
term migration to the country.
Lastly, a word must be said about the effects of the Gulf War on
migration to and from West Asia. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
led to the outflow of large numbers of expatriate workers. At least
700,000 were reported to have fled to Jordan from where they were
eventually repatriated to their countries of origin. Estimates by the
ILO indicate that of the 2.6 million foreigners present in Iraq and
Kuwait before the invasion, only 1.4 million remained two months
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Table 13.5. Average annual migration to Saudi Arabia by region
of citizenship: 1977-1984.
Region of citizenship
Southern Africa
North Africa and West Asia
South Asia
East and Southeast Asia
China
Rest of the world
Total
Total from outside North Africa
and West Asia
1977-1979
8,998
22,938
59,144
51,937
1,865
9,076
153,958
131,020
1980-1984
-5,281
4,208
102,894
37,663
-1,131
-84,530
53,823
49,615
later. Among those departing, there were some 229,000 persons from
South Asia and 49,000 from the Philippines and Thailand, as well
as 68,000 from other Asian countries (ILO, 1990). There is as yet no
information about the resumption of labor migration after the war,
but the task of reconstruction is likely to have attracted not only
those who fled but other workers as well. Indeed, reports about the
decision of Kuwaiti authorities to dispense with Palestinian workers
suggest that workers from other countries may have to be imported
to take their place.
The war also caused major dislocations in Iraq. In particular,
1.4 million Kurdish and Shiite refugees from Iraq fled to Iran be-
tween February and May 1991. Their repatriation, however, was
swift. By early July, only 252,000 remained in Iran (De Almeida e
Silva, 1991). Yet, continued instability in Iraq may lead to further
outflows to neighboring countries.
13.2.6 South Asia
The major countries of South Asia, by virtue of having been under
British colonial rule, have traditionally had close migration ties with
the United Kingdom and other developed members of the British
Commonwealth. As panel 3 of Table 13.1 shows, since 1970 the
region has been an important source of immigrants for the USA
and Canada, and over the period considered net migration between
South Asia and the United Kingdom has been positive. Important
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contingents of South Asians have also been recorded recently in
Germany, a development that is likely to be associated with the
movement of asylum seekers from the region to Europe. As Table
13.2 shows, the number of asylum seekers from South Asia increased
from an annual average of 26,000 during 1983-1984 to 58,000 during
1985-1989. The main sources of asylum seekers in the region have
been Iran and Sri Lanka.
As discussed in Section 13.2.5, South Asia has also been an im-
portant source of labor migration for the oil-rich countries of West
Asia. Data on the outflow of workers from the main sending coun-
tries in South Asia are presented in Table 13.3. It is worth noting
that, particularly for India and Sri Lanka, the number of work per-
mits issued to those intending to work abroad is thought to under-
estimate true outflows. Sri Lanka's worker migration has attracted
attention because of the high proportion of women it involves. Most
of them work as maids in West Asian countries. Although there is
no information on the country of destination of the South Asian
workers who have been granted exit permits, it is safe to assume
that most of them intend to work in West Asia. Only lately have
there been reports of an increasing number of South Asian work-
ers finding employment in other Asian countries, such as Japan or
Taiwan. However, most of them work illegally. Japanese statistics
show that during 1985-1990,11,600 citizens of Bangladesh, 10,700
of Pakistan, 1,000 of Sri Lanka, 700 of each Iran and India, and
400 of Nepal were deported. For each nationality, the number of
deportations rose rapidly over the period considered.
South Asian workers are also finding their way to Europe. To-
ward the end of 1990, Italy recorded 34,100 citizens of Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as legally residing in the country,
13,400 of whom had legalized their status during the 1990 regular-
ization drive and 12,100 during that held in 1986 (OEeD, 1990). In
Spain, the number of South Asian nationals legally present by the
end of 1990 amounted to nearly 8,000, a substantial increase from
the 2,600 registered in 1980 (Spain, 1991).
Some of the largest population outflows have occurred within
the South Asian region itself. According to statistics on the foreign-
born, India was the second largest migrant-receiving country in the
world in 1980. Most of the migrants thus identified had moved to
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India from Bangladesh or Pakistan, probably as a result of partition.
In addition, the region hosts the largest refugee population originat-
ing in a single country, Afghanistan. As of early 1991 an estimated
6.2 million Afghani refugees were present in Iran and Pakistan (UN,
1994). Furthermore, by mid-1991 Iran was still hosting 252,000 Iraqi
refugees.
13.2.7 East and Southeast Asia
The East and Southeast Asia region has been a major source of
migrants for both the developed countries and the labor-importing
countries of West Asia. As Table 13.1 indicates, immigrants from
the region have constituted the second largest contingent admitted
by the USA since 1970-1974. The close strategic, military, or even
colonial ties that link several countries in the region with the USA
have fostered such migration. Thus, the Philippines, the Repub-
lic of Korea, and Vietnam have been among the main sources of
immigrants to the USA for over a decade. Migration from Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Laos has occurred mostly within the frame-
work of refugee resettlement. It is estimated that between 1975
and 1988 nearly 1.5 million Indo-Chinese refugees were resettled
abroad, the vast majority (1.15 million) in developed countries, in-
cluding 108,000 in France, 8,000 in Switzerland, and 6,000 each in
Norway and Japan (UN, 1992). The Vietnamese resettled in other
developed countries are already reflected in the statistics presented
in Table 13.1. In addition, during the 1980s China admitted 284,000
ethnic Chinese from Vietnam for resettlement.
Emigration from Vietnam has also occurred in the context of
labor migration. Newly available statistics from the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic indicate that by the end of 1989 there
were over 60,000 Vietnamese in that country, a number that had
declined to 35,000 by the end of 1990 (GECD, 1992). In the former
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 34,000 Vietnamese workers were
present in 1990, but their number had declined to barely 10,000 by
1991 (GECD, 1992). Vietnamese workers are also known to have
migrated to the former Soviet Union, but no information on their
numbers is available. Table 13.3, however, indicates that during the
1980s a growing number of Vietnamese received clearance to work
abroad.
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At least part of the growth of the number of East and Southeast
Asian immigrants recorded by the countries listed in panel 4 of Ta-
ble 13.1 is attributable to the intake of Indo-Chinese refugees after
the fall of Saigon in 1975. However, especially during the 1980s,
the numbers of migrants originating in countries like the Philip-
pines, Hong Kong, or Malaysia have also been growing. Indeed,
the planned devolution of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of
China has fueled emigration from the Crown Colony. Countries like
Australia, Canada, and the United States have established special
immigration categories aimed, at least in part, at attracting affluent
Hong Kong residents. Although emigration from Hong Kong has
been increasing, net migration to the Colony may still be positive.
Estimates of net migration for earlier periods indicate that Hong
Kong gained an annual average of 11,500 persons during 1961-1971,
20,400 during 1971-1976, and 80,000 during 1976-1981 (Skeldon,
1986). The sharp rise registered in the late 1970s was due to the
increased inflow of illegal migrants from China lured by the possi-
bility of regularizing their status in Hong Kong if they managed to
reach the urban areas of the Colony. The rise in illegal migration
prompted British authorities to remove that possibility in 1980. The
effects of such a change are noticeable in the evolution of the Hong
Kong population born in China. Whereas the 1976 census of Hong
Kong showed that 1.66 million Hong Kong residents were born in
China and the 1981 census put that figure at 1.97 million, the 1986
census showed that the population born in China increased only to
2 million (Hong Kong, 1988). The figures imply that net Chinese
migration would have amounted to an annual average of 79,000 dur-
ing 1976-1981 (assuming a mortality of 10 per 1,000) and of some
25,000 during 1981-1986 under unchanging mortality conditions.
The growing variety of sources of emigration from East and
Southeast Asia has been paralleled by an increasing diversification
of possible destinations. During the 1980s, not only did increas-
ing numbers of East and Southeast Asian workers secure permits to
work in West Asian countries, but the proportion obtaining permits
to work elsewhere rose in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and
Thailand (see Table 13.4). Although many of those workers found
employment in other countries of the region, such as Brunei, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, or Taiwan, others went further afield.
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Rising numbers of Filipinos, in particular, have been recorded in
Japan (49,000 were registered aliens in 1990 compared with only
5,500 in 1980), Italy (34,000 in 1990), and Spain (where 2,500 ap-
plied for regularization in 1991). In addition, during 1985-1990,
31,400 Filipinos were deported from Japan, 72 percent of whom
were women. The same proportion of women was found among the
7,100 Thai migrants deported from Japan during 1985-1990. In con-
trast, among the 6,600 Malaysians deported during the same period,
women amounted to only 12 percent (Japan, 1990).
To conclude, the number of citizens from East and Southeast
Asia seeking asylum in Europe has remained relatively small (see
Table 13.2). The generous resettlement opportunities granted to
Indo-Chinese refugees during most of the 1980s are probably re-
sponsible for these trends. However, as conflict in Indochina sub-
sides and a growing number of would- be refugees are denied asylum
in the region, they may start seeking it elsewhere.
13.2.8 China
The fact that in 1980 over 26 million Chinese or descendants of Chi-
nese were estimated to be living in countries other than mainland
China or Taiwan (Poston and Yu, 1990) proves that Chinese emi-
gration has been significant in modern times. However, during the
first three decades of the People's Republic of China (from the late
1940s to the late 1970s), Chinese emigration from the mainland was
severely restricted and only a small number of people left legally
during the period. More recently, as Chinese authorities have in-
creasingly opened the country to foreigners, emigration levels have
risen somewhat (see panel 5 of Table 13.1) but, in general, Chinese
emigration remains highly restricted.
As panel 5 of Table 13.1 indicates, the main receivers of Chinese
emigrants have been the USA and Canada. Only during the 1980s
did Chinese immigration to Australia or Germany surpass the 1,000
mark. However, as already noted, Chinese emigration to neighbor-
ing countries, particularly Hong Kong, has been considerably larger.
In addition, the number of Chinese registered as resident aliens in
Japan has been rising in recent years, passing from 49,000 in 1975
to 75,000 in 1985 and reaching 150,000 in 1990 (Japan, 1990). It is
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not clear, however, whether the data refer only to mainland Chinese
or also to those of Hong Kong or Taiwanese origin.
As Table 13.2 indicates, the number of Chinese asylum seekers
in Europe, though small, has been increasing. Chinese became more
likely to obtain asylum after the events of Tienamin Square in 1989.
The USA passed at the time a Deferred Enforced Departure Act
that allowed virtually every Chinese student in the country and his
or her dependents to stay. By August 1992, a bill that would grant
permanent residence to an estimated 80,000 Chinese students and
dependents in the USA had been passed (FAIR, 1992).
Chinese are securing entry to developed countries not only via
asylum procedures but also as needed workers. In Italy 18,700 Chi-
nese were resident aliens by the end of 1990, 4,500 of whom had
regularized their status in 1986 and a further 9,700 in 1990. A high
proportion of them were registered as own-account workers. In ad-
dition, Chinese authorities themselves are promoting the export of
labor. As Table 13.3 indicates, the number of Chinese workers ob-
taining permits to work abroad increased markedly from an annual
average of 27,600 during 1985-1989 to nearly 74,000 during 1990-
1991. Given the increasing misgivings that West Asian countries
are having about hiring Muslim workers from other Asian countries
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), resorting to Chinese labor may
be a desirable option during the 1990s.
13.2.9 Central America and the Caribbean
According to the data presented in Table 13.1, the region identified
here as Central America and the Caribbean, which includes Mexico,
has been the main source of emigrants during 1960-1984. Only for
the period 1985-1989 did the gross number of emigrants originat-
ing in East and Southeast Asia surpass those coming from Central
America and the Caribbean. However, the data in panel 6 of Table
13.1 include the over 2 million legalizations from Central America
and the Caribbean that were registered during 1989-1992 and that
have been redistributed over the period 1972-1986. As a result of
such redistribution, the average annual number of admissions of per-
manent immigrants from Central America and the Caribbean by the
USA increased from 133,000 to 165,000 in 1970-1974, from 158,000
to 305,000 in 1975-1979, from 162,000 to 373,000 in 1980-1984, and
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from 198,000 to 277,000 in 1985-1989. Since most of the legal-
izations correspond to Mexican citizens, Mexico became the main
source of migrants to the USA during the late 1970s.
In fact, any attempt at incorporating undocumented migration
into overall migration estimates would make Mexico a major country
of emigration. Indeed, because the regularization established by the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 imposed time limits on
those who could have their status legalized, it did not eliminate en-
tirely the undocumented population present in the USA. It has been
estimated that, even taking into account the regularization results,
by June 1988 nearly 1.9 million undocumented migrants were still
in the country, 1.1 million of whom were Mexican and another half
a million originated in the rest of North America (Woodrow and
Passel, 1990). Furthermore, some 70,000 were estimated to have
entered the country during 1987-1988. However, that number of
entries was not statistically significant (Woodrow and Passel, 1990).
Not only do the figures on immigration to the USA presented in
panel 6 of Table 13.1 exclude estimates of undocumented migration,
they also exclude the inflow of persons from Caribbean Islands whose
inhabitants are US citizens. Puerto Rico is probably the main source
of such migrants. According to census figures, the number of net
migrants from Puerto Rico amounted to an average annual intake
by the United States of 17,700 during 1955-1960, 19,200 during
1965-1970, and 20,000 during 1975-1980 (Ortiz, 1986).
It is noteworthy that relatively few migrants from the region
have found their way to overseas countries. Although migration
from the English-speaking Caribbean to the United Kingdom was
significant during the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the data in
Table 13.1 show, the net migration of Commonwealth citizens from
the Caribbean and Belize to the United Kingdom has been relatively
small or even negative since 1970. However, several Caribbean coun-
tries have been the source of emigrants to other regions. Cuba, for
instance, sent both troops and workers to Angola, and it was also
a source of workers for certain East Bloc countries. There were, for
instance, 8,000 Cubans in the former German Democratic Republic
in 1989, only 3,000 of whom remained by 1990 (OECD, 1992). In
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 1,100 Cuban workers were
present in 1990, but by 1991 only 100 remained.
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Citizens from the Dominican Republic have also migrated in
search of work to both regional and overseas destinations. Thus, the
1980-1981 regularization drive of Venezuela recorded 4,300 Domini-
cans and 1,900 persons from other countries of Central America and
the Caribbean (Torrealba, 1985). In addition, by the end of 1990,
4,400 citizens from the Dominican Republic were registered as legal
resident aliens in Italy, and 5,000 more applied for regularization in
Spain in 1991 (OECD, 1992). Interestingly, the foreign population
of Central American and Caribbean origin residing legally in Spain
changed relatively little, declining from 13,700 to 10,800 between
1975 and 1985 and then rising to 14,000 by 1990 (Spain, 1991).
Although during the 1980s several countries of Central America
were important sources of refugees, relatively few persons from the
region have applied for asylum in Europe (see Table 13.2). Again in
this instance, the USA and Canada have been the preferred desti-
nations of asylum seekers from Central America and the Caribbean.
During 1984-1990, US authorities adjudicated 102,000 applications
for asylum filed by citizens of just three Central American coun-
tries, namely, EI Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Those ap-
plications constituted 64 percent of all the asylum cases adjudicated
in the USA during the period, and the vast majority (88,000) were
denied. Since most applicants remained in the USA even after their
asylum request was turned down, they became undocumented aliens
and were probably adequately reflected by the statistics on undocu-
mented alien stocks reported above. However, as a result of a lawsuit
by human rights advocates, US authorities granted all Salvadorans
present in the country as of 19 September 1990 and all Guatemalans
present on 1 October 1990 the right to new hearings on their asy-
lum claims and the possibility of staying in the country and working
until 30 June 1992 (UN, 1994). Approximately 185,000 Salvadorans
have benefited from the temporary protected status thus granted
(Weintraub and Diaz-Briquets, 1992).
13.2.10 South America
Until the late 1950s, South America was a region of immigration,
since countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay attracted
an important number of immigrants from European countries after
the end of World War II. The main sources of European migration
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to the Americas were Italy, Spain, Portugal, and several East Eu-
ropean countries. By the 1960s, however, the inflow of Europeans
had largely run its course. Only Venezuela was successful in at-
tracting overseas migrants well into the 1970s. Entry and departure
statistics for Venezuela indicate that during 1974-1979 the country
registered, on an annual basis, a net inflow of some 10,000 European
immigrants and another 1,000 from other regions (Torrealba, 1982).
During 1980-1981, however, the net flow became negative and is
likely to have remained so during the rest of the decade.
Census data from two of the main receiving countries in the
region, Argentina and Brazil, suggest that during the 1970s net
migration became negative. In Argentina the population born in
Europe declined from 1.47 million in 1970 to 1.08 million in 1980, a
reduction that cannot be accounted for by mortality alone. In Brazil
the population of European nationality declined from 803,000 in
1970 to 638,000 in 1980. Although such a change could be the result
of naturalization, return migration is likely to have also contributed
to it.
As panel 7 of Table 13.1 shows, South America has been a rel-
atively important source of immigrants to the USA. A fair number
of them remained in that country illegally because, although the
numbers legalizing under IRCA were small in comparison to those
of undocumented aliens from Central America and the Caribbean,
the trend since 1970 has been affected by the redistribution of those
legalizing during 1989-1992. In particular, without the IRCA legal-
izations, the average annual number of admissions of South Amer-
icans by the USA would have amounted to only 31,000 instead of
38,000 in 1975-1979, to 37,000 instead of 45,000 in 1980-1984, and
to 42,000 instead of 44,000 in 1985-1989.
Emigration from South America is likely to have grown signifi-
cantly during the 1980s. Part of it, however, is difficult to measure,
since it involves the emigration of second- and third-generation mi-
grants (i.e., the children and grandchildren of the original immi-
grants) who have been granted citizenship rights by the countries of
origin of their forebears. Thus, Italy and Spain have been receiving
the inflow of Italian or Spanish citizens born overseas who do not
appear on statistics relative to foreigners. According to statistics
on the foreign stock, there were 47,000 South American citizens in
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Italy at the end of 1990 (14,000 of whom were Brazilian and 13,000
Argentine citizens), and the number of South American citizens in
Spain nearly doubled, passing from 24,000 in 1975 to 30,000 in 1985
and then to 49,000 in 1990 (Spain, 1991). In addition, about 7,000
nationals of Argentina and 5,000 of Peru lodged applications for
regularization during the 1991 drive carried out in Spain.
Perhaps one of the most interesting cases of return migration
among the descendants of former immigrants is the migration of
Brazilians and Peruvians of Japanese descent to Japan. Between
1985 and 1990, the population of South American origin in Japan
increased dramatically, rising from 3,600 to 71,500. Underlying such
a change was the decision of Japanese authorities to permit the
establishment in Japan of persons of Japanese descent. Both Brazil
and Peru host relatively sizable subpopulations of Japanese ethnic
origin that may decide to go back to their roots.
The number of South American asylum seekers in Europe has
remained modest. Until the 1990 change of government in Chile,
citizens of that country were likely to obtain asylum in Europe,
particularly in the Nordic countries. The new Chilean government
is planning to facilitate the repatriation of those wishing to return.
13.3 Conclusion
This overview of migration trends to and from the main developing
regions, though fairly comprehensive, is still a weak basis on which
to estimate current interregional migration or derive assumptions
regarding future trends. Although data on migration flows are not
entirely lacking, those available are often incomplete (they do not
refer to all possible long-term movements), and they are not easily
comparable from one country to another. In addition, when the
main countries of destination are located in the developing world,
data on migration flows are often entirely lacking or cannot be read-
ily obtained. The political sensitivity of the migration phenomenon
is such that existing information is often treated as highly classi-
fied material that must be protected. Countries are often guilty
of benign neglect, preferring to ignore the magnitude of flows than
measure them adequately. Despite efforts to improve the quality and
availability of international migration statistics, little progress has
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been made. In the meantime, migration continues to increase and
its complexity rises. Part of that complexity stems from the barriers
that potential countries of destination are using to control or stop
migration. When legal migration is highly restricted or not desired
under any circumstances, different varieties of illegal or undesirable
flows will arise. Such a situation makes the job of the forecaster even
more difficult, since policy aims are at odds with likely outcomes.
On the other hand, consideration of any time series on migration
is a sobering experience. As Table 13.1 indicates, relatively drastic
changes in trends can and have occurred over the course of the past
30 years in many developing regions. Events like the Gulf War can
trigger large interregional flows over relatively short periods. Given
the difficulties in forecasting such events and their likely effects on
migration, population projections are often based on relatively sim-
plistic assumptions regarding future migration trends. Perhaps the
most common assumption is that migration will, in the long run,
have little effect on population dynamics, so that it can be assumed
to be zero. Otherwise, migration assumptions are generally made in
terms of net numbers of migrants gained or lost during each of the
projection quinquennia (see, for instance, Arnold, 1989). When the
latter approach is taken, nonzero assumptions are typically made for
a few projection periods (usually one to four, thus covering at most a
span of 20 years) and from then on migration is assumed to taper off
to zero or to remain constant at the last assumed level. Although un-
doubtedly simplistic, such practices have much to recommend them,
particularly when one is dealing with large and complex regions such
as the ones considered in this paper. Given the relatively large pop-
ulation bases of most regions, estimated net migration levels of the
magnitude presented in Table 13.1 are likely to have relatively small
effects on the overall evolution of the population.
At the level of individual countries or smaller regions, however,
the situation may be different. Migration is also likely to be an im-
portant component of population change when fertility has reached
very low levels, especially if it remains below replacement for a cer-
tain period (see, for instance, OEeD, 1991). Yet, even in countries
facing such fertility prospects, projections continue to be made us-
ing the type of migration assumptions described above: total net
numbers of migrants that vary minimally over time. Although the
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construction of more complex assumptions is technically possible,
policy considerations usually dissuade technicians, who are mostly
at the service of governments, from using more realistic scenarios,
especially if these scenarios are likely to run counter major policy
stances. Whether such scenarios, if available, would help or hinder
the debate on migration, its desirability, or the degree to which it
must be tolerated is a matter that needs to be considered carefully.
Note
[1] Definitions of developing regions used.
Sub-Saharan Africa: East Africa - British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, So-
malia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Central Africa -
Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equa-
torial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, and Zaire; Southern
Africa - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland;
West Africa - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gam-
bia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, St. Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
North Africa and West Asia: North Africa - Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and West Sahara; West Asia - Bahrain,
Cyprus, Gaza Strip (Palestine), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen.
South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
East and Southeast Asia: East Asia - Hong Kong, Korea (Democratic
People's Republic), Korea (Republic), Macau, and Mongolia; South-
east Asia - Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
China.
Central America and the Caribbean: Central America - Belize, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and
Panama; Caribbean - Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Ba-
hamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Do-
minica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica,
Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts
& Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago,
Turks & Caicos Islands, and US Virgin Islands.
South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
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Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Chapter 14
Spatial and Economic
Factors in Future
South-North Migration
Sture Oberg
The objective of this chapter is to estimate future migration flows
between less developed countries and more developed countries.
This could be an easy task, where earlier flows are used as a ba-
sis for trend projections, or an aim far too complex for the scope of
this chapter.
The solution here is close to the first idea. The estimated figures
are based on three factors that determine the probabilities of future
migration. The first is present trends as they are measured by the
UN (see Chapter 13). The second is an estimate of public attitudes
toward immigrants. The assumption is that these attitudes do not
change easily over time. Attitudes are also reflected in contempo-
rary flows, so these two factors are interrelated. The third factor
examines the proximity of push and pull regions, present contacts
between people living in rich and poor regions, and the welfare gap
between regions. This factor is of course also interrelated with the
other two.
There is no official prognosis on future international migration, a
fact which has to do with political politeness. For a sending country
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it is not easy to accept in hard figures that it will not be able to
organize its labor market or food production in the near future via
emigration. For a receiving country, it is not easy to reveal, for
example, that it will deny citizenship to refugees in the future or
that it will continue to accept mostly well-educated immigrants from
poor countries. Prognoses of this kind therefore have to be personal
guesses made by individuals not working for UN agencies or any
other official authority.
Another reason for the lack of migration prognoses is the fairly
low interest in migration figures among demographers and others
working with forecasts. Migration figures are small compared with
other demographic changes. Every day there are 250,000 more in-
habitants on the globe (UN, 1992). Every day 25,000 children and
adults die of starvation and diseases related to lack of nutrition
(Durning, 1989). Compared with this, the number of net migrants
from the South to the North during one day is a small number,
about 5,000 each day. Per year, it is fewer than 1 inhabitant out of
2,000 in developing countries that migrate North. This could partly
explain the lack of prognoses on international migration.
The numbers are small, but the resulting political tension in
both sending and receiving countries is a fact. Even small streams
are visible and create positive and negative changes in the industri-
alized world. In the long run, say after one generation, small num-
bers add up to large numbers and to more impressive demographic-
ethnic changes. But of course, at a very aggregated level, the size of
the numbers is still smaller than the numbers influenced by future
changes in fertility and mortality patterns.
Before the prognosis in this chapter is presented let us define
some concepts and then determine how theories from different sci-
entific disciplines could be used to contribute to an understanding
of historical and current flows which in turn would make it easier
to speculate about future flows. This discussion is based on Oberg
and Wils (1992).
14.1 Definitions
The North is synonymous with the industrialized countries where
the income, on average, is roughly six times higher than in the
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Figure 14.1. The world regions used in this book.
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developing countries, the South. The North consists of Europe,
North America, Japan, and Oceania.
Europe is sometimes divided into Western Europe, which is part
of the North, with around 400 million inhabitants and a high per
capita income, and the rest of Europe, the former communist coun-
tries, with more than 300 million inhabitants and a much lower per
capita income, thus statistically part of the South. North America
consists of the USA and Canada. Oceania is dominated by Australia
and New Zealand.
The regions used in this chapter are consistent with the regions
defined in other chapters in this book. Thus, there are 12 groups of
nations forming the regions: Europe, the USA and Canada, Japan,
Oceania, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and West Asia (including
Iran), South Asia, China (including Hong Kong), East and South-
east Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, and
finally the Asian part of the former USSR. The regions are presented
in Figure 14.1.
Migration usually means "relatively permanent" changes of res-
idence. Since we define regions as continents or groups of nations,
interregional migration refers to movements across the boundaries
of these regions. Permanence stands for several years, preferably a
lifetime.
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Of the large number of persons who enter or leave a country,
only a small portion are defined as migrants. Tourists, business
executives, temporary workers, and asylum seekers trying to find a
new home (Rogge, 1992) are usually not defined as migrants. This
definition makes it easier to make a prognosis because the accepted
flows are statistically better known than the illegal and temporal
ones. Most of the discussion in this chapter uses a wider definition
of migrants, but the prognosis at the end of the chapter is only
concerned with migrants receiving permission to stay permanently,
including those who later become citizens of the new country.
Citizenship is an individual person's formal membership of a
state. This is a purely legal definition that serves as the basis for a
number of rights and duties. The most important here is the legal
right for a person to stay in the country where he or she is a citizen.
There are also other aspects, like political and psychological ones,
but they are not considered here (see Reinans and Hammar, 1993).
14.2 Theories on International Migration
Today, migration is understood as a process of complexity and het-
erogeneity. It can be analyzed from several perspectives and within
different conceptual frameworks or paradigms. It can concentrate
on individuals or structures, on micro or macro factors. It occurs in
response to a wide range of historical processes and contemporary
situations.
Migration concerns individuals, and thus it is a result of unique
responses to an actual, potential, or perceived understanding of
many processes. It is partly a voluntary and partly a forced action
controlled not only by the migrant but also by others, including reg-
ulating governments. With this complexity in mind, researchers still
try to find regularities which could be used for theories or prognoses.
Different scientific disciplines have specialized in different aspects on
regularities or prevailing ideas behind migration processes.
The basic idea in the scientific literature on migration between
less developed and more developed countries, South-North migra-
tion, is that people should migrate North. This will equalize the
capital per worker ratio and thus increase efficiency and hence in-
comes and welfare. A majority of the population in the North will
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gain from migration (Simon, 1993). Industrialists are happy to em-
ploy less-expensive labor. An increased supply of labor would de-
crease the wage level. Rich and well-educated people would also be
better off if they could afford to employ housemaids and gardeners
for low wages. People in possession of real estate will earn money
on increased demand for housing.
Many people in the South would also gain. Migrants would
be better off in their new countries. They could help new migrants
settle in the North. They would probably send money home to their
relatives in the less developed countries. At present the remittances
are about $75 billion annually, substantially more than development
aid.
The first ideas on international migration that were developed
into a theoretical framework are more than two centuries old. In a
study by Kryger (1764), a Swedish social scientist, causes of inter-
national migration were discussed as well as how authorities could
influence the size of the flows. His idea was that migration cannot
be explained in simple words. Individual households could have sev-
eral reasons for migrating, and the gross migration flows could have
several causes. At that time the academic disciplines were broader
and fewer than today, but Kryger's study could be labeled "applied
economics." As Sweden at that time was a poor country, he concen-
trated his analysis on push factors, like low wages in some sectors,
unfair taxation, badly organized social-security systems, and lack of
a well-functioning food distribution system. Several of these factors
are still push factors in today's poor countries.
A little more than a century later, several researchers like Raven-
stein (1885) in England and Rauchberg (1893) in Austria formu-
lated theories on interregional migration that could be extended
to international migration. A French researcher (Lavasseur, 1885)
discussed, as we often do today, "the increased facilities for commu-
nication, and the multiplicity of the relations existing between the
countries of emigration and immigration" as two of the main factors
behind migration.
An example of a summary of present knowledge on regularities
can be found in Lee (1966). He deals with a prevailing set offactors
both in the sending and in the potential receiving regions. These
factors could be positive, neutral, or negative. Added to them are
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potential barriers to migration, "intervening obstacles," such as spa-
tial and cultural distances between regions, costs of migration, or
government restrictions. Bohning (1981) provides a more general
overview. A recent survey of macro determinants of international
migration is given by Greenwood and McDowell (1992).
Today, economic theory is less applied than during Kryger's
time and thus further from actual socioeconomic processes. It is
a scientific discipline with a hard and coherent theory, based on a
number of simplified assumptions about people and society. How-
ever, several economists are struggling to develop theories that can
be applied to real world situations, like international migration (e.g.,
Lucas, 1981; MacPhee and Hassan, 1990; Blanchard et al., 1991).
According to economic theory we could expect not only labor to
move North but also capital to move South. This would increase
the total production of goods and services. In a hypothetical future
with only economic considerations, no restrictions on international
migration, and no ethnic tension or social problems, the greatest
economic efficiency would be attained by a very large redistribution
of the population.
In reality, economic theory cannot be used in this simplified way.
Rather than calculating the flows necessary to achieve a theoretically
efficient equilibrium, economic theory should be used to indicate the
direction of the flows - not only migrants but also capital and trade
commodities - and the marginal returns of these flows.
In geography, a more applied discipline, researchers on migra-
tion have been concerned mainly with intranational migration, in-
cluding urbanization. Strong theories, like the gravitation approach
from the 1940s, could then be applied to make probable prognoses
on migration flows. However, South-North migration is not only
dependent on factors such as distances, information flows, the size
of populations, or the number of employment opportunities in dif-
ferent regions. Legal restrictions in the rich countries prevent many
foreigners from entering. With present trends, less than 1 percent
of the population in the South will probably migrate to the North
before 2010.
The well-known mobility transition theory (Zelinsky, 1971),
which sometimes is treated as a deterministic theory, tells us that
there are historical phases, for example, the demographic transition,
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when movement is related to general processes of urbanization, in-
dustrialization, and modernization. It is, however, not self-evident
how these ideas could be applied to South-North migration.
Political science can teach us about public institutions and pub-
lic decision systems, concerning, for example, the formation of im-
migration policies (Kelley and Schmidt, 1979). Law can explain the
background and practice of immigration rules. However, neither
discipline has a theory on international migration flows.
The geopolitical future of the world, studied by geographers
and political scientists, is important, but there are no good theo-
ries which could help us make forecasts. We know that the lack
of congruence between ethnic settlements and political borders will
continue to be a problem - it is a problem in several regions. The
present situation in Africa is shown in Figure 14.2. In Europe, a
strong ethnic chauvinism not only created more than a dozen new
nations over the last years, but also caused "ethnic cleansing." Un-
wanted minorities have been either expelled from their settlements
or killed in a systematic way. This type of geopolitics is currently
taking place in the former Yugoslavia.
Sociology can explain some of the flows. According to one the-
ory (Hoffman-Nowotny, 1981), some flows have to do with the distri-
bution of power and prestige in a social system. A typical migrant
would first live in a poor country with a specific status among friends
and neighbors, then migrate to a rich country where he or she would
work hard, accumulate savings, and finally move back to the poor
country with the savings and with a higher status than before. The
attractive aspect of this theory is that it fits many movements be-
tween South and North.
Demographers speculate less than other researchers. They want
clear assumptions and established methods. A typical study would,
for instance, assume that 20,000 migrants with a specific ethnic
belonging and age and sex distribution settle permanently in Aus-
tralia every year. The study would then make calculations on how
this flow would change the demographic structure of the Australian
population over time. Lutz and Prinz (1992), in their study on hy-
pothetical migration flows from Eastern Europe to Western Europe,
show that assimilation processes would soon reduce the number of
"foreigners" in the West to very small numbers.
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Figure 14.2. Ethnic territories and national boundaries in Africa.
Present boundaries were drawn with very little consideration of eth-
nicity and long-lasting peaceful coexistence within and between na-
tions. Source: Peoples and Bailey, 1991.
The dependency burden is one of the central concepts in demog-
raphy, and an international gap in this burden would lead to migra-
tion flows. The discrepancy of an elderly (and wealthy) population
in the more developed countries and a young (and poor) population
in the less developed is repeatedly pointed out by demographers.
This creates a "demographic potential" for migration.
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Demographers are also concerned with feedback and return
flows, as are scientists in other fields, such as geography and so-
ciology. It is a well- known fact that small, pioneer flows of a new
group of migrants into a region later generate larger flows. First a
small group of new migrants is established in a new region. If the
members in this group are doing better there than others are doing
at home, they can receive friends or relatives and give them a base
to start from; these friends can in turn receive others, and so on. A
further example of feedback effects is that a migration flow grows
as agencies (formal and informal) are set up in the sending country
to help potential migrants by providing them with information and
practical assistance.
Another well-known fact is that migration flows in one direction
will later cause counterflows. An early reference with both ideas and
empirical evidence on this statement regarding international migra-
tion flows is Ravenstein (1885). For example, a large proportion of
the immigrants, legal and illegal, to the USA from Mexico returns
home after a work season or a few years.
History is, of course, not only an academic discipline; it is also
the empirical source of all applied social science. We understand the
world by observing it. By knowing more about past and present mi-
gration flows it is hoped that we will be better prepared for expected
future flows. There have been many mass migration flows over long
distances. In the last century, Europeans migrated to North Amer-
ica, South America, and Australia; Russians colonized parts of Asia;
Chinese went South. The British, Ottoman, and, more recently, the
Russian empires fell, resulting in large numbers of British, Turkish,
and Russian settlers belonging to the ruling class migrating from
conquered territories. In recent decades, the Rio Grande and the
Mediterranean have become symbols of borders that are crossed by
large numbers of migrants. Today, the need for foreign labor in the
USA, Europe, and the oil-producing countries is resulting in large
flows of labor migrants, staying for shorter or longer periods, some
of them becoming citizens in their new countries.
Can these and other earlier movements tell us anything about
the future? Yes, they can teach us that a few thousand net migrants
per year add up to many millions over several decades. During the
1970s and 1980s about 4 percent (net) of the Mexican population
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migrated to the USA. History also tell us that economic booms in
the North result in large labor flows in the future. Less comforting
is that history also tells us that several flows were not regarded as
probable before they became a fact. For sure, like other disciplines,
history cannot tell us about future details, only probable patterns.
The main factors influencing historic and contemporary interna-
tional migration are well known, and will continue to be important.
There are many ways to label them. Economic factors include wage
differences, different access to economic wealth, and material stan-
dard of living. Social factors comprise proximity to relatives and
friends. Cultural factors, like lifestyles and ethnicity, include so-
cial organizations, religion, and values. Geopolitical factors concern
tension or conflict, political instability, and threats to life. Environ-
mental factors, such as the carrying capacity of land for inhabitants
with limited resources, cause large migration flows, especially when
they are combined with geopolitical instability.
The causal links between these factors and the flows are gen-
erally clear. For example, if everything else is equal, most people
prefer higher wages, nearness to family, and religious freedom.
Migrants from the South usually go directly to the North, but
sometimes they first migrate to another developing country before
continuing to an industrialized country. For example, ethnic Turks
from the Balkan states often migrate to Turkey in a first move and
then to Western Europe. A study of such indirect international
migration to the United States was carried out by Greenwood and
Trabka (1991).
14.3 Push Factors
The welfare gap between countries in the South and North, factors
such as a structural income gap or physical proximity, do not change
easily over time. The income gap between Eastern Europe and
Western Europe or between North America and South America will
not disappear before the year 2020 (Oberg and Boubnova, 1993).
Also even with unrealistically large investments in the South (for
example, 50 percent), it may still take a long time to reduce this
gap. If present policies continue, the gap could even be larger in the
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Figure 14.3. Hard and soft push factors of migration.
future than it is today. There are more dollars invested per person
in the North today than the total income per person in the South.
As indicated earlier, causes of migration are sometimes divided
into two groups - push factors and pull factors. The ways these
factors influence South-North migration are discussed by several
authors (e.g., Golini et al., 1991; Heyden, 1991). Push factors can
be structural, like the rapid global population growth with its effects
on competition for food and other resources. Population growth is
most severe in poor countries, where it is already a major problem
for individuals to afford food. Another structural cause is the welfare
gap between the North and the South. There are several other
structural forces, but they are all somewhat internally interrelated
in a causal structure.
Push factors can also be related to individual motives as shown
in Figure 14.3. There are no indications that these factors will
become less important in the future. Without being pessimistic, it
is easy to believe the opposite for several reasons.
Wars between or within nation-states are usually caused by a
combination of long-lasting ethnic tensions and economic inequali-
ties. They can create large migration flows. For example, in the past
migration flows occurred in many former African colonies such as
Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zim-
babwe (Rogge, 1992). Today these migration flows are taking place
in former Yugoslavia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. Usually people try
to move to neighboring countries. In some cases, they may move
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to distant places if relatives and friends are already located there.
Indonesians migrated to the Netherlands, Armenians to the USA,
and Croats to Sweden. War between nations usually occurs where it
has occurred before, where ethnic hate exists, and where the social
systems are under too loose control (anarchy) or too strict control
(dictatorship).
In some parts of Africa, the Balkan area, or Southeast Asia, the
risk of war in the coming decades is higher than in North America or
Western Europe. Countries like South Africa and Israel have more
tension in relations to their neighbors than Switzerland or Canada,
and thus the risk for future war is higher in the former countries.
However, higher risks do not forecast future outcome. Peace can
come unexpectedly in some areas; tension can rise fast in peaceful
regions.
Persecution exists in many parts of the world, such as in Sudan,
Burma, former Yugoslavia, and EI Salvador. Ethnic tension leads to
murder in war times and persecution in peace times. It will continue
to be a problem in most parts of the world in the coming decade.
Africa may see more of this problem than other parts of the world
in the near future.
Starvation with high mortality is already prevalent in many
countries (Dreze and Sen, 1989). In most African countries the
consumption of calories has decreased in the last decade: 35 out of
47 countries were worse off in 1989 than in 1980, according to FAO
statistics. The worst decline was in sub-Saharan countries like An-
gola, Botswana, Gabon, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Starvation in
the future is more probable in poor countries with a small domestic
food production or in nondemocratic nations, since "no democratic
country with a relatively free press has ever experienced a major
famine" (Sen, 1993). Starvation is also more probable in countries
with ethnic/political tension since it is a weapon that can be used
to hurt enemies, for example, in the Ukraine in the 1930s, Biafra in
the 1960s, and southern Sudan in the 1990s. Areas with current low
income, high debts, and low food consumption are shown in Figure
14·4·
Poverty is probably the largest single factor behind current and
future migration flows. According to one estimation from the UN
(1993), 100 million migrants have left their home countries because
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Figure 14.4. Potential emigration areas. The map shows countries
with low income per capita, large debts in relation to income, and
low food consumption. A quarter of a billion people live in these
countries. Low income is defined as less than $1,500 per person in
1990; high debts mean more than one year's GNP; and at present
low food consumption implies that the supply of food is lower than
2,300 calories per person per day. Source: UNEP and UNDP, 1992.
of poverty. It is of course hard to define poverty gaps, but they
certainly constitute a contemporary and a future main force behind
international migration. The search for a good living standard can
be combined with all the push factors mentioned earlier, such as
parenthood or ethnicity. Poverty has indirect effects on migration
flows in the sense that we do not find the poorest part of the popula-
tion among the migrants. Large numbers of very poor in a country
will increase competition for resources, add to crime and violence,
and thus decrease the living standard for others, including the lower
and upper middle class. It is in these latter groups that we find
most migrants.
Environmental catastrophes are often discussed as a common fu-
ture cause behind large migration flows. Nuclear power stations or
factories producing atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons
could pollute large areas, like Chernobyl did in the Ukraine in 1986.
A rise in sea level or more hurricanes, which are phenomena dis-
cussed as a possible scenario if global warming becomes a reality, will
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create floods in lowlands in many countries. With less ozone protec-
tion in the atmosphere, large areas will be uninhabitable. For the
moment there are no good prognoses of where future environmental
catastrophes are likely to occur. Most environmental catastrophes
have occurred in developing countries. Drought, floods, soil erosion,
and desertification are widespread, recurrent problems. According
to a 1992 report by the International Organization for Migration,
environmental migration will be caused by the following disruptions:
elemental, biological, slow-onset accidents; disruptions caused by de-
velopment; and finally, environmental warfare. Each category covers
a spectrum of disruptions ranging from mild to catastrophic. For an
excellent overview of the literature on links between environmental
degradation and migration see Suhrke (1993).
Social loneliness is a problem of much less general importance
than others mentioned here. Furthermore, it will be a problem only
for a very small minority in the South, such as some parents with
their children in the North. However, this small group can be a
substantial proportion of the migrants going North, since they are
usually allowed to move to their close relatives (Jasso and Rosen-
zweig, 1986).
Summarizing the short discussion of push factors is easy. They
are overwhelming and will probably change the world in many ways.
We may be facing an unrecognizable world in the year 2020 with
migration flows of the same magnitude as during the last century
when Europeans flooded other parts of the world.
The North will be affected in an unforeseeable way, especially
if the future flows are determined by the supply of emigrants in the
South instead of, as today, by the demand for immigrants in the
North. However, a large part of these international flows will con-
tinue to be between neighboring countries in the South. A large part
will also be refugees who will not be allowed to stay permanently
or temporary workers; neither group is defined as migrants in this
chapter.
The basic assumption in this chapter is that changes are not very
spectacular. Restrictions put up by countries in the North will regu-
late future immigration. Future changes in restrictions are assumed
to be mainly influenced by present attitudes toward strangers, atti-
tudes that will not change during one generation.
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Figure 14.5. The gap between demand for cheap labor in the
North and the South is so large that minor changes in the demand
only influence migration flows indirectly through policy formation.
14.4 Pull Factors
The distinction between push and pull factors is usually unclear
from a scientific point of view. Wealth can be a pull factor in the
North, attracting migrants from less wealthy countries, but this phe-
nomenon could also be described as a push factor, lack of wealth,
in the South. With this in mind, caution must be taken when push
and pull concepts are under study.
From a technical point of view, it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween the importance of push and pull factors in relation to South-
North migration. The gap between indicators such as salary, secu-
rity, and demand for cheap labor is usually so large between the
South and the North that changes in either the push or pull factor
only marginally affect it.
Also, theoretically a distinction is combined with severe prob-
lems. A larger flow of migrants during a period of low demand in
poor countries could be dependent either on the low demand during
the period, in which case it is a push factor, or on a delayed response
to an earlier situation with a high demand in the rich countries, in
which case it is a pull factor (see Figure 14.5). Thus, not only
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could data be selected in different ways, but the same information
can also be interpreted in many ways. Concerning, for example,
the early migration flows between Sweden and the United States,
Wilkinson (1967) states that they were mainly determined by labor
demand in the USA, while Thomas (1941) reports that the economic
conditions in Sweden were more important. Quigley (1972) shows
that conditions in both the sending country and the receiving coun-
try were important. An overview of these and other empirically
based studies on patterns and dynamics of push and pull factors
can be found in Greenwood and McDowell (1992). The most suc-
cessful studies of international migration are theoretically weak but
empirically strong.
Models of migration are specific to the relative importance of
push or pull factors. Depending on which theory a researcher uses,
he or she is restricted to specific mathematical tools. Each modeling
technique emphasizes either push or pull factors. For example, a
Markov model "pushes" migrants between time steps in the future
depending on earlier trends. An overview on how different methods
rely on push or pull ideas can be found in the geographic literature
(Alonso, 1974).
In the literature, pull factors are expressed in terms of gaps.
A high demand for labor with a corresponding high salary level
is related to the wage gap between countries. Pull factors of this
kind are difficult to trace in empirical figures because the gap is
so enormous that it is not theoretically sound to relate marginal
changes directly to migration flows.
It would be better to relate pull factors indirectly to migra-
tion flows through the formation and implementation of immigra-
tion policies in the North. According to this idea, there is always
a long-lasting, large structural welfare gap between the North and
the South. The average income on one side of a geographical border
can be more than 2000 percent higher than on the other side - for
example, along the northern Mexican border or along the eastern
Finnish border. An increase in the wage level of a few percentages
on either side of the border does not change the gap as such. How-
ever, in some situations, pull factors in the North, like a shortage
of labor, could make it easier for the people in the North to ac-
cept immigrants. Policies could change and migration flows could
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increase. This view makes the distinction between push and pull
factors instrumental in studies of South-North migration.
Related to this idea is the concept of migration pressure. This
commonly used expression roughly means unrealized migration de-
sires. The migration pressure from the South thus increases either
if fewer people are allowed to migrate through a more restrictive
policy or if a larger proportion of the population in the South would
like to move North.
Pull factors that could change migration policies are related
to economic and humanitarian ideas. Economic considerations are
stronger than humanitarian factors. If influential actors in the North
could earn money on immigration, this would probably be the most
important pull factor. A few can always gain - farmers in California
or fishermen in Sicily - but they must be supported by other groups,
usually more than half of the population in democracies.
Looking ahead, there are different opinions on the future de-
mand of labor in the North. One extreme argument is that there
will not be a future need for more immigrants. The demand for
labor has changed structurally in recent decades. In the future few
laborers will be employed in modern agriculture in the North, yet
this sector will produce more food than ever. Furthermore, there
will not be a future need for industrial workers in the North. This
is not only because of the increasing competition from the newly
industrializing countries but also because of new technologies in the
production system. More investments in industry and its productiv-
ity will only decrease demand for employees. Robots and computers
will run the machines in some rich countries. For example, in the
Netherlands, only three workers out of ten in the labor market are
in farming or in industry.
A further argument for why there is no need for immigration is
that even with a future demand for labor in a booming economy,
many millions of homemakers in the North can enter the labor mar-
ket. Today, the low labor market participation in southern Europe,
for example, functions as a reserve supply of labor.
The opposite argument is that the demand for labor in the North
will increase as a function of income, not as a function of demand for
labor in agriculture and industry. Service employment must also be
included in the analysis. For example, many of rich old people in the
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North will need help in the future, but a shortage of people willing
to care for them has been projected. The shortage is due partly to a
new demographic situation, with a decrease in working-age groups,
and partly to the fact that it is difficult to recruit people living in
the North for jobs with a low status.
The humanitarian rationale for accepting refugees as immi-
grants has been quite strong, and will probably maintain its strength
in the future. A tendency to decrease its influence on migration is
the argument that more refugees could get help for the same amount
of money if they did not have to migrate to the North. Temporary
refugee camps in the South will probably be more common in the
future. Another tendency is that attitudes toward immigration are
slowly changing. Right-wing political parties tend to try to promote
policies that result in fewer accepted migrants (Vandermotten and
Vanlaer, 1993; Fielding, 1993). It is hard to see how the humani-
tarian pull factor can change policies so that more migrants will be
accepted in the future. Yet, if a change in attitudes occurs, it could
influence immigration much more than changes in the labor market.
14.5 Policies
In this chapter, the most important factor for future permanent im-
migration flows to the developed countries is assumed to be attitudes
toward foreigners within the receiving countries. These attitudes
determine regulation policies in the North. Ethnicity in a broad
sense plays an important part in this context. Feelings of superior-
ity among rich majority groups in the North or of hate or fear of
potential immigrant groups belonging to other ethnic groups cause
decreases in future flows. Native ethnic Estonians are afraid of large
flows from Russia. Ethnicity also plays an important role when in-
ternal flows in the South are determined. Muslims in Pakistan are
not interested in large flows of Hindus from India.
Since there is no comparative study of this sensitive issue on
feelings on ethnicity and attitudes toward other ethnic groups, the
current international discussion among researchers is based on a
combination of nonsystematic interviews with colleagues from dif-
ferent countries, official policies, and statistics on actual permissions
for foreigners to obtain citizenship. According to this soft approach,
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Japan, the oil-rich Muslim countries, and Australia will be hesitant
to accept immigrants from other cultures; North America will wel-
come large streams; and Western Europe will hold a position in
between these two.
Within Western Europe, current practice varies: Sweden ac-
cepted one non-European asylum seeker for every 80 inhabitants
during the 1980s; Finland accepted almost no non-European immi-
grants. On average, there are large migration flows within Europe
but very limited immigration from other parts of the world.
However, small labor flows from neighboring regions continue.
For example, in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the Turk-
ish population increased from 1.6 million to 1.8 million between 1985
and 1988. During the same period, the number of Algerians, Mo-
roccans, and Tunisians living in those countries rose from 330,000
to 370,000 (UN, 1992:179). The majority of the labor migrants are
legal. Most of the illegal migrants are now in Italy. There are sev-
eral estimates on the number of illegal migrants, but most of them
are estimates of about 1 million (Montanari and Cortese, 1993).
In the past the immigration policy in Western Europe varied
from country to country, but a more coherent policy is now emerg-
ing (Widgren, 1992). Five countries (Germany, France, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) have signed an agreement to har-
monize immigration. This group of countries, the Schengen group,
will directly or indirectly influence other countries to adjust their
policies in the same direction. Europeans are very restrictive to
non-European immigrants. On average, around 1 percent of the
population are non-Europeans. France, the UK, Germany, Sweden,
and Belgium have higher figures.
Within the former USSR, which consists of a European part (the
Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and an Asian
part (including Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan),
there are now flows from Asia to Europe. Ethnic Russians migrate
to Europe from territories where they used to belong to a ruling mi-
nority, or where they were working for high salaries as compensation
for poor working conditions. The same is true for ethnic Ukrainians
and Belarussians (Oberg and Boubnova, 1993).
The two countries in the North American region are of special in-
terest in this chapter since they have traditionally accept immigrants
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Table 14.1. Principal countriesa
asylum seekers.
Sture Oberg
of resettlement of refugees and
Resettlement
country
Sweden
Canada
Australia
USA
France
Germani
1975-1990
121,000
325,000
183,000
1,478,000
200,000
91,000
Ratio
refugees/population
1/71
1/82
1/96
1/171
1/238
1/869
aSome countries with very small populations - Denmark, Norway, and New
Zealand - have high ratios, as high as those in the USA or France.
bExcludes ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. If this group is included, Ger-
many has the same ratio as France.
Source: USeR, World Refugee Survey, 1992, cited in Rogge, 1992.
with different ethnic backgrounds. The United States accepts more
immigrants than any other country in the world. The USA and
Canada belong to the principal countries of resettlement of refugees
and asylum seekers (see Table 14.1). Canada accepts fewer im-
migrants in absolute numbers but more than the USA in relative
terms. The USA granted permanent resident status to nearly 6
million people and Canada to 1 million during the 1980s.
The US immigration policy legalized the stay of another 0.5 mil-
lion people in 1989. For more than a decade, immigration has been
increasing. About one-third of the immigrants today are admitted
because they are adult children or siblings of US citizens, another
third are spouses, children, and parents, and the last third are hu-
manitarian or economic immigrants without close relatives living in
the USA.
The Canadian immigration policy has always been based on hu-
manitarian ideas and economic considerations (Green, 1976). Fam-
ily reunions and protection of refugees belong to the former category;
labor market needs, to the latter. Approximately one-third of the
immigrants belong to the latter group. They have desired skills or
occupations or business intentions, or they are members of a family
having this labor market advantage. In recent years, labor market
needs have become more important, and there are discussions on
increasing this group of immigrants still further.
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The majority of the population in Oceania lives in Australia and
New Zealand. Australia admitted about 0.8 million immigrants from
countries outside Oceania during the 1980s. New Zealand, a country
with net emigration, admitted less than half in relative terms, which
is approximately one-tenth in absolute numbers. Roughly every fifth
person moving to Australia was skilled and defined as a "business
migrant." Every tenth (between 1986 and 1989) was a refugee or a
person admitted under the Special Humanitarian Program.
Japan is a rich country with a demand for foreign labor. It
is by tradition a closed society. However, its strong and successful
economy has increased the demand for labor within the country to
a degree where legal and illegal imports become a factor. The le-
gal workers are mainly women entertaining Japanese men, 71,000 in
1988 (UN, 1992). The unregistered, illegal workers are increasing in
numbers but are still less than 1 percent of the labor force (Shah,
1992). Thus there are some foreigners working in Japan, but they
seldom get permission to settle in the country. A reasonable guess is
that present attitudes toward non-Japanese will not change within
one generation. The result could then be a large number of tempo-
rary guests or guest workers employed in Japan but not allowed to
be citizens.
The rich oil-producing countries, especially in West Asia, will
probably use the same strategy; they will continue their policy to
allow workers to stay in the country on temporary jobs but will
not allow foreigners to become citizens. Today, they accept large
numbers (perhaps 2 or 3 million) of foreign workers: people of Arab
origin (e.g., Egyptians, Palestinians, and Jordanians), people from
countries in South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh),
and people from Southeast Asia (e.g., the Philippines, Republic of
Korea, and Thailand). By 1985, it was estimated that 63 percent of
all workers in the six Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were from South or
Southeast Asia (Shah, 1992). Since these workers are not allowed to
be citizens in West Asian countries, they are all temporary visitors
and are not treated as (permanent) immigrants in this chapter. The
assumption is that even in the coming decades, very few people will
be allowed to become permanent immigrants to this rich part of the
world.
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Hong Kong, which is a part of China in this book (and will
formally be a part of China as of July 1997), has an unpredictable
future. Many inhabitants have already moved to other countries,
like Canada. The UK says that it will no longer accept the in-
habitants as privileged members of the Commonwealth, except for
50,000 people with their families.
China will, according to a probable scenario, become more in-
tegrated with the economy of the rest of the world in the coming
decades. This event could result in larger migration flows to North
America where there is a positive attitude toward immigrants from
Asia. Also, Australia could be affected demographically by more
intense economic cooperation with China.
The attitudes toward immigration in the rich countries are gen-
erally in favor of strong regulations and limitations on the numbers
allowed to enter. The attitudes vary from a more generous North
America to a restrictive Japan. Australia is similar to North Amer-
ica, but has clear ethnic priorities. Europe is, on average, closer to
Japan, but some individual countries are exceptions.
The discussion of attitudes is mainly based on knowledge from
historic and current situations. Attitudes toward future immigrants
are based on attitudes toward immigrants today. These attitudes
are already known indirectly through the size of contemporary mi-
gration flows. Previous migration flows between South and North,
to a large extent, determine future flows. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, an existing flow tells us that the receiving rich
country accepts immigrants. Second, earlier immigrants, now living
in the North, with social contacts to people in the South, make it
easier for potential migrants to realize their wishes and thus become
new immigrants. Large proportions of present immigrants are re-
lated to earlier immigrants. For example, more than one-third of
the immigrant flow to the USA consists of close relatives of US citi-
zens (spouses, children, and parents). Third, if many immigrants of
one ethnic background move to a country with a democratic society,
they become a political force because they have many votes, have
economic power, and can organize lobbies. The Hispanic part of the
US population is a good example of an immigrant group reaching
the point of being able to exercise political power.
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More detailed figures on assumed future migration streams be-
tween the world regions are discussed in Chapters 15 and 16.
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Editor's Note for Part V
Chapter 13 gives the most complete account of intercontinental mi-
gration that can be composed with existing data. Even without
illegal migration input, data on official or legal migration turn out
to be fragmentary. In a discussion on the forces that will induce fu-
ture migration, Chapter 14 shows that the traditionally studied pull
and push factors of economic disparities are often submerged by the
importance of legal and logistical restrictions on international mi-
gration. Short-term political changes as well as refugee movements
spurred by war or famine can significantly impact on migration level.
As in the past, international migration can be assumed to show great
volatility in the future.
How can one derive from this information assumptions about
the future? An informed guess would be to assume that the future
maximum migration level will roughly equal the maximum that has
been observed at certain times in the past. For such an exercise it
is appropriate to make migration assumptions in absolute numbers,
rather than rates, depending on population size. For some possible
future migration streams, such as Asian migration into Siberia, there
is no recent historical precedent for orientation, and numbers will
have to be chosen rather freely. At the low extreme a convenient
assumption is that of zero net-migration, namely, a balance of in-
migration and out-migration. Such a scenario reflects the possible
case of xenophobic policies, for example, in Europe, under which
immigration would be reduced to an absolute minimum. The central
scenario then gives the average of these two extreme scenarios; it
should also be considered the most likely case. Specific numbers are
given in Chapter 15.
387



Chapter 15
The IIASA World
Population Scenarios to
2030
Wolfgang Lutz, Christopher Prinz, and Jeannette Langgassner
This part presents the population projections that were carried out
on the basis of the considerations given in Chapters 1 through 14.
The part presents two different sets of projections. The first and
foremost is the set of systematic permutation scenarios until 2030
presented in this chapter. Based on the considerations of experts
in the previous chapters for each of the three components (fertility,
mortality, and migration), two extreme paths (one high and one
low) of future levels are assumed for each of the 12 world regions.
This results in eight permutation scenarios, which serve the purpose
of sensitivity analysis as discussed in Chapter 2. In these scenarios
the three components are explicitly assumed to be independent. In
addition the demand for one most likely projection for orientation
is met by the central scenario, which results from the averaging of
the high and low assumptions of all three components. For these
scenarios, assumptions are only defined up to the year 2030 (see
discussion of time horizon in Chapter 2). To illustrate some of the
longer-term impacts of assumptions, results up to 2050 are presented
in shaded areas of the figures for specific cases.
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Chapter 16 presents some special scenarios for illustrative pur-
poses until 2100. The presentation includes two sets of scenarios:
three long-term extensions where the components are still essen-
tially independent and a number oflong-term scenarios that assume
specific interdependencies between the components and feedbacks
from the output parameters to fertility and mortality in the follow-
ing periods. Because the number of possible interdependencies and
feedbacks is almost infinite, the projections only illustrate selected
possible mechanisms and results.
Chapters 15 and 16 also provide a comparison between the re-
sults for our world population scenarios and the world population
projections published by the UN and the World Bank. In several
respects, both parts - the systematic permutation scenarios until
2030 and the special scenarios until 2100 - go beyond other existing
projections. Our scenarios also try to respond to a demand from sci-
entists in the field of global environmental change. To facilitate the
use of the results by others, an extensive set of tables is appended
to the volume. A complete data set for all scenarios and all regions
in five-year age groups and five-year time steps is also available on
diskette from the authors.
15.1 Specification of Scenario Assumptions
In the following set of scenario projections for each of the three
components (fertility, mortality, and migration), high and low val-
ues have been defined based on the substantive analysis of experts
presented in Chapters 3 to 14. Since in general the experts did not
come up with specific numerical information of changes in rates over
time, a first necessary step lies in the operationalization of the views
expressed by the experts.
The editor's notes at the end of each part of this book give brief
statements on how the information given in the preceding chapters
is used for defining specific assumptions. The full set of numerical
assumptions presented in Tables 15.1 to 15.3 resulted from a long
and difficult discussion process that cannot be fully documented
here. Reference is made to the preceding chapters of this volume
and, concerning the industrialized countries, to the set of papers in
Lutz (1991).
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Table 15.1. Alternative fertility assumptions in the 12 world re-
gions for 2030 (TFR).
2030
1990 Low Central High
North Africa 4.7 2.0 3.00 4.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.4 2.5 3.75 5.0
Central America & Caribbean 3.3 1.7 2.35 3.0
South America 2.9 1.7 2.35 3.0
West & Central Asia 4.2 1.7 2.35 3.0
South Asia 4.2 1.7 2.35 3.0
China/Hong Kong/Taiwan 2.2 1.5 2.25 3.0
Southeast Asia 3.2 1.7 2.35 3.0
North America 2.0 1.4 1.85 2.3
Japan/Australia 1.7 1.3 1.70 2.1
Eastern Europe 2.0 1.3 1.80 2.3
Western Europe 1.6 1.3 1.70 2.1
15.1.1 Future fertility
Assumptions about the future course of fertility may be derived from
several sources of information. First, it is the analysis of past trends
and the assessment of where individual countries and regions stand
in the process of demographic transition. This assessment, presented
for today's developing countries in Chapter 3, was a major guideline
in making specific assumptions for the individual regions under the
basic premise that the fertility transition that has started almost
everywhere will essentially continue. While the low values assume
a rapid pace in the continuation of the fertility transition, the high
values assume a much slower pace - in some cases even a stagnation
of the declining trend. In China it even implies increasing fertility.
For the near future the intentions expressed by women in repre-
sentative surveys can be taken as an additional important piece of
evidence. Chapter 4 analyzes this information for a selected num-
ber of countries. Sub-Saharan Africa has by far the highest fertility
levels and the lowest levels of contraceptive prevalence, but in all
countries the desired fertility rates, which have been derived from
the surveys, are clearly lower than the actual ones - in Kenya by
almost two children. This fact, together with indications of increas-
ing contraceptive prevalence, leads to the expectation of significant
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fertility declines in the next decade, even in sub-Saharan Africa
which has shown constant high fertility until recently.
In North Africa the fertility transition is already much further
advanced, and more than one-third of the female population uses
contraceptives. Desired fertility rates in this region indicate that
further significant fertility declines are to be expected unless dra-
matic events, such as a rise in pronatalist fundamentalism, change
the pattern. The three Asian countries considered here, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand, already have total fertility levels below 3.0
with further declines expected. Latin America has an intermediate
position comparable with that in North Africa. A specific feature
about this region is that over the past decades fertility was rather
stagnant at this intermediate level. But recent evidence indicates
further decline.
In the longer run, without doubt it is general socioeconomic and
cultural change that will determine fertility levels. But these trends
are by no means easier to forecast than the direction of fertility
change itself. One more specific aspect in this context is the role of
government policies and family-planning programs. As pointed out
in Chapter 5, experience with such programs over several decades
has shown that they can have an important effect if they are well in-
tegrated into other government policies and, most importantly, if the
socioeconomic development of the population has reached a point at
which limitation of family size is considered a real option and advan-
tageous by sizable segments of the population. Since many countries
have been adopting such programs, they are likely to contribute in
accelerating the fertility decline.
In terms of specific numerical assumptions, for all developing
regions except South America and China, even the high value in
2030 was assumed to be lower than the current fertility level. This
is because of the overwhelming evidence of a further continuation of
the process of demographic transition in parts of the world that still
have high fertility. For this reason no constant fertility scenario was
specified. However, the high values (3.0 in all regions except Africa)
do not assume a smooth fertility transition but an interruption or
at least retardation of the process. This could be due to setbacks in
socioeconomic development, cultural or religious movements such as
a rise of fundamentalism, or strong heterogeneity with rather stable
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pre- and post-transitional populations living together in one region.
The low values indicate a very rapid fertility decline that will not
stop at 2.1 but continue to subreplacement fertility as it did in most
industrialized countries. The resulting central values for 2030 are
somewhat above replacement level in most regions, and significantly
above in Africa. The fertility assumptions for China are based on the
discussion in Chapter 6, and assume a low value of 1.5 as opposed
to a high value of 3.0 in 2030.[lJ
Making assumptions for today's industrialized countries is in one
way more difficult and in another way easier than for today's high
fertility countries. It is more difficult because even the sign of change
is unclear: Will fertility increase or decrease? It is easier because the
margin of uncertainty may be assumed to be smaller. For a modern
urban society with increasing female economic activity, it is unlikely
that fertility will be significantly above replacement level. But it
seems equally unlikely that fertility will remain permanently below
a level that is around half of replacement because, at an individual
level, the desire for children seems to be deeply rooted in women and
men and, at a societal level, rapid population aging would result in
serious problems (see deliberations in Chapter 12).
Until a few years ago, the United Nations and other institutions
preparing population forecasts assumed that fertility would increase
to replacement level and that subreplacement fertility was only a
transitory phenomenon. This assumption is theoretically supported
by the above-discussed argument of homeostasis. In this view, fer-
tility levels are not seen as the sum of individual behavior, but as
one aspect of the evolution of a system where individual behavior is
a function of the status of the system (see Vishnevsky, 1991). Under
such a systems approach the assumption of replacement fertility in
the longer run seems to be natural. For this reason we assumed a
TFR between 2.1 and 2.3 in 2030 as the high-fertility assumption in
the four industrialized regions.
It is difficult, however, to find many researchers that support
this view. Too much evidence points toward low fertility. The return
to replacement fertility has been criticized as an assumed magnetic
force (Westoff, 1991) without empirical support. A large number
of significant arguments support an assumption of further declin-
ing fertility levels. They range from the weakening of the family in
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terms of both declining marriage rates and high divorce rates, to the
increasing independence and career orientation of women, and to a
value change toward materialism and consumerism. These factors,
together with increasing demands and personal expectations for at-
tention, time, and also money to be given to children, are likely to
result in fewer couples that have more than one or two children and
an increasing number of childless women. Also, the proportion of
unplanned pregnancies is still high, and some future improvements
in contraceptive methods seem possible.
In conclusion one can say that the bulk of evidence points to the
direction that fertility will remain low or even decline further. How
far it can decline is not clear at this point. The expert group decided
to settle for a TFR of 1.3 as the low value in the year 2030. This
value is below the low-fertility assumptions in other projections,
but it is far from being impossible. Actually several populations
have already experienced such levels for extended periods. Taking
into account the different ethnic composition in North America, the
fertili ty range in this region was chosen to be slightly higher (1.4 to
2.3) than in Europe and Japan.
15.1.2 Future mortality
Mortality conditions at one point in time can be conveniently sum-
marized by period life expectancy at birth, an indicator that results
from a life table based on all age-specific mortality rates observed
at that time. In the following discussion, this indicator is used to
define mortality assumptions. [2]
The uncertainties about future improvements or possibly even
declines in life expectancy are quite different in today's high- and
low-mortality countries. The latter countries have seen impressive
increases in life expectancy and their populations are approaching
ages that used to be considered a biological upper limit to the human
life span. Hence assumptions about future improvements crucially
depend on whether such a limit exists and will soon be reached (see
Chapter 12; Manton, 1991). In regions that still have much lower
life expectancy, this question is irrelevant, and future mortality con-
ditions will be determined by the efficiency of local health services,
the spread of traditional (e.g., malaria) and new (AIDS) diseases,
and the general level of subsistence.
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Table 15.2. Alternative mortality assumptions in the 12 world
regions (life expectancy at birth).
Assumed change in
Life expectancy years of life expect-
1990 ancy per decade
Region Male Female Low Central High
Developing regions
North Africa 58.6 61.1 0.50 2.25 4.00
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.0 52.4 -3.00 0.00 3.00
Central America & Caribbean 65.7 71.3 1.00 2.00 3.00
South America 64.0 69.6 1.00 2.00 3.00
West & Central Asia 64.4 69.3 0.50 2.25 4.00
South Asia 58.1 58.4 0.00 2.00 4.00
China 68.6 71.8 1.00 2.00 3.00
Southeast Asia 61.2 65.3 0.00 2.00 4.00
Industrialized regions
North America 72.2 79.0 1.00 2.00 3.00
Japan/Australia/New Zealand 75.3 81.1 1.00 2.00 3.00
Eastern Europe 65.9 74.7 0.50 2.25 4.00
Western Europe 73.0 79.4 1.00 2.00 3.00
At the moment, life expectancy at a national level is highest
in Japan: 82.1 years for women and 76.1 years for men. Only 30
years ago in 1960-1964 female life expectancy was 71.7 and male
life expectancy was 66.6, implying an average increase of 3.7 years
per decade for women. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, had
the same life expectancy as Japan during the early 1960s but has
had almost no improvement since then, bringing it to only around
68 for men and 75 for women at present. During the 1970s most
East European countries and the Soviet Union even experienced a
decline in male life expectancy. Western Europe and North Amer-
ica took an intermediate position, where life expectancy increased
steadily by about two to three years per decade. The recent trend
clearly points toward further improvements, and the analysis of age-
and cause-specific mortality trends do not give any indications of an
imminent leveling off of improvements (Valkonen, 1991). Also stud-
ies on occupational mortality differentials in the Nordic countries -
which are more homogeneous than countries in many other regions -
still show significant inequalities, mostly by social class (Andersen,
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1991), which may be taken as an indication of the possibility of
further improvements if the higher-mortality groups change their
lifestyles.
The considerations and high values outlined above made us as-
sume future improvements that are much more significant than those
assumed by most other national and international population pro-
jections. Assuming life expectancy to increase by three years per
decade to 2030, however, we are still below recently observed im-
provements in Japan and parts of Western Europe. The resulting
central variant of a two-year improvement per decade also seems
plausible, as supported by Mesle (1993). A broader margin was
chosen only for Eastern Europe because of greater uncertainties: 0.5
years was taken as the lower value assuming a continuation of the
past slow improvements; 4.0 was taken as the upper value because
there is a greater potential to catch up with the West if lifestyles
should become similar to the Western pattern.
Health and mortality conditions in the developing regions have
generally experienced very impressive improvements since World
War II. Life expectancy in all developing countries has increased
by more than 20 years since 1950-1955, when it was estimated
to be around 40 years for both men and women. Some regions,
such as East and West Asia, have seen especially rapid increases.
Latin America, which already had higher life expectancies during
the 1950s, has by now achieved lower mortality levels than Africa
and Asia. In the Caribbean, the mortality decline is particularly
impressive. These rapid improvements in mortality have led insti-
tutions that produce population projections to constantly change
their assumptions. The UN had to move up the assumed life ex-
pectancy limit for men from 72.6 years, assumed in 1973, in steps
to 82.5 years, assumed in 1988. Equal adjustments had to be made
for women (see Chapter 7).
As with fertility, Africa seems to have the greatest uncertain-
ties of all regions. In Chapter 8, Garenne concludes his survey of
African mortality by stating that past trends in Africa have been
induced by transfers of technology from the West, which affected
virtually all countries in a short period of time. Public health, nu-
trition, economic development, and modern education were the key
determinants of mortality decline. There are reasons for assuming
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that this declining trend of the past 30 years will not continue in
Africa, and that differences between countries will prevail or even
increase. This may be due to the spread of infectious diseases, es-
pecially the HIV virus, as well as problems of basic subsistence and
food supply (see Chapter 10). In Chapter 9, Bongaarts presents a
new calculation of the possible mortality impact of AIDS in Africa.
Translated into life expectancies and projected further into the fu-
ture, his calculations result in a considerable range of uncertainties.
For sub-Saharan Africa, the values assumed for the scenario as-
sumptions, which include not only AIDS but other uncertainties,
are further increases of three years per decade in the best case and
declines of three years per decade in the worst case. Consequently,
the central value shows stagnation at the present level.
In the other developing regions, a general increase in life ex-
pectancy of between one and three years per decade has been as-
sumed. In South Asia and Southeast Asia, which are more seriously
affected by AIDS, the range was chosen to be greater assuming no
improvements in the low case and 4 years per decade in the high
case. For the Islamic regions of North Africa and West and Central
Asia, a minimum increase of 0.5 years and a maximum increase of
4 years was chosen reflecting their somewhat greater potential for
improvements. [3]
15.1.3 Future interregional migration
Of the three components of population change, international migra-
tion is the most difficult to examine for two reasons: less reliable
and representative statistical information is available for assessing
past and present migration levels; and migration patterns tend to
show much less continuity with intensities, changing significantly
within very short time periods depending on changing policies. Re-
cent immigration trends in Western Europe clearly demonstrate the
volatility of migration trends. During the early 1970s West Germany
had an annual net migration gain of more than 300,000; five years
later this had declined to only around 6,000 and even 3,000 during
the early 1980s. During 1985-1989, however, the annual net gain
increased sharply again to 378,000, 100 times that of the previous
period. Few other countries have these extreme fluctuations, but the
traditional immigration countries - USA, Canada, and Australia -
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Table 15.3. Matrix of assumed high values of annual net migration
flows, in thousands.
To
North West Japan/ Western Eastern
From America Asia Australia Europe Europe All
North Africa 90 15 20 275 75 475
Sub-Saharan Africa 115 5 40 275 75 510
Central America 550 0 10 45 45 650
South America 150 5 15 45 45 260
West Asia 25 0 10 10 20 65
South Asia 300 15 80 150 290 835
China 220 0 40 50 160 470
Southeast Asia 550 10 135 150 290 1,135
Total 2,000 50 350 1,000 1,000 4,400
show remarkable ups and downs. Annual net migration to Australia
has declined from 112,000 in the early 1970s to 54,000 in the late
1970s. During the 1980s it increased again to over 100,000. For the
United States and Canada only immigration figures are given, which
for the USA shows a steady increase from around 280,000 per year
during the early 1960s to around 800,000 during the early 1980s. In
1990-1991 the figures have declined to under 700,000.
Aside from the migration streams into Western Europe, North
America, and Australia/New Zealand, labor migration within Asia
has been remarkable over recent decades. For instance, during the
late 1980s more than 430,000 workers left the Philippines annually,
with around 280,000 of them going to the Middle East. The Repub-
lic of Korea lost an average of 170,000 workers per year during the
early 1980s, India lost 240,000, and Pakistan lost 130,000 during the
same period. The largest proportion of these workers went to the
oil-rich countries in the Middle East. During the late 1980s these
migratory streams within Asia have shown significant declines.
Due to the volatility of these trends, described systematically in
Chapter 13, and the great role that short-term political changes play
in both the receiving and sending countries, it is more difficult to
speculate about the future of migratory streams than about future
fertility and mortality trends. Furthermore, net migration always
results from the combination of two partly independent migration
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streams, namely, that entering and that leaving a certain region for
whatever reasons. These reasons are sometimes grouped into polit-
ical (asylum seekers), economic (expected differentials in standard
of living), and recently environmental factors. This last category
remains rather vague because worsening environmental conditions
often result from worsening economic conditions. As pointed out in
Chapter 14, for all categories there seems to be great potential for
further increases in interregional migration due to better commu-
nications between the regions, cheap mass transport facilities, and
the persistent gap between the North, which is not only richer but
also rapidly aging and most likely in need of young labor, and the
South, which has many young people with low-income opportunities
in their home countries.
The actual extent of future South-North migration streams de-
pends not only on the pull and push factors, but also on the mi-
grant acceptance policies in the receiving countries. If the European
Union, for instance, decides to enforce a policy of virtually closed
outside borders because of popular demand within the Union, this
may well result in a situation of almost no net migration. Hence
in the projections, zero was the low value chosen for net migration
for all regions. This does not mean that borders will be entirely
closed to migrants; it only assumes that the number of in-migrants
approximately equals the number of out-migrants.
For the high-migration scenarios, annual net migration gains
of 2 million in North America, 1 million in Western Europe, and
350,000 in Japan/Australia/New Zealand have been assumed. For
Eastern Europe special assumptions were made for the period 1990-
2030 with out-migration dominating the first decade, then a gradual
replacement by immigration peaking at a surplus of 1 million in
2030. This also considers possible immigration from East Asia into
Siberia.
The distribution of migrants from the assumed sending regions
to the receiving regions and migration patterns among the less de-
veloped regions are based mostly on currently observed migratory
streams. Table 15.3 gives the assumed migration matrix in the high-
migration case. In the low-migration case, all cells are zero; in the
central scenario, values are half of those given in Table 15.3. Annual
net migration loss is assumed to be 475,000 in North Africa, 510,000
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in sub-Saharan Africa, 650,000 in Central America, 260,000 in South
America, 15,000 in West Asia, 835,000 in South Asia, 470,000 in
China, and 1,135,000 in Southeast Asia. Model migration sched-
ules by Rogers and Castro (1981) were used to determine the age
patterns of migrants.
For Eastern Europe, net migration flows were assumed to change
significantly over time. The gain from developing regions was as-
sumed to increase from 200,000 today to a net migration gain of 1
million (stated in Table 15.3) that is reached in 2030 and is assumed
to be largely a function of Asian migration into Siberia, which as
part of Russia belongs to Eastern Europe in this study. Simulta-
neously, Eastern Europe is assumed to experience a net loss to the
West of 500,000 annually, which would gradually decline to zero by
2010. The rationale behind this is an expected economic recovery
in Eastern Europe over the next two decades. In summary, the as-
sumptions imply migration losses in the near future but significant
gains in the longer term.
15.2 Results from Alternative Population
Projections until 2030
Taking 1990 as the starting year, the alternative scenario projec-
tions were carried out for the 12 world regions separately in five-year
steps, using MPOPS software for multistate population projections.
MPOPS, recently developed in collaboration with IIASA, uses age
distributions for all regions in 1990 based on UN (1993) data. As
described in Chapter 2, eight scenarios are defined by systematic
permutations of the high and low values assumed for fertility, mor-
tality, and migration, and one central scenario combines the three
central, assumptions which in all cases are the means of the high
and low values.
The values chosen as the high, central, and low assumptions to
the year 2030 are presented in Section 15.1. In the case of fertility,
the values stated in Table 15.1 only refer to the endpoint 2030. Fer-
tility rates for the intermediate period have been derived from linear
interpolation between the present value and the value assumed for
2030. In today's industrialized countries the values given in Table
15.1 are assumed to be reached by 2010. For mortality, the scenarios
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have been defined in terms of improvement in life expectancy per
decade. For migration the assumed levels of net migration are ap-
plied immediately and remain constant thereafter except for Eastern
Europe, where a special path has been assumed.
Tables with results from all nine scenarios in all 12 regions as
well as the world total and developing and industrialized countries
together are given in the Appendices to the volume. These tables
contain total population sizes, mean ages of the population, average
annual growth rates, annual number of births, proportions of chil-
dren aged 0-15, and proportions aged 60 years and over. Detailed
age distributions are available on diskette.
15.2.1 Population size by region
Figures 15.1 and 15.2 give the results of the alternative scenario
projections for the total world population and the population in to-
day's industrialized regions from 1990 to 2030 and extended to 2050.
As discussed above, scenarios have only been defined until 2030, but
to illustrate some of the longer-term implications extensions to 2050
assuming constant rates beyond 2030 are given in the shaded area.
The figure for today's developing countries is very similar to that of
the world total and is therefore omitted.
Figure 15.1 clearly shows that further world population growth
is certain. Unless an unpredictable, major disaster occurs, the world
population will grow by at least another 50 percent to above 8 billion
before the year 2030. It may also increase by 100 percent and reach
close to 11 billion by the year 2030. All likely futures of world
population growth lie within this range, Le., between a 50 percent
and 100 percent increase by 2030. The central scenario yields a total
world population of 9.4 billion in 2030, corresponding to an increase
of roughly 80 percent.
Extended beyond 2030, the high-fertility scenarios show further
significant population growth, which in combination with low mor-
tality would reach 15 billion by 2050. The central scenario extended
beyond 2030 shows significant further growth to 11 billion by 2050,
and even the scenario combining low fertility with low mortality re-
sults in further population growth mostly due to the momentum of
population growth. Only low fertility combined with high mortality
results in a clear leveling off and even a slight decline before 2050.
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Figure 15.1. Alternative projected paths of world population size.
An astonishing feature of this figure is that mortality assump-
tions seem to make a much bigger difference than demographers
tend to expect. Different mortality assumptions bring the high-
fertility flow-mortality scenario more than halfway toward the cen-
tral scenario. In 2020, for instance, the high-mortalityfhigh-fertility
scenario results in 200 million more people than the central scenario,
but the low-mortalityfhigh-fertility scenario results in 580 million
more.
Compared over all scenarios, the total effect of mortality varia-
tion is about half that of the effect of fertility variation because of
fertility's multiplicative effect. But this extent is still astonishing to
demographers who tend to believe that fertility makes the biggest
difference and look at curves that only differ by fertility. Of course,
the relative impact of mortality depends on the degree of variation
assumed in mortality, and this study assumes more variation than
usual. In fact most projections, such as those published by the UN
and the World Bank, do not assume any mortality variation. Nat-
urally, their results only vary with fertility. A fair assessment of
relative future effects needs to have a comparable degree of variabil-
ity in all input parameters. In our scenario, definitions of low and
high assumptions for fertility and mortality should by definition be
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Figure 15.2. Alternative projected paths of population size III
today's industrialized countries.
of comparable likelihood. They both follow a smooth path of ad-
justment. Hence it presents about as fair an assessment as one can
assume given today's knowledge.
Trends in population growth are extremely divergent in different
regions of the world. In Western Europe, the central scenario yields
a mere 10 percent increase by 2030, but in sub-Saharan Africa it
results in a tripling of the population. The central scenario results
in a 35 percent increase in North America, a 75 percent increase
in South America, and a 50 percent increase in China. Roughly
a doubling of the population will occur in North Africa and South
Asia as well as in Central America and the Caribbean.
High fertility combined with low mortality and low migration
results in the highest world population growth of all scenarios. This
scenario also gives the highest population growth in each develop-
ing region. Among others it results in a 3.6-fold increase of the
sub-Saharan population and a 66 percent increase in the Chinese
population. In the industrialized regions naturally the combination
of high migration with high fertility and low mortality reaches higher
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population sizes, because migration streams are mostly assumed to
flow into the industrialized countries. For all industrialized coun-
tries this increment due to migration is an extra 110 million people
by 2030.
Figure 15.2 shows that in the industrialized countries, which
in 1990 had 1.14 billion inhabitants, some further population in-
crease is already preprogrammed and almost certain to take place
until 2010, when the population will reach at least 1.21 billion, pos-
sibly even 1.3 billion. By 2030 some scenarios will have already
resulted in a declining trend of population sizes. In the scenario
that combines low fertility with high mortality and low migration,
the population size of today's industrialized countries will be even
lower in 2030 than it was in 1990. Compared over all scenarios,
the range by 2030 is from a 1 percent decline in that scenario to a
35 percent increase in the case of high fertility, low mortality, and
high migration. However, even within the industrialized countries,
significant regional differences range between a 12 percent and 60
percent increase in North America, and between a 4 percent decline
and a 25 percent increase in Western Europe.
The different paths of future population growth in different re-
gions will inevitably lead to significant changes in the regional com-
position of the world's population. The lower part of Table 15.4
illustrates these changes. Table 15.5 gives the information for all
industrialized and developing regions grouped together. The popu-
lation of the industrialized countries in 1990 comprised 22 percent of
the world's population. Under the central scenario, this proportion
will decrease to a mere 14 percent by 2030. This decrease comes
despite a 13 percent increase in population size. The population
size of the developing countries is projected to increase by almost
100 percent, i.e., double, during the same time. The table indicates
that this trend of changing regional weights in terms of population
size is predetermined and practically inevitable. Under all scenar-
ios the proportions of industrialized countries declines to between
13 percent and 15 percent by 2030, down from 22 percent in 1990.
This is partly already embedded in today's age structure in both
hemispheres, and also results from present fertility differentials and
the assumption of only gradual changes. But even the assumption of
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Table 15.4. Total population size and percentage distributions by
region resulting from four selected scenarios by 2030.
Population (millions) in 2030
High migr. Low migr. Low migr.
High mort. Low mort. Low mort.
Region 1990 Central Low fert. High fert. Low fert.
North Africa 140 330 276 388 312
Sub-Saharan Africa 502 1,496 1,199 1,825 1,424
North America 277 375 362 387 328
Central America &
Caribbean 147 288 251 328 279
South America 294 515 463 572 488
West & Central Asia 197 442 397 487 419
South Asia 1,191 2,426 2,145 2,722 2,349
China & Hong Kong 1,159 1,722 1,538 1,927 1,610
Southeast Asia 518 934 814 1,059 909
Japan, Australia, &
New Zealand 144 160 149 172 150
Eastern Europe 345 379 335 425 351
Western Europe 377 415 388 444 385
World total 5,291 9,482 8,317 10,736 9,004
Percentage distribution in 2030
High migr. Low migr. Low migr.
High mort. Low mort. Low mort.
Region 1990 Central Low fert. High fert. Low fert.
North Africa 2.6 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.5 15.8 14.4 17.0 15.8
North America 5.2 4.0 4.4 3.6 3.6
Central America &
Caribbean 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
South America 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.3 5.4
West & Central Asia 3.7 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.7
South Asia 22.5 25.6 25.8 25.4 26.1
China & Hong Kong 21.9 18.2 18.5 17.9 17.9
Southeast Asia 9.8 9.9 9.8 9.9 10.1
Japan, Australia, &
New Zealand 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7
Eastern Europe 6.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9
Western Europe 7.1 4.3 4.7 4.1 4.3
World total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 15.5. Distribution oftotal population, births, children, and
elderly in developing and industrialized countries, 1990 and 2030,
according to selected scenarios.
Developing Industrialized
countries countries
Absolute Share Absolute Share
1990 Total population 4,149 78% 1,142 22%
Births 115 88% 15 12%
Children 0-14 1,477 86% 236 14%
Elderly 60+ 286 59% 198 41%
2030 Central scenario
Total population 8,167 86% 1,333 14%
Births 165 92% 15 8%
Children 0-14 2,270 90% 247 10%
Elderly 60+ 996 73% 373 27%
2030 Low migr./Low mort./High fert.
Total population 9,309 87% 1,427 13%
Births 222 92% 19 8%
Children 0-14 2,988 92% 275 8%
Elderly 60+ 1,210 75% 410 25%
2030 Low migr./Low mort./Low fert.
Total population 7,790 87% 1,159 13%
Births 122 93% 9 7%
Children 0-14 1,877 94% 115 6%
Elderly 60+ 1,082 72% 417 28%
instant replacement fertility would result in a decline to 17 percent
(Lutz and Prinz, 1991).
No matter which scenario is chosen, Africa will expand its share
in the world population most rapidly. It will increase from today's
12 percent to a projected 19 percent in 2030. In the face of this
overwhelming increase in Africa, most other world regions will be
stagnant in their shares or even lose percentages in the long run.
China, which in 1990 had a share of 22 percent (equal to that of
the industrialized world), is projected to decline under the central
scenario to 18 percent in 2030. The most populous region in 1990,
South Asia (which includes India), is likely to expand its share some-
what by 2030 and be home to more than a quarter of the world's
population.
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Figure 15.3a. Age pyramid for the world population in 1990, in
thousands.
The changing distribution of people over the world regions also
has an important age dimension. Because the growing populations
are much younger, the regional distribution of children is changing
more radically than that of the total population, while the propor-
tion of all men and women above age 60 in today's industrialized
countries will still be rather large in 2030, even under widely di-
verging scenario assumptions. Some of the relevant information is
summarized in Table 15.5. Already in 1990, 88 percent of all chil-
dren of the world were born in developing countries and a mere 12
percent in the industrialized regions, where still 41 percent of the
world's elderly population (60 years and older) lives. Of the world
population above age 75 more than half lives in the industrialized
countries.
By the year 2030, this pattern will definitely change. It is amaz-
ing to see that even the most divergent scenarios produce very simi-
lar results in terms of the population distribution between industri-
alized and developing countries. This information, as shown in Table
15.5, indicates that the patterns for the future are very robust. It is
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Figure 15.3b. Age pyramid for the world population in 2030 under
the low-mortalityflow-fertility scenario, in thousands.
practically certain that by 2030, between 92 percent and 93 percent
of all births will be in today's developing countries, and only 7 per-
cent or 8 percent in today's industrialized countries. For the time
beyond 2030, this implies further changes in regional weights, as is
discussed in the context of the very long-term projections in Chap-
ter 16. Similarly the proportion of all children under age 15 living in
developing countries will increase from 86 percent to between 90 per-
cent and 94 percent. Because in today's developing countries larger
cohorts will also survive to older ages, the proportion of the world's
elderly population living in those regions will increase from 59 per-
cent today to between 72 percent and 75 percent, again a statement
that can be made with great certainty because all scenarios point in
the same direction.
Finally, these considerations bring us to the more explicit anal-
ysis of future age structures. Figure 15.3 graphically presents the
consequences of alternative scenarios in the shape of age pyramids.
Figure 15.3a presents the global male and female populations in
1990, the starting year of our projections. Figures 15.3b and 15.3c
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Figure 15.3c. Age pyramid for the world population in 2030 under
the high-mortality jhigh-fertility scenario, in thousands.
give two age distributions projected for the year 2030 using the same
scale, i.e., the lengths of the bars are comparable. Figure 15.3b
presents the scenario resulting in the greatest degree of global pop-
ulation aging. It clearly illustrates the departure from the pyramid
shape and the narrowing at the bottom, which is due to subreplace-
ment fertility at the global level. Although total population size will
be 56 percent larger (8.9 billion) than in 1990, under this scenario,
the youngest age group 0-5 will have approximately the same size
in 2030 as it had in 1990. Higher age groups increase most signifi-
cantly. The age groups above age 50 will already have about twice
their 1990 size. Above age 60, the increase is even greater. Above
age 75, the number of women is clearly larger than the number of
men - a phenomenon now only visible in the industrialized coun-
tries. Figure 15.3c contrasts this with the case of high fertility and
high mortality. This is the youngest scenario, resulting almost in a
doubling of the world population (9.9 billion) by 2030. The graph
looks like a perfect pyramid with an almost linear slope that signals
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Figure 15.4. Alternative projected trends in the mean age of the
world population.
continued population growth through ever-increasing cohort sizes
at the bottom. These figures graphically demonstrate the fact that
larger population growth means less aging and smaller population
growth results in more aging.
15.2.2 Population aging
Population aging, a phenomenon that is already well recognized and
a cause of concern in the industrialized countries, will also increas-
ingly affect developing countries. In all regions, all scenarios result
in aging, as measured by the mean age of the population or the pro-
portion of the population above age 60. Figure 15.4 shows that the
mean age of the world population today is around 28 years. Only
9.2 percent of the world population is above age 60, while 32 percent
are under age 15 (Table 15.6). Under all scenarios, the mean age
and the proportion above age 60 will significantly increase over the
next decades. This is another certainty in the future course of the
world population. Even under the high-fertility and low-mortality
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Table 15.6. Proportions of the population above age 60 resulting
from selected scenarios by 2030.
Four scenarios in 2030
High migr. Low migr. Low migr.
High mort. Low mort. Low mort.
Region 1990 Central Low fert. High fert. Low fert.
North Africa 5.6 8.4 8.6 7.9 9.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 4.8 5.1 4.5 5.8
North America 16.7 25.6 24.2 26.9 31.7
Central America &
Caribbean 6.4 13.2 13.6 12.1 14.2
South America 7.6 14.8 15.8 14.1 16.5
West & Central Asia 6.6 11.1 11.2 11.1 12.9
South Asia 6.5 10.2 10.3 10.0 11.6
China & Hong Kong 8.8 20.9 22.2 20.0 24.0
Southeast Asia 6.3 13.5 13.6 13.2 15.3
Japan, Australia, &
New Zealand 16.9 31.8 31.1 32.3 37.0
Eastern Europe 15.8 26.0 25.8 26.5 32.1
Western Europe 19.6 30.6 30.1 31.1 35.8
World total 9.2 14.3 15.0 13.9 16.6
scenario, which gives the lowest degree of population aging, the mean
age of the world population will increase to 31 years by 2030. Under
the low-fertility scenarios it will even reach 35 years, the present
mean age of the North American population. With respect to the
proportion above age 60 - an indicator that is more relevant for the
old-age dependency burden of a society - the increase is even more
rapid. By 2030 this proportion will increase from its present 9.2
percent to at least 12.7 percent under high fertility and high mor-
tality, and at most 16.6 percent under low fertility and low mortality,
i.e., an increase of between 40 percent and 80 percent. The central
scenario yields a percentage of 14.3 percent above 60 by 2030.
Extended to 2050, the range of possible different speeds of aging
is naturally much wider. In terms of mean age of the world popula-
tion, which is currently 28 years, the high-fertility scenarios result in
31 years, the central scenario in 35 years, and the low-fertility sce-
narios in around 40 years by 2050. In terms of proportions above age
60, the range is from about 13 percent in the scenarios yielding very
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Figure 15.5. Alternative projected trends in the mean age in sub-
Saharan Africa.
rapid population growth to 22 percent in the scenarios assuming
rapid fertility declines. However, in various world regions ranges
are much wider.
Figure 15.5 shows the projected future paths of the mean age of
the population in sub-Saharan Africa - the region associated with
the greatest uncertainties. Because of past high fertility, it is pre-
determined that the mean age will show a slight decline over the
next few years. Thereafter, it is very likely to increase to between
23 and 26 years by 2030. A curbing of population growth that re-
sults only in somewhat more than a doubling of the population by
2050 will increase the mean age to around 32 years. This would
mean serious problems in care for the elderly in societies that so far
mostly rely on family support and have little government action in
this field. Given the uncertainties about the future of AIDS, other
infectious diseases, political instabilities, and civil wars possibly as-
sociated with famines, aging is probably not the most immediate
concern in sub-Saharan Africa. In the context of the scenarios de-
scribed here, the sections in Chapter 16 on feedbacks define severe
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Figure 15.6. Alternative projected trends in the proportion of
population above age 60 in China.
disaster scenarios for sub-Saharan Africa that result in significant
temporary population losses due to excessive growth resulting in
famines and wars.
China is one developing region where very rapid aging will cer-
tainly occur because fertility has already declined. Figure 15.6
shows the increases in the proportions above age 60 under all dif-
ferent scenarios. This proportion will increase from a present 8.8
percent to around 20 percent by 2030 with a rather small range
of uncertainty. Because this aging is already preprogrammed in the
present age distribution, all scenarios show a similar increase. Hence
in only 35 years China will have a higher old-age dependency bur-
den than North America and about the same as Western Europe
today. Given that Western Europe took more than a century to de-
velop social-security schemes for the elderly and is confronted with
serious problems today, China will have to make immediate inten-
sive efforts to cope with this problem. China's authorities are well
aware of this problem and are considering not pushing fertility too
low in order to avoid too large imbalances in the age structure of
the population.
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Figure 15.7. Alternative projected trends in the proportion of
population above age 60 in North America.
Some of the other developing regions that recently experienced
fertility declines are also certain to experience population aging. In
Southeast Asia, the proportion above 60 will at least double by
2030. In South and Central America, the situation is very similar
to Southeast Asia. In North Africa and West Asia, where fertility is
still higher, aging is also certain but somewhat slower, at least until
2030; thereafter everything depends on the assumed future paths of
fertility and to some degree also on mortality.
In the more developed regions, the proportion elderly is already
rather high today, but further significant increases are inevitable
due to the current age structure that reflects the low fertility and
declining old-age mortality of the past decades. Figure 15.7 gives
the projected proportions above age 60 for North America. In 1990
this proportion was 16.7 percent. Over the next decade it is likely
to even decline slightly due to the baby boom generation and their
children that increase the population below age 60. In contrast, the
mean age of the population already shows an increasing trend from
35 years today to around 37 years in 2010. After 2010 the baby
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boomers start to reach age 60, affecting the proportion above age
60, which will increase to between 21 percent and 32 percent by
2030, depending on fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions.
The central scenario yields a proportion of 25.6 percent. Extensions
to 2050 yield a further divergence of aging trends.
Western Europe is the world's oldest region in terms of its pop-
ulation. In 1990 it had a mean age of 38 years. Under all scenarios
this mean age will increase to 40 years and higher by 2010. Un-
der the scenario assuming low fertility, no net-migration gain, and
increasing life expectancy, the mean age may even increase to 47
years by 2030. Extended to 2050 this scenario would result in an
incredible 52 years as the average age of the population. In terms
of proportions above age 60, Western Europe shows a clearly visible
upward push after 2010, when the baby boomers come to retirement
age. But in contrast to North America, the proportion elderly will
significantly increase to around 23 percent before 2010. For 2030 the
proportion elderly ranges from 26 percent to 36 percent. Extensions
to 2050 yield a range from 23 percent to 43 percent of the population
above age 60. It is hard to imagine today how such an aged society
should function. But assuming further improvements in the health
status of men and women above age 60 and productivity increases
of the labor force, it is not entirely inconceivable.
One controversial issue that is being discussed more heatedly in
Europe than in other regions is whether immigration can compen-
sate for low fertility. The given scenario approach is an ideal setting
to evaluate this question, which is discussed in detail in Lutz and
Prinz (1993). The alternative scenario projections show for Western
Europe that even very high constant annual net-migration gains of
1 million a year cannot fully compensate for the low fertility. In
the short to medium run, immigration increases the labor force and
therefore slightly dampens the increase in the proportion of the el-
derly. In the case of low fertility, low mortality, and no migration
gain, this proportion would increase from 19.6 percent in 1990 to
35.8 percent in 2030. If one assumes an annual migration gain of 1
million - which is very high for a sustained level - this would only
reduce the proportion by 2 percentage points to 33.6 percent in 2030.
Extended to 2050 even the high-immigration scenario would result
in 37 percent above age 60. But by 2050 Western Europe would
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have received more than 60 million immigrants, who together with
their children would make up a large proportion of the population,
something Europeans obviously fear. Hence the only way to avoid
excessive aging in Europe in the long run is higher fertility. How-
ever, even the central scenario results in 31.3 percent above age 60 in
2050, and high fertility, low mortality, and no migration gain yield a
proportion of 31.8 percent. Hence in all cases, Western Europe will
have to adjust to significant aging. In Japan the situation is similar
and even somewhat more extreme.
15.2.3 Population growth versus population aging
When comparing the information on projected aging to that on pro-
jected population growth, one very important feature becomes ap-
parent. The scenarios that result in the highest population growth
show only moderate population aging, while those showing a leveling
off in population size imply very rapid population aging. Generally,
very rapid population growth and very rapid aging are considered
undesirable, but the scenario projections clearly show that one can-
not avoid both. An intermediate path, such as that given by the cen-
tral scenario, avoids extremes but still combines at the global level
substantial population growth (a tripling of population size) with
substantial aging (a doubling of the proportion above 60). Since
the problems caused by and the possible solutions to rapid growth
and rapid aging will substantiate at a regional level rather than at
the global aggregate, this issue needs to be discussed within a more
regional context. The epilogue to this volume takes up some of the
policy issues related to the aging versus population growth dilemma.
15.2.4 Conclusion
The systematic permutation scenarios to 2030 described in this
chapter show that three major certainties hold across all scenarios:
1. The world population will continue to grow. By 2030 it will
have increased by between 50 percent and 100 percent.
2. The regional distribution of the world population will change
significantly. Today's industrialized countries will present an
ever-diminishing fraction of the world population whereas the
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share of the African population will rapidly increase. In 2030 be-
tween 85 percent and 87 percent will live in developing countries.
3. The world population will become older. The mean age of the
population will increase. In regions that already have low fer-
tility, this aging process will be most pronounced.
15.3 Comparison with United Nations
and World Bank World Population
Projections until 2025
In Chapter 2 we exhaustively argue for the need of additional world
population projections, supplementary to those prepared by the UN
and the World Bank. In this chapter, we discuss the results that
we obtained on the basis of our scenario assumptions, for the period
1990 to 2030. Are these results indeed so different from those pre-
pared by other analysts and agencies? If the answer is yes, what are
the main differences, and what are the reasons for those differences?
To answer these questions, we compare the results of our own calcu-
lations with these global projections that are most often cited: the
UN and the World Bank projections.
In this comparison, the nine systematic permutation scenarios
are confronted with the high, medium, and low variants offered by
the UN (1993) and the single projection offered by the World Bank
(1992). The constant fertility variant prepared by the UN is not
further considered, as it is only prepared "for analytical purposes"
(UN, 1993:84). Two aspects are of particular importance: the "most
likely" path offered and the connected range of uncertainty. Both
estimates of population size and population aging are compared.
Table 15.7 gives the respective information for the year 2025.
By 2025, IIASA's central estimate gives a higher world popu-
lation size and a lower overall proportion of elderly than the UN
medium and the World Bank estimates, the latter two being quite
similar. A major reason for this difference is the less rapid decline of
fertility assumed in today's developing regions. The lower estimate
of the population size in today's industrialized regions is largely due
to a difference in the definition of regions: in the IIASA projections,
the European republics of the former Soviet Union are included in
the East European region, while the Asian republics are included in
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Table 15.7. Comparison of nASA results for the year 2025 with
United Nations and World Bank projections.
Total population size Share of population
(in millions) aged 60 and over (in %)
Scenario IIASA UN WB IIASA UN WB
World total
Central 8,955 8,472 8,345 13.2 14.1 14.5
Low 8,093 7,852 - 11.9 13.2
High 9,871 9,080 - 14.9 15.2
Developing regions
Central 7,645 7,069 6,944 10.9 12.1 12.0
Low 6,857 6,562 - 9.8 11.3
High 8,483 7,577 - 12.3 13.0
Industrialized regions
Central 1,311 a 1,403 1,401 26.5 24.5 26.6
Low 1,154a 1,290 - 22.9 23.0
High 1,473a 1,503 - 31.0 26.5
aDoes not include former Soviet Central Asian Republics.
IIASA projections consist of nine permutation scenarios; UN projections consist
of three variants (constant fertility variant is not considered); and the World
Bank projection has only one path.
the West and Central Asia region, and hence are counted as devel-
oping countries. The UN and the World Bank, on the other hand,
summarize all former Soviet republics into the group of today's in-
dustrialized countries.
Independent of the difference in the regional divisions, the re-
sulting range of uncertainty is significantly larger in the nASA pro-
jections than in the UN projections. The resulting range of world
population size is 1.8 billion in the nASA scenarios versus 1.2 billion
in the UN projections. The broader range in population size esti-
mates is a consequence of both the mortality and the fertility uncer-
tainties assumed; in the case of the industrialized region, however,
migration assumptions play a significant role. The broader range
in the proportion elderly is mostly a consequence of the mortality
uncertainty assumed in the nASA projections. The World Bank
does not address the question of uncertainty.
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[1] In all regions, 1990 age patterns of fertility were kept unchanged and
scaled down (or up) according to the specification of the total fertility
rate.
[2] UN model life tables (UN, 1982) corresponding to the respective re-
gion were used as input for 1990 to obtain age-specific mortality rates
for today's developing regions. For the remaining regions, observed
mortality rates were used.
[3] Future age-specific mortality patterns were derived from model life
tables (UN, 1982; Coale and Guo, 1989). Coale-Guo "west tables" were
extended up to life expectancies of 100 to provide mortality schedules
for very high life expectancies.
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Chapter 16
Special World Population
Scenarios to 2100
Wolfgang Lutz} Christopher Prinz} and Jeannette Langgassner
In Chapter 15, a systematic permutation approach is adopted to
produce population projections to 2030. As described in Chapter 2,
there is a demand for population projections with a longer time hori-
zon. In this chapter we present such projections which extend the
population scenarios to the year 2100. For such a long time horizon
a different approach is required. Sensitivity issues, most relevant for
the short and medium run, turn into problems of credibility and reli-
ability. This chapter addresses the question oflong-range extensions
in two ways:
• One set of scenarios attempts to define plausible long-term ex-
tensions for all 12 world regions. A major assumption in the
scenario design is that of a reasonable course of demographic
transition, linking fertility and mortality. Three scenarios are
specified for each region; parameter assumptions are made for
the whole projection period.
• Another set of scenarios mainly serves to illustrate certain fea-
tures of population dynamics. A number of possible interactions
between demographic components and feedbacks from popula-
tion size/density and aging on fertility and mortality are in-
cluded. Only selected regions are considered.
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16.1 Long-Term Extensions for All Regions
One possible systematic approach to long-range population projec-
tion would be an extension of all nine permutation scenarios. Some
of those permutations, however, combine assumptions that seem
implausible in the very long run, such as continued high mortal-
ity together with low fertility. While such a combination is pos-
sible for a couple of decades, it becomes implausible if continued
indefinitely. Also, the probability of extreme combinations de-
creases with increasing length of the projection. Therefore, only
less extreme assumptions (or rather combinations) are extended be-
yond the year 2030: the "most likely" central scenario, the high-
fertility fhigh-mortality combination reflecting a slower completion
of the demographic transition in today's developing regions, and
the low-fertilityflow-mortality combination mirroring a more rapid
completion of the demographic transition. All three scenarios are
combined with the medium migration assumption, both to simplify
the interpretation of scenario results and because very little is known
about long-term trends in migration.
16.1.1 Scenario assumptions
Choosing fertility levels in the very long run, at a point when all re-
gions are assumed to have completed the fertility transition, comes
close to a lottery within a certain range. For convenience, most
long-range projections still choose replacement-level fertility as the
ultimate level. But there is little justification for it aside from the
very vague and unproven homeostasis concept. Here we suggest
another rationale. Ultimate fertility is assumed to be a function
of region-specific population densities. Low densities are correlated
with higher fertility, and vice versa. In our central scenario, fer-
tility is assumed to ultimately reach a level between 1.7 and 2.1
children per woman by the year 2080, notably below replacement
level in some regions. The projected density for 2030 (central sce-
nario) is taken as a criterion. The least densely populated region
- South America with 28 persons per km2 projected for 2030 - is
given the highest ultimate TFR (2.1), while beyond 300 persons
per km 2 (only South Asia, with a density of 478 persons per km 2
by 2030) a TFR of 1.7 is assumed. For densities between 28 and
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300, intermediate fertility levels are obtained through linear inter-
polation. The long-range low- and high-fertility assumptions are
set at 0.3 children below (and above) the value obtained for the
central scenario. Table 16.1 gives, for each of the three scenarios,
(assumed) fertility and mortality levels for the years 2030 and 2100,
together with current 1990 values. Ultimate fertility in 2100 ranges
from 1.4 children per woman in South Asia under the low-fertility
assumption to 2.4 children in South America under the high-fertility
assumption.
Concerning mortality, in the long-range projections prepared by
the UN (1992), for each region one fixed path is assumed. An ulti-
mate life expectancy at birth of 87.5 years for women and 82.5 years
for men is assumed, and improvements in life expectancy end once
the maximum figure is reached (between 2075 and 2150, depending
on the region). In sharp contrast, our mortality assumptions span
a very broad range in the very long term, reflecting the high uncer-
tainty about possible ultimate mortality levels. In the low-mortality
case, almost no biological limit to life is assumed, mortality rate de-
clines being extended to 2100 with a maximum life expectancy of 100
years. Life expectancy increases after 2030 are smaller than before
2030, with constant mortality under the high-mortality assumption,
a one-year increase per decade under the medium-mortality assump-
tion, and a two-year increase per decade under the low-mortality
assumption. An ultimate life expectancy at birth of 100 years is
reached only in today's industrialized regions; the largest range of
uncertainty is found in sub-Saharan Africa (a difference of 38 years
between the low- and high-mortality assumptions by 2100).
The assumptions on fertility and mortality are combined to form
three plausible long-range world population extensions: central fer-
tility with central mortality (central scenario extension), high fertil-
ity with high mortality (slow transition extension), and low fertility
with low mortality (rapid transition extension).
16.1.2 Population size and growth
No matter whether a medium, slow, or rapid course of demographic
transition for today's developing countries is assumed, world popu-
lation size will surpass the 10 billion mark sometime in the middle
of the next century. If the demographic transition proceeds slowly,
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Table 16.1. Ultimate fertility and mortality levels in three long-
range assumptions by region: 2030 and 2100.
Fertility Mortality (female life
(TFR) expectancy at birth)
Region Year Low Central High Higha Central Low
North Africa 1990 4.66 61.1
2030 2.00 3.00 4.00 63.1 70.1 77.1
2100 1.74 2.04 2.34 63.1 77.1 91.1
Sub-Saharan 1990 6.39 52.4
Africa 2030 2.50 3.75 5.00 40.4 52.4 64.4
2100 1.64 1.94 2.24 40.4 59.4 78.4
North America 1990 2.04 79.0
2030 1.40 1.85 2.30 83.0 87.0 91.0
2100 1.79 2.09 2.39 83.0 94.0 100.0
Central America 1990 3.33 71.3
& Caribbean 2030 1.70 2.35 3.00 75.3 79.3 83.3
2100 1.63 1.93 2.23 75.3 86.3 97.3
South America 1990 2.91 69.6
2030 1.70 2.35 3.00 73.6 77.6 81.6
2100 1.80 2.10 2.40 73.6 84.6 95.6
West & 1990 4.23 69.3
Central Asia 2030 1.70 2.35 3.00 71.3 78.3 85.3
2100 1.65 1.95 2.25 71.3 85.3 99.3
South Asia 1990 4.30 58.4
2030 1.70 2.35 3.00 58.4 66.4 74.4
2100 1.40 1.70 2.00 58.4 73.4 88.4
China & 1990 2.20 71.8
Hong Kong 2030 1.50 2.25 3.00 75.8 79.8 83.8
2100 1.57 1.87 2.17 75.8 86.8 97.8
Southeast Asia 1990 3.19 65.3
2030 1.70 2.35 3.00 65.3 73.3 81.3
2100 1.49 1.79 2.09 65.3 80.3 95.3
Japan, Australia, 1990 1.69 81.1
& New Zealand 2030 1.30 1.70 2.10 85.1 89.1 93.1
2100 1.44 1.74 2.04 85.1 96.1 100.0
Eastern Europe 1990 2.00 74.7
2030 1.30 1.80 2.30 76.7 83.7 90.7
2100 1.75 2.05 2.35 76.7 90.7 100.0
Western Europe 1990 1.61 79.4
2030 1.30 1.70 2.10 83.4 87.4 91.4
2100 1.59 1.89 2.19 83.4 94.4 100.0
aHigh mortality corresponds to lower life expectancies at birth.
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Table 16.2. Alternative projected population sizes in developing
and industrialized regions, in millions: 1990-2100.
1,273 1,238
1,396 1,272
1,528 1,261
1,721 1,240
2,096 1,241
World total Developing regions Industrialized regions
Year Central Slow Rapid Central Slow Rapid Central Slow Rapid
1990 5,291 4,149 1,142
2010 7,352 7,427 7,271 6,097 6,154 6,033 1,255
2030 9,499 9,938 9,011 8,167 8,542 7,739 1,333
2050 11,238 12,452 9,913 9,859 10,923 8,653 1,378
2070 12,334 14,594 10,046 10,897 12,873 8,806 1,437
2100 12,562 16,090 9,126 10,980 13,994 7,885 1,582
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Figure 16.1. Alternative projected trends in average annual pop-
ulation growth rates.
total world population will even triple before starting to stabilize.
Projected maximum population sizes are reached by 2090 in the cen-
tral scenario (12.6 billion), by 2065 with rapid transition assump-
tions (10.1 billion), and by 2110 with slow transition assumptions
(16.2 billion). Projected population sizes are given separately for de-
veloping and industrialized countries in Table 16.2. Region-specific
results of the three long-range extensions are given in Appendix B.
Average annual growth rates, which start at 2.1 percent in
today's developing and 0.6 percent in today's industrialized re-
gions, are shown in Figure 16.1. Growth rates decline gradually
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Figure 16.2. Regional distribution of world population projected
under the central scenario: 1990, 2030, and 2100.
throughout the projection period in the former region, reaching neg-
ative values between around 2070 under the rapid transition and
2110 under the slow transition scenario. However, due to constantly
positive net migration, growth rates decline only modestly in to-
day's industrialized regions - a trend that is even reversed between
2040 and 2060. Under all three scenarios, in the very long run (late
21st century), population growth in these regions surpasses the re-
spective growth in today's developing countries. This is due to both
higher ultimate fertility in some of today's industrialized countries
and continued immigration into these regions.
16.1.3 Regional distribution
During most of the 1990-2100 period, the population of today's
developing countries and in particular of Africa - with a growth
rate of still more than 1 percent annually by the year 2050 - grows
very rapidly. Hence, as a consequence of both current differences
and uneven future developments, the globe's regional distribution
will change substantially. Figure 16.2 gives the world's regional
distribution in 1990 and the distribution projected with the central
scenario for the years 2030 and 2100.
Africa will increase its share from 12 percent in 1990 to 19
percent by 2030 and even 26 percent by 2100. Today, Europe
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accommodates more people than Africa, but in the long run only a
small fraction - or 7 percent - of the world population will live in
European countries. Non-African developing countries will roughly
maintain their current shares of world population, with the ex-
ception of China with a declining share under all three scenarios.
Indeed, the future regional distribution - at least the direction of
changes - is relatively insensitive to the course of the demographic
transition assumed; it is largely determined by current demographic
differentials in the 12 regions. Differences between scenarios are
small.
16.1.4 Demographic transition
Scenarios have been defined in terms of age-specific fertility, mor-
tality, and migration schedules. Crude birth and death rates, the
two variables generally used to depict the process of demographic
transition, are not input variables to the projections but rather re-
sult from a combination of the age-specific assumptions and the
projected age distributions. Hence it is illuminating to compare
their projected trends with respect to the future course of the de-
mographic transition.
As an example, Figure 16.3 focuses on South Asia (India and
its neighbors), a region still early in the transition process. The
crude birth rate in South Asia continues to decline rapidly under all
scenarios. In contrast, the direction of change of the crude death
rate is quite uncertain over the next 40 years, but it will certainly
increase in the long run as a consequence of population aging. Much
progress toward completion of the demographic transition is made
during the coming decades. It will, however, most certainly not be
completed before the middle or even the end of the 21st century
under high-fertility assumptions, due to above-replacement fertility
during the whole projection period.
16.1.5 Population aging
Substantial aging will be a major feature offuture population trends
in all regions of the world. While population aging is a recognized
issue in today's industrialized countries, it is likely to occur even
more rapidly in today's developing countries. One indicator of
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Figure 16.3. The demographic transition in South Asia, alterna-
tive projected crude birth and death rates.
Table 16.3. Projected mean ages, in years, of the populations in
developing and industrialized regions: 1990-2100.
World total Developing regions Industrialized regions
Year Central Slow Rapid Central Slow Rapid Central Slow Rapid
1990 28.1 25.9 36.1
2010 30.2 29.7 30.7 28.4 28.0 28.8 39.0 38.2 40.0
2030 32.9 31.0 35.3 31.5 29.7 33.7 41.6 38.6 44.9
2050 35.5 31.8 40.5 34.5 31.0 39.3 42.5 37.5 48.4
2070 37.8 33.3 45.0 37.2 32.8 44.2 42.7 36.8 50.2
2100 41.3 36.5 50.0 41.1 36.5 49.8 43.0 36.8 51.1
aging which is strongly influenced by all three demographic com-
ponents - fertility, mortality, and migration - is the mean age of
the population. Table 16.3, distinguishing between developing and
industrialized regions, shows an increase between 10 and 24 years
in the projected mean age of today's developing regions. Aging in
industrialized regions will be significantly more modest: under the
high-fertility/high-mortality scenario, the mean age is projected to
remain almost stable. As a consequence, age-structure differences
between the two world regions are gradually reduced.
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Figure 16.4. Alternative projected trends in the proportion of the
population above age 60.
This convergence of age structures is also visible from Figure
16.4, which gives the proportion of the population aged 60 years
and over, currently ranging from 4.6 percent in sub-Saharan Africa
to 19.6 percent in Western Europe. The speed of aging will most
likely be more rapid in today's developing countries, the more so
under scenarios that limit population growth. Only further expo-
nential growth of the population would keep the population young.
The long-range calculations strongly support the point made for the
systemic permutation scenarios until 2030 about the fundamental
dilemma of future population trends in today's developing coun-
tries: either the population explodes in size or it ages to an un-
precedented extent. None of these countries seems to be prepared
for either development.
Figure 16.4 also shows the enormous uncertainty with regard to
the future age structure. Taking today's industrialized regions as an
example, a society with 20 percent elderly projected with the high-
fertility /high-mortality scenario is totally different from a society
with almost 45 percent elderly derived from the low-fertility/low-
mortality scenario. While the range of uncertainty is equally broad
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in all regions, after around 2060 the proportion of elderly remains
relatively stable in today's industrialized countries.
The dilemma between population growth and population aging
and the trade-off between speed and extent of aging are discussed
in some detail in the epilogue of this book.
16.2 Special Interaction Scenarios for
Selected Regions
In this section we consider some specific scenarios assuming a higher
degree of interaction between the three components and also allow-
ing for feedback from output parameters, such as population size
and age structure, to the components. First, we assume dependence
between the three components themselves. Dependence between
fertility and mortality is not further considered in this section since
it is already taken into account in the specification of the three
long-range extensions. Migration is, among many other things, a
function of fertility, mortality, and in particular demographic dif-
ferences between regions. However, it is also largely dependent on
political measures; therefore we have decided not to adjust long-term
migration levels. On the other hand, given the level of migration
assumed in the long-range extensions, fertility levels might indeed
be affected. The effect of an increase in overall fertility in today's
industrialized regions from large inflows of migrants whose average
fertility is significantly higher is investigated below.
Future fertility, mortality, and migration, to a largely unknown
degree, may also be assumed to depend on other demographic vari-
ables, most prominently population size and age structure. As there
is no consensus about how such a dependence might operate, explicit
feedbacks from those demographic output variables to anyone of the
input components are usually not specified. Although there is full
consensus that world population cannot grow indefinitely, no state-
ment has been made in population projections about possible levels
at which the world's capacity would be exhausted. Instead, one
usually assumes long-term convergence to a stable population. At
least for illustrative purposes, however, we should also investigate
what would happen if humanity was not able to naturally find its
way to stabilization. Or, what could happen if world population, or
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the population of any of its regions, continued to grow rapidly until
reaching a threshold at which some sort of collapse, e.g., as a conse-
quence of food constraints, seems unavoidable. Taking sub-Saharan
Africa as an example, we show possible demographic effects of such
an evolution given a certain population carrying capacity derived
from agricultural data.
Similarly, persistent population aging might cause problems in
society that trigger actions which in course may have an effect on
some of the demographic components. Obviously, as the example
of today's industrialized countries shows, populations can adapt to
gradual changes in the age structure, at least up to a certain level.
Very rapid aging, on the other hand, will certainly create structural
problems. Again for illustrative reasons, one might think of a reac-
tion to population aging in the form of a fertility increase. Society
might increasingly consider the large number of elderly as a serious
burden in many respects, which in turn might influence individual
decision-making processes, especially if some very strong incentives
for childbearing are introduced. Proportions of elderly beyond cer-
tain thresholds might therefore lead to a larger number of births.
In the following sections, the three types of interactions suggested
above are exemplified.
16.2.1 Higher fertility of immigrants affecting fertility
in today's industrialized regions
To investigate the impact of high fertility among immigrants, the
high-immigration/low-fertility regions (North America and Western
Europe) are considered. The low-fertility/low-mortality extension
is taken as an example. It is assumed that overall immigrant fer-
tility is three children per woman, and that all first-generation im-
migrants maintain this higher fertility level throughout their lives.
Second-generation immigrants, on the other hand, are assumed to
immediately adapt to the country's low fertility level. Resulting fer-
tility levels for the two regions, both with and without consideration
of the higher fertility rates of immigrants, are given in Table 16.4.
By 2100, the total fertility rate would be higher by 0.39 children in
North America and by 0.27 children in Western Europe in the case
of high fertility among immigrants (Le., "adjusted" in Table 16.4).
434 Wolfgang Lutz, Christopher Prinz, Jeannette Langgassner
Table 16.4. Total fertility rate and resulting population size (in
millions) in North America and Western Europe under the special
immigration-fertility interaction scenario.
North America Western Europe
-------'-------
TFR Population TFR Population
Year Initial Adjusted Initial Adjusted Initial Adjusted Initial Adjusted
1990 2.04 277 1.61 377
2010 1.40 1.50 321 322 1.30 1.34 399 400
2030 1.40 1.58 356 362 1.30 1.39 400 403
2050 1.51 1.77 378 391 1.38 1.52 385 390
2070 1.62 1.94 404 429 1.47 1.66 365 373
2100 1.79 2.18 453 512 1.59 1.86 344 363
The difference is due to the higher level of immigration assumed into
North America.
The effect on population size is very small, until around 2050
even negligible. By 2100, population size would be higher by 13
percent in North America and by 5.5 percent in Western Europe
if the higher fertility rates of immigrants are considered (see Table
16.4). Similarly, effects on the population's age structures are also
small, with the proportion elderly, for example, by 2100 being re-
duced from 39.3 percent to 36.2 percent in North America and from
49.7 to 47.2 percent in Western Europe. If first-generation immi-
grants adapt somewhat to the fertility level of their new country,
these effects could even be smaller. The conclusion is that disregard-
ing the question of fertility of immigrants does not introduce serious
distortions in the short and medium term if immigration levels and
fertility differentials are not too extreme.
16.2.2 Overshooting carrying capacity in
sub-Saharan Africa
Obviously, something is going to happen if the population grows
too rapidly or if the population density (in a certain region) passes
a certain threshold. In the following, we attempt to define scenarios
that explicitly assume feedbacks from population size or density on
mortality. Sub-Saharan Africa is chosen as an example because it
is the region that will probably experience the most rapid popu-
lation growth. It is also the only region that might easily surpass
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Figure 16.5. Projected population size in sub-Saharan Africa,
with and without feedback on mortality.
the critical point of population size that was derived from a joint
FAOjUNFPAjIIASA (1984) land-carrying capacity study. In this
study, an agricultural carrying capacity of 4 billion people had been
given for sub-Saharan Africa assuming medium agricultural inputs.
The low input scenario resulted in sufficient agricultural production
for only less than 1 billion.[1]
Figure 16.5 gives future population sizes in sub-Saharan Africa
projected until 2100, including some feedback and disaster scenarios.
The solid line gives the evolution derived from the central extension,
with a gradual increase in population size over the next 80 years and
a stabilization at around 2.7 billion people in the long run. All other
lines reflect disastrous developments. Both the dotted line and the
short dashed line (which begin in 1990) assume gradually increasing
mortality (high-mortality or unspectacular misery scenarios). In
these scenarios, like under the high-mortality permutation for that
region, life expectancy decreases by three years per decade until 2030
and then remains constant. This reflects the possible condition of
a slowly spreading mortality crisis which could be due to AIDS,
deteriorating health systems, local famines, and regional conflicts.
Fertility rates in these two scenarios are similar to the high- and
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low-fertility permutations until 2030, but are kept constant after
2030, with a TFR equal to 5.0 or to 2.5, respectively. In both
cases mortality is very high, but the population could still grow
exponentially if fertility rates also remain high.
The remaining scenario projects more fortunate developments
in mortality: life expectancy increases three years per decade until
2030, when it reaches a level of 61 years for men and 64.4 years for
women, and remains constant thereafter. Fertility, on the other
hand, does not decline as rapidly. The TFR declines as in the
high-fertility permutation until 2030, but remains at the level of
5.0 throughout the period because of the stagnation in mortality
after 2030. Here, the demographic transition comes to a halt, and
as a consequence the critical level of 4 billion people is reached in
the year 2060 (long dashed line in Figure 16.5). At this point,
something must happen; a feedback along the lines of a Malthusian
"positive check" seems unavoidable. Two evolutions are envisaged,
a more modest reaction and a very strong reaction, both in terms of
feedback on mortality. In the first instance, 20 percent of the popu-
lation (more children than adults) die through war, starvation, and
disease. Only 10 years later, however, the magic 4 billion threshold
will again be exceeded.[2] Assuming that no further improvements
in agricultural production are made, the same negative mortality re-
action occurs. In 2070, again, 20 percent of the population dies. The
same kind of catastrophe is repeated in 2080 and in 2095 (dashed-
dotted line in Figure 16.5). As long as fertility and mortality remain
unchanged, a catastrophe would occur in 10- to 15-year cycles. The
strong feedback assumption is in no way more desirable: it assumes
that as a consequence of exceeding the 4 billion margin, half of the
population is killed through war, starvation, and disease. In this
very extreme case, another collapse would possibly occur 35 years
later if fertility were to remain at its high level of 5 children per
woman (long dashed line in Figure 16.5).
In terms of disaster scenarios, of course, all kinds of combina-
tions of the continuous misery and spectacular collapse cases can be
imagined at different population-size levels. The purpose of defining
specific disaster scenarios and calculating the resulting population
size and structures is mostly for illustrating population dynamics
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and for broadening our thinking about possible future population
trends.
16.2.3 Social crisis from population aging causing
fertility to increase
Unprecedented aging of populations might also cause reactions. If
the mean age of the population or the proportion of elderly ex-
ceeds a certain threshold, a feedback to migration or fertility seems
possible. Extremely high levels of aging could be disadvantageous
for economic andfor social reasons. Economic handicaps might re-
sult in larger streams of immigration, which would only delay the
process of aging. It is conceivable that reproductive behavior in
such societies changes through a combination of individual reori-
entation and strong public incentives. To give an example, in the
following discussion it is assumed that such a reaction indeed oc-
curs. China and the JapanfAustralia region are used as examples
because they are particularly interesting as far as the speed of the
mortality transition (China) and the level of life expectancy already
reached (JapanfAustralia) are concerned. To make an interesting
case, the calculations are based on the rapid transition, long-range
extension.
The underlying assumption is simple: as soon as a certain level
of aging, measured in terms of the proportion above age 60 in the
total population, is reached, fertility is assumed to switch from the
low level to the central level for that particular region. If the ag-
ing level exceeds another - somewhat higher - threshold, fertility
is even assumed to switch to the high level assumed for that re-
gion. The central and high fertility levels are, respectively, 0.3
and 0.6 children per woman, higher than the low level assumed
in this low-fertilityflow-mortality rapid transition extension. The
aging levels at which fertility reactions are simulated are 20 and
25 percent elderly, respectively, in China and 25 and 33 percent in
JapanfAustralia. Results of such fertility feedbacks are given in Ta-
ble 16.5, which contrasts total population sizes and proportions of
elderly under three scenarios: the low-fertilityflow-mortality rapid
transition scenario without reactions, with only the first reaction,
and with two reactions.
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Table 16.5. Population size (in millions) and population above age
60 (in %) in China/Hong Kong and Japan/Australia/New Zealand
under the special population aging-fertility feedback scenarios.
China/Hong Kong Japan/Australia/New Zealand
No One Two No One Two
Year reaction reaction reactions reaction reaction reactions
Population size
1990 1,159 144
2010 1,445 1,445 1,445 156 156 156
2030 1,604 1,637 1,637 154 161 161
2050 1,592 1,755 1,854 147 162 168
2070 1,461 1,804 2,081 137 163 177
2100 1,219 1,845 2,488 123 165 198
Proportion elderly
1990 8.8 16.9
2010 12.4 12.4 12.4 27.5 27.5 27.5
2030 24.1 23.6 23.6 35.9 34.4 34.4
2050 33.5 30.4 28.7 43.5 39.4 38.0
2070 41.8 33.9 29.4 50.0 42.2 38.8
2100 51.1 38.9 30.2 53.3 45.6 39.5
As a consequence of aging levels reached under the low-
fertility flow-mortality scenario, the first fertility reaction occurs in
2025 in China and in 2010 in Japan/Australia, and the second re-
action follows 10 and 20 years later, respectively. The consequence
is of course substantial, in particular in the long run. The extent
of aging would certainly be lower, but still - as one would expect
- considerable aging would occur. In all instances, however, effects
become visible only after 2050. By 2100, the proportion of elderly
in China is lowered by 12 and 21 percentage points, depending on
whether one or two fertility reactions are assumed. The respective
figures for the Japan/Australia/New Zealand region are 8 and 14
percentage points. The effect is stronger in China because the fertil-
ity decline was more abrupt in that region and hence the population
momentum has not yet fully worked through the age structure.
Effects on population size are perhaps even more pronounced.
Instead of 1.2 billion Chinese by 2100, a figure only slightly above the
1990 figure, with two fertility reactions China would double its cur-
rent size by the year 2100. Already with only one fertility feedback
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to the respective central fertility level, total population figures would
be some 51 percent higher in China and some 34 percent higher in
Japan in the very long run.
The main conclusion of this illustration is that impacts of feed-
backs on fertility become effective only very slowly. However, in the
long run, significant differences appear.
16.3 Comparisons with United Nations
and World Bank Long-Range World
Population Projections
Complementing the comparison between medium-range projections
until 2025 in Chapter 15, in this section our three plausible
long-range scenarios are confronted with the high, medium, low,
medium/high, and medium/low long-range extensions offered by the
UN (1992) and again the single projection offered by the World Bank
(1992). As in Chapter 15, low, central, and high estimates of popu-
lation size and population aging are discussed. Table 16.6 gives the
respective information for the year 2100.
Differences between the various projections are even more in-
teresting in the long run. For both developing and industrialized
regions, by 2100 UN medium estimates on population size are the
lowest, and nASA central estimates are the highest. World Bank
estimates are closer to the UN estimate for developing countries,
and closer to the nASA estimate for industrialized countries. The
higher estimates for the industrialized region are due to continued
immigration streams and to significantly higher ultimate life ex-
pectancies in the nASA extensions. Therefore, also the proportion
of elderly in these countries is highest in the nASA estimate. The
larger population size and younger age structure for today's devel-
oping countries is still a consequence of the slower completion of the
fertility transition assumed in the nASA extensions.
The most striking difference concerns uncertainty ranges sug-
gested by the UN and nASA long-range extensions. According to
the UN, by 2100 world population size ranges from 6 to 19 billion
people, as a mere consequence of the speed of the fertility transi-
tion and with ultimate fertility levels of 1.7 and 2.5 in all regions.
In contrast, the nASA projections do not extend the systematic
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Table 16.6. Comparison of nASA results for the year 2100 with
United Nations and World Bank projections.
Total population size Share of population
(in millions) aged 65 and over (in %)
Scenario IIASA UN WB IIASA UN WB
World total
Central 12,562 11,186 11,651 19.6 21.6 22.3
Low 9,126 6,009 - 12.5 16.7 -
High 16,090 19,156 - 34.8 28.7 -
Developing regions
Central 10,980 9,984 10,200 18.7 21.3 22.0
Low 7,885 5,314 - 12.0 16.4 -
High 13,994 17,168 - 34.0 28.2 -
Industrialized regions
Central 1,582 1,202 1,452 25.9 24.9 24.6
Low 1,241 0,694 - 15.7 19.1 -
High 2,096 1,988 - 40.3 32.4 -
IIASA extensions consist of three scenarios; UN extensions consist of five variants
(constant fertility and instant replacement variants are not considered); and the
World Bank projection has only one path.
permutation scenarios beyond 2050, but instead somewhat more
narrow long-term extensions are defined because of assumed likely
interactions. Hence the resulting range of the world population is
much smaller, between 9 and 16 billion people in 2100. The signif-
icantly higher minimum even with very low fertility is strongly de-
termined by the assumed high gains in life expectancy, and in case
of the industrialized regions also by continued immigration. This is
also the reason why the high nASA estimate for the industrialized
region is even above the high UN estimate.
In contrast to population size, nASA estimates report much
larger uncertainty regarding the age structure. The proportion of
elderly ranges from 12 to 34 percent in today's developing and even
from 15 to 40 percent in today's industrialized regions. Due to
the restrictive assumptions on mortality with only one future path,
UN estimates on the proportion of elderly are in a much smaller
range, right in the middle of the range suggested by nASA esti-
mates. UN estimates show a relatively high certainty about the
extent and speed of aging to be expected in the future - which
is simply a function of no assumed variation in mortality - while
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nASA estimates reveal a relatively higher certainty about future
world population size.
The nASA world population scenarios were only defined for 12
major world regions for reasons discussed in Chapter 2. Summary
tables for each region for both the systematic permutations (Ap-
pendix A) and the long-range extensions (Appendix B) and for age
structures for the central scenario (Appendix C) follow.
In another context the systematic permutation scenario ap-
proach until 2030 has been applied to 20 large European countries
(see Prinz and Lutz, 1993). Other sets of individual country sce-
narios may follow in the future. All existing data are available on
diskette from nASA.
Notes
[1] This study has frequently been criticized for overestimating the agri-
cultural potential of rain forests. Hence, without breakthroughs in
agricultural production and with no massive imports of food it is fea-
sible to assume a limit of 4 billion people for this region.
[2] Fertility and mortality rates are still kept constant at the same level
that was already reached by 2030. This is also true in the "strong
reaction" disaster scenario.
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Chapter 17
Epilogue
Wolfgang Lutz
This book serves two specific purposes: to respond to the demand
for alternative population projections in the context of global en-
vironmental change and to advance the discussion on projection
approaches within the demographic community. Beyond these two
goals - which are in themselves ambitious enough - the book in-
tentionally refrains from taking a position in other important and
hotly debated issues, such as how many people should live on earth
or should family-planning efforts be intensified. We believe that, at
this point, by making a clearly defined contribution to an important
but still limited issue, we can serve the highly confused discussion
on future world population, development, and environment better
than by considering all relevant issues at a necessarily more superfi-
ciallevel. Brief discussions of two, sometimes antagonistic, positions
are presented in each of the following four sections. These help to
clarify the specific contribution of this book to the discussion of
population issues.
17.1 Possible versus Desirable Population
Trends
This book tries to give the best possible answer to the question,
what will be the size of the future world population, its regional
443
444 Wolfgang Lutz
distribution, and its age and sex structure. The book describes
possibilities and likelihoods. But to ask which of the projected
alternatives is desirable is a different question altogether. In the
discussion of future world population growth, however, these two
different questions are often mixed together which tends to result in
confusion.
One controversial area where these two different questions tend
to be confused is in the discussion of the world's carrying capac-
ity. Chapter 10 of this book reviewed a large number of alternative
estimates of how many people can live and be fed on earth; these
estimates range from less than 1 billion to 1 trillion. Especially in
recent years a number of estimates have been published that come
up with figures below or only slightly above the present world popu-
lation (e.g., Ehrlich et al., 1993; Resources for the Future, 1984). If
these estimates are meant in the sense of what is possible in terms of
people living on earth, they are clearly wrong because more is pos-
sible (at least for the time being and most likely also in the future).
To infer from such estimates that the quality of life will deteriorate
after a certain threshold transcends the original ecological meaning
of carrying capacity (how many people can live on earth?) and in-
troduces welfare standards for those alive that are clearly part of
the second question, namely, what kind of life is desirable.
What is the desirable quality of life for people, is a question far
beyond the scope of this book. In this general form it may not even
be possible to answer it. Great inequalities among people exist and
are not likely to disappear soon. Therefore, it is impossible to apply
a universal standard for quality of life, let alone define such a stan-
dard in the face of differing views on what is good. Population size
is only indirectly related to the question of inequality, if it is relevant
at all. In general it is not clear how even the average quality of life
relates to total population size, although in specific case studies an
association has been found.
Of course, statements of what is desirable cannot be completely
detached from what is possible and likely. Calculations have been
presented that the world population should only be 1 billion to as-
sure an optimal quality of life. [1] But we know that the world pop-
ulation will almost certainly increase to at least 8 billion. The only
response one can give is to ask "so what?"
Epilogue 445
Another recent public statement claimed more specifically that
the world population must and can be reduced to 2 billion or less by
2100 to provide universal prosperity.[2] But only strong increases in
death rates through intentional killing of people could decrease the
population to such a low level by 2100 because even strict fertility
control programs such as in China could never reduce fertility to a
sufficiently low level. Such calculations that treat clearly impossible
goals that may only be achieved through increasing mortality are
not really useful in this discussion.
17.2 Unavoidable versus Avoidable Growth
It is a basic fact - which is also slowly being recognized outside
the community of demographers - that population growth can-
not simply be switched off through population policies. This is
due to two factors: the reproductive behavior of large populations
does not change radically over night and due to past high fertility
ever-increasing numbers of young women are entering the repro-
ductive ages (i.e., the so-called momentum of population growth).
Of course, catastrophically high mortality or birth rates that, on
average, are less than a third of today's level could always stop
population growth, but this is extremely unlikely. In sub-Saharan
Africa, for example, simulations show that fertility would have to
decline to less than one child per woman overnight to prevent fur-
ther population growth, which is an absurd scenario. This book
gives estimates of what is possible in the real world based on our
best present understanding of human behavior.
Within the limits of what is possible, alternatives exist. These
alternatives have been numerically demonstrated in Chapters 15 and
16. For the year 2030 possible total world population sizes range
from a minimum of 8.3 billion to a maximum of 10.7 billion. The
long-range scenarios for 2100 give a minimum of 9.1 and a maxi-
mum of 16.1 billion based on assumptions as described in Chapter
16. One can interpret the minimum population growth resulting
from the low fertility scenarios as realistically unavoidable further
population growth. Figure 17.1 gives this unavoidable growth until
2050 as the shaded area in the context of the five scenarios (disre-
garding migration) as defined in Chapter 15. It can be seen from
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Figure 17.1. Unavoidable and possibly avoidable world population
growth to 2050.
the figure that this realistically unavoidable growth adds 2.5 to 4.0
billion people (depending on the choice of mortality assumptions) to
the world population, bringing it close to 10 billion by 2050 under
the low-fertility and low-mortality scenario.
Figure 17.1 also shows that low fertility combined with high
mortality would result in the lowest population growth (only 8.3
billion by 2050). Although this is a possible scenario, it is by no
means a desirable one because the higher mortality would be associ-
ated with tremendous human suffering (e.g., in sub-Saharan Africa
male life expectancy declines from 50 years presently to only 37
years in 2030). Hence, it can be assumed that any policy intend-
ing to increase the quality of life by averting avoidable population
growth also aims at decreasing mortality. For this reason I chose the
scenario combining low fertility with low mortality as the borderline
between possibly avoidable and unavoidable growth.[3]
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This decomposition into avoidable and unavoidable growth fol-
lows a somewhat different logic than the recent analysis by Bon-
gaarts (1994) which estimates that of the likely 5.7 billion additional
people in the developing world by 2100 (based on the World Bank
projections), 2.8 billion are due to population momentum, 1.0 bil-
lion to high desired family size, and 1.9 billion to unwanted fertility.
Aside from the issue of wanted and unwanted fertility, which is be-
hind the assumptions of our scenarios but not a defining criterion,
his decomposition is different in that it takes stable replacement-
level fertility - a convenient but problematic concept as discussed
in previous chapters - as the point of reference. All births below re-
placement fertility are considered momentum, all births above that
level are considered avoidable through reduction in unwanted preg-
nancies and reduction in demand for large families. Alternative
mortality trends are not considered in these calculations.
17.3 Population Growth versus
Population Aging
Total population size - which tends to get almost exclusive attention
in the discussion of future world population trends - is only one side
of the coin. The other side is population aging. If population growth
follows the unavoidable path, the mean age of the world population
increases from 28.1 years currently to 35.0 in 2030 and even 39.7
years by 2050. The long-range scenario to 2100, which limits total
population to 9.1 billion, even results in an increase of the mean age
of the population to 50 years; the proportion of the population above
age 60 would increase from the present 9.2 percent to an incredible
40.8 percent in 2100. For comparison, in the "oldest" region today,
Western Europe, still only 20 percent of the population is above age
60. And today's developing countries seem to be hardly prepared
to cope with the social challenges of massive aging.
The stated figures on projected population aging under different
scenarios make it clear that when discussing possible and desired
future population trends both sides of the coin - growth and aging
- need to be taken into consideration. Alternative paths of aging
are sometimes consciously disregarded with the argument that for
an eventual stable situation the laws of population dynamics imply
448 Wolfgang Lutz
that at some point the higher mean age of the population resulting
from stable low fertility and mortality patterns will be reached, no
matter what the total population size. While this is certainly true
in the very long run, the big difference for the coming decades lies
in the speed of aging. A mean age of 36 years, which under the high
growth scenario will only be reached in 2100, will already be reached
around 2030 under the low-growth scenario. Hence the low-growth
scenario will certainly put more stress on society to adapt to rapid
and massive aging and develop support networks for the aged that
can no longer count on traditional family support.
Mentioning the aging associated with a rapid curbing of popula-
tion growth is not to say that both aspects are of equal importance.
A weighting of the consequences of both aspects, again, is beyond
the focus of this book and requires very different considerations.
Asked for a first quick guess, I would assume that the benefits of
rapidly declining fertility in terms of a lower child dependency ratio,
less stress on infrastructure and life support systems, better educa-
tional opportunities for women, and a likely boost to productivity
more than compensate the problems of aging, if sufficient attention
is given to timely social policies.[4]
17.4 Population Policy versus Development
At least since the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest
the question whether socioeconomic development will do the job of
bringing fertility down or whether specific programs and incentive
systems or even coercive measures are necessary has been at the
top of international population agenda. Recently, increased envi-
ronmental concerns and the emphasis of reproductive rights have
added new fuel to the debate. This book has intentionally made
only a very limited contribution to this issue because it is not a
programmatic or political book.
What can this book contribute to the issue? Many chapters
clearly show that there is room for population policy to influence the
future paths of fertility, mortality, and migration and consequently
the size, age structure, and regional distribution of the population.
Some of the background chapters also demonstrate that policies did
have an impact in the past and are likely to do so in the future. The
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fertility chapters further indicated that in many countries desired
family sizes are smaller than actual ones, hence showing substantial
demand for family planning and a need for better services and sup-
ply, and less necessity for incentives or even coercive measures. The
empirical analysis in this book also shows that development and es-
pecially the social side of development with emphasis on women's
education is a very important prerequisite for the decline of high
fertility.
17.5 Conclusion
More concretely, the scenario approach described and applied in this
book can also be useful in the specification of priorities for national
population policies. A large number of international statements on
population policies include language referring to the medium vari-
ant of the United Nations population projections as a goal, stating
that efforts should be made to match the figures of that specific
projection. I find this a regrettable abuse of projections that are
intended to give the most likely future path rather than to be taken
as a normative goal for policies. Such statements also imply that
the UN medium projections are considered wrong in the sense that
they no longer give the most likely path without the special efforts
which the statement calls upon. The alternative scenario approach
described and applied in this book together with the now easily avail-
able software could encourage those who define population policies
to perform a number of alternative calculations, including scenarios
that are considered desirable and realistically achievable. The simul-
taneous consideration of several alternative possible paths can also
help to design more robust national development plans that should
hold under somewhat different future population patterns. Finally,
such scenario projection exercises contribute to the understanding
that not only fertility but all three components - fertility, mortality,
and migration - matter in the future size and structure of a region's
population.
This book is a first attempt to simultaneously assemble the most
relevant knowledge about past and future population trends, trans-
late it into alternative projections, and try to meet the demand for
information about the population variable in the context of global
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change. Many more steps by demographers and their colleagues in
ecology and economics are necessary to integrate population aspects
more specifically and correctly into the global discussion about sus-
tainable development.
Notes
[1] See a paper by Paul Ehrlich et al., in POPLINE, World Population
News Service, January-February 1994.
[2] Cornell ecologist David Pimentel makes this claim according to
POPLINE (World Population News Service, March-April 1994). He
also claims that a population of 1 to 2 billion over the next century
could be reached by limiting family size to 1.5 children. To check
this claim we calculated the completely unrealistic scenario: starting
in 1995, the total fertility rate decreases to 1.5 children in all world
regions. But even in this case, world population would increase to 6.6
billion in 2025 and then decline to 3.5 in 2100. Even combining it with
the worst case mortality assumptions (AIDS, starvation, etc.), the 2
billion mark is not reached by 2100. Under the still unrealistic scenario
that fertility would decline to 1.5 everywhere within 20 years the total
population in 2100 would be 4.7 billion.
[3] Alternatively the low-fertility/high-mortality scenario may be chosen
as a reference if one prefers to consider high mortality as part of a
strategy to avoid growth.
[4] This was found to be the case in a recent in-depth study on Mauritius
(see Lutz, 1994).
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Appendix A: Summary Results of Nine Systematic
Permutation Scenarios to 2030
North Africa
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
2000 179 179 178 180 178 179 178 180 178
2010 226 226 216 230 220 229 218 233 222
2020 278 281 250 293 261 290 259 302 269
2030 332 345 276 371 297 362 291 388 312
2050a 440 510 299 584 347 548 326 625 377
Mean age (in years)
1990 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6
2000 24.4 24.0 24.2 24.1 24.2 24.0 24.2 24.1 24.2
2010 25.4 24.6 25.5 24.7 25.6 24.6 25.5 24.7 25.6
2020 26.7 25.3 27.4 25.5 27.7 25.3 27.3 25.5 27.6
2030 28.4 26.0 29.8 26.5 30.5 25.9 29.7 26.5 30.4
2050a 31.6 26.8 34.7 27.8 36.1 26.8 34.5 27.7 35.8
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47
2000 2.41 2.34 2.02 2.46 2.14 2.46 2.15 2.58 2.27
2010 2.26 2.20 1.60 2.41 1.81 2.39 1.80 2.60 2.01
2020 2.00 2.09 1.13 2.38 1.43 2.25 1.31 2.53 1.60
2030 1.72 1.97 0.54 2.32 0.93 2.11 0.72 2.45 1.09
2050a 1.23 1.91 0.06 2.20 0.44 2.01 0.25 2.29 0.61
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 4,512 4,512 4,512 4,512 4,512 4,512 4,512 4,512 4,512
2000 5,600 5,679 5,369 5,685 5,375 5,679 5,369 5,685 5,375
2010 6,561 6,932 5,753 6,987 5,799 7,016 5,823 7,071 5,868
2020 7,266 8,271 5,744 8,449 5,866 8,529 5,926 8,709 6,050
2030 7,770 9,787 5,097 10,207 5,315 10,241 5,352 10,669 5,574
2050a 8,646 14,119 4,568 15,484 5,012 15,164 5,005 16,579 5,467
Proportion of population aged O-lJ, years (in %)
1990 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5
2000 38.9 39.9 39.4 39.9 39.4 39.9 39.4 39.9 39.4
2010 37.0 39.1 36.2 39.1 36.2 39.0 36.1 39.1 36.2
2020 34.6 37.9 32.2 37.9 32.2 37.9 32.2 37.9 32.2
2030 31.7 36.8 27.5 36.6 27.3 36.8 27.6 36.6 27.4
2050a 27.2 35.7 21.6 35.3 21.1 35.7 21.8 35.3 21.3
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
2000 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6
2010 5.7 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.9
2020 7.0 6.2 7.0 6.7 7.6 6.2 7.0 6.7 7.5
2030 8.4 6.9 8.6 7.9 9.9 6.8 8.5 7.9 9.8
2050a 11.8 7.8 13.3 9.6 16.1 7.7 13.0 9.5 15.8
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in mil/ions)
1990 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502
2000 690 690 684 695 689 690 684 695 689
2010 924 926 879 961 913 929 882 964 915
2020 1,201 1,209 1,067 1,325 1,165 1,219 1,075 1,335 1,174
2030 1,499 1,526 1,199 1,806 1,408 1,543 1,214 1,825 1,424
2050a 2,097 2,287 1,297 3,277 1,824 2,326 1,324 3,325 1,857
Mean age (in years)
1990 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8
2000 21.5 21.4 21.6 21.4 21.6 21.4 21.6 21.4 21.6
2010 22.1 21.7 22.5 21.6 22.5 21.7 22.5 21.6 22.5
2020 23.1 22.2 24.1 22.0 24.0 22.2 24.1 22.0 24.0
2030 24.5 23.0 26.6 22.7 26.3 23.0 26.6 22.7 26.3
2050a 27.8 24.3 31.7 23.7 31.3 24.3 31.6 23.8 31.3
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.27
2000 3.09 2.98 2.64 3.23 2.89 3.01 2.67 3.27 2.92
2010 2.86 2.75 2.10 3.23 2.56 2.80 2.16 3.28 2.61
2020 2.53 2.42 1.37 3.13 2.04 2.46 1.41 3.16 2.08
2030 2.11 2.05 0.51 3.00 1.40 2.08 0.55 3.03 1.43
2050a 1.45 1.92 0.02 2.90 0.98 1.94 0.06 2.92 1.01
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 20,934 20,934 20,934 20,934 20,934 20,934 20,934 20,934 20,934
2000 27,555 28,145 26,697 28,190 26,740 28,145 26,697 28,190 26,740
2010 34,588 37,056 31,123 37,584 31,567 37,170 31,218 37,699 31,663
2020 41,325 47,063 33,028 49,436 34,675 47,406 33,273 49,784 34,925
2030 45,819 56,819 29,786 63,540 33,246 57,423 30,127 64,172 33,603
2050a 52,024 82,734 26,655 111,284 35,550 84,085 27,207 112,878 36,187
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0
2000 46.3 46.7 46.1 46.8 46.3 46.7 46.1 46.8 46.3
2010 43.6 44.8 41.9 45.5 42.6 44.8 41.9 45.5 42.6
2020 41.1 43.4 37.6 44.6 38.8 43.4 37.6 44.6 38.7
2030 37.8 41.4 31.8 43.1 33.4 41.4 31.8 43.1 33.4
2050a 31.8 39.4 24.6 41.5 26.3 39.4 24.7 41.5 26.4
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
2000 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2
2010 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.2
2020 4.3 3.8 4.3 4.1 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.7
2030 4.8 4.0 5.1 4.5 5.8 4.0 5.1 4.5 5.8
2050a 6.9 4.8 8.5 5.4 9.6 4.8 8.5 5.4 9.6
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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North America
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 277 277 277 277 277 277 277 277 277
2000 303 304 302 305 303 304 302 305 303
2010 325 335 322 339 326 325 312 329 316
2020 350 377 343 387 353 347 313 357 323
2030 375 424 362 443 381 368 309 387 328
2050a 410 534 388 568 421 400 272 433 305
Mean age (in years)
1990 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
2000 35.5 35.4 35.6 35.5 35.7 35.4 35.6 35.5 35.7
2010 36.9 35.6 36.8 36.0 37.2 36.5 37.9 36.9 38.3
2020 38.2 35.3 37.9 36.2 38.8 37.6 40.7 38.5 41.6
2030 39.3 34.8 38.6 36.4 40.3 38.2 43.1 39.9 44.8
2050a 39.8 33.2 38.6 35.7 41.5 38.2 46.6 41.0 49.7
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2000 0.73 0.98 0.71 1.06 0.79 0.66 0.39 0.75 0.47
2010 0.69 1.16 0.64 1.29 0.78 0.61 0.03 0.75 0.19
2020 0.73 1.19 0.59 1.36 0.80 0.65 -0.04 0.86 0.21
2030 0.57 1.14 0.42 1.31 0.65 0.47 -0.40 0.70 -0.07
2050a 0.40 1.23 0.34 1.22 0.38 0.44 -0.85 0.48 -0.68
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234
2000 4,202 4,466 3,949 4,478 3,960 2,295 3,949 4,478 3,957
2010 3,886 4,645 3,172 4,674 3,193 2,353 3,124 4,608 3,150
2020 4,376 5,693 3,261 5,751 3,298 2,809 3,117 5,529 3,214
2030 4,549 6,641 3,363 6,726 3,415 2,923 2,803 5,775 2,993
2050a 4,824 9,096 3,591 9,163 3,627 3,114 1,948 6,128 2,229
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5
2000 23.8 24.1 23.5 24.0 23.5 24.1 23.5 24.0 23.5
2010 22.3 25.1 22.0 24.9 21.8 22.8 19.5 22.6 19.3
2020 21.2 26.6 21.3 26.0 20.8 21.7 15.3 21.] 14.9
2030 21.3 27.6 21.6 26.5 20.6 22.1 14.5 21.1 13.8
2050a 20.5 27.9 21.0 26.4 19.4 21.5 11.8 20.0 10.6
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7
2000 16.0 15.9 16.0 16.0 16.1 15.9 16.0 16.0 16.1
2010 18.4 17.4 18.1 18.1 18.8 17.9 18.7 18.6 19.4
2020 22.9 20.2 22.2 21.8 23.9 21.9 24.3 23.7 26.1
2030 25.6 20.7 24.2 23.5 27.3 23.8 28.3 26.9 31.7
2050a 24.2 15.9 21.9 20.1 27.2 21.3 31.2 26.4 37.6
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
454 Appendix A
Central America and the Caribbean
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
2000 181 181 180 181 180 181 180 181 180
2010 219 218 210 220 212 222 214 223 215
2020 255 256 235 260 239 268 246 272 250
2030 289 297 251 306 259 318 271 328 279
2050a 342 382 254 407 274 429 292 456 312
Mean age (in years)
1990 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8
2000 26.6 26.2 26.3 26.2 26.3 26.2 26.3 26.2 26.3
2010 28.6 27.6 28.4 27.7 28.5 27.6 28.4 27.7 28.5
2020 30.8 29.2 31.1 29.3 31.2 29.1 30.9 29.2 31.1
2030 33.1 30.6 34.1 30.9 34.5 30.4 33.8 30.7 34.2
2050a 37.1 32.1 39.7 33.0 40.9 31.8 39.0 32.7 40.1
A verage annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11
2000 2.07 1.91 1.66 1.96 1.71 2.08 1.84 2.13 1.89
2010 1.80 1.65 1.21 1.73 1.29 1.94 1.51 2.02 1.59
2020 1.47 1.51 0.79 1.63 0.93 1.77 1.08 1.89 1.21
2030 1.18 1.35 0.29 1.54 0.50 1.59 0.58 1.77 0.78
2050a 0.64 1.16 -0.37 1.28 -0.19 1.37 -0.01 1.48 0.15
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 3,986 3,986 3,986 3,986 3,986 3,986 3,986 3,986 3,986
2000 4,797 4,825 4,591 4,826 4,591 4,825 4,591 4,826 4,591
2010 5,151 5,382 4,560 5,386 4,564 5,472 4,637 5,477 4,640
2020 5,250 5,896 4,273 5,915 4,286 6,169 4,475 6,188 4,488
2030 5,252 6,523 3,682 6,606 3,727 7,004 3,977 7,088 4,023
2050a 5,192 8,003 2,927 8,281 3,029 9,031 3,420 9,323 3,528
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6
2000 33.7 35.1 34.7 35.1 34.7 35.1 34.7 35.1 34.7
2010 30.9 33.3 30.9 33.4 31.0 33.3 30.9 33.4 31.0
2020 27.9 31.3 26.6 31.4 26.7 31.4 26.8 31.5 26.9
2030 25.1 29.9 22.4 29.8 22.4 30.0 22.7 30.0 22.7
2050a 21.2 28.6 17.1 28.3 16.8 28.8 17.6 28.6 17.3
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
2000 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8
2010 8.0 7.5 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.5 7.8 7.7 8.0
2020 9.9 9.0 9.8 9.5 10.3 9.0 9.7 9.4 10.2
2030 13.2 11.5 13.6 12.4 14.6 11.2 13.2 12.1 14.2
2050a 19.4 14.0 20.9 15.9 23.7 13.5 19.9 15.4 22.5
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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South America
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
2000 349 349 347 350 348 349 347 350 348
2010 407 411 397 415 400 412 398 416 402
2020 464 475 437 484 445 480 441 489 450
2030 516 544 463 564 480 552 471 572 488
2050a 604 695 471 743 507 713 486 763 522
Mean age (in years)
1990 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6
2000 28.5 28.3 28.5 28.3 28.5 28.3 28.5 28.3 28.5
2010 30.2 29.7 30.5 29.8 30.6 29.7 30.5 29.8 30.6
2020 32.1 30.9 32.9 31.1 33.0 30.9 32.9 31.0 33.0
2030 33.8 31.9 35.5 32.3 35.9 31.9 35.4 32.2 35.8
2050a 36.6 32.6 40.0 33.1 40.8 32.5 39.8 33.1 40.6
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
2000 1.67 1.66 1.43 1.72 1.49 1.70 1.46 1.76 1.52
2010 1.50 1.50 1.06 1.58 1.14 1.56 1.12 1.64 1.21
2020 1.24 1.36 0.68 1.51 0.83 1.42 0.74 1.57 0.90
2030 1.01 1.30 0.28 1.48 0.48 1.35 0.35 1.53 0.54
2050a 0.66 1.16 -0.26 1.29 -0.09 1.21 -0.18 1.34 -om
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 6,821 6,821 6,821 6,821 6,821 6,821 6,821 6,821 6,821
2000 7,908 8,098 7,654 8,101 7,657 8,098 7,654 8,101 7,657
2010 8,564 9,239 7,730 9,261 7,749 9,272 7,758 9,294 7,777
2020 8,719 10,093 7,179 10,160 7,226 10,197 7,254 10,265 7,302
2030 8,909 11,353 6,382 11,524 6,476 11,540 6,495 11,712 6,590
2050a 9,327 14,288 5,378 14,892 5,602 14,692 5,574 15,304 5,802
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7
2000 30.7 31.2 30.7 31.2 30.7 31.2 30.7 31.2 30.7
2010 28.9 30.3 27.9 30.3 27.9 30.3 27.9 30.3 27.9
2020 26.7 29.2 24.5 29.3 24.6 29.3 24.6 29.3 24.7
2030 24.7 28.4 21.1 28.3 21.0 28.4 21.2 28.4 21.1
2050a 22.3 28.2 17.1 28.1 17.0 28.3 17.3 28.2 17.1
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
2000 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.4
2010 9.7 9.4 9.7 9.6 9.9 9.4 9.7 9.6 9.9
2020 12.2 11.4 12.4 11.7 12.7 11.4 12.3 11.6 12.7
2030 14.8 13.4 15.8 14.2 16.7 13.3 15.6 14.1 16.5
2050a 19.2 15.0 22.1 16.3 23.9 14.8 21.8 16.2 23.6
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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West and Central Asia
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in mil/ions)
1990 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197
2000 251 251 249 252 250 251 249 252 250
2010 312 314 304 318 308 314 304 318 308
2020 378 386 357 397 367 386 357 397 368
2030 442 462 397 487 419 463 398 487 419
2050a 553 627 435 693 486 628 436 694 487
Mean age (in years)
1990 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9
2000 25.8 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.7
2010 27.1 26.6 27.3 26.7 27.4 26.6 27.3 26.7 27.4
2020 28.7 27.7 29.2 28.0 29.6 27.7 29.2 28.0 29.6
2030 30.7 28.9 31.9 29.5 32.6 28.9 31.9 29.5 32.6
2050a 34.9 31.0 37.5 32.3 39.2 31.0 37.5 32.3 39.2
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
2000 2.37 2.29 2.08 2.38 2.17 2.29 2.08 2.38 2.18
2010 2.11 2.12 1.71 2.27 1.86 2.12 1.72 2.27 1.86
2020 1.84 1.88 1.22 2.09 1.43 1.89 1.22 2.09 1.43
2030 1.47 1.60 0.62 1.87 0.93 1.60 0.62 1.88 0.94
2050a 0.96 1.37 0.10 1.58 0.38 1.38 0.11 1.58 0.39
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 5,924 5,924 5,924 5,924 5,924 5,924 5,924 5,924 5,924
2000 7,212 7,281 6,978 7,284 6,980 7,281 6,978 7,284 6,980
2010 7,988 8,419 7,325 8,441 7,344 8,421 7,327 8,443 7,346
2020 8,546 9,702 7,336 9,776 7,391 9,708 7,340 9,781 7,395
2030 8,516 10,641 6,363 10,858 6,489 10,651 6,369 10,869 6,496
2050a 8,840 13,482 5,471 14,217 5,762 13,507 5,483 14,243 5,775
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7
2000 37.1 37.8 37.5 37.9 37.5 37.8 37.5 37.9 37.5
2010 34.4 35.6 33.6 35.7 33.7 35.6 33.6 35.7 33.7
2020 31.6 33.7 29.5 33.8 29.6 33.7 29.5 33.8 29.6
2030 28.3 31.6 24.8 31.6 24.8 31.6 24.8 31.6 24.8
2050a 23.3 29.1 18.4 28.6 17.9 29.1 18.4 28.6 18.0
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
2000 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2
2010 7.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.6
2020 9.0 8.2 8.9 8.9 9.7 8.2 8.9 8.9 9.7
2030 11.1 9.6 11.2 11.1 12.9 9.6 11.2 11.1 12.9
2050a 15.7 11.6 16.8 14.5 20.7 11.6 16.7 14.5 20.6
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
Appendix A 457
South Asia
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191
2000 1,487 1,488 1,480 1,494 1,486 1,488 1,480 1,494 1,486
2010 1,806 1,811 1,757 1,847 1,792 1,815 1,761 1,852 1,796
2020 2,130 2,149 1,993 2,250 2,086 2,163 2,006 2,263 2,098
2030 2,428 2,486 2,145 2,697 2,326 2,511 2,168 2,722 2,349
2050a 2,874 3,131 2,183 3,684 2,581 3,183 2,226 3,742 2,628
Mean age (in years)
1990 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1
2000 25.8 25.7 25.9 25.8 25.9 25.7 25.9 25.8 25.9
2010 27.0 26.6 27.3 26.7 27.3 26.6 27.3 26.7 27.3
2020 28.6 27.7 29.3 27.9 29.5 27.7 29.2 27.9 29.5
2030 30.6 29.0 31.9 29.3 32.3 28.9 31.8 29.3 32.3
2050a 34.7 31.0 37.3 31.8 38.4 31.0 37.2 31.7 38.3
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28
2000 2.15 2.03 1.82 2.17 1.96 2.05 1.84 2.19 1.98
2010 1.87 1.77 1.38 2.00 1.61 1.81 1.42 2.04 1.65
2020 1.57 1.53 0.88 1.86 1.21 1.57 0.92 1.90 1.25
2030 1.21 1.23 0.26 1.66 0.70 1.27 0.31 1.69 0.74
2050a 0.66 1.00 -0.29 1.39 0.15 1.03 -0.24 1.42 0.19
A nnual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132
2000 43,030 43,748 42,058 43,784 42,092 43,748 42,058 43,784 42,092
2010 46,542 49,236 43,033 49,560 43,316 49,354 43,136 49,678 43,420
2020 48,493 54,367 41,242 55,545 42,130 54,708 41,504 55,889 42,394
2030 47,298 57,753 34,701 60,595 36,386 58,322 35,062 61,173 36,753
2050a 45,225 67,768 27,709 76,363 31,154 68,949 28,300 77,611 31,775
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9
2000 36.5 36.7 36.4 36.8 36.5 36.7 36.4 36.8 36.5
2010 34.1 35.1 33.1 35.4 33.4 35.1 33.1 35.4 33.4
2020 31.0 32.9 28.9 33.2 29.2 32.9 28.9 33.2 29.2
2030 27.7 30.9 24.2 31.2 24.4 30.9 24.2 31.2 24.5
2050a 22.5 28.3 18.0 28.5 18.0 28.4 18.0 28.5 18.0
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
2000 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8
2010 7.1 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.3 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.3
2020 8.3 7.7 8.3 8.3 9.0 7.7 8.3 8.3 8.9
2030 10.2 8.9 10.3 10.1 11.7 8.9 10.3 10.0 11.6
2050a 14.3 10.8 15.5 12.9 18.4 10.8 15.4 12.9 18.3
aValues beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
458 Appendix A
China and Hong Kong
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159
2000 1,328 1,332 1,322 1,334 1,324 1,332 1,322 1,334 1,324
2010 1,469 1,489 1,433 1,501 1,443 1,492 1,435 1,503 1,446
2020 1,605 1,663 1,513 1,693 1,540 1,670 1,519 1,700 1,547
2030 1,722 1,846 1,538 1,913 1,597 1,860 1,550 1,927 1,610
2050a 1,873 2,242 1,410 2,412 1,548 2,273 1,434 2,445 1,573
Mean age (in years)
1990 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9
2000 31.1 30.9 31.2 31.0 31.2 30.9 31.2 31.0 31.2
2010 33.8 33.1 34.2 33.2 34.3 33.1 34.2 33.2 34.3
2020 35.8 34.5 37.0 34.7 37.3 34.4 37.0 34.7 37.3
2030 37.6 35.1 39.9 35.8 40.6 35.1 39.8 35.8 40.6
2050a 39.7 34.0 43.9 35.7 45.9 34.0 43.7 35.6 45.8
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41
2000 1.32 1.16 0.90 1.21 0.95 1.17 0.91 1.23 0.97
2010 0.95 1.09 0.61 1.18 0.70 1.12 0.64 1.21 0.73
2020 0.86 1.08 0.29 1.23 0.45 1.11 0.32 1.26 0.48
2030 0.63 0.97 -0.20 1.23 0.12 1.01 -0.16 1.27 0.16
2050a 0.29 1.03 -0.81 1.09 -0.65 1.06 -0.76 1.12 -0.59
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 23,188 23,188 23,188 23,188 23,188 23,188 23,188 23,188 23,188
2000 24,728 25,693 23,570 25,697 23,574 25,693 23,570 25,697 23,574
2010 23,007 25,785 20,010 25,805 20,025 25,836 20,049 25,855 20,064
2020 25,147 30,692 19,530 30,761 19,572 30,849 19,632 30,918 19,674
2030 24,653 34,064 16,047 34,447 16,219 34,363 16,208 34,746 16,380
2050a 25,334 44,729 12,576 46,094 12,957 45,416 12,858 46,790 13,242
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4
2000 26.7 27.1 26.5 27.1 26.5 27.1 26.5 27.1 26.5
2010 23.2 24.8 21.8 24.8 21.8 24.8 21.8 24.8 21.8
2020 21.9 24.6 19.0 24.6 19.0 24.7 19.1 24.7 19.1
2030 21.3 25.6 16.9 25.4 16.7 25.6 17.0 25.4 16.8
2050a 19.9 27.4 13.8 26.6 13.1 27.4 13.9 26.7 13.2
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
2000 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.3 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.3
2010 12.0 11.6 12.1 11.9 12.4 11.6 12.1 11.9 12.4
2020 15.6 14.6 16.1 15.4 16.9 14.6 16.1 15.3 16.8
2030 20.9 18.5 22.2 20.1 24.1 18.4 22.1 20.0 24.0
2050a 24.2 17.5 27.8 20.7 32.2 17.4 27.6 20.6 32.0
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
Appendix A 459
Southeast Asia
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
2000 624 624 620 626 622 622 618 626 622
2010 735 735 710 748 722 736 711 753 728
2020 841 844 778 878 810 854 786 897 827
2030 937 952 814 1,024 877 976 833 1,059 909
2050a 1,076 1,164 792 1,343 927 1,226 836 1,424 991
Mean age (in years)
1990 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6
2000 27.3 27.1 27.2 27.1 27.3 27.0 27.1 27.1 27.3
2010 29.2 28.6 29.4 28.7 29.5 28.3 29.1 28.7 29.5
2020 31.3 30.0 31.8 30.3 32.2 29.5 31.3 30.3 32.1
2030 33.3 31.1 34.5 31.8 35.3 30.4 33.7 31.7 35.1
2050a 36.7 32.1 39.1 33.5 40.9 31.2 38.0 33.3 40.5
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88
2000 1.85 1.70 1.47 1.82 1.59 1.74 1.51 1.90 1.67
2010 1.57 1.43 1.01 1.64 1.22 1.53 1.11 1.78 1.36
2020 1.28 1.25 0.58 1.55 0.88 1.37 0.69 1.68 1.02
2030 1.03 1.08 0.08 1.48 0.52 1.22 0.21 1.61 0.66
2050a 0.51 0.92 -0.51 1.22 -0.13 1.07 -0.31 1.33 0.05
Annual numher of hirths (in 1,000)
1990 13,232 13,232 13,232 13,232 13,232 13,232 13,232 13,232 13,232
2000 15,518 15,782 14,936 15,791 14,944 15,748 14,904 15,791 14,944
2010 16,322 17,302 14,584 17,379 14,650 17,310 14,591 17,525 14,773
2020 16,604 18,690 13,591 18,955 13,782 19,033 13,841 19,401 14,110
2030 16,706 20,487 11,813 21,149 12,189 21,250 12,281 21,931 12,673
2050a 16,146 24,305 9,444 26,475 10,277 26,024 10,279 28,199 11,130
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4
2000 32.4 33.0 32.6 33.0 32.6 33.3 32.8 33.0 32.6
2010 29.8 31.4 29.0 31.6 29.2 32.0 29.6 31.6 29.2
2020 27.1 29.7 25.2 29.8 25.3 30.3 25.8 29.8 25.4
2030 24.8 28.6 21.6 28.6 21.6 29.5 22.4 28.8 21.8
2050a 21.3 27.9 17.2 27.5 16.8 28.8 18.2 27.7 17.1
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
2000 7.3 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3
2010 8.1 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.3 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.3
2020 10.4 9.5 10.3 10.4 11.2 9.1 9.9 10.3 11.2
2030 13.5 11.7 13.6 13.4 15.6 10.9 12.8 13.2 15.3
2050a 18.3 13.2 19.4 16.5 23.9 12.1 17.7 16.1 23.2
aValues beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
460 Appendix A
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
2000 152 152 151 153 152 152 151 153 152
2010 158 160 154 162 157 158 152 161 155
2020 159 165 152 171 158 160 147 166 153
2030 160 171 149 181 159 162 140 172 150
2050a 156 183 136 200 152 162 117 178 133
Mean age (in years)
1990 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9
2000 39.3 39.1 39.3 39.2 39.4 39.1 39.3 39.2 39.4
2010 41.4 40.3 41.6 40.7 42.1 40.7 42.0 41.1 42.5
2020 43.3 40.9 43.5 42.0 44.7 41.9 44.8 43.1 45.9
2030 44.5 40.7 44.7 42.6 46.7 42.3 46.7 44.3 48.7
2050a 45.8 39.5 45.9 42.6 49.3 42.3 50.2 45.5 53.6
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
2000 0.44 0.58 0.32 0.67 0.41 0.47 0.20 0.56 0.30
2010 0.13 0.36 -0.08 0.54 0.12 0.14 -0.31 0.33 -0.11
2020 0.07 0.33 -0.18 0.54 0.06 0.11 -0.44 0.33 -0.18
2030 -0.03 0.35 -0.35 0.57 -0.05 0.05 -0.70 0.30 -0.37
2050a -0.24 0.40 -0.54 0.46 -0.38 -0.02 -1.16 0.08 -0.90
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,685
2000 1,831 1,942 1,713 1,947 1,718 998 1,713 1,947 1,716
2010 1,626 1,926 1,324 1,942 1,336 984 1,317 1,931 1,323
2020 1,501 1,887 1,125 1,910 1,140 959 1,110 1,889 1,118
2030 1,574 2,168 1,120 2,200 1,140 1,054 1,049 2,083 1,060
2050a 1,392 2,378 923 2,400 936 1,002 679 1,972 682
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
2000 18.1 18.4 17.8 18.4 17.8 18.4 17.8 18.4 17.8
2010 17.9 20.0 16.9 19.7 16.7 19.1 15.9 18.8 15.7
2020 16.0 19.7 14.9 19.1 14.4 17.6 12.5 17.1 12.0
2030 16.0 20.5 15.0 19.4 14.1 18.1 11.9 17.1 11.2
2050a 15.3 21.3 14.4 19.7 13.0 18.0 9.8 16.4 8.7
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9
2000 21.2 21.0 21.1 21.1 21.3 21.0 21.1 21.1 21.3
2010 26.6 25.4 26.4 26.4 27.4 25.7 26.7 26.6 27.7
2020 29.5 26.7 29.0 28.9 31.3 27.6 30.1 29.8 32.4
2030 31.8 27.1 31.1 30.6 34.9 28.6 33.1 32.3 37.0
2050a 34.0 25.0 33.6 30.5 39.9 28.4 39.2 34.2 45.8
aValues beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
Appendix A 461
Eastern Europe
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population 8ize (in million8)
1990 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
2000 357 359 356 359 356 359 356 359 356
2010 368 375 357 383 364 373 354 380 361
2020 374 390 348 409 365 382 340 401 357
2030 379 408 335 442 368 390 319 425 351
2050a 376 455 299 519 356 406 257 469 312
Mean age (in year8)
1990 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9
2000 37.0 36.9 37.2 36.9 37.2 36.9 37.2 36.9 37.2
2010 38.6 37.6 39.2 38.0 39.7 37.8 39.5 38.2 39.9
2020 40.0 37.5 40.9 38.6 42.1 38.1 41.7 39.3 42.9
2030 41.3 37.3 42.4 39.4 44.6 38.4 44.0 40.5 46.2
2050a 42.3 35.4 43.3 39.1 47.7 37.7 47.5 41.5 51.9
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
2000 0.31 0.47 0.14 0.60 0.27 0.40 0.06 0.53 0.19
2010 0.21 0.44 -0.21 0.71 0.08 0.30 ---{).37 0.57 -0.07
2020 0.12 0.42 -0.32 0.74 0.06 0.21 ---{).57 0.54 -0.17
2030 0.12 0.54 ---{).45 0.93 0.10 0.22 ---{).85 0.66 -0.25
2050a -0.13 0.67 -0.64 0.75 -0.40 0.25 -1.38 0.38 -0.98
Annual number of birth8 (in 1,000)
1990 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823
2000 4,887 5,241 4,573 5,246 4,577 2,693 4,573 5,246 4,578
2010 4,746 5,771 3,736 5,834 3,778 2,955 3,722 5,814 3,787
2020 4,247 5,592 2,912 5,723 2,984 2,844 2,878 5,665 3,003
2030 4,122 6,074 2,560 6,299 2,667 2,968 2,400 5,998 2,584
2050a 3,918 7,264 2,124 7,508 2,209 3,178 1,596 6,421 1,788
Proportion of population aged 0-14 year8 (in %)
1990 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1
2000 20.1 20.4 19.7 20.4 19.8 20.4 19.7 20.4 19.8
2010 18.8 21.0 17.0 20.9 16.9 20.4 16.3 20.3 16.3
2020 18.3 22.5 15.6 22.0 15.2 21.2 14.0 20.7 13.6
2030 17.6 22.9 15.2 21.8 14.3 20.8 12.4 19.9 11.7
2050a 17.7 25.0 15.9 22.9 13.9 21.8 10.6 19.9 9.2
Proportion of population aged 60 year8 and over (in %)
1990 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8
2000 18.8 18.8 19.0 18.8 19.0 18.8 19.0 18.8 19.0
2010 19.6 18.7 19.7 19.7 20.7 18.9 19.8 19.8 20.8
2020 23.6 20.9 23.5 23.3 26.1 21.4 24.1 23.8 26.7
2030 26.0 21.2 25.8 25.4 30.6 22.1 27.1 26.5 32.1
2050a 29.0 19.5 29.6 26.2 38.2 21.8 34.6 29.0 43.6
aValues beyond 2030 result froIIl an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
462 Appendix A
Western Europe
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377
2000 394 395 392 396 393 395 392 396 393
2010 404 412 397 416 401 407 392 411 396
2020 409 428 393 441 406 413 379 426 391
2030 415 446 388 471 411 420 362 444 385
2050a 407 482 357 525 399 420 302 462 343
Mean age (in years)
1990 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.7
2000 38.6 38.4 38.7 38.5 38.8 38.4 38.7 38.5 38.8
2010 40.2 39.3 40.5 39.6 40.8 39.7 40.9 40.0 41.2
2020 41.8 39.6 42.2 40.5 43.1 40.7 43.5 41.7 44.5
2030 43.1 39.4 43.4 41.2 45.2 41.2 45.6 42.9 47.4
2050a 44.5 38.3 44.5 41.3 47.9 41.2 49.0 44.3 52.4
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
2000 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.51 0.26 0.33 0.08 0.38 0.13
2010 0.10 0.38 -0.07 0.54 0.10 0.14 -0.33 0.31 -0.15
2020 0.17 0.41 -0.13 0.64 0.14 0.17 -0.42 0.42 -0.12
2030 0.07 0.42 -0.27 0.66 0.05 0.09 -0.65 0.37 -0.29
2050a -0.25 0.43 -0.53 0.47 -0.39 -0.02 -1.21 0.06 -0.97
A nnual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524
2000 4,560 4,848 4,258 4,862 4,270 2,491 4,258 4,862 4,268
2010 4,020 4,784 3,278 4,815 3,300 2,444 3,257 4,787 3,283
2020 4,158 5,255 3,109 5,324 3,153 2,662 3,060 5,251 3,137
2030 4,253 5,840 3,051 5,925 3,104 2,824 2,843 5,582 2,983
2050a 3,798 6,518 2,535 6,588 2,575 2,716 1,837 5,357 2,026
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5
2000 19.5 19.8 19.3 19.8 19.2 19.8 19.3 19.8 19.2
2010 18.6 20.6 17.6 20.5 17.5 19.6 16.6 19.5 16.5
2020 16.9 20.6 15.6 20.1 15.3 18.3 13.0 17.9 12.6
2030 17.0 21.6 15.9 20.6 15.0 18.9 12.6 18.0 11.9
2050a 16.0 22.2 15.2 20.5 13.7 18.6 10.3 17.1 9.1
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6
2000 21.0 20.9 21.0 21.0 21.2 20.9 21.0 21.0 21.2
2010 23.2 22.4 23.2 23.1 23.9 22.7 23.5 23.4 24.2
2020 26.4 24.0 26.1 25.9 28.1 24.9 27.2 26.9 29.2
2030 30.6 26.1 30.1 29.3 33.6 27.8 32.2 31.1 35.8
2050a 31.3 22.6 30.5 28.0 36.8 26.0 36.1 31.8 42.8
aValues beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
Appendix A 463
Developing regIOns
Migration Central High High
Mortality Central High High
Fertility Central High Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
Low
Low
High
High
Low
High
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
Low
25.9
27.0
28.7
30.8
33.5
38.6
2.08
1.80
1.54
1.20
0.76
0.23
35.6
34.4
31.2
27.9
24.1
18.9
6.9
7.5
8.3
10.5
13.9
20.0
4,149
5,076
6,033
6,984
7,790
8,748
25.9
26.8
27.9
28.8
29.7
30.6
2.08
2.05
2.02
1.97
1.90
1.78
35.6
34.9
33.7
32.8
32.1
31.6
6.9
7.4
8.0
9.6
11.7
13.0
4,149
5,111
6,263
7,656
9,309
13,473
25.9
27.0
28.7
30.6
33.1
37.7
6.9
7.4
8.1
9.9
12.7
17.4
35.6
34.4
31.0
27.5
23.7
18.6
4,149
5,058
5,923
6,690
7,194
7,359
2.08
1.68
1.32
0.87
0.28
---{).24
25.9
26.8
27.8
28.7
29.5
30.2
2.08
1.92
1.79
1.63
1.43
1.32
6.9
7.4
7.8
9.0
10.6
11.3
4,149
5,093
6,148
7,329
8,585
11,326
2.08
1.76
1.47
1.13
0.69
0.16
25.9
27.0
28.7
30.8
33.5
38.7
4,149
5,076
6,010
6,913
7,664
8,495
2.08
2.01
1.95
1.92
1.85
1.74
25.9
26.8
27.9
28.8
29.8
30.6
4,149
5,111
6,239
7,581
9,167
13,144
Total population size (in mil/ions)
1990 4,149 4,149 4,149
2000 5,086 5,095 5,059
2010 6,085 6,130 5,906
2020 7,136 7,264 6,629
2030 8,153 8,459 7,084
2050a 9,958 11,037 7,142
Mean age (in years)
1990 25.9 25.9 25.9
2000 26.9 26.8 27.0
2010 28.3 27.8 28.7
2020 29.7 28.8 30.7
2030 31.3 29.6 33.3
2050a 33.7 30.3 38.0
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.08 2.08 2.08
2000 1.85 1.89 1.64
2010 1.65 1.73 1.26
2020 1.41 1.58 0.80
2030 1.10 1.37 0.22
2050a 0.81 1.27 -0.32
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 114,729114,729 114,729 114,729 114,729 114,729 114,729 114,729 114,729
2000 135,690 139,253 131,853 139,358 131,953 139,219 131,821 139,358 131,953
2010 147,587 159,350 134,118 160,403 135,013 159,850 134,538 161,041 135,550
2020 160,868 184,774 131,922 188,997 134,929 186,599 133,246 190,934 136,337
2030 164,701 207,428 113,871 218,926 120,047 210,794 115,872 222,360 122,090
2050a 188,024 269,427 94,727 313,089 109,343 276,868 98,128 320,926 112,904
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
2000 34.6 34.8 34.4 34.9 34.4 34.9
2010 32.3 33.4 30.9 33.7 31.2 33.5
2020 30.3 32.3 27.4 32.8 27.8 32.4
2030 28.1 31.5 23.5 32.0 24.0 31.6
2050a 25.5 30.8 18.4 31.6 18.8 30.9
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
2000 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.5
2010 8.1 7.8 8.1 8.0 8.3
2020 9.7 9.1 10.0 9.6 10.5
2030 12.1 10.8 12.8 11.7 14.0
2050a 14.8 11.5 17.7 13.0 20.2
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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Industrialized regions
Migration Central High High High High Low Low Low Low
Mortality Central High High Low Low High High Low Low
Fertility Central High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
2000 1,207 1,210 1,201 1,213 1,204 1,210 1,201 1,213 1,204
2010 1,255 1,282 1,230 1,301 1,248 1,263 1,211 1,281 1,229
2020 1,292 1,360 1,236 1,408 1,283 1,301 1,178 1,349 1,224
2030 1,329 1,449 1,234 1,537 1,319 1,340 1,130 1,427 1,213
2050a 1,349 1,655 1,181 1,812 1,328 1,387 947 1,542 1,092
Mean age (in years)
1990 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1
2000 37.4 37.3 37.6 37.4 37.6 37.3 37.6 37.4 37.6
2010 39.0 38.0 39.3 38.3 39.7 38.4 39.9 38.8 40.2
2020 40.5 38.0 40.8 38.9 41.8 39.3 42.4 40.3 43.4
2030 41.7 37.6 41.9 39.5 43.8 39.7 44.6 41.5 46.5
2050a 42.6 36.0 42.4 39.1 46.0 39.4 48.1 42.7 51.6
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
2000 0.43 0.61 0.33 0.70 0.42 0.45 0.17 0.54 0.26
2010 0.29 0.60 0.08 0.79 0.28 0.31 -0.24 0.51 -0.03
2020 0.30 0.62 0.02 0.86 0.29 0.30 -0.36 0.56 -0.06
2030 0.21 0.66 -0.12 0.92 0.23 0.23 -0.65 0.54 -0.23
2050a -0.02 0.75 -0.27 0.79 -0.14 0.19 -1.14 0.28 -0.88
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 15,267 15,267 15,267 15,267 15,267 15,267 15,267 15,267 15,267
2000 15,480 16,497 14,493 16,533 14,524 8,477 14,493 16,533 14,519
2010 14,278 17,125 11,510 17,265 11,606 8,735 11,419 17,141 11,552
2020 14,281 18,428 10,407 18,707 10,574 9,274 10,165 18,334 10,494
2030 14,498 20,723 10,095 21,150 10,325 9,768 9,095 19,438 9,660
2050a 13,932 25,256 9,173 25,660 9,346 10,010 6,059 19,878 6,783
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7
2000 20.6 20.9 20.3 20.9 20.3 20.9 20.3 20.9 20.3
2010 19.5 21.8 18.5 21.6 18.3 20.6 17.2 20.5 17.0
2020 18.3 22.7 17.1 22.2 16.6 20.0 13.8 19.5 13.4
2030 18.2 23.6 17.2 22.5 16.3 20.2 13.0 19.3 12.3
2050a 17.7 24.7 17.2 23.0 15.5 20.3 10.7 18.7 9.5
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4
2000 19.1 19.0 19.1 19.1 19.3 19.0 19.1 19.1 19.3
2010 21.3 20.4 21.2 21.2 22.1 20.7 21.6 21.5 22.4
2020 25.0 22.4 24.6 24.4 26.8 23.4 25.9 25.5 28.1
2030 28.0 23.3 27.3 26.7 31.1 25.1 29.8 28.7 33.8
2050a 28.8 19.9 27.8 25.3 34.5 23.7 34.7 29.7 41.9
aValues beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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World total
Migration Central High High
Mortality Central High High
Fertility Central High Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
Low
Low
High
High
Low
High
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
Low
28.1
29.0
30.7
32.7
35.2
40.0
1.77
1.51
1.28
1.02
0.63
0.11
32.3
31.7
28.8
25.7
22.5
17.8
9.2
9.8
10.7
13.1
16.6
22.4
5,291
6,280
7,261
8,208
9,004
9,840
28.1
28.9
29.7
30.5
31.3
31.8
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.72
1.63
32.3
32.2
31.5
30.8
30.4
30.3
9.2
9.7
10.3
12.0
13.9
14.7
5,291
6,324
7,544
9,005
10,736
15,015
28.1
29.0
30.6
32.4
34.7
38.9
9.2
9.7
10.4
12.3
15.0
19.3
32.3
31.7
28.6
25.5
22.2
17.7
1.77
1.39
1.06
0.69
0.16
-0.34
5,291
6,259
7,134
7,868
8,323
8,307
1.77
1.65
1.55
1.44
1.27
1.20
9.2
9.6
10.0
11.2
12.6
12.6
32.3
32.2
31.3
30.5
30.0
29.7
28.1
28.8
29.6
30.3
30.9
31.2
5,291
6,304
7,411
8,630
9,925
12,713
28.1
29.0
30.6
32.6
35.0
39.7
1.77
1.51
1.27
1.00
0.62
0.12
5,291
6,280
7,258
8,195
8,983
9,823
1.77
1.77
1.76
1.75
1.72
1.63
28.1
28.9
29.7
30.4
31.2
31.7
5,291
6,324
7,540
8,989
10,704
14,957
Total population size (in millions)
1990 5,291 5,291 5,291
2000 6,293 6,305 6,261
2010 7,339 7,412 7,136
2020 8,428 8,624 7,866
2030 9,482 9,908 8,319
2050a 11 ,307 12,691 8,323
Mean age (in years)
1990 28.1 28.1 28.1
2000 28.9 28.8 29.0
2010 30.1 29.6 30.5
2020 31.4 30.2 32.3
2030 32.8 30.8 34.5
2050a 34.8 31.0 38.6
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.77 1.77 1.77
2000 1.58 1.65 1.40
2010 1.42 1.54 1.06
2020 1.24 1.43 0.68
2030 0.98 1.27 0.17
2050a 0.71 1.20 -0.32
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 129,996129,996 129,996 129,996 129,996 129,996 129,996 129,996 129,996
2000 151,170 155,750 146,346155,891 146,477 147,696 146,314 155,891 146,472
2010 161,865 176,475 145,628 177,668 146,619 168,585 145,957 178,182 147,102
2020 175,148 203,201 142,329 207,704 145,503 195,872 143,411 209,269 146,831
2030 179,198228,151 123,965240,076130,372 220,563 124,967241,798131,750
2050a 201,956 294,684 103,900 338,749 118,688 286,879 104,187340,804 119,687
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3 32.3
2000 31.9 32.2 31.7 32.2 31.7
2010 30.1 31.4 28.8 31.6 29.0
2020 28.4 30.8 25.8 31.1 26.1
2030 26.7 30.3 22.6 30.7 22.9
2050a 24.6 30.0 18.2 30.5 18.3
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
2000 9.7 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.8
2010 10.3 10.0 10.4 10.3 10.7
2020 12.1 11.2 12.3 11.9 13.1
2030 14.3 12.6 15.0 13.9 16.5
2050a 16.4 12.6 19.1 14.5 22.1
a Values beyond 2030 result from an extension of the scenarios, keeping all rates at their
2030 level.
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Appendix B: Summary Results of Three Long-range
Extension Scenarios to 2100
North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 140 140 140 1990 502 502 502
2010 226 229 222 2010 924 929 916
2030 332 356 307 2030 1,499 1,538 1,419
2050 440 515 364 2050 2,097 2,203 1,825
2070 529 674 392 2070 2,561 2,708 2,066
2100 595 827 379 2100 2,700 2,710 2,011
Mean age (in years)
1990 23.6 23.6 23.6 1990 21.8 21.8 21.8
2010 25.4 24.9 25.9 2010 22.1 21.7 22.5
2030 28.4 26.3 30.9 2030 24.5 23.1 26.4
2050 31.6 27.8 37.0 2050 27.8 25.3 32.0
2070 34.7 30.0 42.4 2070 31.5 28.5 37.0
2100 38.9 34.2 48.3 2100 37.0 34.4 42.6
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.47 2.47 2.47 1990 3.27 3.27 3.27
2010 2.26 2.40 2.10 2010 2.86 2.91 2.77
2030 1.72 2.10 1.27 2030 2.11 2.25 1.75
2050 1.23 1.66 0.70 2050 1.45 1.53 1.06
2070 0.75 1.14 0.19 2070 0.73 0.71 0.38
2100 0.19 0.46 -0.29 2100 -0.10 -0.35 -0.33
A nnual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 4,512 4,512 4,512 1990 20,934 20,934 20,934
2010 6,561 7,133 5,966 2010 34,588 37,316 31,787
2030 7,770 10,095 5,481 2030 45,819 57,274 33,498
2050 8,646 12,863 5,033 2050 52,024 69,684 32,236
2070 8,616 14,187 4,262 2070 48,788 66,498 27,332
2095 8,003 14,009 3,506 2095 39,077 49,757 21,181
2100 7,928 14,081 3,370 2100 37,804 47,550 20,242
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 41.5 41.5 41.5 1990 46.0 46.0 46.0
2010 37.0 38.4 35.5 2010 43.6 44.7 42.4
2030 31.7 36.1 26.5 2030 37.8 41.2 33.2
2050 27.2 33.2 19.8 2050 31.8 36.3 24.8
2070 23.3 29.0 15.9 2070 26.0 29.9 19.7
2100 19.3 23.5 12.9 2100 19.4 21.5 15.3
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 5.6 5.6 5.6 1990 4.6 4.6 4.6
2010 5.7 5.5 6.0 2010 4.1 3.9 4.3
2030 8.4 7.1 10.1 2030 4.8 4.0 5.8
2050 11.8 8.4 17.5 2050 6.9 5.1 10.1
2070 15.6 9.8 27.1 2070 10.3 7.1 17.3
2100 21.5 14.0 37.8 2100 16.6 12.2 26.5
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Central America
North America and Caribbean
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 277 277 277 1990 147 147 147
2010 325 330 321 2010 219 222 215
2030 376 397 356 2030 289 309 270
2050 420 470 378 2050 342 397 295
2070 475 570 404 2070 370 474 288
2100 577 757 453 2100 371 550 245
Mean age (in years)
1990 35.2 35.2 35.2 1990 24.8 24.8 24.8
2010 36.9 36.1 37.7 2010 28.6 28.1 29.0
2030 39.2 36.4 42.2 2030 33.1 31.3 35.3
2050 39.7 35.2 44.8 2050 37.1 33.2 42.3
2070 40.3 35.2 46.5 2070 40.0 34.7 48.1
2100 41.2 35.6 47.8 2100 43.8 37.5 55.2
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.00 1.00 1.00 1990 2.11 2.11 2.11
2010 0.68 0.82 0.53 2010 1.80 1.94 1.65
2030 0.69 0.89 0.48 2030 1.18 1.53 0.82
2050 0.54 0.89 0.26 2050 0.64 1.08 0.23
2070 0.65 0.99 0.37 2070 0.26 0.77 -0.26
2100 0.66 0.91 0.39 2100 -0.13 0.35 -0.72
A nnual number of births (in 1, OOO)
1990 4,234 4,234 4,234 1990 3,986 3,986 3,986
2010 3,757 4,427 3,086 2010 5,151 5,582 4,733
2030 4,520 5,950 3,243 2030 5,252 6,761 3,863
2050 5,109 7,447 3,286 2050 5,192 7,740 3,154
2070 5,819 9,070 3,512 2070 4,842 8,220 2,426
2095 6,895 11,520 3,938 2095 4,226 8,237 1,718
2100 7,114 12,058 4,013 2100 4,114 8,254 1,596
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 21.5 21.5 21.5 1990 37.6 37.6 37.6
2010 22.3 24.0 20.5 2010 30.9 32.1 29.7
2030 21.5 25.1 17.9 2030 25.1 28.6 21.0
2050 21.0 25.5 16.6 2050 21.2 26.4 15.1
2070 20.9 25.2 16.5 2070 18.6 24.1 11.7
2100 20.5 24.7 16.4 2100 15.7 20.9 8.5
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 16.7 16.7 16.7 1990 6.4 6.4 6.4
2010 18.4 17.6 19.1 2010 8.0 7.7 8.2
2030 25.5 22.1 29.2 2030 13.2 11.8 15.0
2050 24.4 18.1 31.9 2050 19.4 15.0 25.8
2070 26.5 18.4 37.1 2070 23.9 16.4 36.6
2100 28.1 19.0 39.3 2100 30.2 19.8 49.7
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South America West and Central Asia
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 294 294 294 1990 197 197 197
2010 407 412 402 2010 312 315 309
2030 516 549 485 2030 442 463 420
2050 604 695 523 2050 553 617 491
2070 667 840 526 2070 632 757 525
2100 727 1,033 495 2100 682 896 513
Mean age (in years)
1990 26.6 26.6 26.6 1990 24.9 24.9 24.9
2010 30.2 29.8 30.7 2010 27.1 26.7 27.5
2030 33.8 32.1 36.1 2030 30.7 29.1 32.8
2050 36.6 33.0 41.4 2050 34.9 31.4 39.7
2070 38.4 33.9 45.7 2070 38.3 33.7 45.7
2100 40.5 35.8 49.8 2100 41.9 36.5 52.1
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.73 1.73 1.73 1990 2.50 2.50 2.50
2010 1.50 1.62 1.37 2010 2.11 2.20 2.01
2030 1.01 1.35 0.70 2030 1.47 1.72 1.18
2050 0.66 1.07 0.25 2050 0.96 1.29 0.63
2070 0.38 0.87 -0.07 2070 0.52 0.87 0.19
2100 0.23 0.59 -0.27 2100 0.10 0.40 -0.21
Annual number 0/ births (in 1,000)
1990 6,821 6,821 6,821 1990 5,924 5,924 5,924
2010 8,564 9,314 7,812 2010 7,988 8,518 7,430
2030 8,909 11,448 6,531 2030 8,516 10,603 6,460
2050 9,327 13,583 5,778 2050 8,840 12,471 5,720
2070 9,446 15,256 5,033 2070 8,548 13,348 4,756
2095 9,389 16,649 4,360 2095 8,057 13,668 3,918
2100 9,395 16,966 4,239 2100 7,981 13,779 3,773
Proportion 0/ population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 34.7 34.7 34.7 1990 38.7 38.7 38.7
2010 28.9 30.1 27.6 2010 34.4 35.3 33.4
2030 24.7 28.1 20.7 2030 28.3 31.5 24.6
2050 22.3 27.1 16.6 2050 23.3 28.0 17.7
2070 20.7 25.6 14.3 2070 20.3 25.0 14.0
2100 19.0 23.2 12.8 2100 17.6 21.9 11.4
Proportion 0/ population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 7.6 7.6 7.6 1990 6.6 6.6 6.6
2010 9.7 9.4 9.9 2010 7.4 7.1 7.7
2030 14.8 13.5 16.7 2030 11.1 9.7 13.0
2050 19.2 15.3 25.1 2050 15.7 12.0 21.7
2070 21.9 15.7 33.3 2070 21.1 14.5 32.8
2100 25.5 18.0 41.3 2100 27.3 18.1 45.1
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South Asia China and Hong Kong
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 1,191 1,191 1,191 1990 1,159 1,159 1,159
2010 1,806 1,815 1,796 2010 1,469 1,491 1,445
2030 2,428 2,501 2,340 2030 1,722 1,853 1,604
2050 2,874 3,097 2,595 2050 1,873 2,220 1,592
2070 3,065 3,468 2,600 2070 1,945 2,618 1,461
2100 2,855 3,440 2,212 2100 1,968 3,132 1,219
Mean age (in years)
1990 25.1 25.1 25.1 1990 28.9 28.9 28.9
2010 27.0 26.7 27.4 2010 33.8 33.2 34.3
2030 30.6 29.0 32.4 2030 37.6 35.2 40.7
2050 34.7 31.6 38.6 2050 39.7 34.6 46.6
2070 38.3 34.2 44.4 2070 41.0 34.5 50.8
2100 42.4 37.8 51.0 2100 43.9 37.0 55.5
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.28 2.28 2.28 1990 1.41 1.41 1.41
2010 1.87 1.92 1.81 2010 0.95 1.09 0.78
2030 1.21 1.40 0.99 2030 0.63 1.02 0.30
2050 0.66 0.89 0.34 2050 0.29 0.84 -0.22
2070 0.13 0.37 -0.18 2070 0.17 0.79 -0.47
2100 -0.43 -0.24 -0.74 2100 -0.02 0.47 -0.63
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 36,132 36,132 36,132 1990 23,188 23,188 23,188
2010 46,542 49,499 43,547 2010 23,007 25,892 20,107
2030 47,298 58,120 36,613 2030 24,653 34,202 16,286
2050 45,225 61,532 29,726 2050 25,334 41,203 13,215
2070 38,971 57,680 22,318 2070 23,852 44,975 10,350
2095 30,944 48,708 15,714 2095 21,379 45,986 7,788
2100 29,701 47,303 14,658 2100 20,978 46,228 7,389
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 37.9 37.9 37.9 1990 27.4 27.4 27.4
2010 34.1 35.0 33.3 2010 23.2 24.7 21.7
2030 27.7 30.7 24.3 2030 21.3 25.5 16.6
2050 22.5 26.8 17.5 2050 19.9 26.1 12.8
2070 18.8 23.1 13.5 2070 18.4 24.8 10.8
2100 15.5 19.1 10.4 2100 16.0 21.4 9.3
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.5 6.5 6.5 1990 8.8 8.8 8.8
2010 7.1 6.8 7.3 2010 12.0 11.7 12.4
2030 10.2 8.9 11.7 2030 20.9 18.5 24.1
2050 14.3 11.1 18.7 2050 24.2 17.8 33.5
2070 19.8 14.0 29.6 2070 25.9 16.4 41.8
2100 26.2 18.4 42.0 2100 30.6 19.1 51.1
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Japan, Australia,
Southeast Asia and New Zealand
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 518 518 518 1990 144 144 144
2010 735 740 728 2010 158 159 156
2030 937 972 895 2030 160 166 154
2050 1,076 1,180 969 2050 158 172 147
2070 1,129 1,334 948 2070 154 180 137
2100 1,082 1,406 810 2100 151 195 123
Mean age (in years)
1990 25.6 25.6 25.6 1990 36.9 36.9 36.9
2010 29.2 28.8 29.7 2010 41.4 40.5 42.3
2030 33.3 31.4 35.6 2030 44.5 41.5 47.6
2050 36.7 32.9 41.9 2050 46.1 40.9 51.6
2070 39.1 34.4 47.2 2070 46.7 40.2 54.3
2100 42.7 37.5 53.8 2100 47.8 40.5 56.2
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.88 1.88 1.88 1990 0.55 0.55 0.55
2010 1.57 1.64 1.47 2010 0.27 0.36 0.16
2030 1.03 1.23 0.77 2030 0.05 0.21 -0.09
2050 0.51 0.81 0.20 2050 -0.11 0.16 -0.30
2070 0.11 0.49 -0.26 2070 -0.10 0.27 -0.33
2100 -0.31 0.00 -0.68 2100 -0.04 0.25 -0.36
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 13,232 13,232 13,232 1990 1,685 1,685 1,685
2010 16,322 17,641 14,936 2010 1,604 1,886 1,321
2030 16,706 20,937 12,455 2030 1,580 2,077 1,136
2050 16,146 22,831 10,272 2050 1,427 2,109 889
2070 14,512 22,680 7,849 2070 1,371 2,235 771
2095 12,152 20,625 5,573 2095 1,331 2,388 685
2100 11,761 20,295 5,199 2100 1,312 2,399 665
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 35.4 35.4 35.4 1990 19.0 19.0 19.0
2010 29.8 30.9 28.6 2010 17.9 19.5 16.2
2030 24.8 28.1 21.0 2030 16.0 19.3 12.8
2050 21.3 26.1 15.6 2050 15.3 19.6 ILl
2070 18.7 23.5 12.3 2070 15.4 20.1 10.8
2100 15.9 19.9 9.3 2100 14.9 19.7 10.5
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.3 6.3 6.3 1990 16.9 16.9 16.9
2010 8.1 7.8 8.4 2010 26.6 25.6 27.5
2030 13.5 11.8 15.7 2030 31.8 27.9 35.9
2050 18.3 13.8 25.3 2050 34.6 26.7 43.5
2070 22.0 15.1 35.2 2070 36.6 25.8 50.0
2100 27.5 18.8 47.2 2100 38.6 26.1 53.3
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Eastern Europe Western Europe
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 345 345 345 1990 377 377 377
2010 368 374 363 2010 404 409 399
2030 380 400 362 2030 416 434 400
2050 385 433 351 2050 416 454 385
2070 392 485 333 2070 415 486 365
2100 427 592 322 2100 426 552 344
Mean age (in years)
1990 34.9 34.9 34.9 1990 37.7 37.7 37.7
2010 38.6 37.7 39.8 2010 40.2 39.5 41.0
2030 41.2 37.8 45.2 2030 43.0 40.2 46.1
2050 41.9 36.4 49.3 2050 44.5 39.5 50.0
2070 41.7 35.4 51.1 2070 44.8 38.7 52.1
2100 41.5 35.3 51.2 2100 45.4 38.6 53.7
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 0.43 0.43 0.43 1990 0.44 0.44 0.44
2010 0.27 0.39 0.12 2010 0.17 0.32 0.09
2030 0.15 0.35 0.00 2030 0.17 0.33 0.00
2050 0.04 0.44 -0.25 2050 -0.07 0.21 -0.27
2070 0.14 0.61 -0.26 2070 0.04 0.41 -0.23
2100 0.35 0.67 -0.04 2100 0.14 0.43 -0.18
A nnual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 4,823 4,823 4,823 1990 4,524 4,524 4,524
2010 4,684 5,650 3,749 2010 3,986 4,695 3,275
2030 4,211 5,860 2,799 2030 4,322 5,632 3,144
2050 4,305 6,715 2,461 2050 4,111 6,012 2,600
2070 4,615 7,825 2,415 2070 4,117 6,560 2,386
20!l5 5,065 9,316 2,495 2095 4,258 7,402 2,278
2100 5,151 9,627 2,510 2100 4,267 7,558 2,244
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 23.1 23.1 23.1 1990 18.5 18.5 18.5
2010 18.8 20.8 16.6 2010 18.6 20.1 17.0
2030 17.9 21.9 13.6 2030 17.2 20.4 13.8
2050 18.5 23.7 12.8 2050 16.4 20.8 12.2
2070 19.2 24.3 13.1 2070 16.7 21.4 12.2
2100 19.5 24.2 14.0 2100 16.7 21.4 12.1
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 15.8 15.8 15.8 1990 19.6 19.6 19.6
2010 19.6 18.8 20.7 2010 23.2 22.5 24.1
2030 25.9 21.6 31.1 2030 30.6 26.9 34.5
2050 28.9 20.5 40.8 2050 31.6 24.0 40.2
2070 28.3 18.0 44.8 2070 33.6 23.5 46.4
2100 28.2 17.9 45.0 2100 34.7 23.2 49.1
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Developing regions Industrialized regions
Migration Central Central Central Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 4,149 4,149 4,149 1990 1,142 1,142 1,142
2010 6,097 6,154 6,033 2010 1,255 1,273 1,238
2030 8,167 8,542 7,739 2030 1,333 1,396 1,272
2050 9,859 10,923 8,653 2050 1,378 1,528 1,261
2070 10,897 12,873 8,806 2070 1,437 1,721 1,240
2100 10,980 13,994 7,885 2100 1,582 2,096 1,241
Mean age (in years)
1990 25.9 25.9 25.9 1990 36.1 36.1 36.1
2010 28.4 28.0 28.8 2010 39.0 38.2 40.0
2030 31.5 29.7 33.7 2030 41.6 38.6 44.9
2050 34.5 31.0 39.3 2050 42.5 37.5 48.4
2070 37.2 32.8 44.2 2070 42.7 36.8 50.2
2100 41.1 36.5 49.8 2100 43.0 36.8 51.1
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 2.08 2.08 2.08 1990 0.59 0.59 0.59
2010 1.74 1.83 1.64 2010 0.34 0.47 0.22
2030 1.24 1.49 0.95 2030 0.29 0.48 0.12
2050 0.78 1.07 0.39 2050 0.14 0.47 -0.11
2070 0.35 0.66 -0.07 2070 0.25 0.64 -0.06
2100 -0.14 0.08 -0.53 2100 0.37 0.65 0.04
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 114,729 114,729 114,729 1990 15,266 15,266 15,266
2010 148,722 160,893 136,318 2010 14,030 16,659 11,430
2030 164,921 209,439 121,184 2030 14,633 19,519 10,322
2050 170,735 241,906 105,134 2050 14,952 22,283 9,236
2070 157,574 242,844 84,326 2070 15,922 25,689 9,084
2095 133,226 217,640 63,758 2095 17,549 30,626 9,397
2100 129,661 214,456 60,464 2100 17,843 31,642 9,432
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 35.6 35.6 35.6 1990 20.7 20.7 20.7
2010 32.1 33.2 30.9 2010 19.5 21.2 17.7
2030 27.8 31.2 23.7 2030 18.5 22.0 14.8
2050 24.1 28.9 18.0 2050 18.3 22.9 13.6
2070 20.8 25.6 14.5 2070 18.6 23.3 13.7
2100 17.2 21.0 11.6 2100 18.7 23.2 14.0
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 6.9 6.9 6.9 1990 17.4 17.4 17.4
2010 8.1 7.8 8.4 2010 21.3 20.5 22.3
2030 12.2 10.8 14.1 2030 28.0 24.1 32.2
2050 15.5 11.9 21.1 2050 29.0 21.5 38.2
2070 19.0 13.2 29.9 2070 30.1 20.5 43.3
2100 24.7 17.2 40.2 2100 30.9 20.5 44.9
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World
Migration Central Central Central
Mortality Central High Low
Fertility Central High Low
Total population size (in millions)
1990 5,291 5,291 5,291
2010 7,352 7,427 7,271
2030 9,499 9,938 9,011
2050 11,238 12,452 9,913
2070 12,334 14,594 10,046
2100 12,562 16,090 9,126
Mean age (in years)
1990 28.1 28.1 28.1
2010 30.2 29.7 30.7
2030 32.9 31.0 35.3
2050 35.5 31.8 40.5
2070 37.8 33.3 45.0
2100 41.3 36.5 50.0
Average annual growth rate (in %)
1990 1.76 1.76 1.76
2010 1.49 1.58 1.38
2030 1.10 1.34 0.83
2050 0.70 1.00 0.32
2070 0.33 0.65 -0.07
2100 -0.08 0.15 -0.45
Annual number of births (in 1,000)
1990 129,995 129,995 129,995
2010 162,752 177,552 147,748
2030 179,554 228,958 131,506
2050 185,687 264,188 114,370
2070 173,496 268,533 93,409
2095 150,775 248,266 73,155
2100 147,504 246,098 69,896
Proportion of population aged 0-14 years (in %)
1990 32.3 32.3 32.3
2010 29.9 31.1 28.7
2030 26.5 29.9 22.4
2050 23.3 28.1 17.4
2070 20.6 25.3 14.4
2100 17.4 21.3 11.9
Proportion of population aged 60 years and over (in %)
1990 9.2 9.2 9.2
2010 10.4 10.0 10.7
2030 14.4 12.7 16.7
2050 17.2 13.1 23.3
2070 20.3 14.0 31.5
2100 25.5 17.6 40.8
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Appendix C: Age Structures of the Central Scenario,
1990-2100, in millions.
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2100
F M F M F M F M F M F M F M
North Africa
0-4 10.6 11.0 12.6 13.3 14.9 15.7 16.6 17.5 17.8 18.9 20.0 21.2 18.5 19.5
5-9 9.6 10.1 11.2 11.8 13.5 14.3 15.5 16.5 17.1 18.1 19.5 20.6 18.6 19.6
10-14 8.3 8.7 10.2 10.7 12.2 12.9 14.5 15.4 16.3 17.3 18.7 19.9 18.6 19.7
15-19 7.1 7.4 9.5 9.9 11.0 11.7 13.4 14.1 15.4 16.3 17.9 19.0 18.3 19.5
20-24 6.3 6.6 8.2 8.5 10.1 10.5 12.1 12.8 14.4 15.2 17.5 18.5 19.0 20.2
25-29 5.4 5.6 6.9 7.2 9.3 9.7 10.9 11.4 13.2 13.9 16.8 17.8 19.4 20.5
30-34 4.8 4.9 6.1 6.4 8.0 8.3 9.9 10.3 11.9 12.5 16.0 16.9 19.6 20.8
35-39 4.0 4.0 5.2 5.4 6.7 7.0 9.0 9.4 10.7 11.2 15.1 15.9 19.6 20.8
40-44 3.0 2.9 4.6 4.7 5.9 6.1 7.7 8.0 9.6 10.0 14.0 14.7 19.6 20.7
45-49 2.4 2.3 3.7 3.7 4.9 5.0 6.4 6.7 8.7 9.0 12.7 13.2 19.3 20.4
50-54 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.6 4.3 4.3 5.5 5.6 7.3 7.5 11.2 11.6 18.8 19.7
55-59 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.0 3.4 3.3 4.5 4.5 6.0 6.0 9.7 9.9 17.9 18.6
60-64 1.5 1.4 1.9 1.6 2.4 2.2 3.8 3.6 4.9 4.8 8.4 8.2 16.6 16.8
65-69 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.5 2.8 2.5 3.8 3.5 7.0 6.7 14.8 14.4
70-74 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.8 1.4 2.8 2.5 5.2 4.6 12.8 12.0
75-79 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.8 1.8 1.4 3.4 2.9 10.0 8.9
80+ 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.3 0.9 3.2 2.4 11.5 9.8
Total 70 71 89 91 111 115 136 141 163 169 216 224 293 302
Sub-Saharan Africa
0-4 46.8 47.3 61.2 63.9 76.9 80.3 92.0 96.0 102.0 106.5 116.5 121.7 85.8 90.0
5-9 37.4 37.6 52.2 54.2 64.3 66.6 79.6 82.4 91.4 94.7 107.7 111.7 84.9 88.5
10-14 30.9 31.0 43.9 44.2 56.5 58.4 71.0 73.4 84.9 87.8 102.4 105.9 85.6 89.0
15-19 26.0 25.9 36.5 36.6 51.0 52.8 62.7 64.9 77.6 80.3 96.1 99.3 85.3 88.6
20-24 21.7 21.5 30.1 30.2 42.8 43.2 55.1 57.1 69.3 71.8 92.2 95.4 91.7 95.2
25-29 18.3 18.0 25.0 25.0 35.4 35.7 49.5 51.4 60.9 63.2 86.9 90.0 96.4 100.1
30-34 15.1 14.8 20.7 20.6 29.1 29.2 41.4 41.8 53.3 55.3 80.4 83.3 99.5 103.1
35-39 12.4 12.1 17.3 17.1 24.1 24.0 34.1 34.2 47.6 49.3 72.8 75.2 100.9 104.3
40-44 10.3 9.9 14.2 13.8 19.8 19.5 27.7 27.6 39.5 39.6 64.2 66.0 100.9 103.7
45-49 8.6 8.2 11.5 11.0 16.3 15.8 22.7 22.2 32.1 31.7 55.5 56.3 98.8 100.4
50-54 7.2 6.6 9.3 8.7 13.1 12.3 18.2 17.3 25.6 24.6 47.1 46.9 94.4 94.2
55-59 5.9 5.3 7.5 6.8 10.2 9.3 14.5 13.3 20.1 18.7 39.9 38.8 86.7 84.5
60-64 4.6 4.1 5.8 5.1 7.7 6.8 10.8 9.6 15.0 13.5 30.3 27.7 75.4 71.2
65-69 3.4 2.9 4.3 3.6 5.5 4.6 7.5 6.4 10.7 9.1 21.2 18.6 60.8 55.1
70-74 2.4 1.9 2.9 2.3 3.6 2.9 4.8 3.9 6.8 5.5 13.4 11.2 46.0 39.7
75-79 1.4 1.0 1.7 1.3 2.1 1.6 2.7 2.1 3.7 2.9 7.4 5.9 29.9 24.7
80+ 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.9 1.5 2.5 2.0 4.9 4.0 24.5 20.6
Total 253 249 345 345 460 464 596 605 743 756 1,039 1,058 1,348 1,353
North America
0-4 9.9 10.4 12.3 12.8 11.6 12.1 12.8 13.4 13.5 14.1 14.9 15.6 19.8 20.8
5-9 9.8 10.3 13.1 13.7 11.7 12.2 12.0 12.5 13.3 13.9 14.4 15.0 19.2 20.2
10-14 9.3 9.8 9.9 10.4 12.2 12.7 11.6 12.1 12.8 13.4 13.9 14.5 18.7 19.7
15-19 9.6 10.1 9.8 10.2 13.1 13.6 11.7 12.2 12.0 12.5 13.6 14.2 18.3 19.2
20-24 10.4 10.7 9.3 9.7 9.9 10.3 12.2 12.7 11.6 12.0 13.4 14.0 17.7 18.5
25-29 11.9 11.9 9.6 10.0 9.7 10.1 13.1 13.5 11.6 12.1 13.3 13.8 17.2 18.0
30-34 12.2 12.1 10.3 10.6 9.2 9.6 9.9 10.2 12.2 12.6 12.8 13.3 16.6 17.3
35-39 11.2 11.0 11.8 11.8 9.5 9.9 9.7 10.0 13.0 13.4 11.9 12.3 16.1 16.7
40-44 10.0 9.7 12.1 11.9 10.3 10.5 9.2 9.5 9.8 10.1 11.5 11.8 15.6 16.2
45-49 7.9 7.6 11.1 10.8 11.7 11.5 9.4 9.7 9.6 9.9 11.6 11.8 15.3 15.8
50-[;4 6.5 6.2 9.8 9.3 11.9 11.5 10.1 10.1 9.1 9.2 12.0 12.2 14.8 15.2
55-59 6.1 5.7 7.6 7.1 10.8 10.1 11.4 11.0 9.3 9.3 12.8 12.8 14.2 14.4
60-64 6.3 5.5 6.2 5.5 9.4 8.5 11.6 10.6 9.9 9.5 9.5 9.4 13.6 13.7
65-69 6.2 5.0 5.7 4.7 7.1 6.1 10.3 9.0 11.0 10.0 9.2 8.8 13.2 12.9
70-74 5.1 3.8 5.5 4.2 5.6 4.3 8.7 7.0 10.9 9.2 8.5 7.8 12.8 12.2
75-79 4.1 2.7 4.8 3.2 4.7 3.2 6.2 4.4 9.2 6.9 8.3 7.0 12.3 11.0
80+ 5.2 2.5 5.9 2.9 7.2 3.7 8.1 4.2 12.6 6.8 21.4 12.5 36.6 23.9
Total 142 135 155 149 166 160 178 172 191 185 213 207 292 286
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1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2100
--
F M F M F M F M F M F M F M
Central America and Caribbean
0-4 9.8 10.2 10.6 11.1 11.5 12.1 11.8 12.4 11.9 12.4 11.8 12.4 9.2 9.7
5-9 9.0 9.4 9.7 10.1 11.1 11.6 11.6 12.1 11.9 12.4 11.9 12.4 9.4 10.0
10-14 8.3 8.6 9.6 9.9 10.5 10.9 11.4 11.9 11.8 12.2 11.8 12.4 9.7 10.2
15-19 8.3 8.5 9.0 9.3 9.7 10.1 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.1 11.7 12.2 9.8 10.4
20-24 7.3 7.4 8.3 8.5 9.6 9.9 10.4 10.9 11.3 11.9 11.8 12.3 10.2 10.8
25·-29 6.2 6.1 8.3 8.4 9.0 9.2 9.6 10.0 11.0 11.5 11.8 12.3 10.5 11.1
30-34 5.0 4.8 7.3 7.2 8.2 8.4 9.6 9.8 10.4 10.8 11.7 12.1 10.9 11.4
35-39 4.1 4.0 6.1 6.0 8.2 8.3 8.9 9.1 9.6 9.9 11.5 12.0 11.1 11.6
40-44 3.4 3.3 4.9 4.7 7.2 7.1 8.2 8.3 9.5 9.7 11.2 11.7 11.3 11.7
45-49 2.8 2.7 4.0 3.8 6.1 5.9 8.1 8.1 8.8 9.0 10.8 11.2 11.4 11.9
50-54 2.3 2.2 3.3 3.1 4.8 4.5 7.0 6.9 8.0 8.0 10.1 10.4 11.5 11.8
55-59 2.0 1.9 2.7 2.5 3.9 3.6 5.8 5.5 7.8 7.7 9.2 9.3 11.5 11.6
60-64 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.9 3.1 2.8 4.5 4.0 6.6 6.2 8.9 8.7 11.3 11.1
65-69 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.5 2.3 2.0 3.5 2.9 5.3 4.6 7.9 7.4 10.9 10.4
70-74 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.7 1.4 2.5 2.0 3.8 3.0 6.7 5.8 10.6 9.6
75-79 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.3 2.6 1.9 5.8 4.5 9.8 8.2
80+ 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.8 1.6 1.1 2.4 1.8 6.6 4.4 18.0 12.1
Total 74 73 91 91 109 109 127 128 144 145 171 171 187 184
South America
0-4 17.3 17.8 18.4 19.3 20.1 21.1 20.5 21.5 21.2 22.1 22.3 23.2 22.5 23.8
5-9 17.2 17.5 17.1 17.8 19.2 20.1 20.2 21.1 20.9 21.6 22.0 22.9 22.4 23.7
10-14 16.0 16.3 17.0 17.4 18.2 18.9 19.8 20.7 20.4 21.3 21.7 22.6 22.4 23.6
15-19 14.5 14.7 17.0 17.3 17.0 17.7 19.1 19.9 20.1 21.0 21.3 22.0 22.2 23.5
20-24 13.6 13.8 15.9 16.1 16.9 17.2 18.1 18.8 19.8 20.6 21.1 21.8 22.4 23.6
25-29 12.8 12.9 14.4 14.4 16.9 17.0 16.9 17.4 19.0 19.7 20.7 21.3 22.4 23.5
30-34 11.0 11.0 13.4 13.4 15.7 15.7 16.8 16.9 18.0 18.5 20.2 20.9 22.4 23.5
35-39 9.5 9.4 12.6 12.5 14.2 14.1 16.7 16.7 16.7 17.1 19.9 20.5 22.2 23.0
40-44 7.7 7.6 10.8 10.6 13.2 13.0 15.5 15.3 16.6 16.6 19.5 20.0 22.1 22.8
45-49 6.1 6.0 9.2 8.9 12.3 12.0 13.9 13.6 16.4 16.2 18.6 19.0 21.9 22.3
50-54 5.3 5.1 7.4 7.1 10.4 10.0 12.8 12.4 15.0 14.7 17.4 17.5 21.6 21.8
55-59 4.5 4.3 5.8 5.5 8.7 8.2 11.7 11.1 13.3 12.7 15.9 15.8 21.1 21.0
60-64 3.9 3.6 4.8 4.4 6.8 6.2 9.7 8.9 11.9 11.1 15.3 14.5 20.5 20.0
65-69 3.1 2.7 3.9 3.4 5.1 4.5 7.7 6.8 10.4 9.4 14.5 13.2 19.5 18.3
70-74 2.2 1.9 3.0 2.6 3.8 3.2 5.5 4.7 8.0 6.8 12.2 10.5 18.4 16.4
75-79 1.6 1.2 2.1 1.6 2.7 2.1 3.7 2.9 5.5 4.5 9.2 7.4 16.4 13.3
80+ 1.3 0.9 2.0 1.4 2.9 2.0 3.9 2.7 4.9 3.9 10.5 8.3 26.1 16.2
Total 147 147 175 174 204 203 232 231 258 258 302 301 367 360
West and Central Asia
0-4 14.3 14.8 16.5 17.3 18.7 19.6 20.3 21.4 20.5 21.4 21.4 22.3 19.3 20.4
5-9 11.9 12.5 15.1 15.8 17.5 18.3 19.6 20.5 20.5 21.4 21.1 22.0 19.5 20.6
10-14 11.1 11.6 14.1 14.4 16.3 17.0 18.5 19.3 20.2 21.1 20.6 21.5 19.6 20.7
15-19 9.8 10.4 11.8 12.4 15.1 15.7 17.5 18.2 19.6 20.4 19.8 20.6 19.7 20.8
20-24 8.7 9.0 11.0 11.5 14.0 14.4 16.2 16.9 18.4 19.2 20.4 21.2 20.1 21.2
25-29 8.0 8.5 9.7 10.3 11.8 12.3 15.0 15.6 17.4 18.1 20.4 21.2 20.4 21.4
30-34 6.6 7.2 8.6 8.9 10.9 11.4 14.0 14.2 16.2 16.8 20.1 21.0 20.6 21.6
35-39 5.3 5.9 7.9 8.4 9.6 10.2 11.7 12.1 14.9 15.5 19.4 20.3 20.6 21.6
40-44 4.0 4.3 6.5 7.1 8.5 8.8 10.8 11.2 13.8 14.1 18.2 19.0 20.7 21.6
45-49 3.5 3.6 5.2 5.7 7.8 8.1 9.5 9.9 11.5 11.9 17.1 17.8 20.8 21.5
50-54 3.4 3.4 3.8 4.1 6.4 6.7 8.3 8.4 10.6 10.9 15.7 16.2 20.8 21.2
55-59 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.3 5.0 5.3 7.5 7.6 9.1 9.3 14.2 14.5 20.4 20.5
60-64 2.6 2.3 3.1 2.9 3.6 3.6 5.9 6.0 7.8 7.6 12.8 12.5 19.5 19.3
65-69 1.7 1.3 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.7 4.4 4.3 6.7 6.4 10.3 9.7 18.3 17.5
70-74 1.2 0.8 2.0 1.6 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.6 5.0 4.5 8.7 7.8 18.0 16.5
75-79 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.8 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.6 3.2 2.8 6.6 5.4 16.5 14.1
80+ 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.6 1.6 1.1 2.4 1.7 2.9 2.3 7.4 5.7 27.3 19.4
Total 97 100 124 127 154 159 187 192 218 224 274 279 342 340
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1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2100
F M F M F M F M F M F M F M
South Asia
0-4 81.386.097.8103.7106.4 112.8 111.4 118.3 109.2 115.9 104.9 111.5 69.4 73.8
5-9 73.6 78.4 88.1 93.8 98.9 105.4 106.4 113.3 109.0 116.1 104.4 111.2 71.5 76.2
10-1463.968.5 77.1 82.0 93.5 99.6 102.4 109.6 107.9 115.0 104.0 110.9 73.9 78.8
15-1959.764.6 72.4 77.3 87.0 92.6 97.8 104.3 105.4 112.3 101.9 108.6 76.0 81.0
20-2452.958.063.0 67.7 76.2 81.1 92.5 98.6101.5108.7105.7112.6 80.9 86.2
25-2945.649.4 58.6 63.6 71.4 76.2 85.9 91.6 96.8 103.3 107.3 114.4 84.7 90.2
30-3439.4 42.5 51.8 57.0 61.8 66.6 75.0 80.0 91.4 97.5 106.2 113.2 88.4 94.2
35-3933.1 36.044.5 48.2 57.3 62.3 70.0 74.9 84.5 90.2 103.2110.1 91.3 97.2
40-4427.1 28.738.2 41.1 50.3 55.3 60.4 64.9 73.5 78.2 98.8105.7 94.3100.4
45-4923.324.331.7 34.3 42.8 46.1 55.4 59.9 68.0 72.3 93.2 99.0 96.5 102.6
50-5420.521.1 25.5 26.6 36.1 38.4 47.9 51.9 57.7 61.3 86.4 91.2 97.9103.5
55-59 17.4 18.1 21.1 21.5 29.1 30.9 39.5 41.7 51.6 54.6 77.4 80.7 96.1 100.7
60-64 14.2 14.6 17.5 17.4 22.1 22.3 31.7 32.5 42.4 44.6 63.5 65.1 91.2 94.2
65-69 10.4 10.7 13.5 13.5 16.7 16.3 23.4 23.8 32.3 32.7 53.3 53.4 81.8 82.7
70-74 7.3 7.3 9.6 9.3 12.1 11.4 15.6 14.9 22.9 22.4 38.6 37.9 73.1 72.2
75-79 4.2 4.2 5.6 5.6 7.6 7.2 9.7 9.0 14.0 13.5 26.8 25.9 58.3 56.1
80+ 2.5 2.5 4.2 4.4 6.0 6.0 8.1 7.9 11.0 10.7 23.7 23.7 70.3 69.2
Total 576 615 720 767 875 9311,0331,0971,1791,2491,3991,4751,3961,459
China and Hong Kong
0-4 56.2 59.9 58.2 61.4 54.3 57.4 60.2 63.0 59.1 62.3 60.7 64.2 50.3 53.2
5-9 50.1 53.6 58.7 61.8 54.0 56.9 57.6 60.1 60.2 62.9 60.8 64.3 51.2 54.2
10-1447.150.255.7 59.2 57.6 60.6 54.0 56.8 60.0 62.5 60.0 63.4 51.9 54.9
15-1960.564.249.9 53.3 58.6 61.5 53.8 56.7 57.5 59.9 59.2 62.6 52.6 55.6
20-24 62.5 66.6 46.9 49.8 55.6 59.0 57.4 60.4 53.8 56.6 58.8 61.9 54.4 57.4
25-2951.855.860.1 63.5 49.7 53.0 58.3 61.3 53.6 56.4 59.9 62.4 56.1 59.1
30-3441.344.662.0 65.8 46.7 49.5 55.3 58.7 57.1 60.1 59.6 61.8 56.9 59.9
35-3942.845.5 51.3 55.1 59.8 63.0 49.4 52.7 57.9 60.9 57.0 59.0 57.6 60.5
40-4430.933.940.7 43.8 61.5 65.0 46.2 49.0 54.7 58.1 53.2 55.6 58.0 60.8
45-49 23.6 26.6 42.0 44.3 50.6 54.0 58.7 62.0 48.6 51.8 52.7 55.1 58.7 61.5
50-5421.924.729.9 32.4 39.9 42.2 59.9 63.1 45.1 47.6 55.6 57.9 59.4 61.8
55-59 20.4 22.5 22.4 24.6 40.4 41.6 48.5 51.1 56.6 59.0 55.6 57.3 58.9 60.9
60-64 17.0 18.1 20.1 21.7 27.9 29.0 37.2 38.4 56.6 58.0 51.4 52.8 57.3 58.4
65-69 13.9 13.5 17.6 18.2 19.8 20.5 36.1 35.3 44.3 44.4 44.0 44.5 55.3 55.2
70-74 10.3 8.9 13.3 13.0 16.3 16.2 23.1 22.3 31.9 30.4 38.3 37.4 52.8 51.0
75-79 6.8 5.2 9.3 8.1 12.5 11.6 14.2 13.5 27.4 24.2 42.6 39.5 49.9 45.6
80+ 5.2 2.9 8.2 6.1 12.6 10.6 15.3 15.1 22.0 20.1 57.1 46.5 95.6 81.7
Total 563 597 646 682 718 752 785 819 847 875 927 946 977 991
Southeast Asia
0-4 31.833.1 35.1 36.9 37.1 39.0 37.9 39.9 38.2 40.3 37.0 39.1 27.1 28.6
5-9 30.1 31.2 32.4 34.1 35.6 37.3 36.9 38.7 37.6 39.5 37.3 39.2 27.9 29.3
10-1428.1 29.1 31.1 32.2 34.3 35.8 36.4 38.1 37.3 39.1 37.4 39.3 28.7 30.0
15-1928.028.829.8 30.9 32.2 33.8 35.5 37.0 36.7 38.4 37.3 39.2 29.3 30.6
20-24 25.6 26.1 27.8 28.8 30.9 32.0 34.1 35.5 36.3 37.9 37.7 39.5 30.9 32.1
25-2922.5 22.4 27.7 28.4 29.6 30.5 32.0 33.5 35.3 36.7 37.4 39.1 32.0 33.3
30-34 19.9 19.4 25.2 25.6 27.6 28.4 30.6 31.6 33.9 35.2 37.1 38.7 33.2 34.5
35-39 15.6 15.2 22.1 21.9 27.3 27.9 29.3 30.1 31.8 33.1 36.4 37.9 34.0 35.4
40-4412.111.819.4 18.8 24.8 25.0 27.2 27.8 30.3 31.1 35.8 37.1 34.9 36.3
45-4910.4 9.9 15.1 14.5 21.5 21.1 26.8 27.0 28.8 29.3 34.6 35.6 35.4 37.0
50-54 9.5 8.9 11.5 10.9 18.7 17.7 24.0 23.7 26.5 26.6 32.9 33.4 35.4 36.9
55-59 8.1 7.4 9.7 8.8 14.2 13.2 20.4 19.3 25.5 25.0 30.1 30.2 35.1 36.3
60-64 6.4 5.6 8.4 7.4 10.3 9.3 17.0 15.3 22.1 20.8 27.6 26.6 34.1 34.5
65-69 4.7 3.9 6.7 5.6 8.1 6.8 12.1 10.4 17.7 15.6 24.5 22.6 32.3 31.6
70-74 3.2 2.5 4.6 3.6 6.3 5.0 7.9 6.5 13.4 10.9 20.0 17.4 29.9 27.5
75-79 2.1 1.5 2.9 2.1 4.2 3.1 5.3 4.0 8.2 6.2 15.9 12.9 25.2 21.4
80+ 1.6 0.9 2.3 1.6 3.5 2.5 5.1 3.7 6.9 5.0 17.0 12.5 34.5 26.7
Total 260 258 312 312 366 368 419 422 467 471 536 540 540 542
Appendix C 477
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2100
---
F M F M F M F M F M F M F M
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
0-4 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.5 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.8
5-9 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.4 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.8
10-14 4.9 5.1 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.2 3.7 3.9
15-19 5.7 6.0 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.4 3.8 3.9
20-24 5.2 5.4 4.9 5.1 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.5 3.7 3.9
25-29 4.9 5.0 5.7 6.0 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.2 4.4 3.7 3.9
30-34 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.4 4.9 5.1 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.9 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.9
35-39 5.3 5.3 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.9 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.0 4.2 3.8 4.0
40-44 6.0 6.1 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.3 4.8 5.0 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.5 3.9 4.1
45-49 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.9 5.6 5.8 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 3.9 4.1
50-54 4.6 4.5 5.9 5.9 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.8 3.9 4.0
55-59 4.4 4.2 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.7 5.6 5.7 4.5 4.6 3.8 4.0
60-64 3.9 3.7 4.4 4.1 5.8 5.5 4.5 4.3 5.0 5.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.0
65-69 3.3 2.6 4.1 3.7 4.8 4.4 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.1
70-74 2.6 1.8 3.5 3.0 4.1 3.5 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.9 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.0
75-79 2.1 1.3 2.7 1.8 3.6 2.8 4.2 3.4 4.5 3.7 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.7
80+ 2.0 1.1 3.2 1.7 4.8 2.8 6.7 4.1 9.6 6.3 11.9 8.1 15.6 11.0
Total 73 71 77 75 80 78 81 78 81 79 80 78 77 74
Eastern Europe
0-4 13.2 13.8 11.1 11.5 11.4 11.8 11.1 11.5 11.2 11.6 11.7 12.2 13.7 14.4
5-9 13.0 13.5 11.2 11.6 11.6 11.9 11.4 11.7 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.1 13.5 14.2
10-14 12.8 13.3 13.1 13.4 11.0 11.3 11.4 11.7 11.0 11.3 11.5 12.0 13.3 14.0
15-19 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.4 11.2 11.5 11.6 11.8 11.4 11.7 11.5 11.9 13.1 13.8
20-24 11.6 12.0 12.8 13.2 13.0 13.4 11.0 11.2 11.4 11.6 11.2 11.5 12.8 13.4
25-29 13.3 13.7 12.0 12.5 12.9 13.4 11.2 11.4 11.6 11.8 11.1 11.4 12.6 13.1
30-34 14.1 14.3 11.6 11.9 12.7 13.1 13.0 13.3 11.0 11.2 11.0 11.2 12.4 12.9
35-39 13.4 13.4 13.2 13.5 11.9 12.4 12.9 13.2 11.1 11.4 11.3 11.5 12.2 12.7
40-44 10.0 9.7 14.0 14.0 11.4 11.7 12.6 13.0 12.9 13.2 11.3 11.4 12.0 12.4
45-49 9.9 9.1 13.2 13.0 13.0 13.2 11.7 12.1 12.7 13.0 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.1
50-54 11.4 10.2 9.7 9.3 13.6 13.4 11.2 11.3 12.4 12.6 10.8 10.7 11.5 11.7
55-59 10.7 8.9 9.5 8.4 12.7 12.1 12.6 12.3 11.4 11.5 10.8 10.6 11.3 11.4
60-64 11.2 7.8 10.7 8.8 9.2 8.2 13.0 12.0 10.8 10.3 12.4 11.8 11.2 10.9
65-69 8.0 4.5 9.5 7.1 8.6 6.8 11.8 10.0 11.9 10.5 12.0 10.9 11.0 10.3
70-74 5.5 2.6 9.1 5.5 9.1 6.4 8.0 6.1 11.7 9.2 11.3 9.4 10.4 9.2
75-79 5.7 2.5 5.6 2.6 7.1 4.3 6.8 4.3 9.8 6.7 9.7 7.0 9.9 8.0
80+ 5.0 1.8 6.0 2.3 8.4 3.9 10.8 5.5 11.5 6.1 18.2 8.8 26.6 13.0
Total 181 164 185 172 189 179 192 183 195 185 199 186 219 208
Western Europe
0-4 10.9 11.5 13.3 13.7 11.5 12.1 11.3 11.9 11.7 12.3 11.2 11.8 11.6 12.2
5-9 11.3 11.9 13.6 14.1 12.0 12.5 10.9 11.4 11.8 12.4 11.0 11.6 11.6 12.2
10-14 11.8 12.4 10.9 11.4 13.2 13.7 11.5 12.1 11.3 11.9 11.1 11.6 11.6 12.2
15-19 13.2 13.8 11.2 11.8 13.6 14.1 12.0 12.5 10.9 11.4 11.3 11.9 11.6 12.2
20-24 14.8 15.4 11.7 12.3 10.8 11.4 13.2 13.6 11.5 12.0 11.7 12.3 11.5 12.0
25-29 15.0 15.5 13.1 13.7 11.2 11.8 13.5 14.0 12.0 12.4 11.8 12.3 11.3 11.8
30-34 13.8 14.0 14.8 15.3 11.7 12.3 10.8 11.3 13.2 13.5 11.3 11.8 11.2 11.7
35-39 13.0 13.2 14.9 15.4 13.0 13.6 11.2 11.6 13.5 13.8 10.8 11.3 11.3 11.8
40-44 12.6 12.7 13.6 13.9 14.7 15.2 11.6 12.1 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.8 11.3 11.8
45-49 11.5 11.5 12.9 13.0 14.8 15.1 12.9 13.4 11.1 11.5 11.9 12.2 11.3 11.7
50-54 11.3 11.1 12.3 12.3 13.4 13.5 14.5 14.7 11.5 11.8 13.0 13.1 11.1 11.5
55-59 10.7 10.1 11.1 10.9 12.6 12.4 14.5 14.4 12.7 12.9 13.2 13.2 10.9 11.1
60-64 10.5 9.2 10.7 10.0 11.8 11.4 13.0 12.6 14.1 13.9 10.5 10.4 10.8 11.0
65-69 10.1 7.7 9.9 8.6 10.5 9.5 12.0 11.1 14.0 13.2 10.6 10.3 11.0 10.9
70-74 7.1 4.9 9.2 7.1 9.7 8.0 11.0 9.6 12.3 10.9 10.8 10.1 11.2 10.8
75-79 7.4 4.4 8.0 5.1 8.2 5.9 9.1 7.0 10.8 8.7 11.4 9.8 10.9 10.0
80+ 8.8 4.0 9.6 4.8 12.4 6.5 14.6 7.8 18.6 10.6 28.9 18.4 36.9 24.5
Total 194 184 201 193 205 199 208 201 212 204 212 204 217 209
478 Appendix C
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2100
--
F M F M F M F M F M F M F M
Developing regions
0-4 268.1 280.2 310.3 326.9 339.7 358.0 370.7 390.0 379.9 399.8 394.6 415.6 302.1 319.0
5-9 238.9 250.2 284.6 299.4 314.1 330.4 347.4 364.8 368.6 386.7 384.7 404.4 305.5 322.1
10-14 213.6 223.9 258.7 270.1 298.9 314.2 328.0 345.2 358.8 376.3 376.8 395.7 310.3 326.9
15-19 213.8 224.6 236.0 246.9 281.4 295.8 310.8 326.6 344.0 360.8 365.2 383.5 313.4 330.1
20-24 198.6 209.0 211.0 221.0 256.1 267.3 296.0 311.0 324.9 341.8 365.1 383.1 329.5 346.7
25-29 170.6 178.8 210.7 220.9 233.0 243.7 278.1 292.2 307.2 322.8 361.3 378.6 341.8 359.3
30-34 143.2 149.4 195.2 204.9 208.0 217.5 252.6 263.4 292.1 306.7 351.2 367.8 351.5 369.0
35-39 126.9 132.2 167.0 174.5 207.3 216.8 229.2 239.3 273.7 287.2 335.2 350.8 357.3 374.4
40-44 98.5 102.5 139.4 144.6 191.2 199.8 203.7 212.2 247.6 257.4 314.9 329.7 361.8 378.0
45-49 80.8 83.5 122.5 126.3 162.4 168.0 201.6 209.4 223.1 231.2 295.1 307.2 362.9 377.5
50-54 72.3 74.0 93.5 95.5 133.6 136.1 183.7 189.3 195.8 201.2 276.5 285.2 359.7 370.9
55-59 63.1 64.0 74.6 74.8 114.8 115.2 152.4 154.1 190.0 193.0 252.1 256.5 347.7 354.1
60-64 51.8 51.0 63.7 62.5 83.9 82.1 120.6 118.3 167.5 166.6 218.2 216.1 325.8 325.4
65-69 39.5 37.3 51.7 49.3 62.2 58.8 97.5 92.5 131.2 125.7 182.7 176.1 293.6 285.2
70-74 28.3 24.9 37.8 34.3 47.7 43.3 64.2 58.3 94.5 86.0 143.1 132.6 261.6 244.9
75-79 18.3 14.8 24.1 20.6 32.8 28.6 40.3 35.1 66.3 57.5 117.7 104.4 216.1 192.5
80+ 13.3 9.0 20.4 15.9 29.9 24.7 39.3 34.4 53.9 46.6 130.3 107.5 307.9 255.6
Total 2,039 2,109 2,501 2,589 2,997 3,100 3,516 3,636 4,019 4,148 4,865 4,995 5,449 5,532
Industrialized regions
0-4 38.1 39.9 41.4 43.0 38.9 40.6 39.3 41.0 40.7 42.5 41.7 43.7 48.8 51.2
5-9 38.4 40.3 42.5 44.1 40.0 41.4 38.3 39.9 40.5 42.2 40.8 42.8 48.0 50.4
10-14 38.8 40.6 37.9 39.5 41.3 42.6 38.8 40.3 39.2 40.9 40.4 42.3 47.4 49.7
15-19 40.5 42.5 38.4 40.1 42.4 44.0 40.0 41.3 38.3 39.8 40.5 42.3 46.8 49.1
20-24 42.0 43.6 38.7 40.4 37.8 39.3 41.2 42.4 38.7 40.2 40.6 42.3 45.8 47.9
25-29 45.1 46.1 40.3 42.2 38.2 39.8 42.3 43.7 39.9 41.1 40.4 41.9 44.8 46.8
30-34 44.8 45.2 41.8 43.2 38.5 40.0 37.7 39.0 41.1 42.1 39.1 40.5 44.0 45.9
35-39 43.0 43.0 44.8 45.6 40.1 41.8 38.1 39.4 42.2 43.3 38.1 39.3 43.4 45.2
40-44 38.6 38.3 44.4 44.5 41.5 42.6 38.3 39.6 37.5 38.6 38.5 39.6 42.8 44.5
45-49 34.4 33.4 42.4 41.9 44.3 44.7 39.8 41.0 37.8 38.8 39.6 40.3 42.2 43.7
50-54 33.8 31.9 37.8 36.8 43.6 42.9 40.9 41.3 37.8 38.6 40.5 40.8 41.3 42.4
55-59 31.8 28.9 33.2 31.2 41.2 39.5 43.3 42.4 39.0 39.3 41.3 41.2 40.2 40.9
60-64 32.0 26.3 32.0 28.5 36.1 33.6 42.0 39.5 39.7 38.6 36.3 35.6 39.5 39.5
65-69 27.6 19.8 29.1 24.1 31.0 26.8 39.0 34.7 41.5 38.1 36.0 34.2 39.2 38.2
70-74 20.2 13.1 27.4 19.7 28.4 22.2 33.1 27.4 39.2 33.2 35.1 31.5 38.5 36.2
75-79 19.2 10.9 21.2 12.7 23.5 16.2 26.4 19.2 34.2 26.0 34.4 28.4 36.9 32.7
80+ 21.0 9.3 24.6 11.7 32.9 16.9 40.2 21.7 52.2 29.7 80.3 47.8 115.8 72.4
Total 589 553 618 589 640 615 658 634 679 653 704 675 805 777
World total
0-4 306.2 320.1 351. 7 369.9 378.6 398.5 410.0 431.0 420.6 442.4 436.3 459.3 350.8 370.2
5-9 277.3 290.5 327.1 343.6 354.1 371.9 385.7 404.7 409.1 429.0 425.5 447.2 353.5 372.6
10-14 252.4 264.5 296.6 309.6 340.2 356.8 366.8 385.5 398.0 417.2 417.2 438.0 357.7 376.7
15-19 254.3 267.1 274.3 287.0 323.9 339.8 350.8 368.0 382.2 400.6 405.7 425.8 360.2 379.2
20-24 240.6 252.6 249.7 261.4 293.9 306.5 337.2 353.4 363.6 382.0 405.6 425.4 375.2 394.6
25-29 215.7 224.9 251.0 263.1 271.3 283.5 320.4 335.9 347.1 363.9 401. 7 420.5 386.6 406.1
30-34 188.0 194.6 236.9 248.1 246.5 257.6 290.2 302.4 333.2 348.8 390.3 408.3 395.5 414.9
35-39 169.8 175.2 211.8 220.1 247.4 258.6 267.2 278.7 315.9 330.5 373.3 390.1 400.7 419.5
40-44 137.1 140.8 183.8 189.1 232.7 242.4 241.9 251.8 285.0 295.9 353.4 369.3 404.6 422.5
45-49 115.2 116.9 164.9 168.2 206.7 212.7 241.4 250.4 260.8 270.1 334.7 347.5 405.1 421.1
50-54 106.1 106.0 131.3 132.4 177.2 179.1 224.6 230.7 233.6 239.8 317.0 326.0 400.9 413.3
55-59 95.0 92.9 107.8 106.1 155.9 154.8 195.7 196.5 229.0 232.3 293.4 297.8 387.9 394.9
60-64 83.8 77.2 95.7 91.0 120.0 115.7 162.6 157.8 207.2 205.2 254.5 251. 7 365.4 364.9
65-69 67.1 57.1 80.8 73.4 93.2 85.7 136.5 127.2 172.7 163.8 218.7 210.2 332.8 323.4
70-74 48.5 38.0 65.2 54.0 76.0 65.6 97.3 85.8 133.7 119.2 178.3 164.1 300.1 281.1
75-79 37.4 25.7 45.3 33.3 56.3 44.8 66.6 54.3 100.5 83.5 152.1 132.8 253.1 225.2
80+ 34.3 18.3 45.0 27.6 62.8 41.6 79.5 56.1 106.1 76.3 210.6 155.3 423.7 328.0
Total 2,629 2,662 3,119 3,178 3,637 3,715 4,174 4,270 4,698 4,801 5,568 5,669 6,254 6,308
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